Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

The Government and Hyten (together, Appellants) seek review of the district court’s decision denying Appellants’ motion to dismiss Spletstoser’s First Amended Complaint (FAC). Specifically, the district court concluded that the Feres doctrine does not bar Spletstoser’s claims because the “alleged sexual assault [could] not conceivably serve any military purpose.”The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision. The court wrote that the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”) created a broad waiver of the federal government’s sovereign immunity. The court applied the factors developed in Johnson v. United States, 704 F.2d 1431 (9th Cir. 1983), and held that the Feres doctrine did not bar the claims raised by Plaintiff at this stage of the proceedings. The court initially emphasized that this case involved an allegation of sexual assault, and that this case was before the court on a motion to dismiss where the court must assume the truth of the allegations as pled. After considering the Johnson factors and other cases analyzing the Feres doctrine, the court agreed with the district court that Plaintiff’s action was not barred by the Feres doctrine at this stage, and therefore the motion to dismiss was properly denied. View "KATHRYN SPLETSTOSER V. JOHN HYTEN" on Justia Law

Plaintiff brought suit alleging medical malpractice by government physicians at Naval Hospital Bremerton in the state of Washington. Plaintiff first submitted a timely administrative claim to the Navy under the FTCA, which was denied. She filed her complaint in the Western District of Washington within six months thereafter, as required by the FTCA. The Government sought dismissal on grounds that Plaintiff’s claim had been extinguished by a Washington statute of repose.The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s order and remanded for further proceedings to determine the constitutionality of the statute of repose under Washington’s state constitution. The panel held that the only question at issue was whether the FTCA’s statute of limitations supplanted the eight-year statute of repose embodied in the latter clause of Section 4.16.350.The U.S. Supreme Court addressed a similar question in a parallel context in CTS Corp. v. Waldburger, 573 U.S. 1, 3-4 (2014). CTS explained the consequences of the distinction between a statute of limitation and a statute of repose. Here, Plaintiff concedes that the eight-year limit in Section 4.16.350 is a statute of repose, and that it represents substantive law of the state of Washington. The court held that because there was no contradictory statute of repose in the FTCA, and the FTCA generally applied the substantive law “of the place where the omission occurred,” it followed that Section 4.16.350 applied to Plaintiff’s claims and precluded them., The court rejected Plaintiff’s contention that state statutes of repose do not apply to claims under the FTCA. View "BETTE BENNETT V. USA" on Justia Law

In February 2016, three-month-old A.K., daughter of respondents Michelle Desmet and Sandro Kasco, was taken into protective custody after she suffered a spiral fracture to her left femur. When the parents could not explain the injury, A.K. was placed with her paternal aunt for six months while the Department of Social Health Services (DSHS) initiated an investigation. By August, A.K. was returned to her parents and a dependency action was dismissed. In August 2018, the parents sued the DSHS (the State) for negligent investigation, negligent infliction of emotional distress (NIED), and invasion of privacy by false light (false light) based on the Department’s allegedly harmful investigation and issuance of a letter indicating that allegations of child abuse/neglect against Desmet were founded (the founded letter). The Department moved for summary judgment, arguing it was immune from suit under RCW 4.24.595(2) because its actions in A.K.’s dependency proceedings were taken pursuant to the juvenile court’s order to place A.K. with her aunt. The trial court denied summary judgment and entered a final order finding that no immunity applied. The Department appealed on the immunity issue, and the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court. The Department claimed on appeal to the Washington Supreme Court that the Court of Appeals’ decision rendered RCW 4.24.595(2) meaningless and that the court erroneously refused to consider the legislative history of RCW 4.24.595(2), which, in the Department’s view, was enacted to bar claims like those brought by the parents. The Supreme Court found the unambiguous text of RCW 4.24.595(2) did not grant the Department immunity for all actions in an investigation of child abuse/neglect that might coincide with a court order in related dependency proceedings. The Court of Appeals was affirmed and the matter remanded back to the trial court for further proceedings. View "Desmet v. Washington" on Justia Law

In this tort suit brought against an employer by an employee the Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the judgment of the circuit court denying both parties' motions for summary judgment, holding that the court erred in denying the employer's motion for summary judgment.The employee in this case died after falling off the roof of a building he was working on for a subcontractor. After the employee's estate brought this tort action the employer moved for summary judgment, asserting that under S.D. Codified Laws 62-3-2, workers' compensation was the estate's exclusive remedy. In response, the estate argued that the exception to S.D. Codified Laws 52.-3-2 for intentional torts applied. The circuit court denied summary judgment for either party. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding that there was no issue of material of fact in dispute on the question of whether the employer committed an intentional tort in this case. View "Althoff v. Pro-Tec Roofing, Inc." on Justia Law

The United States Government seized $69,940.50 in cash from Plaintiff’s car. Plaintiff and his girlfriend challenged the seizure, claiming that the cash was not subject to forfeiture. To forfeit the seized cash, the Government bore the burden of establishing a connection between the cash and the illegal activity—in this case, illegal drug trafficking. The district court, in granting summary judgment, found that the facts painted a picture that definitively established that the cash was drug money.   The Fourth Circuit reversed finding that the record is unclear regarding whether a reasonable jury might well decide that the painting of these facts shows the cash came from drug trafficking. The court explained that summary judgment in a forfeiture proceeding is like summary judgment in any other civil case. Applying those standards correctly ensures that the Government must prove its case before depriving citizens of their private property based on an allegation of wrongdoing. Here, the Government has the burden of proof. The Government lacks any direct evidence of a drug transaction or involvement in the drug trade beyond Plaintiff’s possession of a single marijuana blunt and medical marijuana cards. The Government would have the court rely on its own inferences from its circumstantial evidence, which the court may not do. View "US v. Dereck McClellan" on Justia Law

