Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court reversed the order of the district court granting summary judgment in favor of Freedom Healthcare, LLC in this medical malpractice action, holding that the record presented genuine issues of material fact that precluded summary judgment.In his complaint, Plaintiff alleged that Freedom Healthcare acted negligently when it performed hemocyte tissue autograft therapy on Plaintiff's knees, causing an infection requiring extensive treatment and hospitalization. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Freedom Healthcare, concluding that Plaintiff had failed to put forward competent expert testimony that Freedom Healthcare had breached the applicable standard of care. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the district court erred when it disregarded Plaintiff's expert's testimony and granted summary judgment on negligence; and (2) there existed an inference of negligence under the theory of res ipsa loquitur, presenting a question of material fact for the fact-finder. View "Evans v. Freedom Healthcare, LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff was injured when a gun manufactured by the defendant accidentally discharged. Plaintiff and her family filed several claims in the district court. The district court dismissed all parties’ claims except the plaintiff’s defective-design claim under the Louisiana Product Liability Act. Plaintiff recovered $500,000 and the defendant appealed.On appeal, the Fifth Circuit reversed the district court’s finding that the Louisiana Product Liability Act (“LPLA”) permitted the plaintiff’s claim. Section 60(b) of the LPLA provides that no firearm manufacturer can be held liable for any shooting injury unless the injury was “proximately caused by the unreasonably dangerous construction or composition of the product.” The court held that this language unambiguously bars design-defect claims. The court also rejected the plaintiff’s argument that the natural reading of Section 60(b) leads to an absurd result. View "Seguin v. Remington Arms" on Justia Law

The plaintiffs filed suit in South Carolina state court against fourteen defendants (ten individuals and four agencies), alleging five causes of action. The circuit court reviewed five preserved issues: (1) the applicable statutes of limitations for plaintiffs' claims under the Rehabilitation Act ("RA") and the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"); (2) whether the district court abused its discretion in excluding the witnesses' testimonies; (3) the plaintiffs' assertion that the district court improperly instructed the jury as to the duty owed under the South Carolina Tort Claims Act; (4) whether the district court improperly dismissed plaintiff’s RA claims; and (5) whether the court erred in dismissing plaintiff’s 1983 claims.The circuit court affirmed the district court’s decision to limit the plaintiffs' witness's testimony and further found that the court did not abuse its discretion by limiting the hybrid witness's testimony or by determining whether the defendant’s deposition had any potential to lead to admissible evidence.Further, the court found no error in the district court’s instruction or its' finding that the ADA and RA claims were subject to the South Carolina Human Affairs Law’s one-year statute of limitations. The plaintiffs failed to show reversible error as they neither pleaded nor proved any action or inaction by any individually named defendants that caused them harm. View "Johnny Timpson v. Anderson County Disabilities" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed in part the decision of the circuit court granting summary judgment in favor of David Straight on Doug Gantvoort's claims asserting intentional invasion of privacy, aiding and abetting others in the invasion of his privacy, and civil conspiracy, holding that the circuit court erred in granting summary judgment as to the aiding and abetting count.Doug sued his former wife, Mary Ranschau, and Strait, her attorney, alleging claims arising from the divorce proceedings between Doug and Mary. During their divorce, Mary placed a hidden recording device in Doug's office, and Strait accepted fifty-one of those records, attempting to introduce two of them into evidence during trial. The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of Strait on all counts. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding that the circuit court (1) erred in granting Strait summary judgment on Doug's claim for aiding and abetting Mary's invasion of privacy; but (2) correctly granted summary judgment on the remaining counts. View "Gantvoort v. Ranschau" on Justia Law

Plaintiff alleges he was unlawfully assaulted, pepper-sprayed, detained in an unlawful mass arrest, and ultimately incarcerated. He sued the City of St. Louis and multiple police officers for First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendment violations, conspiracy to deprive him of civil rights, and supplemental state law claims. One officer moved to dismiss the 1983 claims, arguing plaintiff’s amended complaint failed to state a claim and he is entitled to qualified immunity. The only allegations relating to the defendant’s involvement are that he was working on September 17 and took custody of the plaintiff’s bicycle lying in the street at the time of his arrest. These allegations do not establish a causal link between the plaintiff and the specific wrongs the defendants as a whole allegedly committed. Further, the defendant is entitled to qualified immunity because the amended complaint did not contain specific and plausible allegations linking the defendant to overt acts alleged as part of the conspiracy of all the defendants. The assertion that he agreed to participate in those acts does not state a plausible claim.Finally, the circuit court held that the district court erred in denying the other defendants' motion to dismiss. The defendants are entitled to qualified immunity because the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine was not clearly established. View "Michael Faulk v. Gerald Leyshock" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court dismissed this appeal from the decision of the common pleas court entering a temporary restraining order (TRO) prohibiting Appellants from publishing the personal identifying information of Ryan Olthaus, a Cincinnati police officer, holding that the appeal was moot.Olthaus filed a complaint against Appellants alleging, among other claims, defamation and false-light invasion of privacy. The common pleas court granted a temporary restraining order (TRO) restraining Appellants from publicly disseminating Olthaus's personal identifying information. Appellants appealed the TRO. The court of appeals concluded that the TRO was not a final, appealable order. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that this matter was moot because the TRO expired. View "M.R. v. Niesen" on Justia Law

