Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals certified a question of law to the Louisiana Supreme Court in Doe v. Mckesson, 2 F.4th 502 (5th Cir. 2021) (per curiam). The plaintiff in this personal injury case named as defendants the Black Lives Matter (“BLM”) organization1 and DeRay Mckesson (alleged to be a leader and co- founder of BLM). The plaintiff alleges that he was a duly commissioned police officer for the City of Baton Rouge on July 9, 2016, when he was ordered to respond to a protest “staged and organized by” BLM and DeRay Mckesson, which was in response to the July 5, 2016 death of Alton Sterling, who was shot by a Baton Rouge police officer when Sterling resisted arrest. The issues raised by the Fifth Circuit were: (1) whether Louisiana law recognized a duty, under the facts alleged in the complaint, or otherwise, not to negligently precipitate the crime of a third party; (2) assuming Mckesson could otherwise be held liable for a breach of duty owed to Officer Doe, whether Louisiana’s Professional Rescuer’s Doctrine barred recovery under the facts alleged in the complaint. The Court answered the former in the affirmative and the latter in the negative. View "Doe v. McKesson et al." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the compensation court denying James Spratt's request seeking to modify his workers' compensation award, holding that the compensation court erred in holding that it lacked the statutory to do so and, alternatively, that the principal of finality precluded relief.Spratt injured his back while working for Crete Carrier Corporation and received a workers' compensation award granting medical rehabilitation services for his lumbar back. Spratt subsequently requested that the compensation court modify the original award so that he may receive thoracic back treatment. The compensation court denied Spratt's request for modification. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the compensation court erred in concluding that it lacked the power to modify the original award to treat Spratt's thoracic back; and (2) modification was not precluded by the law-of-the-case doctrine. View "Spratt v. Crete Carrier Corp." on Justia Law

The Hinds County Circuit Court denied the motion of Weeks, Inc., to transfer venue to Madison County, even though neither Mississippi defendant (both corporations) had its principal place of business in Hinds County. Nor did any substantial alleged act or event causing the alleged injuries occur in Hinds County. The circuit court based its ruling on Weeks’s corporate filings with the Mississippi Secretary of State, which listed a Hinds County address as Weeks’s principal address. Affidavits and other documents submitted with Weeks’s motion to transfer venue showed this was not Weeks’s address; the address belonged to an outside certified public accountant who handled Weeks’s correspondence and filings with the Secretary of State. Weeks conducts no business from this location. Instead, it solely operates out of its Madison County location. Still, plaintiff Gregory Lewis, asked the Mississippi Supreme Court to hold that Weeks’s corporate filings were conclusive evidence of the corporation’s principal place of business. Lewis conceded, in his own words, that the “actual physical location” where Weeks conducted its business was in Madison County. The Supreme Court therefore concluded the circuit court abused its discretion by denying Weeks’s motion to transfer venue. Judgment was reversed and the matter remanded with instructions to transfer this case to the Madison County Circuit Court. View "Weeks, Inc. et al.. v. Lewis" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Anonymous Defendant 1 - a physician group - in this vicarious liability case, holding that disputed issues of material fact existed, precluding summary judgment.In Sword v. NKC Hospitals, Inc., 417 N.E.2d 142 (Ind. 1999), the Supreme Court adopted the Restatement (Second) of Torts section 429, holding that, through apparent or ostensible agency, a hospital may be held vicariously liable for the tortious conduct of an independent contractor. At issue in the instant case was whether Sword extends its vicarious liability to a physical therapist with whom it had no contractual relationship. The Supreme Court remanded the case, holding (1) the rule articulated in Sword is inapplicable on these facts; (2) under Restatement (Second) of Agency section 267 a medical provider may be held liable for the acts of an apparent agent based on the provider's manifestations of an agency relationship with the apparent agent, which causes a third party to rely on such a relationship; and (3) there existed disputed issues of fact as to whether Anonymous Defendant 1 held out Plaintiff's physical therapist as its apparent agent. View "Wilson v. Anonymous Defendant 1" on Justia Law

