Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs appeal from a judgment of dismissal entered as to Defendants State of California, acting by and through the California Highway Patrol (CHP), and CHP Sergeant (together, the CHP defendants), after the trial court sustained without leave to amend the CHP defendants’ demurrers to the Plaintiffs’ first amended complaint. Plaintiffs asserted on behalf of their deceased son claims for negligence and wrongful death after CHP Sergeant’s patrol car struck and killed Plaintiffs’ son while Langford was responding to an emergency call concerning an altercation on the freeway. The trial court found the claims against the CHP defendants were barred by investigative immunity conferred under California Government Code section 821.6 (section 821.6).The Second Appellate Division affirmed the trial court’s sustaining the Sergeant’s demurrer based on Plaintiffs’ concession at oral argument that the Sergeant is entitled to immunity as an emergency responder under California Vehicle Code section 17004. However, because California Vehicle Code section 17001 provides an independent statutory basis for CHP’s liability based on the Sergeant’s alleged negligence, the court did not reach the scope and application of section 821.6 immunity, and the court reversed the judgment as to CHP and remand for further proceedings. View "Silva v. Langford" on Justia Law

The appeals at issue involve two conceptually different causes of action against separate Defendants. These claims were pled together and tried to a jury empaneled for each claim. In one claim, Plaintiff, an at-will employee of a sheriff’s office, sued the sheriff, alleging that he made false and stigmatizing statements in terminating her employment that deprived her of a liberty interest in her reputation without affording her a post-termination hearing to clear her name in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. In the other claim, Plaintiff alleged that a sheriff’s office co-employee, whom she supervised, defamed her in violation of state tort law. The jury found for Plaintiff on both claims. Defendants’ appealed the judgments entered pursuant to the jury’s verdicts in No. 18-14808. In No. 19-13269, the sheriff appealed the judgment awarding Plaintiff an attorney’s fee on the claim brought against him.The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the judgment in No. 18-14808 and vacated and remand for further proceedings the judgment for attorney’s fee in No. 19-13269. The court held that because the defamation claim and the due process claim are unrelated, it was an error for the district court to consider the hours expended on the defamation claim in determining the lodestar. The court explained that Plaintiff had the burden of establishing the hours her attorneys spent in preparing for and prosecuting her due process claim against the Sheriff. Thus on remand, the district court must hold Plaintiff to her burden of proof so that it can identify the non-compensable hours and adjust the lodestar accordingly. View "Jacquelyn Johnston v. Gary S. Borders, et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs were fired from their Department of Public Safety positions with the Village of Bald Head Island (“the Village”), a municipality located in Brunswick County, North Carolina. Following their departures, Village employees published Plaintiffs’ termination letters and department separation affidavits which accused Plaintiffs of violating certain employee policy provisions. Plaintiffs filed suit alleging numerous claims. As relevant here, they brought defamation claims under North Carolina state law against the Village;.the Village Town Manager (“Manager”) ; and the Village Director of Public Safety (“Director”). The district court dismissed the defamation claims against the Village but found the Manager and Director liable for defamation for publishing the termination letters and separation affidavits, respectively. Defendants appealed and Plaintiffs cross-appealed as to the dismissal of the Village.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s (1) judgment against the Manager for libel per se arising from publication of the separation affidavits; (2) dismissal of all defamation claims against the Village; (3) denial of leave to amend to add the August 28, 2014 email as a third publication; (4) exclusion of the August 28 email for other purposes; (5) exclusion of Facebook posts; and (6) denial of Plaintiffs’ untimely Rule 59(e) motion seeking prejudgment interest. The court reversed the district court’s judgment against the Manager on all libel claims stemming from the publication of the termination letters for lack of actual malice. Finally, the court denied Plaintiffs’ pending motion, purportedly filed under Rule 60, “for corrections based on clerical mistakes, oversights, and omissions.” View "Thomas Cannon v. Calvin R. Peck, Jr." on Justia Law

