Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

The Anne Carlsen Center (ACC) petitioned the North Dakota Supreme Court for a supervisory writ after the district court granted plaintiff A.K.-W.'s motion to compel discovery of documents that ACC claimed were not subject to disclosure. The case arose from an alleged sexual assault of A.K.-W., an autistic child, by an ACC employee. The plaintiff's grandmother and adoptive parent, Lisa Wibstad, noticed signs of trauma and sought medical care, leading to a Sexual Assault Nurse Examination (SANE) that documented injuries consistent with sexual contact. The employee was placed on administrative leave and later terminated, but criminal charges were dismissed for lack of probable cause. Wibstad then filed a civil suit against ACC.The district court ordered an in-camera review of the disputed documents and subsequently granted the motion to compel, concluding that the asserted privileges did not apply. The court ordered the documents to be re-designated from "sealed" to "confidential." ACC then sought a supervisory writ from the North Dakota Supreme Court, arguing that the district court's order was contrary to law and created an injustice without an adequate alternative remedy.The North Dakota Supreme Court found that the district court erred by not explaining why the asserted privileges did not apply and by not addressing necessary or agreed-upon redactions. The court noted that the district court's order lacked sufficient detail for meaningful review and directed the district court to vacate its order and enter a new order that addresses redactions and explains the decision on a document-by-document, privilege-by-privilege basis. The Supreme Court emphasized the need for specificity in claims of privilege and the importance of providing readable documents for review. View "Anne Carlsen Center v. LeFevre" on Justia Law

Robbie Plyler, a longtime farm worker, was injured when his leg became trapped in a running grain auger inside a grain bin on Cox Brothers Farms, resulting in the amputation of his right leg below the knee. The jury found that both Plyler and Cox Brothers Farms were negligent, but the farm had the last clear chance to avoid the injury. The jury awarded Plyler $2,000,000 in compensatory damages and $500,000 for loss of consortium to his wife, Deborah. Cox Brothers Farms appealed the decision.The United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina denied Cox's pre-trial motions for summary judgment and its renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law on Plyler’s negligence and gross negligence claims. The court also denied Cox's motion to bifurcate the trial into separate liability and damages phases and its motion to exclude testimony from Plyler’s farm safety expert.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the jury’s verdict. The court found that the district court did not err in denying Cox's motions for summary judgment and judgment as a matter of law, as there was sufficient evidence to support the jury's finding that Cox had the last clear chance to avoid Plyler’s injury. The appellate court also upheld the district court’s decision to deny Cox's motion to bifurcate the trial and to admit the expert testimony, noting that the district court provided appropriate limiting instructions to the jury regarding the use of OSHA regulations as evidence. The court concluded that the district court acted within its discretion and that there were no exceptional circumstances warranting a new trial. View "Plyler v. Cox" on Justia Law

Everett Robinson was transferred to Canton Harbor Healthcare Center, a skilled nursing facility, for follow-up care after a stroke. During his stay, he developed pressure ulcers, which allegedly worsened after his transfer to other facilities, leading to his death. Felicia Robinson, his widow, and his surviving children filed a complaint against Canton Harbor, alleging negligence in allowing the pressure ulcers to develop and worsen, causing his wrongful death. They submitted a certificate of a qualified expert, signed by registered nurse Anjanette Jones-Singh, attesting that Canton Harbor breached the standard of care, causing the pressure ulcers.The Circuit Court for Baltimore City dismissed the complaint, ruling that as a registered nurse, Jones-Singh was not qualified to attest to the proximate cause of Robinson's pressure ulcers. The Robinsons appealed, and the Appellate Court of Maryland vacated the dismissal, holding that a registered nurse is not disqualified per se from attesting that a breach of nursing standards proximately caused pressure ulcers. The case was remanded for further proceedings.The Supreme Court of Maryland affirmed the Appellate Court's judgment. The court held that a registered nurse may attest in a certificate that a breach of nursing care standards at a skilled nursing facility proximately caused a pressure ulcer, provided the nurse relies on a pre-existing diagnosis and does not make a medical diagnosis. The court also held that a registered nurse meets the peer-to-peer requirement to attest to breaches of nursing care standards but not to the standards applicable to physicians. The case was allowed to proceed based on the certificate provided by Nurse Jones-Singh. View "Canton Harbor Healthcare v. Robinson" on Justia Law

