Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

Scott Hockenberry filed a complaint against Michelle Kalas in Oklahoma state court alleging state-law claims of defamation, tortious interference, invasion of privacy, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and abuse of process. Hockenberry was a Captain in the United States Army and Kalas was an Army Reserve Captain. In 2016, Hockenberry and Kalas were employed as attorneys at Fort Sill near Lawton, Oklahoma. Beginning in May 2016, Hockenberry and Kalas became involved in a consensual sexual relationship. In August 2016, Kalas made statements accusing Hockenberry of sexual assault and other misconduct to work colleagues, an officer with the Lawton Police Department, and a Sexual Assault Response Coordinator at Fort Sill. The Army brought formal charges of sexual and physical assault against Hockenberry under the Uniform Code of Military Justice. The charges were referred to a general court-martial.The United States certified under 28 U.S.C. § 2679 that Kalas was acting within the scope of her federal employment when she made such statements. It then removed the action to federal court and substituted the United States as the defendant, deeming Hockenberry’s claims to be brought under the Federal Torts Claims Act (“FTCA”). Once in federal court, Hockenberry challenged the United States’ scope-of-employment (“SOE”) certification. The district court rejected that challenge, ruling that Hockenberry failed to demonstrate that Kalas had engaged in conduct beyond the scope of her federal employment. The court then granted the United States’ motion to dismiss Hockenberry’s action for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction based upon the United States’ sovereign immunity. Hockenberry appealed, arguing the the district court erred in its denial of his motion challenging the United States’ SOE certification. After review, the Tenth Circuit found the district court erred in concluding that an evidentiary hearing on Hockenberry’s motion was not necessary. The district court’s judgment was reversed and the matter remanded for further proceedings. View "Hockenberry v. United States" on Justia Law

The Seventh Circuit affirmed the order of the district court granting summary judgment in favor of the United States Army and dismissing Gerald Swain's claims brought under the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. 701 et seq., alleging disability discrimination, holding that there was no error.As a civilian employee at an Army installation in Illinois, Swain asked for and received several accommodations for his physical limitations. Swain later brought this lawsuit against the Army, alleging failure to accommodate, disparate treatment, and retaliation under the Rehabilitation Act. The district court granted summary judgment for the Army. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that the Army met its obligations under the Rehabilitation Act. View "Swain v. Wormuth" on Justia Law

An anonymous complaint led to Plaintiff’s arrest and trial on charges of aggravated animal cruelty, battery on an officer, and resisting arrest. After a jury acquitted Plaintiff, he sued the officers who arrested him. At issue on appeal was whether those officers are immune from suit under Florida law.   The Eleventh Circuit denied Plaintiff’s motion to dismiss the officers’ appeal for lack of jurisdiction. The court further reversed the district court’s judgment and remanded with instructions for the district court to enter summary judgment, based on sovereign immunity under Fla. Stat. Section 768.28(9)(a), in favor of the officers Officers on Plaintiff’s claims.   The court explained that the district court erred in this case when it applied the legal malice standard — instead of the actual malice standard — and determined that an arrest without probable cause by itself establishes that the officers acted with malice for purposes of Section 768.28(9)(a). Thus, because the district court applied the wrong standard, the district court didn’t do what is required, which is to analyze if each officer’s actions created a fact question about whether he was entitled to immunity from each state law claim against him.   The court addressed the immunity issues now instead of remanding the case for the district court to do so. In doing so the court held that no reasonable jury could find that any of the officers acted with actual malice or with wanton and willful disregard in arresting Plaintiff, even if they lacked probable cause to arrest him. View "Aaron Coleman v. John Riccardo, et al." on Justia Law

