Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

In 2012, Bill Simmon, an employee of Vermont Community Access Media, Inc. (VCAM), invited Ciara Kilburn and her minor sister Brona to VCAM’s premises to record a commercial. Simmon secretly recorded the sisters changing clothes using VCAM’s equipment and shared the videos online, where they were viewed millions of times. In 2020, the Kilburns filed a lawsuit against Simmon for invasion of privacy, intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED), and negligence per se, and against VCAM for vicarious liability, negligence, and negligent infliction of emotional distress (NIED).The Superior Court, Chittenden Unit, Civil Division, dismissed claims against Vermont State Colleges and did not instruct the jury on vicarious liability or NIED. The jury found Simmon liable for invasion of privacy and IIED, and VCAM liable for negligent supervision. Each plaintiff was awarded $1.75 million in compensatory damages against both Simmon and VCAM, and $2 million in punitive damages against Simmon. The court denied VCAM’s motions to exclude evidence, for a new trial, and for remittitur, and also denied plaintiffs’ request to hold VCAM jointly and severally liable for Simmon’s damages.The Vermont Supreme Court affirmed the lower court’s decision. It held that emotional-distress damages were available to plaintiffs for VCAM’s negligent supervision because the claim was based on intentional torts (invasion of privacy and IIED) for which such damages are recoverable. The court found no error in the jury’s award of damages, concluding that the evidence supported the verdict and that the damages were not excessive. The court also ruled that plaintiffs waived their claim for joint and several liability by not objecting to the jury instructions or verdict form before deliberations. View "Kilburn v. Simmon" on Justia Law

The case involves a wrongful-death action brought by the Estate of Jared Shaffer, through Daniel Shaffer as administrator, against Northeast Kingdom Human Services, Inc. Jared Shaffer, a developmentally disabled adult, died on April 18, 2017, from a sudden pulmonary embolism caused by metastatic testicular cancer. The estate claimed that the defendant, responsible for overseeing Jared's Medicaid waiver funds and coordinating his care, was negligent in its duties, leading to Jared's death.Initially, the estate sued Heartbeet Lifesharing, Dr. Peter Sher, and the defendant in federal court, but the case was dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction after a settlement with Dr. Sher’s medical practice. The estate then filed the wrongful-death action in the civil division against the defendant and Heartbeet. Before the trial, the estate settled with Heartbeet, leaving the case to be tried solely against the defendant. The defendant asserted a comparative negligence defense, implicating Daniel Shaffer, Jared's father and co-guardian, in Jared's death.The Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the case after the estate appealed a jury verdict in favor of the defendant. The estate argued that the trial court erred in instructing the jury on comparative negligence, providing misleading jury instructions, and sustaining objections to certain questions posed to the defendant’s corporate representative. The estate also contended that the jury deliberated too quickly and that the evidence overwhelmingly supported its claim of negligence.The Vermont Supreme Court found that while the trial court erred in conflating the identity of the plaintiff with Daniel Shaffer, the estate was not prejudiced because the jury never reached the question of comparative negligence, having found no negligence on the defendant's part. The court also upheld the trial court's evidentiary rulings and found no error in the jury's deliberation process. The jury's verdict in favor of the defendant was affirmed. View "Shaffer v. Northeast Kingdom Human Services, Inc." on Justia Law

A City of Houston police officer, while responding to an armed robbery, collided with another motorist, Maria Christina Gomez. The officer, Bobby Joe Simmons, was driving in heavy rain with his emergency lights on but did not engage his siren. He did not exceed the speed limit and applied his brakes when the traffic light turned yellow, but his car slid into the intersection and collided with Gomez's vehicle. Gomez sued the City for negligence, seeking damages for her injuries.The trial court granted the City’s plea to the jurisdiction, citing the Texas Tort Claims Act’s emergency exception, which preserves immunity unless the officer acted with "conscious indifference or reckless disregard for the safety of others." The Court of Appeals for the Fourteenth District of Texas reversed this decision, finding a fact question regarding the officer's recklessness. The City then supplemented its plea with additional evidence and appealed again after the trial court denied the plea.The Supreme Court of Texas reviewed the case de novo and concluded that the evidence showed, at most, ordinary negligence rather than recklessness. The court held that Simmons’s actions, including adjusting his radio and not exceeding the speed limit, did not demonstrate a willful or wanton disregard for safety. Consequently, the court reversed the Court of Appeals' judgment and rendered judgment dismissing Gomez’s claim against the City for lack of jurisdiction, reaffirming the City’s immunity under the Texas Tort Claims Act’s emergency exception. View "City of Houston v. Gomez" on Justia Law

