Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

Randy Wiertella died in the Lake County Adult Detention Facility on December 10, 2018. Dennis Wiertella, as the Administrator of Randy's estate, filed a lawsuit claiming that Randy's constitutional rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments were violated by Jail staff Diane Snow, RN, and Christina Watson, LPN. Randy had been booked into the Jail without his essential medications for heart disease, diabetes, high blood pressure, and a psychiatric disorder. Despite multiple requests, he did not receive all necessary medications, leading to his death from hypertensive cardiovascular disease.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio denied Snow and Watson's motion for summary judgment, which sought dismissal based on qualified immunity. The court found that there were genuine disputes of material fact regarding whether Snow and Watson were aware of the substantial risk to Randy's health and whether they failed to respond reasonably.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that Snow and Watson were not entitled to qualified immunity. The court found that both nurses were aware of Randy's serious medical conditions and the need for continuous medication. Despite this knowledge, they failed to ensure that Randy received his essential medications in a timely manner. The court concluded that their actions were unreasonable and violated Randy's constitutional rights. The court affirmed the district court's decision and remanded the case for further proceedings on the Estate's § 1983 claim. View "Wiertella v. Lake County" on Justia Law

Allen Turner died from surgical complications, leading his daughter, Norkesia Turner, to sue Drs. William Thompson and Heather Nolan, and their employer, the Medical Center of Central Georgia, Inc. (MCCG), for medical malpractice and wrongful death. The jury awarded Turner approximately $7.2 million in noneconomic damages for wrongful death. MCCG moved to reduce this award to the statutory cap of $350,000 under OCGA § 51-13-1 (b) and (c), but the trial court denied the motion, citing the Georgia Supreme Court's decision in Atlanta Oculoplastic Surgery, P.C. v. Nestlehutt, which found such caps unconstitutional.MCCG appealed to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the trial court's decision, reasoning that the Nestlehutt decision foreclosed MCCG's argument. The Court of Appeals held that the $7.2 million award did not need to be reduced to the statutory cap. MCCG then petitioned the Supreme Court of Georgia for a writ of certiorari, which was granted to address whether the Court of Appeals properly applied the precedent regarding the constitutional right to trial by jury.The Supreme Court of Georgia did not decide whether the application of OCGA § 51-13-1’s caps to the $7.2 million award would violate Turner’s constitutional right to a jury trial. Instead, it found that the lower courts had not applied the correct analytical framework from Nestlehutt to the wrongful death claim. The Supreme Court clarified that the holding in Nestlehutt was specific to medical malpractice claims and did not control the issue in this case. Consequently, the Supreme Court vacated the decision of the Court of Appeals and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "THE MEDICAL CENTER OF CENTRAL GEORGIA, INC. v. TURNER" on Justia Law

A local housing authority, authorized by state statute and activated by city government, faced a personal injury lawsuit. The plaintiff alleged that the authority negligently failed to ensure the safety of the apartment complex where she was shot. The authority claimed sovereign immunity, arguing it was an instrumentality of the state, a municipal corporation, and an instrumentality of the municipality.The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the housing authority, concluding it was protected by sovereign immunity under all three claims. The Court of Appeals affirmed, focusing on the authority's status as an instrumentality of the municipality. The appellate court relied on case law regarding state instrumentalities and concluded that the authority was entitled to sovereign immunity.The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the case and found that the Court of Appeals had incorrectly applied state instrumentality case law to determine municipal instrumentality immunity. The Supreme Court noted that the Georgia Constitution does not explicitly extend sovereign immunity to municipalities or their instrumentalities, and any such immunity must be derived from common law as of 1776. The Court found that neither the trial court nor the Court of Appeals had conducted the necessary common law analysis to determine if the housing authority was entitled to sovereign immunity as an instrumentality of the municipality.The Supreme Court vacated the Court of Appeals' judgment and remanded the case for further consideration under the proper analytical approach, specifically examining the common law scope and nature of sovereign immunity as it applied to municipal instrumentalities. View "GUY v. HOUSING AUTHORITY OF THE CITY OF AUGUSTA" on Justia Law

