Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court quashed the decision of the Second District Court of Appeal reversing the circuit court's grant of Airbnb, Inc.'s motion to compel arbitration, holding that the circuit court did not err in compelling arbitration.Plaintiffs brought this complaint against Airbnb, alleging constructive intrusion and loss of consortium. After a hearing, the circuit court granted Airbnb's motion to compel arbitration and stayed the underlying lawsuit pending arbitration, finding that the parties entered into an express agreement that incorporated the the American Arbitration Association (AAA) rules, requiring Airbnb to submit the issue of arbitrability to the arbitrator. The Second District Court reversed, concluding that the arbitration provision and the AAA rule it referenced did not amount to "clear and unmistakable" evidence that the parties agreed to arbitrate arbitrability. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Airbnb's terms of service that incorporate by reference rules that expressly delegate arbitrability determinations to an arbitrator constitute clear and unmistakable evidence of the parties' intent to authorize an arbitrator, rather than a court, to resolve questions of arbitrability. View "Airbnb, Inc. v. Doe" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Arkansas Workers' Compensation Commission denying Appellant's claim for additional medical benefits, holding that the Commission erred in determining that Appellant's claim for additional medical benefits was barred by the statute of limitations.In 2015, Appellant was injured while working for Liberty Trailer and sustained a compensable right-shoulder injury. In 2019, Appellant requested additional benefits. An administrative law judge found that the claim was barred by the statute of limitations. The Commission affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that, under a plain reading of Ark. Code Ann. 11-9-702(b)(1), Appellant's claim for additional medical benefits was timely. View "Wynne v. Liberty Trailer" on Justia Law

Allied provided security guard services at UCSF medical facilities, hiring security guards and assigning them to particular locations. UCSF was responsible for supervising the security guards. Villegas worked 11:00 p.m.-7:00 a.m., five nights per week. Allied did not require Villegas to use her car for work and did not dictate how she traveled to and from work. She frequently requested extra shifts and often worked six shifts per week. On August 21, Villegas began her fourth straight day of work. When her shift ended the following morning, Villegas’s mother picked Villegas up in Villegas’s vehicle. Villegas dropped her mother off at work, then began driving home. About an hour after finishing her shift, near her home, Villegas fell asleep and drove into oncoming traffic, hitting and severely injuring Feltham, who was riding a motorcycle.In a negligence action, the court of appeal affirmed summary judgment in favor of Allied. Allied was entitled to judgment as a matter of law because Villegas was not acting within the course and scope of her employment at the time of the accident, and the accident was not a foreseeable consequence of Villegas’s employment. View "Feltham v. Universal Protection Service, LP" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Hamid Harris alleged that Donald Stabile, a Newark Police Department detective, falsely accused him of four armed robberies that were committed in Newark in January 2015, and unlawfully arrested him in connection with those robberies based on an improperly issued arrest warrant. After the charges against plaintiff were dismissed, he filed this action. Defendants the City of Newark, Detective Donald Stabile, and Police Officer Angel Romero following the trial court’s denial of their motion for summary judgment, contended the trial court erred in denying them qualified immunity as a defense to Harris’s claims brought under the New Jersey Civil Rights Act (NJCRA). Defendants contended the trial court’s order denying summary judgment was a legal determination and should therefore be deemed appealable as of right, in keeping with both New Jersey appellate practice and federal law. The trial court reasoned that because Stabile did not have probable cause to arrest plaintiff, and because Stabile’s belief that plaintiff committed the robberies was objectively unreasonable, defendants were not entitled to qualified immunity. The Appellate Division ruled that “[t]he appeal is interlocutory as it is not from a final order” and dismissed defendants’ notice of appeal. The appellate court also denied defendants’ motion for leave to appeal. The New Jersey Supreme Court found the trial court’s order was a decision premised on factual findings as well as legal conclusions, not an exclusively legal determination. "In an NJCRA action, a defendant seeking to challenge a trial court’s order denying qualified immunity prior to final judgment must proceed by motion for leave to file an interlocutory appeal in accordance with Rules 2:2-4 and 2:5-6. View "Harris v. City of Newark, et al." on Justia Law

The First Circuit vacated the order of the district court dismissing this action, holding that the court erred in characterizing the forum selection clause in this case as mandatory.Plaintiff Zuleyka Rivera, a former Miss Universe, sued Kress Stores of Puerto Rico, Inc. and Mark Berezdivin in federal district court alleging breach of contract and tort claims in connection with an agreement between the parties granting Kress Stores exclusive rights to use Plaintiff's name, pageant title, image, and likeness for the development and promotion of branded items of apparel and fragrances. When Kress Stores failed to pay Plaintiff the stipulated annual stipend she sued in federal district court. The district court granted Kress Stores' motion to dismiss, concluding that the suit was brought in contravention of the agreement's forum selection clause. The First Circuit vacated the judgment below, holding (1) the agreement's forum selection clause did not by its terms exclude jurisdiction in another court; and (2) therefore, the district court erred in dismissing the action based on the forum selection clause. View "Rivera v. Kress Stores of Puerto Rico, Inc." on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court granting summary judgment in favor of Defendants and dismissing this lawsuit alleging various Massachusetts law claims based on a purported manufacturing defect in a Kawasaki motorcycle owned and ridden by Junior Williams, holding that there was no error.Junior Williams suffered severe injuries, including second- and third-degree burns, when his 2007 Kawasaki motorcycle collided with a Jeep and a fire resulted. Williams brought this lawsuit against the designer and manufacturer and the distributor of Kawasaki brand motorcycles. The district court granted summary judgment for the Kawasaki defendants and against Williams, concluding that the opinions of Williams's proffered liability expert as to defect and causation should be excluded, and therefore Williams lacked expert testimony on these topics. The First Circuit affirmed on other grounds, holding that even assuming that the expert opinion testimony was admissible, Williams failed to satisfy his burden of proving causation by a preponderance of the evidence. View "Williams v. Kawasaki Motors Corp., U.S.A." on Justia Law

