Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

Bourke was exposed to fumes during his employment with the Veterans Administration. He received treatment at a VA hospital and contends that medical malpractice there caused him serious injuries. He sought compensation from the Department of Labor under the Federal Employees Compensation Act for on-the-job injuries and from the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act for medical malpractice. The Department of Labor processed Bourke’s claim but found that he had not shown that his asserted injuries had been caused by exposure to fumes. The VA (handling the FTCA claim) concluded that, once Bourke applied to the Department of Labor, all other sources of relief were precluded. Bourke sued under the Tort Claims Act, conceding the Department of Labor’s conclusion that conditions at work did not cause the medical issues for which he was treated by the VA, and alleging medical malpractice.The district court rejected his complaint on the ground that the Federal Employees Compensation Act offers his sole avenue of relief.; once the Department of Labor adjudicates a claim, the applicant must accept the result because 5 U.S.C. 8116(c) forecloses other sources of relief and 5 U.S.C. 8128(b)(2) blocks judicial review of the Department’s decisions.The Seventh Circuit vacated. Bourke is not seeking judicial review of the Department of Labor’s decision. Someone who loses before the Department cannot contest that outcome in court but may pursue other remedies that are compatible with the Department’s views. View "Bourke v. United States" on Justia Law

Appellant Dameron Hospital Association (Dameron) required patients or their family members to sign Conditions of Admissions (COAs) when Dameron provided the patients’ medical care. The COAs at issue in this case contained language that assigned to Dameron direct payment of uninsured and underinsured motorist (UM) benefits and medical payment (MP) benefits that would otherwise be payable to those patients under their automobile insurance policies. Dameron treated five of California State Automobile Association Inter-Insurance Bureau's ("CSAA") insureds for injuries following automobile accidents. Those patients had UM and/or MP coverage as part of their CSAA coverage, and Dameron sought to collect payment for those services from the patients’ UM and/or MP benefits at Dameron’s full rates. Instead of paying to Dameron the lesser of either all benefits due to the patients under their UM and MP coverage, or Dameron’s full charges, CSAA paid portions of those benefits directly to the patients which left balances owing on some of Dameron’s bills. Dameron sued CSAA to collect UM and MP benefits it contended CSAA owed Dameron under the assignments contained in the COAs. The trial court concluded that Dameron could not enforce any of the assignments contained in the COAs and entered judgment in CSAA’s favor following CSAA’s successful motion for summary judgment. The Court of Appeal held Dameron could not collect payment for emergency services from the UM or MP benefits due to patients that were covered under health insurance policies. Further, the Court held: (1) the COA forms were contracts of adhesion; (2) it was not within the reasonable possible expectations of patients that a hospital would collect payments for emergency care directly out of their UM benefits; and (3) a trier of fact might find it was within the reasonable expectations of patients that a hospital would collect payments for emergency care directly out of their MP benefits. Accordingly, the Court concluded Dameron could not maintain causes of action to collect MP or UM benefits due to four of the five patients directly from CSAA. However, consistent with this opinion, the trial court could consider whether an enforceable assignment of MP benefits was made by one adult patient. View "Dameron Hospital Assn. v. AAA Northern Cal. etc." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals granting a writ ordering the Industrial Commission of Ohio to vacate its order awarding compensation to Cami Bowman, holding that the court of appeals correctly concluded that the Commission abused its discretion.Bowman sought compensation for the permanent partial loss of her sight based on a seventy percent bilateral loss of vision. The Commission awarded compensation based on only a forty-five percent loss of sight in the left eye, maintaining a prior award based on a sixty-seven percent loss of sight in the right eye. The court of appeals granted Bowman a writ ordering the Commission to vacate its order and award her requested compensation, ruling that the Commission abused its discretion by relying on a portion of a physician's report that the physician had disclaimed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Commission failed to base its decision on medical evidence. View "State ex rel. Bowman v. Industrial Commission" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court vacated the opinion of the court of appeals reversing the judgment of the trial court denying summary judgment for Defendant and remanded this matter to the trial court to grant summary judgment for Defendant, holding that Plaintiff was not entitled to relief on her defamation claim.This defamation action arose from a political advertisement directed at an opposing candidate, in which the third-party plaintiff was unnamed, the alleged defamation was not expressed but implied, and the asserted implication was not one that a reasonable listener would likely draw. Defendant moved for summary judgment, arguing that the advertisement made truthful claims about matters of public concern and that Defendant did not make the statements with actual malice. The superior court denied the summary judgment motion. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court vacated the court of appeals, holding that the First Amendment does not tolerate a defamation action under the facts presented in this case. View "Rogers v. Honorable Mroz" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court upheld the decision of the trial court denying Plaintiff's application for a civil protection order, holding that Plaintiff's claims on appeal lacked merit.At issue before the Supreme Court was the standard courts must apply to determine whether an applicant for a civil protection order has established the element of fear. On appeal from the denial of her application for a civil protection order Plaintiff argued, among other things, that the trial court improperly interpreted Conn. Gen. Stat. 46b-16a as creating a subjective-objective standard for establishing fear rather than a purely objective standard. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial court properly interpreted section 46b-16a; (2) none of the trial court's factual findings was clearly erroneous; and (3) section 46b-16a does not violate the equal protection clause of the Connecticut constitution. View "L.H.-S. v. N.B." on Justia Law