Bettie Leverette was shopping at a Walmart store in Conyers, Georgia, when two Walmart employees moving a 2,000-pound box on a pallet jack backed into her. Leverette initially reported no significant injury but later went to the hospital with head pain, blurred vision, and nausea. She was diagnosed with a mild traumatic brain injury and post-concussion syndrome. Leverette sued Walmart, claiming her symptoms were caused by the employees' negligence. At trial, Leverette's family and expert witnesses testified about her injuries and the projected costs of her future care, estimated between $2 million and $3.5 million. Walmart argued that Leverette's symptoms were due to pre-existing conditions and presented expert testimony to support this.The trial court gave a jury instruction on nominal damages at Walmart's request. Walmart suggested in closing arguments that nominal damages could be as low as $10 or as high as $500 but should not be $3 million. Leverette's counsel argued for over $5 million in damages. The jury awarded Leverette $1 million in nominal damages, leaving other damage categories blank. Walmart moved for a new trial, arguing the award was excessive, but the trial court denied the motion. The Court of Appeals affirmed, relying on precedent that nominal damages have no maximum limit.The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the case to determine if the $1 million award exceeded the limits on nominal damages under Georgia law. The court concluded that nominal damages, as adopted from English common law, are intended to be a trivial sum, important for the fact of the award but not meaningful in amount. The court overruled the Court of Appeals' precedent allowing large nominal damages and vacated the judgment. The case was remanded for the lower courts to resolve case-specific issues, including whether the error was invited by Walmart and the appropriate remedy. View "WALMART STORES EAST, LP v. LEVERETTE" on Justia Law

Robert Carbone, a Connecticut resident, sued two Swiss organizations and several individuals from California, Illinois, and Switzerland for defamation and other tortious conduct. Carbone, a member of the two Swiss organizations, claimed that the defendants used websites to publish defamatory statements about him and facilitate his removal from the organizations. He filed the lawsuit in Ohio, arguing that the defamatory statements passed through servers located in Ohio, which hosted the organizations' websites.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio dismissed Carbone's complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction. The court found that Carbone failed to establish that the defendants had sufficient contacts with Ohio to justify the court's jurisdiction over them. The defendants had not purposefully availed themselves of the privilege of acting in Ohio, as the servers' location in Ohio was chosen by third parties, not the defendants.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court held that the defendants did not purposefully avail themselves of the privilege of acting in Ohio, as their only connection to the state was the location of the servers, which was a decision made by third parties. The court also found that Carbone's claims did not arise from the defendants' activities in Ohio, as the allegedly defamatory statements were not directed at Ohio or its residents. Therefore, the exercise of personal jurisdiction over the defendants in Ohio would not comply with the Due Process Clause. View "Carbone v. Kaal" on Justia Law

Carl and Roberta Culp filed a lawsuit alleging federal and state law claims against various defendants, including Fort Wayne and Allen County police officers. The claims included excessive force under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress, assault and battery, criminal mischief, and violations of the Rehabilitation Act and the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). The incident in question occurred on August 20, 2018, when Carl Culp, a double amputee, expressed suicidal intentions during a psychiatric appointment, leading to police intervention.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Indiana granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants on most claims, leaving only Carl Culp’s § 1983 excessive force claim and state law claims against Officers Woods and Schulien for trial. A jury found in favor of the defendants on all claims except for Roberta Culp’s state law battery claim against Officer Woods, awarding her nominal damages of $1. The Culps appealed the summary judgment decision, and Woods and Schulien cross-appealed the denial of costs.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the district court did not err in granting summary judgment to the defendants, as the defendants’ brief complied with the local rules. The court also found that the Culps failed to present evidence of discrimination or failure to accommodate under the ADA and Rehabilitation Act. The court assumed, without deciding, that these laws applied to law enforcement actions but concluded that the evidence did not support the Culps' claims.Regarding the cross-appeal, the Seventh Circuit upheld the district court’s decision to deny costs to both parties, recognizing the mixed outcome of the case. The court affirmed the district court’s judgment in its entirety. View "Culp v. Caudill" on Justia Law

In 2012, Bill Simmon, an employee of Vermont Community Access Media, Inc. (VCAM), invited Ciara Kilburn and her minor sister Brona to VCAM’s premises to record a commercial. Simmon secretly recorded the sisters changing clothes using VCAM’s equipment and shared the videos online, where they were viewed millions of times. In 2020, the Kilburns filed a lawsuit against Simmon for invasion of privacy, intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED), and negligence per se, and against VCAM for vicarious liability, negligence, and negligent infliction of emotional distress (NIED).The Superior Court, Chittenden Unit, Civil Division, dismissed claims against Vermont State Colleges and did not instruct the jury on vicarious liability or NIED. The jury found Simmon liable for invasion of privacy and IIED, and VCAM liable for negligent supervision. Each plaintiff was awarded $1.75 million in compensatory damages against both Simmon and VCAM, and $2 million in punitive damages against Simmon. The court denied VCAM’s motions to exclude evidence, for a new trial, and for remittitur, and also denied plaintiffs’ request to hold VCAM jointly and severally liable for Simmon’s damages.The Vermont Supreme Court affirmed the lower court’s decision. It held that emotional-distress damages were available to plaintiffs for VCAM’s negligent supervision because the claim was based on intentional torts (invasion of privacy and IIED) for which such damages are recoverable. The court found no error in the jury’s award of damages, concluding that the evidence supported the verdict and that the damages were not excessive. The court also ruled that plaintiffs waived their claim for joint and several liability by not objecting to the jury instructions or verdict form before deliberations. View "Kilburn v. Simmon" on Justia Law