Plaintiff sued Defendant in a Texas federal court to recover unpaid legal fees. The federal rules allow service under the law of the state “where service is made,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(e)(1), so Plaintiff tried serving Defendant by publication under Florida law. But that publication notice was defective. Noting that defect, Defendant moved to vacate his default. Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(c). But the district court declined and soon entered a default judgment.The Fifth Circuit vacated and remanded the district court’s judgment. The court held that it was an error for the district court to decline to consider Defendant’s objection to improper service. The court explained that because Defendant was never properly served, he showed good cause to set aside his default and the default judgment that followed. View "Espinoza v. Humphries" on Justia Law

The issue this appeal presented for the New Jersey Supreme Court’s review centered on an exclusionary clause in a commercial general liability insurance policy issued by Admiral Insurance Company (Admiral) to Richfield Window Coverings, LLC (Richfield). Richfield sold window coverage products, including blinds, to national retailers like Home Depot and provided retailers with machines to cut the blinds to meet the specifications of the retailers’ customers. Colleen Lorito, an employee of a Home Depot located in Nassau County, was injured while operating the blind cutting machine. She and her husband filed a civil action against Richfield, asserting claims for product liability, breach of warranty, and loss of spousal services. Admiral denied any obligation to defend or indemnify, asserting the claims were not covered under the policy based on the Designated New York Counties Exclusion of the insurance policy. Richfield filed a declaratory judgment action seeking to compel Admiral to defend it in the Lorito case and, if necessary, indemnify it against any monetary damages awarded to the plaintiffs. The Law Division granted summary judgment in favor of Admiral. The Appellate Division reversed, finding that “Richfield’s limited activities and operations have no causal relationship to the causes of action or allegations.” The Supreme Court found that the policy’s broad and unambiguous language made clear that a causal relationship was not required in order for the exclusionary clause to apply; rather, any claim “in any way connected with” the insured’s operations or activities in a county identified in the exclusionary clause was not covered under the policy. Richfield’s operations in an excluded county were alleged to be connected with the injuries for which recovery was sought, so the exclusion applied. Admiral had no duty to defend a claim that it is not contractually obligated to indemnify. View "Norman International, Inc. v. Admiral Insurance Company " on Justia Law

Plaintiffs seek to hold Bodum USA, Inc., responsible for an alleged manufacturing defect in one of its French press coffee makers (“the Press”) that they claim caused it to malfunction and injure their young child. The district court granted summary judgment for Bodum, concluding that no reasonable jury could find that the Press deviated from its intended design.The Fifth Circuit reversed and remanded. The court explained that a manufacturing defect may be established exclusively through circumstantial evidence and plaintiffs must allege a specific deviation from the product’s intended design that allegedly caused the injury. Here, Plaintiffs show the alleged defect was present when the Press left Bodum’s control, Plaintiffs point to French press coil assemblies advertised on Bodum’s website that also contain an outwardly protruding coil. Moreover, the court wrote that the following evidence creates a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the Press contained a manufacturing defect: (1) testimony from Plaintiffs that they purchased their Press in brand-new condition; (2) a specific alleged defect consisting of a metal coil protruding beyond its mesh enclosure; (3) the district court’s finding that “the metal mesh was intended to completely engulf the metal coil,” which is corroborated by expert testimony; (4) an expert witness who examined the Press, tested it, compared it with two exemplars, and opined that the protruding metal coil deviated from the Press’s intended design, and caused the glass to fracture and ultimately shatter; and (5) the shattering of the Press’s glass carafe allegedly during ordinary use, albeit by a five-year-old child. View "Norman v. Bodum USA" on Justia Law

The Seventh Circuit affirmed the order of the district court granting summary judgment for Defendant after finding that the injuries Plaintiff suffered while he was at Defendant's scrap facility were within the scope of a valid exculpatory clause that Plaintiff signed, holding that there was no error or abuse of discretion in the proceedings below.Plaintiff, an independent contractor for another business, delivered scrap metal to Defendant's scrap metal yard in Illinois. Before Plaintiff could enter Defendant's facility for the first time each year, Plaintiff signed an agreement containing an exculpatory clause releasing Defendant of any liability for injuries sustained at the facility. When Plaintiff was injured at Defendant's facility he filed suit, alleging negligence and willful and wanton conduct. The district court ruled in favor of Defendant, concluding that the exculpatory clause in the agreement barred the claims. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that, while Defendant's conduct may have been negligent, the conduct was not outside the scope of the exculpatory clause. View "Munoz v. Nucor Steel Kankakee, Inc." on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the summary judgment entered by the superior court in favor of Somatex, Inc. on Kim Boivin's complaint alleging that she suffered from post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) as a result of the negligence of Somatex, Inc., holding that the superior court correctly determined that Somatex owed no duty to Boivin.Boivin was operating a crane when a Somatex employee was knocked out of the crane and feel thirty feet to the floor, where he landed in front of Boivin. The employee died from his injuries, and Boivin sustained PTSD and related disorders as a result of the accident. Boivin brought this action against Somatex, alleging negligence. The superior court granted summary judgment for Somatex. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding (1) Boivin failed to generate a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether Somatex breached its general negligence duty of care not to cause her physical injury or as to whether Somatex owed her a duty to avoid causing emotional harm; and (2) therefore, the superior court did not err in determining that Somatex was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. View "Boivin v. Somatex, Inc." on Justia Law