While shopping at a Wal-Mart Supercenter retail store in Weatherford, Texas, the plaintiff slipped and fell in the store’s deli section. Her amended complaint referred to the cause of her fall as “grease or a similar slick substance.” She alleged that Wal-Mart had either actual or constructive knowledge of the spilled grease yet failed to clean it up or warn her of the hazardous condition.Wal-Mart argued that the plaintiff’s testimony showed that she had no evidence that it had actual or constructive knowledge of the spill Plaintiff submitted an affidavit, and Wal-Mart objected that it “lack[ed] credibility” and was a “self-serving sham.” The Fifth Circuit explained that the sham-affidavit doctrine is not applicable when discrepancies between an affidavit and other testimony can be reconciled such that the statements are not inherently inconsistent.The court found that affidavit testimony did not inherently contradict her deposition testimony, and the district court abused its discretion in applying the sham-affidavit rule. Further, because the evidence shows a genuine dispute of material fact regarding whether Wal-Mart had constructive notice of the spilled grease, the district court erred in granting summary judgment. View "Seigler v. Wal-Mart Stores TX" on Justia Law

While shopping at a Wal-Mart Supercenter retail store in Weatherford, Texas, the plaintiff slipped and fell in the store’s deli section. Her amended complaint referred to the cause of her fall as “grease or a similar slick substance.” She alleged that Wal-Mart had either actual or constructive knowledge of the spilled grease yet failed to clean it up or warn her of the hazardous condition.Wal-Mart argued that the plaintiff’s testimony showed that she had no evidence that it had actual or constructive knowledge of the spill Plaintiff submitted an affidavit, and Wal-Mart objected that it “lack[ed] credibility” and was a “self-serving sham.” The Fifth Circuit explained that the sham-affidavit doctrine is not applicable when discrepancies between an affidavit and other testimony can be reconciled such that the statements are not inherently inconsistent.The court found that affidavit testimony did not inherently contradict her deposition testimony, and the district court abused its discretion in applying the sham-affidavit rule. Further, because the evidence shows a genuine dispute of material fact regarding whether Wal-Mart had constructive notice of the spilled grease, the district court erred in granting summary judgment. View "Svetlana Lokhova v. Stefan Halper" on Justia Law

Plaintiff’s, two patients at an acute psychiatric hospital, obtained judgments against the hospital and its parent company under the Elder Abuse and Dependent Adult Civil Protection Act (“the Elder Abuse Act”).On appeal, Defendants claimed that the Medical Injury Compensation Reform Act of 1975 (“MICRA”) applied to Plaintiffs’ claims. Defendants contend that under MICRA, Plaintiffs’ claims are time-barred.The Second Appellate District explained that MICRA is “designed to discourage medical malpractice lawsuits,” whereas the Elder Abuse Act permits “interested persons to engage attorneys to take up the cause of abused elderly persons and dependent adults. The legislative intent is clear that professional negligence and the Elder Abuse Act are separate and distinct. Thus, Plaintiffs’ claims under the Elder Abuse Act were not time-barred.The otherwise court affirmed the lower court’s rulings over Defendants’ objections. However, on Plaintiffs’ appeal, the court ordered a new trial on the issues of respondeat superior and ratification. View "Samantha B. v. Aurora Vista Del Mar" on Justia Law

Plaintiff was seriously injured when a pledge of the defendant fraternity snuck into her room and slit her throat after a night of drinking. The plaintiff filed tort claims against the fraternity and related parties (“the fraternity”). Plaintiff claimed primary and vicarious liability.Applying Nebraska law, the Eighth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the plaintiff’s primary liability claims, finding that the attack was not a foreseeable result of the fraternity’s forced hazing. The attacker’s criminal conduct was an intervening cause, severing the chain of causation. As to the plaintiff’s vicarious liability claims, the court held that the plaintiff failed to prove that any supposed agents of the fraternity were negligent under Nebraska law.The Eighth Circuit also held that social host liability does not apply. Nebraska’s Minor Alcoholic Liquor Liability Act provides a cause of action related to the “negligence of an intoxicated minor.” Here, the attacker was convicted of second-degree assault, which requires a finding that he acted knowingly or intentionally. This precludes a finding that the attacker acted negligently. View "Teresa Spagna v. Collin Gill" on Justia Law