Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the superior court entered in favor of Plaintiff that granted Plaintiff's motion for additur, holding that there was no error.In 2013, Plaintiff was involved in an automobile accident. Because she believed she was not fully compensated for the injuries she sustained from the accident, Plaintiff brought this complaint against Allstate Insurance Company, her insurer, seeking underinsured motorist benefits. The jury reached a verdict in favor of Plaintiff, awarding damages in the amount of $22,890. Plaintiff filed a motion for an additur, which the trial justice granted in the amount of $6,000. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial justice did not abuse his discretion in granting an additur of $6,000. View "Mowry v. Allstate Insurance Co." on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court declined to consider a question certified to the Court by the First Circuit Court of Appeals, holding that there was no clear controlling precedent.Plaintiff brought a complaint in a federal district court against multiple defendants, including Investor's Business Daily (IBD) and Sally Pipes, a writer for the IBD, alleging, among other claims, defamation and negligent infliction of emotional distress. IBD filed a special motion to dismiss, arguing that Me. Rev. Stat. Title 14, 556, Maine's anti-SLAPP statute applied. The district court denied the special motion to dismiss. On appeal, the First Circuit certified to the Supreme Court regarding whether IBD's special motion to dismiss should be granted under Maine's anti-SLAPP law. The Supreme Judicial Court declined to answer the question, holding that there was no clear precedent that applied to this dispute. View "Franchini v. Investor's Business Daily, Inc." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court concluding that the accidental failure of suit statute, Conn. Gen. Stat. 52-592, did not save the otherwise time-barred action of Plaintiff, executrix of the estate of Theresa Riccio, holding that there was no error.The trial court concluded that Plaintiff's wrongful death action was time barred because her first medical malpractice action was dismissed due to her attorney's gross negligence for failing to file with the complaint legally sufficient medical opinion letters, as required by Conn. Gen. Stat. 52-190a(a) and two appellate court decisions interpreting section 52-190a(a). The appellate court dismissed the appeal, concluding that the action was time barred. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court did not err in determining that the omission of the experts' qualifications was egregious conduct rather than a matter of form or mistake. View "Riccio v. Bristol Hospital, Inc." on Justia Law

In this action arising from an explosion at a power generating facility under construction in Middletown the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court in favor of Defendants with respect to Plaintiffs' strict liability claims and grant of summary judgment with respect to Plaintiffs' negligence claims, holding that tort remedies were not available to Plaintiffs under the circumstances of this case.Several the victims of the blast and ensuing fire and their families brought this action against, among others, the power plant's owner, the owner's administrative agent, and the general contactor. The claims against the general contractor were resolved in the contractor's favor. As to the owner and administrative agent, the trial court rendered judgment for Defendants with respect to the strict liability claims and granted summary judgment with respect to the negligence claims. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Plaintiffs were not entitled to relief on their allegations of error. View "Gonzalez v. O & G Industries, Inc." on Justia Law

The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's grant of defendant's motion for summary judgment in an action alleging claims for negligence and premises liability. Plaintiff was jogging on defendant's property when she encountered a homeless encampment that blocked her path. In order to avoid the encampment, she ran onto the street's bicycle lane, where she was struck and injured by a car.The court concluded that jogging to train for a foot race is an activity in which one engages for a recreational purpose under Civil Code section 846 and a property owner generally owes no duty of care to those who enter or use its property for such an activity. Because plaintiff failed to demonstrate a triable issue of material fact as to her negligence and premises liability claims, the trial court did not err by granting summary judgment in favor of defendant. View "Rucker v. WINCAL, LLC" on Justia Law

The parties to this appeal disputed the sequence for applying the provisions when calculating compensation for injured employees; another provision applied a cost-of-living ratio only to out-of-state recipients. Richard Roberge injured his shoulder in May 2014 while working for ASRC Construction Holding Company; he continued working with accommodations until the job ended in November. Roberge then returned to his Idaho residence. ASRC paid him $834.85 weekly in temporary total disability compensation through mid-August 2015, calculated by adjusting the maximum weekly compensation rate by the prevailing cost-of-living adjustment (COLA) percentage for his residence. The Alaska Supreme Court concluded We conclude the Act required first applying the cost-of-living ratio and then applying the maximum rate. View "Roberge v. ASRC Construction Holding Company, et al." on Justia Law