The case involves a wrongful-death action brought by the Estate of Jared Shaffer, through Daniel Shaffer as administrator, against Northeast Kingdom Human Services, Inc. Jared Shaffer, a developmentally disabled adult, died on April 18, 2017, from a sudden pulmonary embolism caused by metastatic testicular cancer. The estate claimed that the defendant, responsible for overseeing Jared's Medicaid waiver funds and coordinating his care, was negligent in its duties, leading to Jared's death.Initially, the estate sued Heartbeet Lifesharing, Dr. Peter Sher, and the defendant in federal court, but the case was dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction after a settlement with Dr. Sher’s medical practice. The estate then filed the wrongful-death action in the civil division against the defendant and Heartbeet. Before the trial, the estate settled with Heartbeet, leaving the case to be tried solely against the defendant. The defendant asserted a comparative negligence defense, implicating Daniel Shaffer, Jared's father and co-guardian, in Jared's death.The Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the case after the estate appealed a jury verdict in favor of the defendant. The estate argued that the trial court erred in instructing the jury on comparative negligence, providing misleading jury instructions, and sustaining objections to certain questions posed to the defendant’s corporate representative. The estate also contended that the jury deliberated too quickly and that the evidence overwhelmingly supported its claim of negligence.The Vermont Supreme Court found that while the trial court erred in conflating the identity of the plaintiff with Daniel Shaffer, the estate was not prejudiced because the jury never reached the question of comparative negligence, having found no negligence on the defendant's part. The court also upheld the trial court's evidentiary rulings and found no error in the jury's deliberation process. The jury's verdict in favor of the defendant was affirmed. View "Shaffer v. Northeast Kingdom Human Services, Inc." on Justia Law

A City of Houston police officer, while responding to an armed robbery, collided with another motorist, Maria Christina Gomez. The officer, Bobby Joe Simmons, was driving in heavy rain with his emergency lights on but did not engage his siren. He did not exceed the speed limit and applied his brakes when the traffic light turned yellow, but his car slid into the intersection and collided with Gomez's vehicle. Gomez sued the City for negligence, seeking damages for her injuries.The trial court granted the City’s plea to the jurisdiction, citing the Texas Tort Claims Act’s emergency exception, which preserves immunity unless the officer acted with "conscious indifference or reckless disregard for the safety of others." The Court of Appeals for the Fourteenth District of Texas reversed this decision, finding a fact question regarding the officer's recklessness. The City then supplemented its plea with additional evidence and appealed again after the trial court denied the plea.The Supreme Court of Texas reviewed the case de novo and concluded that the evidence showed, at most, ordinary negligence rather than recklessness. The court held that Simmons’s actions, including adjusting his radio and not exceeding the speed limit, did not demonstrate a willful or wanton disregard for safety. Consequently, the court reversed the Court of Appeals' judgment and rendered judgment dismissing Gomez’s claim against the City for lack of jurisdiction, reaffirming the City’s immunity under the Texas Tort Claims Act’s emergency exception. View "City of Houston v. Gomez" on Justia Law

Cesar Posada sued Osvanis Lozada and his employer, TELS, Inc., after a collision between their tractor-trailers. Posada claimed negligence and negligence per se against Lozada and sought to hold TELS vicariously liable. Lozada's tire unexpectedly lost air, causing his truck to jackknife and block the highway, leading to Posada crashing into it. Lozada and TELS filed no-evidence motions for summary judgment, which the trial court granted.The trial court in El Paso County granted the no-evidence motions for summary judgment filed by Lozada and TELS, dismissing Posada's claims. Posada's motions for a new trial were denied. The Court of Appeals for the Eighth District of Texas reversed the trial court's decision, holding that a reasonable jury could find that Lozada breached his duty of care and that his actions were the proximate cause of the collision. The court of appeals also reversed the summary judgment in favor of TELS, as their liability was predicated on Lozada's liability.The Supreme Court of Texas reviewed the case and concluded that Posada failed to produce summary-judgment evidence raising a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether Lozada breached his duty of care. The court noted that the evidence showed Lozada was driving under the speed limit when his tire rapidly lost air, causing the accident. There was no evidence Lozada acted negligently in response to the tire failure. Consequently, the Supreme Court of Texas reversed the court of appeals' judgment and reinstated the trial court's judgment, dismissing Posada's claims against Lozada and TELS with prejudice. View "Lozada v. Posada" on Justia Law