Shelley Droz alleged that her husband, Eric Droz, used an arc grinding machine to resurface brake drum shoes that contained asbestos. She claimed the arc grinder manufacturer, Hennessy, knew that the grinding process generated asbestos dust, and Hennessy had a duty under Washington State law to warn about the dangers of asbestos dust exposure. Eric Droz died of mesothelioma while the litigation was pending. The Superior Court granted Hennessy’s summary judgment motion, holding that once Hennessy showed that the arc grinder could be used with asbestos-containing and asbestos-free brake drum shoes, the burden shifted to Ms. Droz to show that Mr. Droz used asbestos-containing brake drum shoes with the arc grinder. The court agreed with Hennessy that Droz did not offer sufficient evidence of exposure to brake drum shoe asbestos dust to counter Hennessy’s summary judgment motion. The issues for the Delaware Supreme Court were whether the Superior Court misapplied Superior Court Rule 56’s burden-shifting framework and, once the burden shifted to the plaintiff to raise a genuine issue of material fact, whether Ms. Droz came forward with evidence demonstrating that Mr. Droz used asbestos-containing brake drum shoes with the arc grinder. The Supreme Court found the Superior Court properly allocated the summary judgment burdens. But the Court reversed, finding Ms. Droz met her burden to raise a genuine issue of material fact whether Mr. Droz was exposed to asbestos dust from using the arc grinder with asbestos-containing brake drum shoes. View "Droz v. Hennessy Industries, LLC" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court dismissing Plaintiff's claims against Liberty Mutual Fire Insurance Company, holding that there was no error.Plaintiff brought this lawsuit based on a violation of the Connecticut Unfair Insurance Practices Act (CUIPA), Conn. Gen. Stat. 38a0815 et seq., asserting breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, negligent infliction of emotional distress, and violation of the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act (CUTPA), Conn. Gen. Stat. 42-110a et seq. The trial court dismissed the claims, determining that the litigation privilege deprived the court of subject matter jurisdiction. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the litigation privilege barred Plaintiff's CUTPA-CUIPA claim. View "Dorfman v. Smith" on Justia Law

The District appealed a judgment entered following a jury's finding that the District's employees were 54 percent responsible for injuries sustained by plaintiff when another student shot him in the stomach with a shotgun. This allocation of fault and the jury's findings as to damages resulted in a judgment holding the District vicariously liable for approximately $2 million.In the published portion of the opinion, the Court of Appeal concluded that the specific acts and omissions identified by plaintiff's expert as below the standard of care for conducting a threat assessment are properly characterized as administrative and not as a mental examination. Thus, those negligent acts and omissions fall outside the scope of Government Code section 855.6 immunity. The court affirmed the judgment. View "Cleveland v. Taft Union High School District" on Justia Law

In 2015, plaintiff Ronald Hicks was a passenger in a heavy-duty flatbed truck when it was rear-ended by a vehicle driven by Robert Harger, Jr., who was traveling at approximately 60-65 mph and did not brake before impact. Plaintiff was treated on 79 occasions with several orthopedic and pain management specialists and surgeons and underwent 13 separate procedures. Relevant here, plaintiff was initially examined by Dr. Jason Smith, an orthopedic spine surgeon, to whom he was referred in conjunction with his worker’s compensation plan. Dr. Smith examined plaintiff and found no evidence of obvious trauma resulting from the accident. Instead, he determined the condition of plaintiff’s lower back was indicative of preexisting degenerative disc disease that was aggravated by the accident. While Dr. Smith did not believe plaintiff exaggerated his pain, he also did not believe plaintiff was a candidate for surgery. Plaintiff ceased treatment with Dr. Smith on January 6, 2017. Plaintiff was thereafter referred by his attorney to Dr. Jorge Isaza, an orthopedic surgeon specializing in spine surgery. At the time of his 2017 deposition, Dr. Isaza recommended cervical surgery but had difficulty identifying the primary source of plaintiff’s lumbar pain and did not definitively suggest lumbar surgery. Dr. Isaza linked the collision to plaintiff’s injuries. In November 2017, defendants moved to compel an additional medical examination (“AME”) under Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 1464. The Louisiana Supreme Court granted the writ in this case to examine the meaning of the requirement of “good cause” in Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 1464. The Court held that a showing of “good cause” under article 1464 required the moving party establish a reasonable nexus between the requested examination and the condition in controversy. The Court found the trial court abused its discretion in denying defendants’ motion to compel an additional medical examination in this case. Judgment was therefore reversed and the matter remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. View "Hicks v. USAA General Indemnity Co., et al." on Justia Law