Cesar Posada sued Osvanis Lozada and his employer, TELS, Inc., after a collision between their tractor-trailers. Posada claimed negligence and negligence per se against Lozada and sought to hold TELS vicariously liable. Lozada's tire unexpectedly lost air, causing his truck to jackknife and block the highway, leading to Posada crashing into it. Lozada and TELS filed no-evidence motions for summary judgment, which the trial court granted.The trial court in El Paso County granted the no-evidence motions for summary judgment filed by Lozada and TELS, dismissing Posada's claims. Posada's motions for a new trial were denied. The Court of Appeals for the Eighth District of Texas reversed the trial court's decision, holding that a reasonable jury could find that Lozada breached his duty of care and that his actions were the proximate cause of the collision. The court of appeals also reversed the summary judgment in favor of TELS, as their liability was predicated on Lozada's liability.The Supreme Court of Texas reviewed the case and concluded that Posada failed to produce summary-judgment evidence raising a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether Lozada breached his duty of care. The court noted that the evidence showed Lozada was driving under the speed limit when his tire rapidly lost air, causing the accident. There was no evidence Lozada acted negligently in response to the tire failure. Consequently, the Supreme Court of Texas reversed the court of appeals' judgment and reinstated the trial court's judgment, dismissing Posada's claims against Lozada and TELS with prejudice. View "Lozada v. Posada" on Justia Law

Rhonna Tindall slipped on a layer of ice in a parking lot owned by the County of Nevada and injured her knee. She sued the County, alleging that the icy parking lot was a dangerous condition of public property under Government Code sections 830 and 835. The County moved for summary judgment, claiming immunity under section 831, which provides that a public entity is not liable for injuries caused by weather conditions affecting the use of streets and highways.The trial court granted the County’s motion for summary judgment, ruling that the parking lot was a “street” or “highway” within the meaning of section 831, and that the County was entitled to “weather immunity.” The court also found that a reasonably careful person would have anticipated the potential existence of slippery ice in the parking lot. Tindall appealed, arguing that section 831 immunity does not apply to parking lots, that the dangerous condition resulted from a combination of weather and other factors, and that the County did not meet its burden to show that a reasonably careful person would have anticipated the ice.The California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court concluded that the parking lot is a “street” within the meaning of section 831, largely based on the Vehicle Code’s definition of “street” as a publicly maintained place open to the public for vehicular travel. The court found Tindall’s arguments unpersuasive and determined that the County was not liable for her injury caused by the weather condition. The court also held that Tindall’s arguments regarding the combination of weather with other factors and the reasonably careful person standard were forfeited on appeal. The judgment of the trial court was affirmed. View "Tindall v. County of Nevada" on Justia Law

Lauren Scottoline gave birth to J.S.S. at Christiana Care Hospital on July 28, 2015. After birth, J.S.S. could not breathe on his own, had low blood-oxygen levels, and suffered seizures. He was diagnosed with hypoxic-ischemic encephalopathy (HIE) and stayed in the newborn intensive care unit for three weeks. J.S.S. showed developmental delays and was diagnosed with autism spectrum disorder (ASD) in 2018, confirmed in 2021. Lauren and Stephen Scottoline filed a lawsuit against Christiana Care Health System, Inc. and Women First, LLC, claiming negligence during J.S.S.’s birth caused his condition.The Superior Court of Delaware excluded the expert causation opinion of Dr. Daniel Adler, a pediatric neurologist, who claimed that HIE caused J.S.S.’s ASD. The court found Dr. Adler’s opinion unreliable and inadmissible under Delaware Rule of Evidence 702, as it lacked a scientific basis and did not employ a reliable methodology. The court granted the defendants’ motion in limine to exclude Dr. Adler’s testimony and subsequently granted summary judgment for the defendants due to the lack of admissible causation testimony.The Supreme Court of Delaware reviewed the case and affirmed the Superior Court’s rulings. The court held that Dr. Adler’s causation opinion was inadmissible because it was not supported by scientific literature or a reliable differential etiology. The court also found that Dr. Adler’s third report did not materially differ from his previous reports and failed to provide a reliable basis for his causation opinion. The Supreme Court concluded that the Superior Court did not abuse its discretion in excluding Dr. Adler’s testimony and denying an evidentiary hearing. The court also upheld the exclusion of Jody Masterson’s derivative opinion and found no error in the Superior Court’s handling of procedural motions. View "Scottoline v. Women First LLC" on Justia Law

Rose, while 24 weeks pregnant with M.W., was traveling by Greyhound bus from Washington State to Las Vegas. During the journey, she boarded a bus in Redding, California, where another passenger, Asaandi Coleman, opened fire, injuring Rose. Rose was treated in California and later transferred to Las Vegas, where she suffered complications leading to an emergency C-section for M.W. M.W. has required constant medical care since birth. M.W.'s father filed a negligence lawsuit against Greyhound, alleging negligence and negligent hiring, training, retaining, supervising, and equipping.The Eighth Judicial District Court in Clark County, Nevada, dismissed the case for lack of personal jurisdiction over Greyhound, applying the Calder effects test, which is used for intentional torts. The court found that Greyhound did not purposefully direct its conduct toward Nevada, the cause of action did not arise from Greyhound's contacts with Nevada, and exercising jurisdiction would be unreasonable.The Supreme Court of Nevada reviewed the case and concluded that the district court erred in applying the Calder effects test, as it only applies to intentional torts, and the claims against Greyhound were based on negligence. However, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court's dismissal, determining that even under the correct test for specific personal jurisdiction, the district court lacked jurisdiction. Greyhound's contacts with Nevada were not sufficiently related to the negligence claims, which arose from events in California. Therefore, the Supreme Court of Nevada affirmed the district court's order dismissing the action. View "WHITLEY VS. GREYHOUND LINES, INC." on Justia Law

