Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

This case centered on the loss of use or function of claimant’s right knee, specifically, reduced range of motion and decreased stability in that knee, that was determined to be entirely related to causes other than claimant’s compensable workplace injury. In addition, claimant had loss of use or function of that same knee, surgical value and chronic condition loss, that was related to the workplace injury. In claimant’s view, she was entitled to the full measure of impairment for all new findings of loss: the reduced range of motion, the decreased stability, the surgical value, and the chronic condition. On judicial review, the Court of Appeals agreed with claimant, holding that “claimant’s impairment ‘as a whole’ included her whole-person impairment, of which the work injury is a material contributing cause, as well as her impairment due to loss of range of motion and stability.” SAIF disagreed and sought review from the Oregon Supreme Court, arguing that findings of loss due entirely to causes other than the compensable injury did not satisfy the statutory definition of “impairment” and, accordingly, should be excluded from an injured worker’s permanent partial disability award. The Supreme Court agreed with SAIF: claimant was not entitled to compensation for the reduced range of motion and decreased stability findings of loss. Accordingly, the decision of the Court of Appeals was reversed and the order of the Workers’ Compensation Board affirmed. View "Robinette v. SAIF" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court affirming the decision of the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH) upholding the Wyoming Workers' Compensation Division's denial of Appellant's request for an endless pool to treat his work-related injury, holding that there was no error.Appellant requested that the Division preauthorize the purchase of a small pool with an underwater treadmill known as an endless pool to help him manage his medical condition. The Division denied the request in part, and the OAH upheld the determination. The district court affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the OAH had authority to decide this case; and (2) the OAH properly determined that Appellant was collaterally estopped from relitigating his right to an endless pool for treatment because the issue was fully decided in an earlier OAH order denying the claim. View "McCallister v. State, ex rel. Department of Workforce Services, Workers' Compensation Division" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the district court affirming the decision of the workers' compensation commissioner denying Petitioner's petition for benefits for trauma-induced mental injuries she suffered on the job while working as emergency dispatcher, holding that because Petitioner established that her PTSD resulted from a manifest happening of a sudden traumatic nature from an unexpected cause or unusual strain, Petitioner was entitled workers' compensation benefits.Petitioner, a sixteen-year veteran of the county emergency dispatch system, sought benefits for the PTSD she suffered after taking a 911 call from a woman screaming over and over at a high pitch, "Help me, my baby is dead." The workers' compensation commissioner and district court denied benefits, concluding that the mother's call wasn't an "unexpected cause or unusual strain." The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Petitioner was entitled to benefits because she established that her PTSD resulted from a manifest happening of a sudden traumatic nature from an unexpected cause or unusual strain. View "Tripp v. Scott Emergency Communication Center" on Justia Law

Claimant Elba Hawes appealed a decision of the New Hampshire Compensation Appeals Board (CAB) determining that he was not entitled to workers’ compensation benefits. Claimant was employed as a “ground man” for Asplundh Tree Expert, LLC. In November 2019, claimant and his fellow workers were working at a job site that was approximately 10-15 minutes away from a sandpit in Conway, where they punched in and punched out. On November 1, claimant reported to work for his regular 7:00 a.m. to 4:00 p.m. shift, punched in, left his personal vehicle at the sandpit, and traveled with his coworkers to the job site in company trucks. Because of an impending storm, the employer told its workers to stop work at noon, punch out, and go home and rest for the afternoon so they could return to the sandpit at 8:00 p.m. for storm cleanup activities through the night. It was not uncommon for the work schedule to change because of weather. As instructed, claimant left the job site with his coworkers, returned to the sandpit, and punched out at noon. Soon after driving away from the sandpit in his personal vehicle, the claimant was severely injured in a vehicular accident that was not his fault. Because of his accident-related injuries, the claimant was disabled from work from November 1, 2019, through February 9, 2020. The employer’s insurance carrier denied benefits on the ground that claimant’s injuries were not causally related to his employment. At claimant’s request, the matter was heard by a New Hampshire Department of Labor hearing officer, who ruled in the carrier’s favor. Claimant argued his injuries were compensable under the “special errand” exception to the coming and going rule. To this, the New Hampshire Supreme Court concurred: although it was not uncommon for the work schedule to change because of weather, the claimant’s trip home at noon was not part of his regular schedule. The claimant would not have left work at noon but for the employer’s direction to do so. Judgment was reversed and the matter remanded for further proceedings. View "Appeal of Hawes" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Aleice Jeter filed a negligence claim against Sam’s Club after sustaining injuries when she slipped on one or more grapes. Plaintiff stated that she fell while walking away from the checkout area, “halfway past” the fruit and vegetable aisle. Sam’s Club asserted several defenses, including lack of actual or constructive notice of the hazardous condition -- loose grapes on the floor. The trial court, after acknowledging that no party had moved for summary judgment, sua sponte conducted an N.J.R.E. 104(a) hearing to determine whether the "mode of operation" rule applied and, if not, whether plaintiff could provide some evidence of actual or constructive notice. The court agreed with Sam’s Club that the mode of operation rule did not apply, then proceeded to analyze the case under traditional negligence principles that require actual or constructive notice of the dangerous condition -- grapes on the floor. Finding that there was no evidence as to “how long this particular grape [was] on the floor,” the court held that plaintiff failed to meet her burden of proving actual or constructive notice and dismissed the case with prejudice. Finding no reversible error in the trial court's judgment, the New Jersey Supreme Court affirmed. View "Jeter v. Sam's Club" on Justia Law