The plaintiff, Colleen Ryan, was injured in a parking lot owned by Sea Colony Recreational Association, Inc. while attending an event organized by Operation SEAs the Day, Inc. Before the event, Ryan signed a liability waiver that covered the event organizer and its agents. Upon arrival, she was directed to park in Sea Colony's lot, where she tripped in a hole and injured her ankle. The relationship between the event organizer and the parking lot owner was not clear from the pleadings.The Superior Court of Delaware granted judgment on the pleadings in favor of Sea Colony, concluding that Sea Colony was an agent of the event organizer based on the fact that the parking lot was used for the event. The court found the waiver unambiguous and applicable to Sea Colony, and that Ryan's injuries fell within its scope. Ryan's motion for reargument, which included new information that she was a registered guest at Sea Colony, was denied.The Supreme Court of Delaware reviewed the case and reversed the Superior Court's decision. The Supreme Court held that the Superior Court erred in finding an agency relationship between Sea Colony and the event organizer based solely on the use of the parking lot. The Supreme Court noted that the pleadings did not contain sufficient facts to establish an agency relationship and that other reasonable inferences could be drawn, such as a license agreement or public use of the lot. The case was remanded for further proceedings to determine whether the waiver covered Sea Colony and whether Ryan's injuries fell within its scope. View "Ryan v. Sea Colony Recreational Association, Inc." on Justia Law

An assistant prosecuting attorney, Jennifer Janetsky, filed a lawsuit against Saginaw County, the Saginaw County Prosecutor’s Office, John McColgan, and Christopher Boyd. Janetsky alleged violations of the Whistleblowers’ Protection Act (WPA), public policy violations, assault and battery, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and false imprisonment. The case stemmed from Janetsky’s handling of a criminal sexual conduct prosecution and subsequent alleged retaliatory actions by her supervisors, McColgan and Boyd, after she reported concerns about a plea agreement.The Saginaw Circuit Court granted summary disposition to the Saginaw County Prosecutor’s Office on all claims, to all defendants on the intentional infliction of emotional distress claim, and to McColgan on the intentional-tort claims, but denied the motion for the remaining claims. The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s judgment in part, ordering summary disposition in favor of all defendants on the remaining claims. The Michigan Supreme Court reversed in part and remanded to the Court of Appeals to consider unresolved issues. On remand, the Court of Appeals again reversed in part, ordering summary disposition on the intentional-tort and public-policy claims in favor of all defendants and on the WPA claim in favor of Saginaw County.The Michigan Supreme Court held that the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the trial court’s denial of summary disposition. The Supreme Court determined that Saginaw County was an employer under the WPA, allowing Janetsky to sue under the Act. The Court also established a test for wrongful termination in violation of public policy, remanding the case to the trial court to apply this test. Additionally, the Court found genuine issues of material fact regarding Janetsky’s intentional-tort claims, including false imprisonment and assault and battery, sufficient to defeat summary disposition. The judgment of the Court of Appeals was reversed in part, and the case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Janetsky v. County Of Saginaw" on Justia Law

Jody Pham injured her neck and right shoulder while working at Smithfield Foods, a self-insured employer. Smithfield accepted the injury as a compensable workers’ compensation claim and paid benefits for over two years. In 2018, Smithfield stopped paying medical benefits, believing Pham’s employment was no longer a major contributing cause of her need for additional treatment. Pham filed a petition for a hearing with the Department of Labor and Regulation, and an administrative law judge (ALJ) determined that Pham failed to establish causation. Pham appealed to the circuit court, which reversed the ALJ’s decision, reasoning that Smithfield had the burden to show a change in circumstances to justify suspending benefits. Smithfield appealed.The South Dakota Supreme Court reviewed the case. The court concluded that SDCL 62-7-33, which the circuit court relied on, did not apply because Smithfield’s pre-petition payments were voluntary and not based on a final order or settlement agreement. The court also found that Pham’s argument that Smithfield had the burden to prove non-compensability was incorrect. The court emphasized that Pham bore the burden to establish compensability since the issue had not been previously litigated or adjudicated.Regarding the expert testimony, the court noted that the ALJ found Dr. Jensen’s testimony more persuasive than Dr. Ripperda’s. The court held that the ALJ’s findings were not clearly erroneous and that the circuit court erred in reweighing the evidence. The South Dakota Supreme Court reversed the circuit court’s decision and reinstated the ALJ’s decision, concluding that Pham failed to meet her burden of proving that her work-related injury was a major contributing cause of her need for additional treatment. View "Pham v. Smithfield Foods" on Justia Law

