Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of a panel of the court of appeals affirming the judgment of the district court granting summary judgment to the Kansas Workers Compensation Fund on the Fund's collateral action against Trademark, Inc., holding that there was no error.After Juan Medina received a workplace injury he sought compensation from his direct employer under the Kansas Workers Compensation Act, Kan. Stat. Ann. 44-501 et seq. Because the employer did not carry workers compensation insurance, Medina impleaded the Fund to obtain benefits. Thereafter, an ALJ awarded compensation to Medina, and the Fund paid Medina benefits. The Fund then filed this action under Kan. Stat. Ann. 44-532a against Trademark, the general contractor for whom Medina's employer was acting as a subcontractor at the time of the injury. The district court granted summary judgment to the Fund and denied attorney fees. The court of appeals panel affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the lower courts correctly interpreted section 44-532a as allowing the Fund to pursue an action against Trademark; but (2) the Fund was not entitled to attorney fees. View "Schmidt v. Trademark, Inc." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals reversing the trial court's grant of summary judgment in this case brought under Chapter 95 of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code, holding that because the landowner conclusively established that Plaintiff was adequately warned of the dangerous condition, the trial court properly granted summary judgment.Plaintiff was working as a power lineman for OTI Energy Services when he was injured while working to de-energize part of an energized power line and transformer. Plaintiff sued SandRidge Energy, which hired OTI, for negligence, alleging that SandRidge could not establish a defense under Chapter 95 because it exercised control over the manner in which he performed the work, knew of the dangerous condition, and failed adequately to warn him of that condition. The trial court granted summary judgment for SandRidge. The court of appeals reversed, holding that Plaintiff had raised a fact issue as to whether SandRidge failed to provide an adequate warning. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the evidence conclusively established that Plaintiff was fully aware of the dangerous condition that caused his injury; and (2) therefore, the trial court properly granted summary judgment. View "SandRidge Energy, Inc. v. Barfield" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals affirming the judgment of the district court concluding that Plaintiff's filed petition did not relate back to her previously rejected filing, holding that the district court did not err in granting Defendants' motion to dismiss.Plaintiff filed this personal injury suit against Defendants one day after the two-year statute of limitations set forth in Iowa Code 614.1(2). Defendants filed a motion to dismiss the petition on the grounds that Plaintiffs' claims were time-barred. In response, Plaintiff argued that her untimely petition related back to the date she attempted to file her petition but the clerk of court rejected it due to Plaintiff's failure to include personal identification information with the proposed filing. The district court dismissed the action, concluding that the filed petition did not relate back to the rejected filing. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Plaintiff's filing did not relate back to her attempted filing. View "Carlson v. Second Succession, LLC" on Justia Law

St. Alexius Medical Center, d/b/a CHI St. Alexius Health Bismarck, requested a supervisory writ preventing enforcement of the district court’s order compelling disclosure of privileged information. Kevin McKibbage sued Daniel Dixon, Bone & Joint Center, and CHI for medical malpractice relating to a surgery Dixon performed in 2017. In response to McKibbage’s discovery requests, CHI produced some of the requested documents and asserted privileges on others. CHI provided a privilege log identifying undisclosed documents and the privileges claimed. McKibbage filed a motion to compel arguing CHI did not provide sufficient information in the privilege log. CHI responded that it identified all the information it could without violating the peer review law, but CHI agreed to produce an amended privilege log containing greater descriptions. The district court found the law permitted the disclosure of additional information and ordered the following to be disclosed: the dates the documents were created, the identity of the person who created each document and their position at the time of creation, and the identity of the person who received each document and their position for peer review. CHI argued to the North Dakota Supreme Court that the disclosures violated North Dakota’s statutory peer review privilege. The Supreme Court granted CHI's petition and directed the district court to vacate its November 8, 2021 discovery order. View "St. Alexius Medical Center v. Nesvig, et al." on Justia Law

At a Speedway convenience store, Weaver tripped on the curb in front of the doorway, fell to the ground, and sustained injuries. Weaver sued for negligence, alleging that Speedway failed to maintain its premises in a reasonably safe condition. After discovery on liability, a magistrate granted Speedway summary judgment, reasoning that any danger posed by the curb was obvious and that Speedway had no reason to anticipate that Weaver would not protect herself from such a situation. The court cited evidence that, in the last five years, only one other person had reported falling over that curb; Weaver herself had visited the same store multiple times without tripping. Although the company policy to paint the curbs outside store entrances was relevant, a violation of that policy would not by itself establish a breach of Speedway’s duty.The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Although a policy manual may be admissible, it cannot, alone, set the standard for a landowner’s duty of ordinary care. Here, there is no evidence that the area surrounding the curb renders the curb particularly dangerous. Weaver has no evidence from which a jury could conclude that the curb posed any unusual danger to those entering the store in the normal course of doing business. View "Weaver v. Speedway, LLC" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court dismissed this appeal from the decision of the Labor and Industrial Relations Commission (Commission) reversing the administrative law judge's award and denying Claimant permanent total disability benefits, holding that Claimant's brief preserved nothing for appellate review because it failed to comply with the mandatory and straightforward rules governing the contents of an appellant's briefs.After the Commission denied Claimant's claim, Claimant appealed. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that each of Claimant's points on appeal was defective because each point relied on wholly failed to follow the simple template provided in Rule 84.04. View "Lexow v. Boeing Co." on Justia Law