In this appeal, the issue presented for the New Jersey Supreme Court in this case was whether a plaintiff had to submit an affidavit of merit (AOM) in support of a vicarious liability claim against a licensed health care facility based on the alleged negligent conduct of an employee who was not a “licensed person” under the AOM statute. Plaintiff Troy Haviland brought a claim against defendant Lourdes Medical Center of Burlington County, Inc., alleging, as relevant here, that an unnamed radiology technician employed by defendant negligently performed his radiological imaging examination, causing serious injuries. Defendant filed a motion to dismiss plaintiff’s complaint for failure to serve an AOM, which was granted. The Appellate Division reversed, determining that an AOM was not required when a plaintiff’s claim against a licensed person was limited solely to vicarious liability, based upon the alleged negligence of an employee who was not a licensed person under the AOM statute. To this the Supreme Court concurred: the AOM statute did not require submission of an AOM to support a vicarious liability claim against a licensed health care facility based only on the conduct of its non-licensed employee. View "Haviland v. Lourdes Medical Center of Burlington County, Inc." on Justia Law

Defendants Township of Sparta, Paul Austin, and Sparta Department of Public Works (collectively, defendants) challenged a denial of workers’ compensation benefits to plaintiff Diane Lapsley under the Workers’ Compensation Act. Lapsley was employed by the Township as a librarian for the Sparta Public Library. On February 3, 2014, Lapsley’s husband arrived at the library to drive Lapsley home. As they walked from the library to the car through the parking lot, they were suddenly struck by a snowplow owned by the Township and operated by Paul Austin, a Township employee. As a result, Lapsley suffered injuries to her leg requiring multiple surgeries and leaving her permanently disfigured. Lapsley filed a complaint against defendants in court, and later, a claim for workers’ compensation benefits against the Township in the Law Division of Workers’ Compensation. The Division found that Lapsley’s injuries arose out of and in the course of her employment and were therefore compensable under the Workers’ Compensation Act. Lapsley appealed, and the Appellate Division reversed, finding Lapsley’s injuries were not compensable under the Act. The New Jersey Supreme Court concluded Lapsley’s injuries arose out of and in the course of her employment because the parking lot where she was injured was owned and maintained by the Township, adjacent to her place of work, and used by Township employees to park. Lapsley was therefore entitled to benefits under the Workers’ Compensation Act. View "Lapsley v. Township of Sparta" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the order of the district court granting a motion for relief from a default judgment under Nev. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(1) and (6), despite the fact that the motion was filed more than fourteen months after service of written notice of entry of default, holding that the district court abused its discretion in granting Rule 60(b) relief.Plaintiff filed a complaint alleging that he was attacked by security guards on Defendant's premises and that Defendant was negligent in its duty to maintain the premises in a reasonably safe condition. Default was later entered against Defendant. Over fourteen months later Defendant filed a motion to set aside the judgment and stay execution on the ground of mistake or excusable neglect under Rule 60(b)(1) and any other reason justifying relief under Rule 60(b)(6). The district court found sufficient ground for relief under both rules. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) this Court had jurisdiction over this appeal; (2) Rule 60(b)(6) may not be used as a subterfuge to circumvent the time limits that apply to a request for relief based on Rule 60(b)(1); and (3) the district court abused its discretion in granting relief under Rule 60(b)(6). View "Vargas v. J Morales Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed the district court’s summary judgment dismissal of the breach of contract claims that he has asserted, as a third-party beneficiary, against Defendant. The district court determined that the insurer’s duty to defend its insured, on which Plaintiff’s claims were based, was never triggered, relative to Plaintiff’s underlying personal injury suit, because the insured, N.F. Painting, Inc., never requested a defense or sought coverage.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed finding no error in the district court’s assessment under Texas law. The court explained that it is well-established, that under Texas law, despite having knowledge and opportunity, an insurer is not required to simply interject itself into a proceeding on its insured’s behalf.   Here, as stated, N.F. Painting did not seek defense or coverage from Defendant when it was served with Plaintiff’s original state court petition. The undisputed facts show that N.F. Painting chose, with the assistance of counsel, to handle Plaintiff’s personal injury claims in its own way, without involving Defendantin its defense, as it was entitled to do. And Plaintiff has put forth no evidence suggesting that Defendant was not entitled to rely on that decision. Having made that decision, it is N.F. Painting, and thus Plaintiff, as third-party beneficiary, not Defendant who must bear responsibility for any resulting adverse consequences. In other words, the law will not permit a third-party beneficiary to simply disregard an insured’s litigation decisions, i.e., essentially re-write history, merely because he has no other means of satisfying his judgment against the insured. View "Moreno v. Sentinel Ins" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs in this civil action served process on several of Defendants roughly a year after filing their complaint, in violation of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(m)’s 90-day time requirement for service. The district court found insufficient Plaintiffs’ efforts to establish “good cause” for the delay, and because the court understood that a showing of good cause was a condition for any extension, it dismissed Plaintiffs’ claims against these Defendants.   The Fourth Circuit concluded that the record amply supports the district court’s ruling that Plaintiffs failed to show good cause for their failure to serve Defendants within the time period provided by Rule 4(m). Nonetheless, the court vacated the district court’s order of dismissal concluding that Rule 4(m) confers discretion on district courts to extend the time period for service even when good cause has not been shown.   The court explained that it does not fault the district court for its ruling in conformance with Mendez. But in light of the court’s holding, it was necessary to vacate the district court’s dismissal of the Plaintiffs’ claims against the five health care provider Defendants and remand to allow the court to consider in the first instance the parties’ arguments as to whether the court should exercise its discretion to extend the time for serving those defendants in the circumstances of this case, even though good cause was not shown. View "Edward Gelin v. Kyle Shuman" on Justia Law