Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court granting summary judgment in favor of Expert Training, LLC after Plaintiff settled with all other defendants in her personal injury lawsuit, holding that the district court did not err.Plaintiff was injured when she fell from the attic of Sunrise Shopping Center to the floor below. Plaintiff sued the Shopping Center's owner, various property management companies, and Expert Training, the staffing company that provided janitorial and maintenance workers to the Shopping Center. Plaintiff settled with all defendants except Expert Training. The district court subsequently entered summary judgment in favor of Expert Training, finding that Expert Training was not engaged in a joint venture and that it owed no duty to Plaintiff. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court properly granted summary judgment on Plaintiff's joint enterprise and negligence claims. View "Weir v. Expert Training, LLC" on Justia Law

While driving the co-plaintiffs car, the plaintiff negligently changed lanes and caused a collision, seriously injuring another driver. At the time of the incident at-fault car’s owner had a GEICO insurance policy that provided bodily-injury coverage up to $100,000 per person. The victim and Geico assert they made offers to settle, but the parties never agreed. After the conclusion of the victim's lawsuit, plaintiffs sued GEICO for bad faith, seeking to recover the amounts of the final judgments entered against them that exceeded the $100,000 policy limit. They contended that GEICO had breached its fiduciary duty to them by failing to settle the victim’s case within the policy limit. Plaintiffs challenge Cawthorn v. Auto-Owners Insurance Co 791 F. App’x 60, 65 (11th Cir. 2019), arguing that Florida law doesn’t require that a verdict precede an excess judgment as a prerequisite to proving the causation element of an insurer-bad-faith claim. The court reasoned that plaintiffs' available coverage and final judgments entered against them constituted excess judgments. Thus, plaintiffs could prove causation in their bad-faith case because they were subject to excess judgments. Finally, the court declined to follow Cawthorn because that court incorrectly analyzed Florida's bad-faith law and is unpersuasive. View "Erika L. McNamara v. Government Employees Insurance Company" on Justia Law

Walmart employees stopped the plaintiffs, a woman and her daughter, on suspicion of shoplifting. The plaintiffs sued Walmart in state court, alleging false imprisonment, among other claims. Walmart removed the case to federal court, and the district court dismissed some claims and entered summary judgment in favor of Walmart. Regarding the plaintiffs' Texas Deceptive Trade Practices & Consumer Protection Act claim, the court found they failed to identify any facts that would establish an unconscionable action. Next, plaintiffs assert that Walmart employees committed acts underlying their false imprisonment claims and that Walmart is vicariously liable. The court reasoned that the off-duty police officer is treated as an anon-duty police officer for vicarious liability purposes. As a result, Walmart cannot be vicariously liable for the off-duty officer’s actions. Plaintiffs further argue that Walmart did not establish that her detention was reasonable. The court found that plaintiff cannot state a prima facie case for assault, battery, or offensive contact. Finally, they do not provide any argument that they were harmed, let alone substantially prejudiced, by allowing Walmart to attach portions of depositions, an asset protection case record sheet, and body camera footage. The court found that the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate the necessary elements for their claims. View "Huynh v. Walmart" on Justia Law

Tarango Trucking, L.L.C. (“Tarango”) appeals from a judgment declaring that its insurer, Penn-America Insurance Company (“PennAmerica”), owes neither defense nor indemnity concerning third-party claims against Tarango concerning a fatal accident on its property.At the time of the accident, Tarango was insured under a commercial general liability policy issued by Penn-America (“the Policy”). Penn-America defended Tarango but reserved its right to contest coverage. Texas law governs the insurance issues in this diversity case. The Policy contains both a duty to defend and a duty to indemnify. PennAmerica must show that the plain language of an exclusion avoids coverage of all claims within the confines of the eight-corners rule. Penn-America argues that the Policy’s Auto Exclusion satisfies this burden. Because the Parking Exception is an exception to the Auto Exclusion, it is reasonable to interpret it as employing the same “arising-out-of” nexus as the Auto Exclusion.The Fifth Circuit held that the Parking Exception applies to bodily injury and property damage arising out of parking. Because the petition alleges some claims that arise out of parking and are potentially covered by the Policy, Penn-America must defend Tarango. The court also held that it was premature for the district court to decide the indemnity issue. View "Penn-America Ins v. Tarango Trucking" on Justia Law