Richard Hicks and his wife, Jocelyn Hicks, filed a lawsuit seeking monetary damages after Richard was injured by a vehicle driven by Gregory Middleton, an employee of Marine Terminals Corporation - East, d.b.a. Ports America. The incident occurred at the Port of Savannah, where both Hicks and Middleton worked as longshoremen. Middleton struck Hicks with his personal vehicle while allegedly on his way to retrieve work-related documents called "game plans."The United States District Court for the Southern District of Georgia granted summary judgment in favor of Ports America. The court ruled that Ports America could not be held vicariously liable for Middleton's actions because Middleton was not acting within the scope of his employment when the incident occurred. The court determined that Middleton was engaged in a personal activity, specifically commuting, and had not yet begun his work duties for Ports America.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case and vacated the district court's grant of summary judgment. The appellate court found that there were genuine issues of material fact regarding whether Middleton was acting in furtherance of Ports America's business and within the scope of his employment when the incident occurred. The court noted that a jury could reasonably infer that Middleton's actions, including driving to retrieve the game plans, were part of his job responsibilities and thus within the scope of his employment. The case was remanded for further proceedings to allow a jury to determine these factual issues. View "Hicks v. Middleton" on Justia Law

Eric Coomer, Ph.D., the former Director of Product Strategy and Safety at Dominion Voting Systems, Inc., filed a defamation lawsuit against several defendants, including Make Your Life Epic, LLC, Reopen America, LLC, and Clayton Thomas Clark. Joseph Oltmann, a nonparty to the lawsuit, was subpoenaed to testify and produce documents. Oltmann initially appeared for his deposition but left without authorization and later boasted about his actions on his podcast, disparaging the magistrate judge and suggesting violence.The United States District Court for the District of Colorado held Oltmann in civil contempt for failing to comply with the subpoena and court orders. The court imposed a $1,000 per day fine until Oltmann complied and ordered him to pay attorney’s fees and costs. Oltmann appealed the Contempt Order, arguing that he properly invoked the newsperson’s privilege and that his due process rights were violated because the district court did not hold a hearing before issuing the Contempt Order.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s Contempt Order. The appellate court held that Oltmann waived his arguments by not raising them specifically in his objections to the magistrate judge’s recommendations. The court also found that the district court did not abuse its discretion in issuing the Contempt Order without a second hearing, as the material facts were undisputed. The appellate court further imposed sanctions on Oltmann, ordering him to pay Coomer’s reasonable expenses, including attorney’s fees and costs associated with the appeal, and remanded the case to the district court to determine the amount. View "Coomer v. Make Your Life Epic" on Justia Law

In 2016, a plaintiff filed a personal injury lawsuit in the Circuit Court of the First Circuit in Hawai‘i against his uncle, alleging sexual abuse that occurred in 1975 and 1976 when the plaintiff was a minor. The plaintiff sought damages for intentional infliction of emotional distress and assault and battery, among other claims. The case was subject to Hawai‘i Revised Statutes (HRS) § 657-1.8, which sets specific time limitations for civil actions arising from the sexual abuse of a minor.The Circuit Court instructed the jury based on criminal statutes in effect at the time the complaint was filed, rather than those in effect when the alleged abuse occurred. The jury awarded the plaintiff $50,000 in general damages and $200,000 in punitive damages. The defendant appealed to the Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA), arguing that the instructions should have been based on the criminal statutes in effect during the time of the alleged abuse. The ICA affirmed the Circuit Court's judgment, holding that the defendant failed to show that HRS § 657-1.8 violated the ex post facto clause.The Supreme Court of the State of Hawai‘i reviewed the case and held that HRS § 657-1.8(a) establishes a statute of limitations for civil actions based on the sexual abuse of a minor and does not create an independent cause of action. The court concluded that the applicable criminal statutes are those in effect when the alleged conduct occurred. Although the Circuit Court erred in instructing the jury on the criminal statutes in effect when the complaint was filed, the Supreme Court found this error to be harmless. The record showed that the defendant admitted to conduct that would have constituted a criminal offense under the statutes in effect at the time of the alleged abuse. Consequently, the Supreme Court affirmed the ICA’s judgment, which upheld the Circuit Court’s final judgment. View "Foresman v. Foresman" on Justia Law