Yulanda Haddan appealed the grant of summary judgment entered in favor of Norfolk Southern Railway Company and Norfolk Southern Corporation (collectively referred to as "Norfolk Southern"). She also sought review of a circuit court order striking certain deposition testimony. Haddan was injured when a pickup truck in which she was riding collided with a Norfolk Southern train at a railroad crossing. In its summary judgment, the circuit court concluded that Haddan could not recover against Norfolk Southern because, it determined, the driver of the truck failed to stop, look, and listen before entering the crossing and that failure was the sole proximate cause of Haddan's injury. The Alabama Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court's order striking the testimony, but reversed summary judgment and remand the matter to the circuit court for further proceedings. "Haddan presented substantial evidence ... from which a reasonable person could conclude that Norfolk Southern contributed to cause the collision resulting in Haddan's injuries, calling into question whether Cox's contributory negligence rose to the level of a superseding, intervening cause and creating a jury question as to whether Cox's conduct was that of a concurrent tortfeasor. The evidence of Norfolk Southern's failure to install lights and a gate at the crossing further raises doubt as to whether Cox's failure to stop, look, and listen was truly unforeseeable. Haddan has raised enough of a factual issue to preclude the entry of a summary judgment in favor of Norfolk Southern. Ultimately, 'the jury must decide whose actions are the proximate cause of the injury, or whether both [parties'] actions concurred and combined to proximately cause the injury.'" View "Haddan v. Norfolk Southern Railway Co." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that, at least where specific jurisdiction is asserted, Tex. R. Civ. P. 120a discovery need not relate exclusively to jurisdictional issues without touching on merits issues.The parties in this suit concerning water leaks from plastic pipe made of cross linked polyethylene failed to agree on the scope of two corporate representative depositions, and so the trial court granted a motion to compel the depositions on a list of thirty topics proposed by Plaintiffs. The nonresident defendant sought mandamus relief, which the court of appeals granted, concluding that the trial court erred in compelling discovery on topics that touched both jurisdictional and merits issues. The Supreme Court directed the court of appeals to vacate its mandamus order, holding (1) the trial court did not abuse its discretion merely by compelling discovery on jurisdictional topics; (2) the standard for trial courts to apply is that the information sought must be essential to prove at least one part of the plaintiff's theory of personal jurisdiction; and (3) general principles that limit the scope of discovery apply equally to jurisdictional discovery. View "In re Christianson Air Conditioning & Plumbing, LLC" on Justia Law

DiDonato fell and seriously injured her head in the bathroom of Panatera’s home Panatera, a Chicago paramedic, found DiDonato disoriented and badly bleeding but allegedly only rinsed the blood from DiDonato’s head, wrapped it in a towel, moved her to his bed, and sexually assaulted her. When DiDonato regained consciousness the next afternoon, Panatera drove her home. DiDonato went to an emergency room. She had sustained head trauma and a concussion.DiDonato filed suit, 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that Panatera violated her due process rights by failing to provide medical care, with state law claims for assault, battery, and negligence. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of DiDonato’s section 1983 claim. DiDonato had to allege that a state actor failed to adhere to a duty to protect and care for a person with whom the state had a “special relationship.” States and municipalities are not in a “special relationship” with all residents and do not shoulder a constitutional duty to provide medical care to anyone needing help. There was no allegation that DiDonato was ever in the city’s care or custody. DiDonato also failed to plausibly allege that Panatera acted “under color of state law.” Section 1983 does not cover disputes between private citizens; an individual’s employment by the state does not render any and all action by that person state action. DiDonato’s need for help and medical care arose during entirely private interaction. View "Didonato v. Panatera" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court vacated the decision of the district court denying the motion for summary judgment filed by Barnes Bullets asking the district court to rule that the Workers' Compensation Act (WCA) barred Layne Kay's claim, holding that the Occupational Disease Act (ODA) may bar Kay's lawsuit.Kay contracted lead poisoning while working at Barnes and sued Barnes under the exception to the WCA permitting employees like Kay to sue over injuries caused by an employer's intentional act. Barnes moved for summary judgment, arguing that the WCA barred Kay's claim where Kay did not present sufficient evidence that Barnes acted intentionally. The Supreme Court vacated the district court's decision and remanded the case for further proceedings, holding that Utah law recognizing lead poisoning as an occupational disease raises a significant question as to whether the ODA, not the WCA, covered Kay's claim. View "Kay v. Barnes Bullets" on Justia Law