Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court denied a petition for writ of mandamus sought by Relators for relief from trial court orders granting Christina Broussard's motions to quash certain discovery subpoenas in this case brought by Broussard against Relators for personal injuries and economic losses following a rear-end collision, holding that the discovery requests sought relevant information.The subpoenas sought post-accident medical-billing information from Broussard's medical providers and third-party production of Broussard's pre-accident medical, education, employment, and insurance records. Relators argued that the requested discovery was relevant to the issue of damages causally attributable to the accident. The trial court quashed the discovery subpoenas. The Supreme Court denied mandamus relief without prejudice to Relators' seeking relief, if necessary, after the trial court has had an opportunity to reconsider its rulings, holding that the trial court should reconsider its orders in light of this Court's opinion in In re K&L Auto Crushers, LLC, 627 S.W.3d 239 (Tex. 2021). View "In re Central Oregon Truck Co., Inc." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court in this case arising from the death of a television crew member who was shot and killed while filming law enforcement activities at the scene of a robbery when officers fired their weapons at the suspect, holding that there was no error.The filming in this case was conducted pursuant to a contract between the City of Omaha and the television production activity. The estate of the deceased crew member sued the city for wrongful death, and the city brought a third-party claim against the production company. The district court granted summary judgment against the city on its third-party claims. After a trial as to the estate's wrongful death claim, the court rendered judgment for the city, ruling that the wrongful death action was barred by sovereign immunity. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in its judgment. View "Dion v. City of Omaha" on Justia Law

Plaintiff slipped on a puddle of water and broke her hip shortly after boarding a Carnival cruise ship. She then sued the cruise line for negligence. The district court granted summary judgment for Carnival, holding that it lacked a duty to protect Plaintiff because its crewmembers had neither actual nor constructive notice of the particular puddle that caused her fall.   The Eleventh Circuit reversed and remanded to the district court, holding that the district court’s grant of summary judgment to Defendant on the basis that Defendant lacked notice was improper. The court found that the district court failed to faithfully follow Carroll. (Carroll v. Carnival Corp., 955 F.3d 1260, 1264 (11th Cir. 2020.) The relevant question, in this case, was whether Carnival “had actual or constructive knowledge that the pool deck where [Plaintiff] fell could be slippery (and therefore dangerous) when wet.” The fact that warning signs were “posted on the pool deck” in the general area of Plaintiff’s fall, when “viewed in the light most favorable to [Plaintiff], is enough to withstand summary judgment as to notice.” View "Mary Brady v. Carnival Corporation" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the district court denying Appellant's request for a declaration that Nev. Rev. Stat. 42.021 precluded Respondent from recovering its workers' compensation payments from Appellant's medical malpractice settlement proceeds, holding that the statute applies only to situations in which a medical malpractice defendant introduces evidence of a plaintiff's collateral source benefits.Appellant brought this action against Respondent asserting claims for declaratory and injunctive relief and claiming that Nev. Rev. Stat. 42.021(2) prohibited Respondent from asserting a lien against her settlement proceeds and seeking an injunction requiring Respondent to continue paying her workers' compensation benefits. The district court denied Appellant's motion for partial summary judgment and granted Respondent's Nev. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(5) motion, concluding that section 42.021's plain language applied only to actions where third-party payments were introduced into evidence and did not apply to cases that settled before trial. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the plain language of sections 42.021(1) and (2) prohibits a payer of collateral source benefits from seeking reimbursement from a medical malpractice plaintiff only when the medical malpractice defendant introduces evidence of those payments. View "Harper v. Copperpoint Mutual Insurance Holding Co." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court dismissing this complaint alleging negligence for failure to state a claim, holding that there was no error.Neva Larue Moses negligently collided with another vehicle while driving a vehicle owned and insured by Moses Inc., killing her and the other driver. Moses Inc.'s insurer settled the ensuing negligence claim and then canceled Moses Inc.'s policy. Moses Inc. brought this claim against the Estate of Neva Larue Moses and the Neva Larue Moses Living Trust, arguing that the defendants were liable for its increased insurance costs from another insurer. The district court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that a person who borrows another person's vehicle does not owe the vehicle owner a duty to protect it from increased insurance costs. View "Moses Inc. v. Moses" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the superior court in favor of the Treasurer for the City of Providence (the City) and dismissing Plaintiff's personal injury claim, holding that the trial justice erred in entering judgment in favor of the City.Plaintiff fell into a manhole that was covered with a loose pallet. The jury returned a verdict in favor of Plaintiff and awarded him $87,500 in damages. The City filed a motion for judgment as a matter of law, arguing that the City was immune from liability pursuant to the public duty doctrine. The trial justice granted the motion for judgment as a matter of law. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment below, holding that the trial justice erred in determining that the egregious conduct exception to the public duty doctrine did not apply because the judge usurped the jury's fact-finding function. View "Battaglia v. Lombardi" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a personal injury lawsuit against a Hilton hotel after she was allegedly hit by a shuttle operated by Hilton. Although Hilton denied liability, mid-trial the parties settled for $85,000. The trial court confirmed Plaintiff's desire to accept the agreement on the record. Through different counsel, Plaintiff later filed a motion to rescind the settlement agreement, claiming counsel forced her to accept the agreement. According to Plaintiff, counsel stated that if she did not accept the settlement "he would not be coming back to trial tomorrow."The trial court denied Plaintiff's motion and the Second Appellate District affirmed. The court explained that Hilton was not involved in any potential duress, but was unaware of counsel's refusal to resume proceedings if Plaintiff did not accept the agreement. The court explained the contract was not voidable because Hilton acted in good faith and lacked knowledge of any potential duress. View "Fettig v. Hilton Garden Inns Management LLC" on Justia Law

