Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court denied relief in this original petition for a writ of mandamus, holding that the district court did not manifestly abuse its discretion by denying Petitioner's motion and dismissing her complaint as to the party whom she failed timely to serve.Petitioner filed a complaint against Mark Thomas Anderson and his employer, Thor Development, LLC, alleging various tort claims arising out of a motor vehicle accident. After the expiration date of the Nev. R. Civ. P. 4 service period, Petitioner filed two motions to enlarge time for service. The district court granted the first motion but denied the second, finding that the motion was untimely. The court then dismissed Petitioners' complaint. The Supreme Court denied Petitioner's subsequent request for relief, holding that Emergency Directive 009 did not toll the 120-day service period established by Rule 4(e), and therefore, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Petitioner's second motion to enlarge time. View "Cervantes-Guevara v. District Court" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the circuit court determining that Julie Niemitalo released her right to bring this post-divorce civil suit against Richard Seidel for conduct that occurred while the parties were separated and in the process of obtaining a divorce, holding that the language of the agreement did not preclude Julie's civil suit against Richard.Julie asserted that while the divorce action was pending Richard attacked her, bound her, and raped her. A jury found Richard guilty of all offenses. In Julie's pending civil suit she brought claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligent infliction of emotional distress, false imprisonment, and civil battery. The circuit court granted summary judgment for Richard, determining that a divorce agreement between the parties was unambiguous and interpreted it to be a broad release and full and final settlement of all claims. The Supreme Court reversed, (1) the language in the agreement did not preclude Julie's lawsuit; and (2) res judicata did not apply. View "Niemitalo v. Seidel" on Justia Law

In these consolidated appeals, the Supreme Court held that Rhode Island's civil death statute, R.I. Gen. Laws 13-61-1, is unconstitutional and in clear contravention of the provisions of R.I. Const. art. I, 5.Plaintiffs, Cody-Allen Zab and Jose R. Rivera, were two inmates serving sentences of life imprisonment. Plaintiff brought this action against Defendants, the Rhode Island Department of Corrections and its director and Global Tel*Link Corporation, asserting that while they were imprisoned they incurred injuries due to Defendants' negligence. The hearing justice concluded that the civil death statute barred Plaintiffs' negligence claims and that Zab's 42 U.S.C. 1983 federal claim failed as a matter of law. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding that the civil death statute unconstitutionally denied Plaintiffs the right to gain access to the courts. View "Zab v. R.I. Department of Corrections" on Justia Law

The South Carolina Supreme Court granted review of a court of appeals' decision affirming a trial court's finding that Respondents Fred's, Inc. (Fred's) and Wildevco, LLC (Wildevco) were entitled to equitable indemnification from Petitioner Tippins-Polk Construction, Inc. (Tippins-Polk). Respondent Fred's was a Tennessee corporation that operated a chain of discount general merchandise stores in several states, including South Carolina. Respondent Wildevco is a South Carolina limited liability company that owned a tract of undeveloped commercial property in Williston, South Carolina. In February 2005, Wildevco and Fred's entered into a lease agreement in which Wildevco agreed to construct a 16,000-square-foot commercial space located in Williston, South Carolina, according to Fred's conceptual design specifications. In turn, Fred's agreed to lease the property for ten years. In April 2005, Wildevco entered into a contract with general contractor Tippins-Polk for the construction of the Fred's store and adjoining strip center. Pursuant to the lease agreement between Wildevco and Fred's, Wildevco was the party responsible for "keep[ing] and repair[ing] the exterior of the [] Premises, including the parking lot, parking lot lights, entrance and exits, sidewalks, ramps, curbs," and various other exterior elements. Fred's was responsible for maintenance of the interior of the premises. Five years after the Fred's store opened, on a sunny day in March, Martha Fountain went to the Williston Fred's to purchase light bulbs. Her toe caught the sloped portion of the ramp at the entrance of the store, causing her to trip and fall. Fountain sustained serious injuries to her hand, wrist, and arm and has undergone five surgeries to alleviate her pain and injuries. Fountain and her husband filed a premises liability suit against Fred's and Wildevco, alleging Respondents breached their duty to invitees by failing to maintain and inspect the premises and failing to discover and make safe or warn of unreasonable risks. Pertinent to this appeal, Tippins-Polk argued the court of appeals erred in finding a special relationship existed between it and Fred's and in finding Respondents proved they were without fault as to the Fountain premises liability claim. Because the Supreme Court found Respondents failed to establish they were without fault in the underlying action, judgment was reversed. View "Fountain v. Fred's, Inc., et al." on Justia Law