This case involved a medical-malpractice suit brought by Jalena and Brian Taylor against Jalena’s OB/GYN, Dr. Donielle Daigle, and her clinic, Premier Women’s Health, PLLC. In 2017, Jalena was admitted to Memorial Hospital of Gulfport in active labor preparing to give birth. After pushing for two and a half hours, the baby’s head became lodged in the mother’s pelvis, and it was determined that a caesarean section was necessary. Following delivery of the child, Jalena’s blood pressure dropped, and her pulse increased. The nurses worked to firm Jalena’s uterus post delivery, but she continued to have heavy clots and bleeding. Jalena was given a drug to tighten the uterus, and an OR team was called to be on standby in the event surgery became necessary. Dr. Daigle called the OR team off after Jalena’s bleeding was minimal, and her uterus remained completely firm. But Jalena’s heart rate remained extremely elevated. Dr. Daigle allowed Jalena to go back to her room, and she checked her again, and the uterus was firm. A minute or two later, Jalena sat up and felt a gush of blood. Dr. Daigle prepared to perform a hysterectomy, There was still bleeding from the cervical area, which doctors decided they needed to amputate. Even after doing so, there was still bleeding because of a laceration extending into the vagina. When the vagina was sutured and incorporated into the repair of the vaginal cuff, the bleeding finally stopped. The Taylors allege that Dr. Daigle failed to adequately treat Jalena and, as a result, she cannot have any more children. A five-day jury trial was held in January 2021, and the jury returned a twelve-to-zero verdict in favor of Dr. Daigle and Premier. On appeal, the Taylors argued the trial court committed reversible error by: (1) refusing to grant their cause challenges of patients of Dr. Daigle and Premier, thus failing to give them a right to a fair and impartial jury; and (2) failing to find a deviation from the standard of care for failing to perform a proper inspection of a genital tract laceration. The Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed the jury verdict because it was reached on factual evidence in favor of Dr. Daigle and Premier by an impartial jury. "All twelve of the jurors agreed on the verdict, and the verdict was not against the overwhelming weight of the evidence. It should not be disturbed." View "Taylor v. Premier Women's Health, PLLC, et al." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court affirming the determination of the Department of Labor and Regulation that Appellant was not permanently totally disabled, holding that Appellant failed to sustain his claim for permanent total disability.While he was employed by Rapid City Regional Hospital (RCRH) Appellant claimed he sustained two work-related head injuries that caused ongoing mental impairments. Appellant sought workers' compensation benefits from RCRH and its insurer, but the Department denied the claim, finding (1) Appellant failed to prove his work injuries were a major contributing cause of his mental impairments, and (2) Appellant failed to establish that he was permanently disabled. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Department and circuit court properly concluded that Appellant was not permanently totally disabled. View "Baker v. Rapid City Regional Hospital" on Justia Law

Appellant, then proceeding pro se, brought an action against Respondent, her brother, alleging he had falsely accused her of committing crimes against him and their elderly parents. Respondent emailed the attorney in this matter (“Attorney”), who was Appellant’s husband since June 2015, her former coworker at his law firm, and later her counsel in this action, warning that if Appellant did not settle the action, Respondent would file a cross-complaint the next day.   The court subsequently dismissed Respondent’s cross-complaint. Appellant retained Attorney to represent her pro bono or at a discounted rate, having been advised by Attorney that he would likely need to testify at trial, and having executed informed written consent to Attorney’s representation notwithstanding his expected dual role as advocate and witness   Two months before trial, Respondent moved to disqualify Attorney as Appellant’s counsel under California’s advocate-witness rule, viz., rule 3.7 of the Rules of Professional Conduct (Rule 3.7). The trial court disqualified Attorney from all phases of the litigation.   The Second Appellate District reversed the trial court’s disqualification order, holding that the trial court failed to apply the proper legal standards, and thereby abused its discretion, in disqualifying Attorney from representing Appellant under the advocate witness rule. The court explained that the trial court failed to apply Rule 3.7’s informed-consent exception. Indeed, the trial court failed even to cite Rule 3.7, instead applying the ABA Rule, which is not binding and lacks any informed-consent exception. The trial court further abused its discretion in failing to apply Rule 3.7’s limitation to advocacy “in a trial.” View "Lopez v. Lopez" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that a claim brought pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stat. 52-557n(b)(8) is a "cause of action created by statute based on negligence" such that apportionment is allowed under Conn. Gen. Stat. 52-572h(o).At issue was whether the apportionment statute, section 52-572h, permits municipal defendants whose liability is based on section 52-557n(b)(8) to file an apportionment complaint sounding in negligence. The trial court dismissed Defendants' apportionment complaint, but the appellate court reversed, concluding that Plaintiff's claims under section 52-557n(b)(8) fell within the first exception, which it held to incorporate a negligence standard. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because section 52-557n(b)(8) expressly abrogates the common law doctrine of municipal immunity and because the first exception under the statute allows for a cause of action based on negligence, claims brought pursuant to that exception qualify for apportionment. View "Costanzo v. Plainfield" on Justia Law