In this case considering Sword v. NKC Hospitals, Inc., 417 N.E.2d 142 (Ind. 1999), and the Restatement (Second) of Torts section 429's reasoning and application to a non-hospital diagnostic medical imaging center, the Supreme Court held that Sword and section 429's apparent agency principles apply to non-hospital medical entities that provide patients with health care.In Sword, the Supreme Court adopted section 429 and held that a hospital may be held vicariously liable for the tortious conduct of an independent contractor through apparent or ostensible agency. In the instant case, Plaintiff alleged medical malpractice related to his MRI and imaging care. Marion Open MRI moved for summary judgment, arguing that it was not liable for the actions of the radiologist with whom Marion Open MRI contracted. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Marion Open MRI, finding that Indiana's appellate court have applied Sword's apparent agent principles only to hospitals and not to non-hospital medical entities. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Sword and its apparent agency rules apply to non-hospital medical entities. View "Arrendale v. Orthopaedics Northeast, P.C." on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Oregon Supreme Court's review centered on whether a truck driver (claimant) who sustained injuries while driving a truck that he leased directly from a trucking company, with restrictions that prohibited him from driving the truck for the use of any other company, was a “subject worker” within the meaning of ORS 656.027 such that the trucking company was required to provide workers’ compensation insurance coverage for claimant’s injuries. SAIF and Robert Murray, the owner of Bob Murray Trucking (BMT), a for-hire carrier, sought review of the Court of Appeals’ opinion affirming the final order of the Workers’ Compensation Board: that claimant was a subject worker of BMT under the workers’ compensation laws and did not qualify for the exemption to “subject worker” status contained in ORS 656.027(15)(c). To this the Supreme Court agreed and affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals and the Workers’ Compensation Board’s final order. View "SAIF v. Ward" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the trial court dismissing this tort action with prejudice under CR 41.02(1), holding that the trial court abused its discretion in dismissing the action with prejudice.Plaintiff commenced this tort action alleging violations of various laws relating to occupational safety. Defendant filed a notice for independent medication examination (IME), but Plaintiff did not appear. Defendant then filed a motion to dismiss. The trial court concluded that dismissal was warranted in part because Plaintiff violated court orders by failing to appear for mediation and the IME. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that to the extent Plaintiff violated any court orders, those violations were insufficient to warrant the extreme remedy of dismissal with prejudice. View "Jones v. Pinter" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals reversing the circuit court's grant of summary judgment in favor of homeowners in this complaint brought against them and their attorneys for wrongful use of civil proceedings and abuse of process, holding that the case must be remanded for reinstatement of summary judgment in favor of the homeowners.At issue was the proposed development by Bardstown Capital Corporation of Jefferson County residential property into a commercial center. The proposed development was ultimately approved, despite opposition by neighboring homeowners. The homeowners appealed, arguing that the rezoning ordinance was invalid due to, among other things, inadequacy of notice of the various zoning hearings. After the appeal was denied, Bardstown Capital brought this action against the homeowners. The circuit court granted summary judgment for the homeowners. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the Noerr-Pennington doctrine afforded the homeowners immunity from claims of wrongful use of civil proceedings; and (2) the trial court properly applied the Doerr-Pennington doctrine and, therefore, did not err in granting summary judgment. View "Seiller Waterman, LLC v. Bardstown Capital Corp." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the opinion of the court of appeals affirming the Workers' Compensation Board's decision reversing a decision by the Chief Administrative Law Judge (CALJ) denying Carlye Harper's motion to reopen her workers' compensation claim to seek vocational rehabilitation benefits, holding that there was no error.Harper suffered a work-related injury to her back and lower extremities. After a hearing, an ALJ awarded permanent partial disability income benefits. Approximately sixteen months later, Harper sought to file an application for vocational rehabilitation services pursuant to Ky. Rev. Stat. 342.710. The CALJ overruled the motion to reopen. The Board reversed, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the legislature intended section 342.710(3) to provide an independent ground for reopening, and claim preclusion did not bar adjudication of Harper's claim. View "Kindred Healthcare v. Harper" on Justia Law

Fisher is the personal representative of his mother’s estate and a co-trustee of her trusts with his siblings, Perron and Peter. Perron recorded telephone discussions of estate matters without informing her siblings that she was recording. Perron sued Fisher and attached transcripts of one call to pleadings; the probate court struck the transcript from the record, prohibited its further use, and held Perron liable for attorney’s fees and costs.Fisher sued, alleging that Perron violated the Federal Wiretap Act, 18 U.S.C. 2510– 23, which prohibits a call participant from recording the call “for the purpose of committing any criminal or tortious act” or disclosing or using any such illegally intercepted oral communication; violated Michigan’s eavesdropping law, which makes the use of an electronic “device to eavesdrop upon [a] conversation without the consent of all parties thereto” a felony; and committed the tort of public disclosure of private facts.The Sixth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the suit. A participant does not violate Michigan’s eavesdropping statute by recording a conversation without the consent of other participants. The complaint contains no facts to support an inference that a reasonable person would find the facts disclosed in the call “highly offensive” to support a claim of public disclosure of private facts. Because Fisher did not establish either the tort or the state law violation, he did not establish “the purpose of committing any criminal or tortious act” under federal law. View "Fisher v. Perron" on Justia Law