While driving over 100 miles per hour, Christal McGee rear-ended a car driven by Wentworth Maynard, causing him to suffer severe injuries. When the collision occurred, McGee was using a “Speed Filter” feature within Snapchat, a mobile phone application, to record her real-life speed on a photo or video that she could then share with other Snapchat users. Wentworth and his wife, Karen Maynard, sued McGee and Snapchat, Inc. (“Snap”), alleging that Snap negligently designed Snapchat’s Speed Filter. The trial court dismissed the design-defect claim against Snap, and a divided panel of the Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that Snap did not owe a legal duty to the Maynards because a manufacturer’s duty to design reasonably safe products does not extend to people injured by a third party’s intentional and tortious misuse of the manufacturer’s product. On certiorari, the Georgia Supreme Court concluded the Court of Appeals erred: "a manufacturer has a duty under our decisional law to use reasonable care in selecting from alternative designs to reduce reasonably foreseeable risks of harm posed by its products. When a particular risk of harm from a product is not reasonably foreseeable, a manufacturer owes no design duty to reduce that risk. How a product was being used (e.g., intentionally, negligently, properly, improperly, or not at all) and who was using it (the plaintiff or a third party) when an injury occurred are relevant considerations in determining whether a manufacturer could reasonably foresee a particular risk of harm from its product. Nevertheless, our decisional law does not recognize a blanket exception to a manufacturer’s design duty in all cases of intentional or tortious third-party use." Because the holding of the Court of Appeals conflicted with these principles, and because the Maynards adequately alleged Snap could have reasonably foreseen the particular risk of harm from the Speed Filter at issue here, the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals and remanded for further proceedings. View "Maynard, et al. v. Snapchat, Inc." on Justia Law

Curt and Dara Von Lossberg filed this suit against the State of Idaho and the Idaho State Police after their son, Bryan Von Lossberg, ended his life with an unlawfully purchased handgun. The Von Lossbergs alleged that this purchase stemmed from failures in Idaho’s electronic case management system to properly report his mental health status. The district court dismissed the Von Lossbergs’ claims for negligence and wrongful death, concluding that the government defendants were immune from tort liability under the immunity provisions of the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act (“Brady Act”). On appeal, the Von Lossbergs argued their case should not have been dismissed because: (1) the Brady Act’s immunity provision did not apply to the State of Idaho; and (2) the Brady Act’s immunity provision was not preserved by the Idaho Tort Claims Act. The Idaho Supreme Court concurred that the Brady Act did not grant immunity to the State and its agencies. Accordingly, judgment was reversed, and the case remanded for further proceedings. View "Von Lossberg v. Idaho" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the order of the superior court granting summary judgment in favor of the University of Maine System and the University of Maine and dismissing Plaintiff's complaint asserting negligent maintenance and operation of a parking lot, holding that there was no error.Plaintiff slipped and fell on a patch of untreated ice on the University of Maine's Orono campus and sustained injuries. Plaintiff filed this complaint alleging that the University was negligent in its maintenance and operation of the parking lot. The superior court granted summary judgment for the University on the grounds that the parking lot was not an appurtenance as that term is used in Me. Rev. Stat. 14, 8104-A(2) and, therefore, that no exception to governmental immunity applied. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that the superior court correctly determined that the University was entitled to summary judgment. View "Klein v. University of Maine System" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court modified and affirmed the ruling of the court of appeals reversing the trial court's denial of Plaintiff's N.C. Gen. Stat. Chapter 50B domestic violence protective orders (DVPO) complaint, holding that the district court did not err in determining that it had subject matter jurisdiction to allow Plaintiff to proceed with her Chapter 50B DVPO action.Plaintiff struck through a notice of voluntary dismissal and wrote "I do not want to dismiss this action" on a notice of voluntary dismissal form that she had filed less than one hour before after learning that she could request a DVPO under Chapter 50B. The trial court concluded that the handwritten amendment could revive Plaintiff's previously dismissed complaint and therefore exercised jurisdiction over the subsequent hearing. The court of appeals reversed the trial court's denial of Plaintiff's Chapter 50B complaint and remanded for further proceedings. The Supreme Court modified and affirmed, holding that the trial court had proper jurisdiction to hear Plaintiff's DVPO complaint and motions where Plaintiff's amended form served as a functional Rule 60(b) motion for equitable relief from her mistaken dismissal, and the court of appeals did not err in determining the same. View "M.E. v. T.J" on Justia Law