Quintero sued Weinkauf asserting the torts of stalking, assault, intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED), and domestic violence, alleging that after Quintero ended their romantic relationship, Weinkauf shot arrows and discharged a firearm through the windows of Quintero’s law office under cover of darkness. Quintero had identified him on surveillance video footage. Weinkauf, also an attorney, pled guilty to stalking with an enhancement for the personal use of a dangerous and deadly weapon and conceded that he had shot a crossbow at Quintero’s window once but denied involvement in the other shootings.The jury found in favor of Quintero on the stalking, IIED, and domestic violence claims and in favor of Weinkauf on the assault claim; awarded Quintero $1.3 million in compensatory damages; and found that Weinkauf had engaged in conduct with malice, oppression, or fraud. The court determined Weinkauf’s net worth to be $1.5 million. The jury then awarded Quintero $6,000 in punitive damages. After denying Weinkauf’s post-trial motions, the court awarded Quintero $869,688.79 in attorney fees and $60,565.25 in costs.The court of appeal affirmed, upholding the admission of audio clips from a pretext telephone call between the parties recorded by police and video clips of the surveillance footage from the shootings. The court also rejected challenges to jury instructions, to modification of a protective order, and to the calculations of the awards. View "Quintero v. Weinkauf" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed failure-to-warn product liability claims against a medical device manufacturer based on the manufacturer’s failure to warn about certain risks of its electroconvulsive therapy (“ECT”) device. The district court granted summary judgment to the manufacturer, finding that Plaintiff’s evidence failed to show that stronger warnings from the manufacturer would have affected their physician’s decision to prescribe the product.Plaintiffs appealed, relying on testimony from their prescribing physicians that, had the manufacturer included stronger warnings, they would have communicated those warnings to Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs claimed that, in light of these warnings, they would not have given consent for the procedures.Finding that California law applies and that there is no binding precedent on the issue, the Ninth Circuit certified the following question to the California Supreme Court: Is a plaintiff required to show that a stronger risk warning would have altered the physician’s decision to prescribe the product? Or can a plaintiff establish causation by showing that the physician would have communicated the stronger risk warnings to the plaintiff and a prudent person in the patient’s position would have declined the treatment? View "MICHELLE HIMES V. SOMATICS, LLC" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the district court affirming the conclusion of the workers' compensation commissioner that Claimant's rotator cuff injury was a scheduled shoulder injury rather than an unscheduled whole body injury under Iowa Code 85.34(2), holding that there was no error.Claimant sustained a work-related injury that was diagnosed as a "full thickness rotator cuff tear that has retracted to the level of the glenoid, severe AC arthrosis, tendonitis and tearing of the biceps tendon." In seeking permanent partial disability benefits, Claimant argued that her injury qualified as an unscheduled injury to the body as a whole, entitling her to industrial disability benefits. The commissioner concluded that Claimant's rotator cuff injury was a scheduled injury to the shoulder, and the district court affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court properly determined (1) Claimant's rotator cuff injury was a scheduled shoulder injury under Iowa Code 85.34(2)(n); and (2) substantial evidence supported the commissioner's finding that Claimant failed to prove her biceps tear resulted in a permanent disability to her arm under section 85.34(2)(m). View "Chavez v. MS Technology LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Janet Bisceglia appealed a superior court order granting summary judgment to defendants' the New Hampshire Secretary of State and the New Hampshire Department of Natural and Cultural Resources (collectively the State). The court ruled that the State was immune from liability for plaintiff’s negligence claim under New Hampshire’s recreational use statute. Plaintiff and her family visited a historic lighthouse situated on land in New Castle, which was owned by the United States. That federal land was adjacent to Fort Constitution, which was owned and operated by the State. While plaintiff was standing on the federal land next to the outer wall of Fort Constitution, a portion of the wall fell on top of her, causing her substantial injuries. The trial court determined that because the State “held Fort Constitution out to the public at no charge” and the wall “was maintained as part of the historic site for the use and enjoyment of the public,” RSA 508:14, I, shielded the State from liability, “regardless of whether Plaintiff was physically on [the State’s] property at the time of the injury.” The court denied the plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration. The New Hampshire Supreme Court reversed, finding it was undisputed that plaintiff did not use the State’s land; the trial court erred in granting the State’s motion for summary judgment based on RSA 508:14, I. View "Bisceglia v. New Hampshire Secretary of State & al." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court quashed the decision of the Second District Court of Appeal reversing the circuit court's grant of Airbnb, Inc.'s motion to compel arbitration, holding that the circuit court did not err in compelling arbitration.Plaintiffs brought this complaint against Airbnb, alleging constructive intrusion and loss of consortium. After a hearing, the circuit court granted Airbnb's motion to compel arbitration and stayed the underlying lawsuit pending arbitration, finding that the parties entered into an express agreement that incorporated the the American Arbitration Association (AAA) rules, requiring Airbnb to submit the issue of arbitrability to the arbitrator. The Second District Court reversed, concluding that the arbitration provision and the AAA rule it referenced did not amount to "clear and unmistakable" evidence that the parties agreed to arbitrate arbitrability. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Airbnb's terms of service that incorporate by reference rules that expressly delegate arbitrability determinations to an arbitrator constitute clear and unmistakable evidence of the parties' intent to authorize an arbitrator, rather than a court, to resolve questions of arbitrability. View "Airbnb, Inc. v. Doe" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Arkansas Workers' Compensation Commission denying Appellant's claim for additional medical benefits, holding that the Commission erred in determining that Appellant's claim for additional medical benefits was barred by the statute of limitations.In 2015, Appellant was injured while working for Liberty Trailer and sustained a compensable right-shoulder injury. In 2019, Appellant requested additional benefits. An administrative law judge found that the claim was barred by the statute of limitations. The Commission affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that, under a plain reading of Ark. Code Ann. 11-9-702(b)(1), Appellant's claim for additional medical benefits was timely. View "Wynne v. Liberty Trailer" on Justia Law