Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff wife of decedent and executor of the estate of the decedent, brought suit under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA). The district court granted summary judgment to the government, dismissing the suit with prejudice.   On appeal, Plaintiffs argued that the district court (1) erred in denying their motion for voluntary dismissal and (2) erred in granting summary judgment to the government. The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that because Plaintiffs moved for voluntary dismissal after the government filed its answer, the action could be dismissed only by court order, on terms the court considers proper. Here, the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Plaintiffs’ motion for voluntary dismissal without prejudice.   Plaintiffs argued that their filing of unverified medical records with the complaint substantially complied with the requirement to file an expert witness affidavit on the question of the standard of care within the prescribed deadline. However, the court explained it is undisputed that Plaintiffs failed to serve the government with a certificate of merit within 60 days of the government filing its answer.” Thus, the district court did not err in granting summary judgment to the government and in dismissing Plaintiffs’ complaint with prejudice. View "Robert Morrow v. United States" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, independent contractors of American Family Life Insurance Company of Columbus (Aflac), alleged that an Aflac employee, sexually assaulted Plaintiff in her hotel room during a work conference in St. Louis, Missouri. Plaintiffs filed suit against Defendant, asserting tort claims for battery, assault, false imprisonment, and loss of consortium, among others. the beneficiary under Plaintiffs’ Arbitration Agreements with Aflac. The district court denied the motion as to the aforementioned claims, holding that they did not arise under or relate in any way to the arbitration agreements. Defendant appealed, arguing that the claims fall within the scope of the arbitration agreements.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court held that Plaintiffs’ tort claims do not fall within the scope of the Arbitration Agreements. The facts underlying Plaintiffs’ tort claims do not touch matters covered by Plaintiffs’ Arbitration Agreements in light of the Agreements’ limiting language requiring the “dispute arise under or relate in any way to the Associate’s Agreements. As a result, the district court did not err in denying Defendant’s motion to compel arbitration. View "Katherine Anderson v. Jeffrey Hansen" on Justia Law

Jana Mortensen sought treatment from Dr. Jeffrey Baker at The Healing Sanctuary, LLC, after a hysterectomy failed to resolve symptoms for ongoing pelvic pain. Mortensen alleged Dr. Baker prescribed Mortensen a 14-day course of “ozone treatment” to be self-administered intravaginally at home. Mortensen allegedly breathed in ozone gas while administering the treatment, which she alleged caused her permanent pulmonary and cardiac injuries. Mortensen filed a complaint against Dr. Baker and The Healing Sanctuary (collectively “Dr. Baker”), claiming medical malpractice. Dr. Baker moved for summary judgment, arguing that Mortensen could not prove causation. The district court conditionally granted Dr. Baker’s motion for summary judgment after finding Mortensen had not raised a genuine issue of material fact; however, the court gave Mortensen a specified time to secure expert testimony on causation. Mortensen did not comply with the deadline. The district court entered summary judgment, denying Mortensen’s second request for additional time. The district court also denied her motion to reconsider. Mortensen appealed. The Idaho Supreme Court reversed, finding the district court erred in excluding certain statements. As a result, Dr. Baker was not entitled to summary judgment because the excluded testimony created a genuine issue of material fact. View "Mortensen v. Baker" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeal reversing the judgment of the trial court ruling that the exception to landowners' negation of their statutory duty of care to keep their property safe for others who may enter or use it for recreational purposes does not apply when the landowners' live-at-home child invites someone onto the property without the owners' knowledge or permission, holding that the court of appeals erred.The trial court ruled that the exception did not apply in this case because the landowners had not issued the invitation. The court of appeals reversed, holding that the exception to the landowners' statutory negation of duty when a landowner expressly invites someone onto the property applied unless the child had been prohibited to make the invitation. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) a plaintiff may rely on the exception and impose liability if there is a showing that a landowner extended an express invitation to come onto the property; and (2) the plaintiff in this case did not meet her burden. View "Hoffmann v. Young" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a sheriff’s department employee, had an affair with the wife of a county administrator. The mistress allegedly conducted a smear campaign against Plaintiff’s wife and, when the affair ended, against Plaintiff as well. The sheriff’s department fired Plaintiff and a local prosecutor declined to prosecute the mistress for harassment. Suspecting the county administrator had a hand in both actions, Plaintiffs sued the mistress, the county administrator, and a host of other county officials for violating state and federal law. The district court entered a summary judgment in favor of the officials and certified that judgment as final even though claims against the mistress remained pending.   The Eleventh Circuit dismissed the appeal, finding that the district court abused its discretion when it determined that the summary judgment warranted certification under Rule 54(b). The determination in this case that there was no just reason for delay rested on a single factual finding—that “[t]his litigation could potentially remain pending for quite a lengthy time due to the COVID-19 pandemic.” The court wrote that there is no indication that the delays here would cause anything other than inconvenience. Indeed, if pandemic-related delays alone justified an immediate appeal, Rule 54(b) certifications” would cease to “be reserved for the unusual case. View "Chase Peden, et al v. Glenn Stephens, et al" on Justia Law

