Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

A trooper with the Louisiana State Police was responding to a car crash when a driver, driving a tractor-trailer owned by Nu Line Transport, crashed into the parked vehicle in which Plaintiff was sitting. The trooper and his wife on behalf of themselves and their two minor children (collectively “Plaintiffs”) filed a lawsuit in state court seeking damages for personal injury and loss of consortium. Plaintiffs alleged that the crash was proximately caused by (1) negligence on the part of the truck driver (for which the Plaintiffs sought to hold Nu Line vicariously liable), and (2) negligence on the part of Nu Line in its hiring, training, and supervision of the driver.   Before rendering a decision, the Fifth Circuit certified the following question of law to the Louisiana Supreme Court for rendition of a judgment or opinion concerning such questions or propositions of Louisiana law:   Under Louisiana law, can Plaintiffs, individually and on behalf of their minor children, simultaneously maintain (1) a direct negligence claim against Nu Line for negligent hiring, training, and supervision of its employee and (2) a negligence claim against the employee for which Nu Line could be held vicariously liable under respondeat superior, (3) after Nu Line has stipulated that the employee was in the course and scope of employment when the alleged negligence occurred?   The court explained that certification was appropriate because this proceeding involves a question or proposition of Louisiana state law that is determinative of said cause independently of any other questions involved in said case and that there are no clear controlling precedents. View "Fox v. Nu Line Transport" on Justia Law

Plaintiff led police on a high-speed chase through a residential neighborhood. Once Plaintiff exited his vehicle, Defendant sheriff's deputy tased Plaintiff. Plaintiff sued the deputy, claiming he violated Defendant's Fourth Amendment Rights. The District Court denied the deputy's claim of qualified immunity, finding there were material factual disputes as to whether a reasonable officer would have viewed Plaintiff as an immediate threat; whether Plaintiff's apparent surrender was a ploy to evade arrest; and whether Plaintiff was tased once or twice.The Fifth Circuit reversed. After considering the threat posed by Plaintiff in fleeing law enforcement as well as the force used by the deputy, the court determined that the deputy did not violate Plaintiff's clearly established constitutional rights under the Fourth Amendment. Thus, Plaintiff was unable to overcome the bar of qualified immunity. View "Salazar v. Molina" on Justia Law

