Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

A general contractor was hired to oversee the construction of a hotel in Vermont and subcontracted with a firm to install metal siding panels manufactured by a third party. The subcontractor relied on installation instructions available on the manufacturer’s website, which did not specify the use of a splice plate to connect the panels. The panels were installed without splice plates, and after construction, the panels began to detach from the building, causing some to fall and damage nearby property. The contractor later discovered that the manufacturer had created an instruction sheet in 2006 recommending splice plates, but this information was not publicly available at the time of installation.The contractor initially sued the installer for breach of contract, warranty, and negligence in the Vermont Superior Court, Chittenden Unit, Civil Division. The complaint was later amended to add a product liability claim against the manufacturer. After further discovery, the contractor sought to amend the complaint a third time to add new claims against the manufacturer, arguing that new evidence justified the amendment. The trial court denied this motion, citing undue delay and prejudice to the manufacturer, and granted summary judgment to the manufacturer on the product liability claim and on a crossclaim for implied indemnity brought by the installer, finding both barred by the economic-loss rule.On appeal, the Vermont Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s decisions. The Court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the third motion to amend due to undue delay and prejudice. It also held that the economic-loss rule barred the contractor’s product liability claim, as neither the “other-property” nor “special-relationship” exceptions applied. Finally, the Court found the contractor lacked standing to appeal the summary judgment on the installer’s implied indemnity claim. View "PeakCM, LLC v. Mountainview Metal Systems, LLC" on Justia Law

The plaintiff, after consuming a significant amount of alcohol and becoming heavily intoxicated, joined a group of friends at a municipal golf course and later proceeded to the driving range. While at the driving range, the plaintiff sat in a golf cart, distracted by his phone and unaware of his surroundings. The cart’s exact position was disputed, but evidence showed it was in or near the range of play. Defendant Hendricks, one of the group, hit a golf ball from the tee-off area, which struck the plaintiff in the eye, causing serious injury. The plaintiff did not see the ball coming and was unaware of the risk due to his lack of attention and intoxication.The plaintiff filed a negligence suit in the Superior Court, Wilson County, against both Hendricks and the City of Wilson, alleging negligent conduct and inadequate safety measures. Both defendants raised contributory negligence as a defense, and the City also asserted governmental immunity. The trial court granted summary judgment for both defendants, finding the plaintiff contributorily negligent as a matter of law. The plaintiff appealed, and a divided panel of the North Carolina Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the plaintiff’s lack of situational awareness, due in part to intoxication and distraction, barred recovery. The majority also found no genuine issue of material fact regarding the cart’s location or movement and declined to address governmental immunity.The Supreme Court of North Carolina reviewed the case de novo and affirmed the Court of Appeals. The Court held that the plaintiff was contributorily negligent as a matter of law because the risk of injury was open and obvious, and a reasonably prudent person would have recognized and avoided the danger. The Court did not address the issue of governmental immunity, as contributory negligence was dispositive. View "Moseley v. Hendricks" on Justia Law

Daniel Flickinger, a litigator at Wainwright, Pope & McMeekin, P.C. (WPM), posted conservative commentary on his personal social media, including a controversial post about George Floyd. Lawrence Tracy King, a partner at King Simmons Ford & Spree, P.C., sent a screenshot of Flickinger’s post—paired with a professional photo from WPM’s website—to WPM partners, expressing concern about the post’s impact on the firm’s reputation. The WPM partners, after reviewing Flickinger’s social media activity and discussing with King, asked Flickinger to resign, which he did. Flickinger alleged that the screenshot misrepresented his post as being made in his professional capacity and falsely associated his views with WPM.Flickinger sued King and the King law firm for defamation, invasion of privacy, and tortious interference with a business relationship. The Jefferson Circuit Court dismissed all claims, but the Supreme Court of Alabama previously reinstated the tortious interference claim, remanding for further proceedings. On remand, the King defendants moved for summary judgment, submitting affidavits from WPM partners stating their decision to terminate Flickinger was based solely on their independent review of his public posts, not on King’s actions. Flickinger sought to compel production of King’s cell phone records and to continue the summary judgment hearing, but the circuit court denied both motions and granted summary judgment for the King defendants, finding no genuine issue of material fact on causation.The Supreme Court of Alabama affirmed summary judgment for the King law firm, holding King’s actions were outside the scope of his employment and did not benefit the firm. However, the Court reversed summary judgment for King, finding genuine issues of material fact regarding causation and justification. The case was remanded for further proceedings against King, while the denial of Flickinger’s discovery and continuance motions was affirmed. View "Flickinger v. King" on Justia Law

