Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

The Oklahoma Supreme Court granted certiorari to review a certified interlocutory order dismissing Defendant-respondent OSU Medical Trust, doing business as OSU Medical Center (OSUMC), from a medical malpractice lawsuit. The issue was whether Plaintiffs-appellants Miranda and Colby Crawford, Natural Parents and on Behalf of C.C.C., a Minor, and Miranda and Colby Crawford, Individually (collectively, the Crawfords) complied with the notice provisions of the Governmental Tort Claims Act (GTCA). The Supreme Court held that the Crawfords failed to present notice of their tort claim within one year of the date the loss occurred and, pursuant to 51 O.S.Supp.2012 section 156(B), their claims against OSUMC were forever barred. The Court thus affirmed the trial court's order dismissing OSUMC with prejudice. View "Crawford v. OSU Medical Trust" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH) affirming the denial of Appellant's request for benefits related to her injury, holding that substantial evidence supported the agency's decision.On May 3, 2019, Appellant, a sales associate at Flaming Gorge Harley-Davidson, was moving a motorcycle when her back grabbed and her legs felt weak. On May 6, Appellant was standing in her kitchen and turning slightly to the left when she felt excruciating pain. Appellant filed a claim with the Department of Workforce Services, Workers' Compensation Division for benefits related to her May 6 injury. The Division denied Appellant her requested benefits. The OAH and the district court affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the law does not require OAH to reference the "second compensable injury" rule in its decision; and (2) there was substantial evidence to support OAH's conclusion that Appellant failed to prove her May 6 injury was caused by the May 3 injury. View "Boylen v. State, ex rel., Department of Workforce Services, Workers' Compensation Division" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals reversed the order of the Appellate Division modifying the order of Supreme Court by granting Plaintiff summary judgment on his claim brought under N.Y. Labor Law 241(6), holding that the section 241(6) claim must be dismissed.Plaintiff was struck by a power buggy while working at the World Trade Center Transportation Hub construction site owned by the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey (Port Authority). Plaintiff filed this action against the Port Authority, bringing claims under N.Y. Labor Law 241(6) and N.Y. Labor Law 200(1). Supreme Court granted the Port Authority summary judgment on the section 200(1) claim but denied summary judgment on the section 241(6) claim. The Appellate Division modified by granting Plaintiff summary judgment on the section 241(6) claim. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that 12 NYCRR 23-9.9(a) does not set forth a concrete specification sufficient to give rise to a non-delegable duty under section 241(6). View "Toussaint v. Port Authority of N.Y. & N.J." on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals reiterated that plaintiffs must establish that a municipality owed them a special duty when they assert a negligence claim based on actions taken by the municipality acting in a governmental capacity and that plaintiffs may establish a special duty when a municipality's police force plans and executes a no-knock search warrant at a person's residence.Plaintiff bought this action in federal court against the City of Binghamton and its police department, arguing that the City breached a special duty and was liable under a respondent superior theory for a police officer's negligence in shooting Plaintiff. The jury determined that the City was liable under a respondeat superior theory. The City moved for judgment as a matter of law. The district court granted the motion, determining that the City did not owe Plaintiff a special duty. On appeal, the federal circuit court certified a question of law to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals answered that a special duty arises when the police plan and execute a no-knock search warrant at an identified residence, running to the individuals within the targeted premises at the time the warrant is executed. View "Ferreira v. City of Binghamton" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted a writ of prohibition sought by Petitioner to prohibit the circuit court from enforcing its order to strike the notice it received pursuant to W. Va. Code 55-7-13d regarding Respondent's belief that some or all of the fault in the matter should be assigned to the Monongalia County Commission, holding that Petitioner was entitled to the writ.Respondent was employed by the County Commission when he was injured his work. After resolving his workers' compensation claim Respondent sued Petitioner for further compensation. Thereafter, Petitioner filed the motion at issue. The circuit court granted Respondent's motion to strike the notice, concluding that fault could not be assigned to the County Commission, and, alternatively, that Petitioner failed to allege deliberate intention on the part of the County Commission. The Supreme Court granted Petitioner's petition for a writ of prohibition, holding (1) the circuit court committed clear error in ruling that the County Commission could not be named as a nonparty defendant under W.Va. Code 55-7-13d; and (2) section 55-7-13d did not require Petitioner to meet the deliberate-intention standard in order for fault to be assigned to the County Commission. View "State ex rel. March-Westin Co. v. Honorable Phillip D. Gaujot" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, a putative class of fantasy sports players, filed suit alleging claims for fraudulent misrepresentations and omissions, negligent misrepresentations, violations of various state consumer protection laws, and unjust enrichment. Plaintiffs alleged that defendants fraudulently concealed that player statistics were purportedly unreliable because of rule violations in the form of electronic sign-stealing by certain MLB teams during the 2017–2019 baseball seasons. Plaintiffs further alleged that MLB intentionally took no action to address these rule violations in order to protect its financial interest and investment in DraftKings.The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of the First Amended Complaint and its denial of plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration, holding that alleged misrepresentations or omissions by organizers and participants in major league sports about the competition itself—such as statements about performance, team strategy, or rules violations—do not give rise to plausible claims sounding in fraud or related legal theories brought by consumers of a fantasy sports competition who are utilizing a league's player statistics.The court also affirmed the district court's order, which concluded that a September 14, 2017 letter from the MLB Commissioner to the New York Yankees General Manager should be unsealed. The court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in unsealing the letter in light of plaintiffs' attempted use of the letter in their proposed Second Amended Complaint and the district court's discussion of the letter in explaining its decision to deny plaintiffs' request for leave to amend in their reconsideration motion, and because MLB disclosed a substantial portion of the substance of the letter in its press release about the investigation. View "Olson v. Major League Baseball" on Justia Law