A trial jury disbelieved Plaintiff’s claim that a 2017 rear-end accident caused him $1.5 million in damages. The jury awarded Plaintiff nothing finding the 2017 accident with Defendant caused Plaintiff no injury. Plaintiff appealed and the Second Appellate District affirmed the trial court’s judgment.   The court explained that Plaintiff incorrectly faulted the trial court for refusing to direct a verdict on the issue of causation. Plaintiff told the trial court that causation was undisputed: that everyone agreed the 2017 accident caused Plaintiff at least some injury, so Plaintiff deserved a directed verdict on causation. This argument is inaccurate Plaintiff bases this claim—on the root idea that the defense expert conceded the 2017 accident caused Plaintiff a new neck injury, different from the one Plaintiff claimed from 2016. The defense witness did not concede causation, rather the evidence put causation in play.   Next, Plaintiff argued no substantial evidence supports the defense verdict. Plaintiff’s medical witnesses opined the 2017 accident injured him, but Plaintiff had hidden his 2016 accident from them. Thus, substantial evidence supported the verdict. Third, Plaintiff argued the jury instructions and verdict form led the jury astray, but if there was any error, he invited it. View "Davis v. Harano" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against the Iredell-Statesville School District Board of Education (“ISSD”) and several individual defendants, alleging federal constitutional and statutory claims, as well as state law claims for negligence and negligent inflection of emotional distress arising from school officials’ mistreatment of her son.  Some of the defendants timely moved to dismiss, asserting that the state law negligence claims against them in their individual capacities were barred by public official immunity under North Carolina law.   The district court granted their motion in part and dismissed all federal claims against the appellants. But as for the state law negligence claims, it denied the school officials’ motion to dismiss. It concluded that the school officials were not entitled to public official immunity for a breach of a ministerial duty to report child abuse.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of Plaintiff’s negligence claims. The court reasoned that the school officials’ actions at issue here were discretionary. What to do when faced with allegations of a teacher mistreating her student is not a decision that can be made automatically, without regard to the administrator’s judgment.  Further, Plaintiff’s claim was against public officials, in their individual capacities, for state law negligence. For such claims, North Carolina law dictates that the plaintiff may only pierce public official immunity by “showing that the defendant-official’s tortious conduct falls within one of the immunity exceptions. Plaintiff has not satisfied this obligation because she did not allege malice, or any other piercing exception, in the amended complaint. View "R.A. v. Brady Johnson" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court denying Defendants' renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law and request for a new trial in this negligence action, holding that there was no error or abuse of discretion.Plaintiff, the wrongful death representative for William Gray, brought this action against Defendants for the wrongful death of Gray following a motorcycle vehicle collision in a construction work zone, alleging that Defendants disregarded their duty to implement reasonably safe traffic control at an intersection. The district court entered judgment against Defendants and denied their motion for judgment as a matter of law and request for a new trial. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that there was no error in the proceedings below. View "JTL Group, Inc. v. Gray-Dockham" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the superior court ruling that Defendant did not owe a duty of care to eighteen-year-old Plaintiff at the time of an accident in a utility substation, holding that there was no error.Plaintiff was a trespasser at the substation when an accident occurred, resulting in the amputation of her left hand and a two-month hospital stay. Plaintiff brought this action alleging that Defendant, the property owner, owed a duty of care to maintain its substation in a reasonably safe condition and that, as a direct and proximate result of Defendant's negligence, Plaintiff was injured. The hearing justice granted summary judgment in favor of Defendant. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that no duty flowing to Plaintiff from Defendant ever arose under the circumstances of this case. View "Borgo v. Narragansett Electric Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiff was severely burned when the landing gear on a tanker-trailer detached from its tractor and sank into a gravel surface, causing the tanker-trailer to tip over and spill scalding water on him. Plaintiff brought a premises liability claim against the owner of the property and product liability claims against the owner of the tanker-trailer and three related companies. The district court dismissed his product liability claims on the pleadings and his premises liability claim on summary judgment.The Fifth Circuit held that the district court did not apply the proper standard for evaluating the plausibility of George’s pleadings under Federal R. of Civ. Pro. 12(b)(6). Further, the court held that the district court erroneously concluded that Chapter 95 of the Texas Civil Practice & Remedies Code governed Plaintiff's premises liability claim. Thus the court affirmed in part, reversed in part, vacated the district court's judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "George v. SI Grp, et al" on Justia Law

Tymoc died in a single-car accident. At the time of the accident, Tymoc was traveling between 80-100 miles per hour; the speed limit was 60 miles per hour speed. As Tymoc attempted to pass multiple cars, the gap between a car in the right lane and a box truck in the left lane closed. Tymoc veered to the right, causing his vehicle to drive off the road, roll down an embankment, striking multiple trees, and flip over several times.Through his employer, Tymoc was covered by Unum life insurance; the policy provided both basic life insurance coverage and an additional accidental death benefit. Unum approved a $100,000 payment of group life insurance benefits but withheld $100,000 in accidental death benefits, explaining that Tymoc’s conduct—speeding and reckless driving—caused his death, thereby triggering the policy’s crime exclusion. In a suit under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C. 1001– 1191d, the district court entered in Fulkerson’s favor as to the accidental death benefits. The Sixth Circuit reversed. Reckless driving falls within the unambiguous plain meaning of crime. View "Fulkerson v. Unum Life Insurance Co. of America" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, a group of drivers, sued Defendants, a group of personal injury lawyers, after Defendants sought and obtained car accident reports from North Carolina law enforcement agencies and private data brokers and then sent Plaintiffs unsolicited attorney advertising material. Plaintiffs' claims were brought under the Driver’s Privacy Protection Act (“DPPA”).The district court held that, although Plaintiffs have standing to bring their claims, the claim failed on the merits.The Fourth Circuit affirmed. Plaintiffs have a legally recognizable privacy interest in the accident reports. However, Defendant's conduct in obtaining the records did not constitute a violation of DPPA. Defendants obtained Plaintiffs’ personal information from the accident reports; however, Plaintiffs failed to preserve the argument that those accident reports are“motor vehicle records under DPPA. View "William Garey v. James S. Farrin, P.C." on Justia Law