A waste hauling company operating in Kansas City brought suit against a mobile waste compaction business and its franchisor. The waste hauler owns containers that are leased to customers, who sometimes contract separately with the compaction company to compress waste inside those containers. The hauler alleged that the compaction company’s activities damaged its containers and interfered with its business relationships. The hauler sought various forms of relief, including damages, injunctive and declaratory relief, and nominal damages, but ultimately disavowed any claim for actual monetary damages, citing a lack of evidence to support such damages.The United States District Court for the Western District of Missouri denied the hauler’s request for a temporary restraining order, finding no irreparable harm. During discovery, the hauler admitted it could not identify or quantify any actual damages and stipulated it was not seeking damages outside Kansas City. The district court granted the compaction company’s motion to strike the hauler’s jury demand, holding that the hauler had not presented evidence of compensatory damages, that nominal damages were unavailable under Missouri law for the claims asserted, and that the remaining claims were equitable in nature. After a bench trial, the district court entered judgment for the compaction company and its franchisor, finding the hauler failed to prove essential elements of its claims, including actual damages and direct benefit conferred for unjust enrichment.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court held that the hauler was not entitled to a jury trial under the Seventh Amendment because it failed to present evidence of compensatory damages and nominal damages were not available for its claims under Missouri law. The court also affirmed judgment for the compaction company on the trespass to chattels and unjust enrichment claims, finding the hauler failed to prove dispossession, damages, or a direct benefit conferred. View "Allied Services v. Smash My Trash, LLC" on Justia Law

A woman was injured while running along a city road when she stepped off the roadway to avoid traffic and her foot became lodged in a metal culvert that was partially exposed in a roadside ditch. The culvert had been installed by the city as part of improvement projects in the mid-1990s, and there were no sidewalks in the area. The woman suffered a sprained ankle and a significant laceration that required medical treatment. She alleged that the city failed to maintain the public right-of-way, leaving the culvert uncapped and exposed, and did not provide adequate inspection, maintenance, or warnings.After the incident, the city admitted responsibility for maintaining public rights-of-way and acknowledged that its maintenance practices were primarily complaint-driven, with no routine inspections or written policies for culvert maintenance. The city stated that it had not received complaints about the culvert before the accident and that, after being notified of the incident, it inspected and repaired the culvert by removing the damaged end section.The Circuit Court of the Fourth Judicial Circuit granted summary judgment in favor of the city on all claims, holding that the city owed no common law duty of care, that the plaintiff failed to show the culvert was damaged as required under the relevant statute (SDCL 31-32-10), and that the nuisance and gross negligence claims were barred or unsupported.The Supreme Court of the State of South Dakota reviewed the case de novo. It held that there were genuine issues of material fact as to whether the culvert was damaged and whether the city should have discovered the damage, making summary judgment on the negligence claim improper. However, the court affirmed summary judgment for the city on the nuisance and gross negligence claims, finding them barred by statutory exemptions and insufficient evidence, respectively. The court thus reversed in part and affirmed in part. View "Mahmoudi v. City Of Spearfish" on Justia Law

A police officer filed a workers’ compensation claim in December 2020, alleging cumulative injuries—including orthopedic conditions and hypertensive cardiac disease—arising from employment with a city through 2013. The city and its claims administrator denied the allegations, and the matter proceeded to trial before a Workers’ Compensation Administrative Law Judge (WCJ). The WCJ found the officer sustained several injuries, but determined the cardiac disease claim was time-barred under the applicable statute of limitations, awarding medical treatment only for the other conditions.The officer timely petitioned the Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board (WCAB) for reconsideration, challenging the WCJ’s finding that the cardiac claim was untimely. The city and claims administrator responded, supporting the WCJ’s determination. The WCJ recommended denying reconsideration. Under former Labor Code section 5909, the Board had 60 days from the petition’s filing to act, or the petition would be deemed denied. However, due to administrative delay, the Board did not receive the petition until after the 60-day period had expired. The Board ultimately granted reconsideration, applying equitable tolling to the statutory deadline, and found the cardiac injury compensable.The City and its claims administrator sought writ review in the California Court of Appeal, Sixth Appellate District, arguing the Board lacked jurisdiction to act after the statutory deadline. The Court of Appeal held that the 60-day deadline in former section 5909 is mandatory, and the Board generally acts in excess of its jurisdiction if it grants reconsideration after that period. However, the court concluded that the deadline does not affect the Board’s fundamental jurisdiction, allowing for equitable tolling in narrow circumstances. Because the officer acted diligently and was misled by administrative delay outside his control, the court affirmed the Board’s order granting reconsideration. View "City of Salinas v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd." on Justia Law