A carrier for the United States Postal Service was involved in an automobile accident that killed another motorist. He had already completed his delivery route and returned undeliverable mail to the post office. Plaintiff, the trustee for the motorist’s heirs, sued under the Federal Tort Claims Act. The district court found that the employee was not acting within the scope of employment at the time of the accident. It dismissed the FTCA claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed the dismissal. The court explained that the FTCA waives federal sovereign immunity for injuries ‘caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the Government while acting within the scope of his office or employment, under circumstances where the United States, if a private person, would be liable. While Plaintiff cites cases imposing or contemplating vicarious liability where employees cause accidents while driving personal vehicles, those cases did not find that employees were acting within the scope of employment because they were driving their own vehicles. Rather, they observe that an employer is not relieved of liability because the employee was driving his or her own car.   Because the employee was not within the scope of employment at the time of the accident, the FTCA does not waive federal sovereign immunity. Thus, the district court properly dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. View "Jason Blais v. United States" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the judgment of the circuit court affirming the decision of the Department of Labor of Regulation granting Employer/Insurer's motion for summary judgment regarding medical expenses Claimant incurred while being treated by Dr. Donald Corenman, holding that the circuit court erred in part.Employer and Insurer denied coverage for the medical expenses Claimant incurred by being treated for her back injury by Dr. Corenman. Claimant filed a petition for hearing with the Department, which granted summary judgment for Employer/Insurer as to these medical expenses. The circuit court affirmed. Claimant appealed, and Employer/Insurer filed a notice of review regarding an earlier Department ruling. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding that the Department erred in granting summary judgment denying compensation for Dr. Corenman's medical services. View "Dittman v. Rapid City School District" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that the circuit court did not err when it granted Nationwide's motion for summary judgment on its complaint seeking a declaratory judgment regarding its duty to indemnify and defend Defendants against a personal injury lawsuit stemming from an accident on their farm.Nationwide issued a farm liability insurance policy for Defendants' farm and cattle ranch operation. After an accident resulted in permanent injuries to a relative, the relative filed a personal injury action against Defendants and their business entities. Nationwide then commenced this declaratory judgment action to determine the extent of its obligation to defend or indemnify Defendants. The circuit court granted summary judgment for Nationwide, concluding that a "Recreational Vehicle Liability Coverage Endorsement" in the policy operated to exclude coverage for the accident. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court properly granted summary judgment based on the language in the Recreational Vehicle Endorsement. View "Nationwide Agribusiness v. Fitch" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court vacated the decision of the court of appeals affirming the summary judgment and fees ordered by the trial court in favor of Defendants' right to direct payment of basic reparation benefits within an element of loss under Kentucky's Motor Vehicle Reparations Act, holding that this Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over this appeal.Defendants were involved in a collision while in a vehicle insured by Erie Insurance Exchange. Erie filed a declaratory judgment action to determine whether it was required to pay bills within an element of loss in an order directed by secured persons. Defendants filed a counterclaim seeking attorney's fees and excess interest for the unreasonable delay of the payment of their bills caused by Erie. The trial court granted Defendants' motion for an attorney's fee and denied Erie's second summary judgment motion, but did not indicate in its order that it granted Defendants' motion for summary judgment. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court vacated the order below, holding that no final and appealable orders were before the Court, and therefore, this Court lacked jurisdiction over the appeal. View "Erie Insurance Exchange v. Johnson" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals declining to extend the holding in Livingood v. Transfreight, LLC, 467 S.W.3d 249 (Ky. 2015) to Ky. Rev. Stat. 342.730(1)(c)1, otherwise known as the three-multiplier, holding that this Court declines to extend Livingood to the three-multiplier.At issue was whether the holding in Livingood "that the legislature did not intend to reward an employee's wrongdoing with a double benefit" should be extended to preclude application of the three-multiplier when a claimant has been terminated for misconduct. Claimant in this case was allegedly fired for filing false information on a company report. The ALJ found that Claimant retained a permanent impairment due to a work injury and that this case justified application of the three-multiplier. The Workers' Compensation Board affirmed, determining that Livingood did not apply to the three-multiplier. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that nothing in the statue or the facts below requires extension of Livingood to section 342.730(1)(c)1. View "Tractor Supply v. Wells" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals affirming the order of the Workers Compensation Board reversing an Administrative Law Judge's (ALJ) application of the 2x multiplier in Ky. Rev. Stat. 342.730(1)(c)2, holding that there was no error.After suffering a work-related injury Claimant continued working his normal job for almost one year before he was laid off for unrelated reasons. The ALJ determined that, since Claimant earned no wage after the lay-off he qualified for the 2x multiplier, which doubles a claimant's benefits if the claimant returns to work after injury at the same or higher wages but subsequently experiences a cessation of that employment. The Board reversed as to the application of the 2x multiplier, determining that there was no "return" to work under section 342.730(1)(c)2. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the ALJ misapplied the law to the facts. View "Helton v. Rockhampton Energy, LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff’s guardian ad litem filed suit against Defendants for damages resulting from personal injuries suffered by Plaintiff in connection with a bicycle accident that occurred at Defendants’ residence when Plaintiff was six years old. The jury determined, by special verdict, that Defendant was not negligent. Judgment was entered in favor of Defendant.   Plaintiff challenged the trial court’s rulings on three motions in limine. The first motion in limine sought permission for Plaintiff’s counsel to give a brief opening statement prior to voir dire questioning. The remaining two motions sought to exclude testimony from two witnesses. Plaintiff also challenged the court’s denial of his motion for a new trial.   The Fifth Appellate District affirmed the trial court’s judgment denying Plaintiff’s motion for a new trial.  Ultimately, the court held that Plaintiff’s motion for a new trial was grounded upon the same arguments he made on appeal. The court reasoned that a trial judge is accorded wide discretion in ruling on a motion for a new trial and the exercise of this discretion is given great deference on appeal. Here, Defendant acknowledges he did not file an opposition to Plaintiff’s motion for a new trial. Plaintiff contends that, as a result, Defendant has now waived all opposition to the legal errors and abuse of judicial discretion Plaintiff raised in his Motion for New Trial, as well as on appeal. However, neither authority Plaintiff cites stands for the proposition that the failure to oppose a motion for a new trial operates to waive any argument on appeal that the judgment should be affirmed. View "D.D. v. Pitcher" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, seven adults who claimed they were molested by a priest when they were children, brought suit against The Roman Catholic Archbishop of Los Angeles and related parties ("Defendants"). The Plaintiffs' claims were that the Defendants ratified the assaults and acted negligently in failing to supervise the priest who committed the assaults.In response, Defendants moved to strike the complaint, claiming that some of the acts that allegedly ratified the priest's conduct, as well as those serving as the basis for the allegations of negligence, constituted speech and litigation conduct that was protected under California's anti-SLAPP law (Code Civ. Proc. § 425.16). The district court rejected Defendants' anti-SLAPP motion.The Second Appellate District affirmed. As to the ratification claims, the court held that Defendants mischaracterized Plaintifffs' complaint, "cherry-picking allegations of litigation conduct, and, without support, suggesting that they are the only allegations incorporated by reference into the sexual abuse cause of action."As to the negligence claims, Defendants too narrowly construed Plaintiffs' complaint, focusing only on what Defendants claim was protected speech. Any allegations in Plaintiffs' complaint that may have been "conclusory" when taken out of context, were supported by factual allegations earlier in the complaint. View "Ratcliff v. Roman Catholic Archbishop of L.A." on Justia Law