Ethicon manufactures a mesh sling, used to treat stress urinary incontinence, and a posterior mesh “Prolift, “designed to treat pelvic organ prolapse. In 2009, Dr. Guiler surgically implanted both devices to treat Thacker. Before the surgery, Thacker reviewed and signed an informed consent form that listed several risks, including: “infections and/or erosions of the mesh” which could require additional follow-up surgeries, urinary retention, “[p]ainful intercourse and vaginal shortening,” and treatment failure. After the surgery, Thacker’s incontinence worsened, and she suffered from shooting pain in her groin area and severe abdominal swelling and bloating. In 2010, Thacker started experiencing severe and unbearable pain during intercourse.Thacker ultimately sued Ethicon, alleging strict liability and negligence claims under the Kentucky Product Liability Act for design defect and failure to warn. The district court granted Ethicon summary judgment. The Sixth Circuit reversed. Dr. Guiler’s testimony suggested that he likely would have recommended a different course of treatment had Ethicon given adequate information. Thacker’s expert testified that no reasonable physician would have used the Pelvic Mesh Devices to treat Thacker had Ethicon given adequate information in 2009. A jury could accept that expert’s opinion that a feasible alternative design would have prevented Thacker’s injuries. View "Thacker v. Ethicon, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff was severely injured in a crash while he was driving a Peterbilt semi-truck. He sued the truck’s manufacturer, PACCAR, Inc. (PACCAR), alleging that the truck’s defective design caused his injuries. A jury returned a verdict in PACCAR’s favor. His estate appeals, arguing that the district court committed several evidentiary errors at trial.The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court held, 1.) Plaintiff's expert's second report was untimely under the discovery orders in the case, and the district court did not abuse its discretion by excluding it; 2.) the district court did not abuse its discretion by concluding that plaintiff had failed to show the good cause required under Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b)(4) to modify the scheduling order after the court declared a mistrial; 3.) Plaintiff failed to preserve his challenge to Defendant's "state-of-the-art" defense.Applying plain error review to Plaintiff's challenge to Defendant's "state-of-the-art" defense, the court held the district court did not plainly err in admitting the testimony as the witnesses were testifying based on their extensive industry experience, and noted that Iowa law permits industry custom as evidence of the state of the art. View "Elizabeth Zick v. Paccar, Inc." on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit certified the following three questions to the Georgia Supreme Court regarding Georgia’s fiduciary duty to disclose.(1) If a confidential relationship creates a duty to disclose which, if breached, would constitute fraud sufficient to toll the statute of limitations, would that duty to disclose also support a breach of fiduciary duty tort claim under Georgia law?(2) If so, may an adult fiduciary in a confidential relationship with a minor beneficiary without a written agreement discharge his duty to disclose by disclosing solely to the minor’s parents or guardians?(3) If the adult fiduciary does have an obligation to disclose to the minor beneficiary directly without a written agreement, when must the adult fiduciary disclose or redisclose to the minor beneficiary? View "Elkin King v. Forrest King, Jr." on Justia Law

Appellants lost over $850,000 when an alleged BB&T employee and a co-conspirator impersonated them, changed their passwords, and transferred the money out of their BB&T bank accounts. Appellants sued BB&T under contract and tort theories. The district court dismissed the tort claims as duplicative of the contract claim, concluding that Appellants’ demand was time-barred because BB&T’s standard bank account contract limited the time to assert a demand from the statutory one-year period to just 30 days. In the alternative, the district court entered summary judgment for BB&T because it concluded the bank had and had followed commercially reasonable security procedures.The Eleventh Circuit vacated (1) the district court’s order dismissing the complaint and (2) the district court’s order entering summary judgment for BB&T on the remaining counts in the Fourth Amended Complaint, finding, as a matter of law, that Appellants’ claim for statutory repayment is not time-barred. View "Jesus Alonso Alvarez Rodriguez, et al v. Branch Banking & Trust Company, et al" on Justia Law

In July 2017, Jeremy Thornhill said that he had injured his back while working. He sought workers’ compensation benefits from his employer, Walker-Hill and its insurance carrier, Zurich American Insurance Company of Illinois (collectively, Employer/Carrier), but the Employer/Carrier denied that Thornhill had sustained a compensable injury. Ultimately, the parties agreed to compromise and settled pursuant to Mississippi Code Section 71-3-29 (Rev. 2021). Thornhill submitted the settlement to the Mississippi Workers’ Compensation Commission for approval. After examining the application, the Commission approved the settlement and dismissed Thornhill’s case with prejudice. Pursuant to the settlement, Thornhill signed a general release,” which reserved his right to pursue a bad faith claim. Believing he had exhausted his administrative remedies, Thornhill filed a bad faith suit against the Employer/Carrier. The Employer/Carrier moved to dismiss, arguing that Thornhill had not exhausted administrative remedies—and that the circuit court lacked jurisdiction—because the Commission never made a factual finding that he was entitled to workers’ compensation benefits. The trial court granted the motion on that basis. The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded, finding that Thornhill indeed exhausted his administrative remedies and that the circuit court had jurisdiction to hear his bad faith claim. Finding no reversible error in the appellate court’s decision, the Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed. View "Thornhill v. Walker-Hill Environmental, et al." on Justia Law