A meat cutter with a long career suffered multiple work-related injuries over the years, including injuries to his back, shoulder, knee, and wrist, but was able to return to full-time, heavy-duty work after each incident. In 2015, he experienced a severe workplace accident in which his dominant right hand was caught in a meat grinder, resulting in the loss of most of his hand and significant impairment. Despite extensive medical treatment, including surgeries and a spinal cord stimulator, he was left with chronic pain and severe functional limitations. He was ultimately found to be totally and permanently disabled and unable to work.After settling with his employer, the claimant sought additional workers’ compensation benefits from the State of Idaho’s Industrial Special Indemnity Fund (ISIF), arguing that his pre-existing impairments, particularly a left wrist injury, combined with the 2015 accident to cause his total disability. The Idaho Industrial Commission held a hearing, considered expert testimony, and found that while the claimant had several pre-existing impairments, only the left wrist injury was a subjective hindrance to employment. However, the Commission concluded that the 2015 meat grinder accident alone rendered him totally and permanently disabled, as his prior injuries had not prevented him from working full-time before that event. The Commission adopted the findings of its appointed Referee and denied ISIF liability.The Supreme Court of the State of Idaho reviewed the case, applying a standard that defers to the Commission’s factual findings if supported by substantial and competent evidence. The Court held that the Commission’s determination was supported by the record, particularly the expert testimony that the 2015 accident, by itself, caused the claimant’s total and permanent disability. The Court affirmed the Commission’s order, holding that ISIF was not liable for any portion of the claimant’s disability. Costs on appeal were awarded to ISIF. View "Westman v. Industrial Special Indemnity Fund" on Justia Law

A high school student in the District of Columbia was sexually assaulted by a classmate in a school bathroom. The student’s mother reported the incident to school officials, prompting an investigation by the District. The District ultimately found the assault claim credible and took steps to support the student, including offering counseling and a school transfer. However, the school principal, before any investigation, expressed disbelief in the student’s claim, made derogatory remarks about her, and attempted to undermine the investigation, even after video evidence corroborated the student’s account. The principal’s conduct included misleading superiors and withholding information. The student and her mother later learned of these actions, which caused them significant distress.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia dismissed the student’s claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress (NIED) for failure to state a claim, finding that the school-student relationship alone did not create a special duty under D.C. law. After discovery, the court granted summary judgment to the defendants on the intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED) and Title IX claims, holding that the District’s response was not deliberately indifferent and that the principal’s conduct did not meet the standard for IIED because the remarks were made outside the student’s presence.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the NIED claim and the grant of summary judgment to the District on the Title IX claims, finding the District’s overall response was not clearly unreasonable and that the principal’s actions could not be attributed to the District for Title IX retaliation. However, the appellate court reversed the grant of summary judgment on the IIED claim against the principal, holding that a reasonable jury could find her conduct was extreme and outrageous, intended or recklessly caused severe emotional distress, and remanded for further proceedings on that claim. View "Doe v. DC" on Justia Law

A Liechtenstein-based satellite company was developing a network of low-Earth-orbit satellites and had obtained radio-frequency usage rights through a contract with another company, TRION AG. In 2021, a competitor, Rivada Networks, Inc., took over TRION and TRION’s board terminated the contract with the satellite company, transferring the frequency rights to Rivada. The legality of this transfer is being contested in European litigation. Shortly after the contract termination, Rivada’s CEO made public statements on an industry podcast, asserting that the satellite company no longer had usage rights and suggesting it planned to move its operations to China. These statements were broadcast during a major satellite industry conference, after which manufacturers expressed doubts about the satellite company’s viability and some refused to partner with it.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia dismissed the satellite company’s defamation lawsuit against Rivada. The court assumed, without deciding, that the statements were false and defamatory, but found they were not defamatory per se and that the complaint failed to adequately allege special damages, specifically a causal link between the statements and any harm suffered.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the dismissal de novo. The appellate court agreed with the district court that the statements were not defamatory per se, as they did not inherently impute professional misconduct or dishonesty. However, the appellate court found that the complaint plausibly alleged special damages, specifically that the statements caused the loss of business relationships with satellite manufacturers, leading to identifiable economic harm. The court held that the complaint’s factual allegations were sufficient to support a plausible inference of causation at the pleading stage.The appellate court affirmed the dismissal in part, reversed in part, and remanded the case for further proceedings on the special damages theory. View "KLEO AG v. Rivada Networks, Inc." on Justia Law

The plaintiff, representing herself and a proposed class, alleged that she was exposed to ethylene oxide (EtO), a carcinogenic gas, due to emissions from a plant in South Charleston, West Virginia, operated by the defendants from 1978 to 2019. She claimed that this exposure increased her risk of developing serious diseases, necessitating ongoing medical monitoring and diagnostic testing, for which she sought compensation under West Virginia common law.The United States District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia recognized that West Virginia law allows for medical monitoring claims but held that the plaintiff lacked Article III standing because she did not have a manifest physical injury. The district court also excluded the plaintiff’s expert, Dr. Sahu, finding his testimony unreliable, and granted summary judgment to the defendants. The court reasoned that the plaintiff’s alleged injury—an increased risk of future illness—was not concrete or ripe, relying on the Supreme Court’s decision in TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case de novo. It held that, under West Virginia law, the injury in a medical monitoring claim is the tortious exposure to a hazardous substance and the present need for medical testing, not the manifestation of disease. The court found that this injury is concrete and actual, satisfying Article III standing requirements. The Fourth Circuit also determined that the district court abused its discretion in excluding Dr. Sahu’s expert testimony, as its criticisms went to the weight, not the admissibility, of his opinions. The Fourth Circuit reversed the district court’s grant of summary judgment and exclusion of the expert, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Sommerville v. Union Carbide Corp." on Justia Law