Daniel Schafer, a teacher at a high school in the Anderson Union High School District (District), had a sexual relationship on school premises with one of his students, plaintiff Jane Doe. Doe sued the District, principal Carol Germano, and superintendent Tim Azevedo for negligent hiring and negligent supervision. The trial court granted the District’s motion for summary judgment and entered judgment in favor of the District, finding that there was no evidence the District knew or should have known that Schafer posed a risk of harm to students. On appeal, Doe contended the trial court erred by granting summary judgment because the District had a duty to supervise and monitor Schafer and Doe, and whether the District breached its duty to Doe was a question of fact for the jury to decide. The Court of Appeal affirmed, finding that on the trial court record, the District did not have a duty to review alarm data and video recordings in order to constantly monitor all teachers, students, and campus visitors, nor did it have such a duty specifically with regard to Schafer and Doe. View "Doe v. Anderson Union High School Dist." on Justia Law

Plaintiff-appellant John Coates brought an action for breach of contract and breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing against defendant-appellee Progressive Direct Insurance Company. Plaintiff was injured after a motorcycle collision; he was insured by Progressive under a motorcycle policy, an auto policy, and a policy providing UM coverage. Coates moved for partial summary judgment regarding his entitlement to uninsured/underinsured motorist benefits. Progressive moved for summary judgment regarding Coates' bad faith claim. Coates sought more time to conduct discovery to address Progressive's counterclaim on bad faith. The trial court granted Coates' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, allowing his UM claim against Progressive. The trial court also granted Progressive's Motion for Summary Judgment, denying Coates' claim for breach of duty of good faith and fair dealing. The trial court denied Coates' Motion for Additional Time to Respond. After review of the parties’ arguments on appeal, the Oklahoma Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s grant of partial summary judgment on Coates' UM claim. The Court reversed, however, the decisions granting Progressive's Motion for Summary Judgment and denying Coates additional time to respond to that motion. View "Coates v. Progressive Direct Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiff and his wife were passengers on a cruise aboard a ship operated by Defendant. A verbal altercation between Plaintiff and another passenger ensued and while the security officer turned to speak to Plaintiff, the other passenger punched Plaintiff in the face.   Plaintiff alleged that Defendant was negligent because it failed to (a) reasonably and properly train security personnel; (b) have adequate security measures, including adequate security presence and surveillance cameras; (c) warn him of the danger of being physically assaulted while onboard the vessel; (d) promulgate and enforce policies and procedures designed to prevent passengers from physically assaulting other passengers; and (e) exercise reasonable care under the circumstances. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendant, ruling that there was no evidence suggesting that Defendant had actual or constructive notice of the risk of harm.   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the grant of summary judgment to Defendant and denied Plaintiff’s motion for sanctions. The court held that Plaintiff has not presented sufficient evidence to create an issue of fact as to whether Defendant had actual notice that any passengers would attack him. The court reasoned that in the context of passenger-on-passenger violence, a cruise line has a duty to warn and/or protect when it or its employees reasonably apprehend the danger such that the attack was foreseeable. However, while the presence of a security officer during disembarkation connotes some awareness of the importance of order, a verbal dispute does not provide actual notice that a physical assault is to follow. View "Reinier Fuentes v. Classica Cruise Operator Ltd, Inc." on Justia Law