In this interlocutory appeal the Supreme Court declined to adopt the apex doctrine, which can prevent parties from deposing top-level corporate executives absent the requesting party making certain initial showings, holding that remand was required for the trial court to consider a motion for a protective order with the benefit of guidance set forth in this opinion.Plaintiffs sued the National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) alleging that despite being aware of the consequences of repetitive head trauma, the NCAA failed to implement reasonable concussion-management protocols to protect its athletes, causing three former college football players to die from a neurodegenerative disease linked to repetitive head trauma. The NCAA moved twice for a protective order to prevent Plaintiffs from deposing three of its high-ranking executives. After the trial court denied the motions the NCAA sought discretionary interlocutory review, inviting the Supreme Court to adopt the apex doctrine. The Supreme Court remanded the case, holding (1) this appeal was properly before the Court; and (2) although the Court declines to adopt the apex doctrine, it establishes a framework that harmonizes its principles with the applicable trial rules to aid courts in determining whether good cause exists to prohibit or limit the deposition of a top-level official in a large organization. View "National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Finnerty" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a police officer for the Metropolitan Transportation Authority (“MTA”), sued the MTA under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act (“FELA”), alleging that the MTA negligently failed to provide him with a safe workplace when it sent him on patrol in a vehicle without a prisoner compartment. A jury found the MTA liable and awarded Plaintiff damages. The MTA moved for judgment as a matter of law notwithstanding the verdict, arguing that it is immune from liability pursuant to the governmental function defense and that the evidence was insufficient to support the verdict because it lacked expert testimony. The district court denied that motion, holding that the governmental function defense does not apply in FELA cases.   The Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The court held that the FELA does not abrogate the governmental function defense, and therefore the defense is available in FELA cases. Though the governmental function defense was available for the MTA to assert, the MTA failed to show that the defense barred liability in this case. Here, the defense did not apply on the merits in this case, however, because the MTA has failed to show that it performed a discretionary governmental function when committing the allegedly negligent acts. Additionally, the court held that expert testimony was not required in this case. Further, the court could not say that the evidence supporting the jury’s verdict for Plaintiff was legally insufficient. View "Ojeda v. MTA" on Justia Law

During a decade as a member of USA Gymnastics, J.J. was one of the hundreds of gymnasts sexually assaulted by Larry Nassar, the organization’s physician. In response to the claims based on Nassar’s conduct, USA Gymnastics filed for bankruptcy. The bankruptcy court set a deadline for filing proofs of claim. USA Gymnastics mailed notices to all known survivors who had filed or threatened to file lawsuits, had reported abuse, had entered into a settlement agreement, or had received payment as a result of an allegation of abuse--more than 1,300 individuals. USA Gymnastics also emailed copies of the notice to more than 360,000 current and former USA Gymnastics members, and placed information about the bar date on its website, social media pages, in USA Today, and in gymnastics journals, podcasts, and websites J.J. did not receive actual notice and filed her proof of claim five months late.The bankruptcy court treated her claim as untimely. The district court and Seventh Circuit affirmed. J.J. argued that she was entitled to actual notice; she claimed USA Gymnastics should have known that she was a potential claimant because it needed to retain medical records under Michigan law and should have known that she had seen Nassar for medical care. The court found no evidence that USA Gymnastics had these records; J.J.’s argument that Michigan law required retention of any relevant documents “is dubious.” View "Jane Doe JJ v. USA Gymnastics" on Justia Law