An employer has an affirmative duty to provide employees with a safe place to work. This duty does not include ensuring that an off-site meeting place for coworkers and business associates like an employee's private residence is safe from third party criminal harm.The Court of Appeal granted the writ petition challenging the trial court's order denying summary judgment and directed the trial court to enter a new and different order granting summary judgment. In this case, a young man suffering from a mental health condition suddenly fired a handgun at family members and guests inside his family home. Plaintiffs filed a lawsuit against Colonial and Defendant Holaday for personal injury damages, alleging negligence claims stemming from their injuries. The court concluded that Colonial owed no duty to protect plaintiffs because Colonial did not control Holaday's home. Furthermore, Colonial owed Plaintiff Dominguez no duty to protect based on the employer-employee relationship. Finally, the Rowland factors counsel against imposing a duty to protect; plaintiffs' claim of intentional infliction of emotion distress against Colonial fails as a matter of law as there are no triable issues (1) Colonial knew or reasonably should have known that the young man posed a danger to plaintiffs—his deadly misconduct was unforeseeable, and (2) Colonial had no ability to control him; and respondeat superior liability is inapplicable here as a matter of law. View "Colonial Van & Storage, Inc. v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

Victoria Leasy sued after she allegedly slipped and fell in her hotel room’s bathroom at Harlow’s Casino. The circuit court granted SW Gaming LLC d/b/a Harlow’s Casino's motion to dismiss, and on appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the judgment of the circuit court and remanded the case. Finding that the Court of Appeals reweighed the evidence and substituted its own findings for those of the circuit court, the Mississippi Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals. The Supreme Court reinstated and affirmed the judgment of the circuit court, and reaffirmed the controlling abuse-of-discretion standard of review in such cases. View "Leasy v. SW Gaming, LLC d/b/a Harlow's Casino" on Justia Law

Claiborne County Hospital (CCH) sought summary judgment against Julius Truitt on his medical-negligence claim. CCH claimed Truitt failed to designate a medical expert. Truitt responded to CCH’s motion that a genuine issue of material fact existed, and that he was exempt from producing sworn expert testimony under the layman’s exception allowing lay testimony despite the general rule requiring medical expert testimony in medical-negligence cases. The Mississippi Supreme Court found that as a matter of law, the trial court erred by denying CCH’s motion for summary judgment. The Supreme Court found CCH met its summary-judgment burden by showing that Truitt failed to produce sworn expert testimony establishing a prima facie case of medical negligence. The trial court's judgment was reversed and the matter remanded for further proceedings. View "Claiborne County Hospital v. Truitt" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of a panel of the court of appeals affirming the judgment of the district court granting summary judgment to the Kansas Workers Compensation Fund on the Fund's collateral action against Trademark, Inc., holding that there was no error.After Juan Medina received a workplace injury he sought compensation from his direct employer under the Kansas Workers Compensation Act, Kan. Stat. Ann. 44-501 et seq. Because the employer did not carry workers compensation insurance, Medina impleaded the Fund to obtain benefits. Thereafter, an ALJ awarded compensation to Medina, and the Fund paid Medina benefits. The Fund then filed this action under Kan. Stat. Ann. 44-532a against Trademark, the general contractor for whom Medina's employer was acting as a subcontractor at the time of the injury. The district court granted summary judgment to the Fund and denied attorney fees. The court of appeals panel affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the lower courts correctly interpreted section 44-532a as allowing the Fund to pursue an action against Trademark; but (2) the Fund was not entitled to attorney fees. View "Schmidt v. Trademark, Inc." on Justia Law