The Nelson Estate claimed an interest in a coin shop and alleged conversion of its property. Dr. Earl Nelson had provided funds for the business, resulting in a 50% ownership interest, which was confirmed by William Tinkcom. After Dr. Nelson's death in 2013, Tinkcom continued to operate the business and assured Nelson's heirs of their 50% interest. Tinkcom died in 2022, and the business was sold to Eddie Welch without including the Nelson Estate in the final agreement. The Nelson Estate sued the Tinkcom Estate, Welch, and Mere Coin Company, LLC, for breach of contract, unjust enrichment, and other claims, including conversion of valuable coins and collectibles.The Circuit Court of the Second Judicial Circuit in Minnehaha County, South Dakota, granted the defendants' motion for judgment on the pleadings, concluding that the statute of limitations barred all claims. The Nelson Estate argued that the statute of limitations had not expired and that equitable estoppel or fraudulent concealment should prevent the statute of limitations defense.The Supreme Court of South Dakota reviewed the case and affirmed the circuit court's determination that the first six business interest claims accrued upon Dr. Nelson's death in 2013. However, the court reversed the dismissal of these claims because the circuit court did not address the Nelson Estate's defenses of equitable estoppel and fraudulent concealment. The court also reversed the dismissal of the tortious interference and civil conspiracy claims, as these claims arose from the 2022 sale of the business. Lastly, the court reversed the dismissal of the conversion claim, noting that the record did not establish when the conversion occurred or when the Nelson Estate became aware of it. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Nelson v. Tinkcom" on Justia Law

Carol Cutting filed a medical malpractice lawsuit against Down East Orthopedic Associates, P.A., based on treatment she received in 2013. Cutting alleged that a doctor at Down East treated her shoulder improperly and failed to obtain informed consent, particularly regarding how her Tourette’s syndrome might affect the surgery. She also claimed the doctor falsified her medical records. A prelitigation screening panel found unanimously against Cutting, determining that the doctor’s conduct did not deviate from the standard of care.The Superior Court (Penobscot County) admitted the panel’s finding into evidence at trial. The jury found that Down East was not negligent. Cutting challenged the admission of the panel’s finding, arguing it was biased and violated her due process rights. She also contested the court’s judgment as a matter of law on her claim for punitive damages, arguing that the court erred in its decision.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the case. The court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the panel’s finding. The court noted that the panel’s offer to decide the case based on written records, if both parties agreed, did not demonstrate bias, especially since the offer was declined and a full hearing was held. The court also found that the trial court provided the jury with the necessary instructions to contextualize the panel’s finding, preserving Cutting’s right to a jury trial.Regarding punitive damages, the court held that any error in granting Down East’s motion for judgment as a matter of law was harmless. Since the jury found no negligence, they could not award any damages, including punitive damages. Therefore, the court affirmed the judgment in favor of Down East Orthopedic Associates, P.A. View "Cutting v. Down East Orthopedic Associates, P.A." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, thirty survivors of childhood sexual abuse, sought damages for negligence from the Holy See under a vicarious liability theory. They alleged that the Holy See promulgated a mandatory policy of secrecy that governed how its dioceses and bishops handled reports of sexual abuse by clerics. Plaintiffs claimed that bishops in New York failed to warn children and parents of the dangers posed by the accused clerics and failed to report suspected abuse to law enforcement, thus emboldening abusers and exposing children to harm.The District Court granted the Holy See’s motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA). The court concluded that the discretionary function exclusion from the FSIA’s tortious activity exception barred Plaintiffs’ claims. The court found that the bishops’ conduct was discretionary and susceptible to policy analysis, thus falling within the discretionary function exclusion.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case de novo and affirmed the District Court’s judgment. The appellate court agreed that the discretionary function exclusion applied, precluding federal courts from exercising jurisdiction over the claims against the Holy See. The court held that the bishops’ challenged conduct involved discretionary acts and that Plaintiffs failed to allege that the bishops’ conduct violated a mandatory policy. Additionally, the court found that the bishops’ conduct was susceptible to policy analysis, satisfying the second prong of the Berkovitz/Gaubert test. Therefore, the discretionary function exclusion barred the exercise of jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ claims against the Holy See. View "Blecher v. Holy See" on Justia Law

James E. Carroll, Jr. signed a contract with Isle of Palms Pest Control, Inc. and SPM Management Company, Inc. for termite protection services for his home. The contract specified the use of the Exterra Termite Interception and Baiting System, with a liability limit of $250,000 for new termite damage. However, the respondents abandoned the bait station system without informing Carroll and began using a liquid application, which was allegedly done negligently. Carroll continued to renew the bait station contract, unaware of the change, and discovered significant termite damage to his home ten years later.Carroll sued the respondents for negligence and breach of contract. The Circuit Court granted summary judgment to the respondents on the negligence claim, citing the economic loss rule, which confined Carroll's remedy to the breach of contract action. The Court of Appeals affirmed this decision.The Supreme Court of South Carolina reviewed the case and reversed the lower courts' decisions. The court clarified that the economic loss rule applies only in the product liability context when the only injury is to the product itself. Since the contract did not involve the sale of a product, the economic loss rule did not apply. The court found that the respondents' conduct in secretly switching to a liquid termiticide application was beyond the contract's scope, creating a duty of due care. The court held that there was sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact regarding the respondents' negligence and its proximate cause of the termite damage. The case was remanded for further proceedings, with the $250,000 liability limitation applying only if the verdict is based solely on the breach of contract claim. View "Carroll v. Isle of Palms Pest Control, Inc." on Justia Law