The San Francisco Police Department allowed officers to carry secondary firearms when on duty, and to carry loaded handguns when off duty. A Department bulletin stated officers are responsible for ensuring that firearms under their control are secure at all times and provided specific guidelines for securing firearms in an unattended vehicle.Officer Cabuntala regularly carried an approved secondary firearm on duty and regularly transported it in his vehicle. On August 11, 2017, the city assigned Cabuntala to a training session in a different county. He drove his personal vehicle to the site, with his personal firearm in the vehicle. Firearms were not allowed at the training session. When the training was over, Cabuntala drove home but failed to follow his usual practice of securing his personal firearm inside his house. He left it unsecured inside his vehicle. Cabuntala’s vehicle was broken into. The firearm was stolen and was used to kill Plaintiff’s son. The trial court entered summary judgment, finding Cabuntala was not acting within the scope of his employment. The court of appeal reversed. In the context of policing, a jury could reasonably find the officer’s failure to safely secure his weapon is “not so unusual or startling that it would seem unfair to include the loss resulting from it among other costs of the employer’s business.” View "Perez v. City and County of San Francisco" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that the National Highway Transportation Safety Administration (the Agency) has not established a clear policy objective concerning automatic emergency breaking (AEB) technology that preempts state tort law claims based on an auto manufacturer's alleged failure to install AEB.Plaintiff sued Chrysler alleging negligence, defective product design, defective product warning, and wrongful death. Chrysler moved to dismiss the lawsuit, asserting that it was preempted given the Agency's objectives regarding the development and deployment of AEB technology. The trial court granted Chrysler's motion. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the Agency did not intend to preempt tort claims based on the absence of AEB. The Supreme Court reversed the trial court's order, holding (1) the Agency has neither conveyed an authoritative statement establishing manufacturer choice as a significant federal policy objective nor made explicit a view that AEB should not be regulated; and (2) therefore, the Agency has not established a policy objective that actually conflicts with the claims at issue. View "Varela v. FCA US LLC" on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of plaintiff's negligence claims against Carnival based on failure to state a claim. Plaintiff alleged claims for negligent failure to maintain and negligent failure to warn after she slipped and fell on a wet substance near the bar onboard a Carnival cruise ship. The court concluded that plaintiff failed to include any factual allegations that were sufficient to satisfy the Iqbal and Twombly pleading standards such that it is facially plausible that Carnival had actual or constructive notice of the dangerous condition. Rather, the court concluded that plaintiff's complaint contains only conclusory allegations as to actual or constructive notice. Finally, because plaintiff never sought leave to amend the complaint, there was no error in granting leave sua sponte before dismissing the complaint. View "Newbauer v. Carnival Corp." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court answered a question certified to the Supreme Court by the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut in this declaratory judgment action by holding that Defendant's plea of nolo contendere could not be used to trigger a criminal acts exclusion in a homeowners insurance policy governed by Connecticut law.At issue was whether Plaintiff, Allstate Insurance Company, could use Defendant's plea of nolo contendere to the charge of assault in the first degree to trigger a criminal acts exclusion that would bar Plaintiff's coverage of Defendant in a civil action involving the same underlying incident. The district court certified the question to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court answered that Defendant's plea of nolo contendere could not be used by Plaintiff to establish the applicability of the criminal acts exclusion of the relevant policy. View "Allstate Insurance Co. v. Tenn" on Justia Law

While incarcerated in the Ada County jail, Appellant Tom Williamson fell from the upper bunk bed during a request that he stand for roll call. Williamson suffered a head injury and sued Respondents Ada County and the Ada County Sheriff (collectively “Ada County”), alleging they were negligent in maintaining unsafe bunk beds, ordering him to descend from the top bunk bed for roll call, and in responding to injuries he suffered. The district court dismissed the case after concluding Ada County was immune from liability under Idaho Code sections 6-904(1) and 904B(5). Williamson appealed. After review, the Idaho Supreme Court reversed the district court’s decision to dismiss Williamson’s claim that Ada County was negligent in ordering him to descend from the top bunk for roll call, and remanded the case for further proceedings. The Court affirmed the district court’s dismissal of Williamson’s remaining claims. View "Williamson v. Ada County" on Justia Law

In this insurance dispute, the Supreme Court held that the MCS-90 endorsement, which provides that if a motor vehicle is involved in an accident the insurer may be required to pay any final judgment against the insured arising out of the accident, does not apply to an accident that occurred during an intrastate trip transporting non-hazardous property.One way motor carries can comply with the financial requirements of the federal Motor Carrier Act of 1980 is by adding an MCS-90 endorsement to their insurance policy. The insurer in this case brought an action seeking a declaration that the MCS-90 endorsement creating a suretyship whereby the insurer agreed to pay a final judgment against the insured in certain negligence cases did not apply. The trial court found that the MCS-90 endorsement applied, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) because the insured driver was neither engaged in interests commerce at the time of the action nor transporting hazardous property, the MCS-90 endorsement did not apply; and (2) the insurer had no duty to defend or indemnify the driver. View "Progressive Southeastern Insurance Co. v. Brown" on Justia Law