Carl Gardei filed a petition for declaratory judgment against R. L. “Butch” Conway, the Sheriff of Gwinnett County, Georgia, and D. Victor Reynolds, the Director of the Georgia Bureau of Investigation (“GBI”), in their individual capacities (collectively “Respondents”), alleging that Respondents’ continued enforcement against him of the statutory requirements governing Georgia’s Sex Offender Registry (the “Registry”) violated his constitutional rights. The trial court dismissed Gardei’s petition on the ground that his claims for relief were time barred under OCGA 9-3-33, the two-year statute of limitation for personal injury claims, because Gardei had initially registered under the Registry Act in 2009 and every year thereafter. The Court of Appeals affirmed in a divided opinion. The Georgia Supreme Court granted Gardei’s petition for certiorari to address whether Gardei’s claims for declaratory and injunctive relief were subject to the limitation period set forth in OCGA 9-3-33, and whether any applicable statute of limitation was tolled based on the requirement that Gardei annually renew his sex-offender registration. The Supreme Court concluded that although Gardei’s claims were subject to the two-year statute of limitation under OCGA 9-3-33, because he sought only prospective relief, the statute of limitation on those claims had not yet begun to run. Therefore, the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals’s judgment holding that Gardei’s claims were time-barred, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Gardei v. Conway, et al." on Justia Law

The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's judgment in favor of defendant, a neurosurgeon, in a medical malpractice action against defendant and others, alleging claims related to plaintiff's treatment in the emergency room. Plaintiff and his wife alleged that emergency surgery should have taken place sooner than six hours after his arrival at the emergency room because time was of the essence in removing a blood clot. After the surgery, plaintiff ended up partially quadriplegic.The court concluded that the trial court did not err in declining to instruct the jury with CACI 509 (Abandonment of Patient) as the instruction was not supported by substantial evidence. The court also concluded that CACI 411 (Reliance on the Good Conduct of Others) did not prejudice plaintiffs. Furthermore, the trial court's refusal to give CACI 430 (Causation: Substantial Factor) and CACI 431 (Causation: Multiple Causes) and its decision to give Defense Special Instruction No. 2 are moot in light of the jury's finding of no negligence. Finally, plaintiff's challenge to CACI 506 (Alternative Methods of Care) is waived, and the trial court did not err in refusing to give BAJI 6.15, which defined "emergency." View "Zannini v. Liker" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-appellant Treasure Andrews sued the Metropolitan Transit System, San Diego Transit Corporation, and Janalee St. Clair (collectively, MTS) after she was injured on an MTS bus driven by St. Clair. MTS moved for summary judgment on the ground that Andrews’s complaint was barred by the statute of limitations because Andrews filed suit more than six months after MTS mailed a notice of rejection of Andrews’s claim for damages. Andrews opposed, arguing among other things that MTS’s notice of rejection was defective because it did not include the full warning required by statute, and the two-year statute of limitations therefore applied. The trial court found that Andrews’s complaint was untimely, granted the motion, and entered judgment against Andrews. On appeal, Andrews again contended the notice of rejection was defective. To this, the Court of Appeal agreed: the notice did not comply with the statute and was therefore insufficient to trigger the six-month statute of limitations in Government Code section 945.6 (a)(1). Instead, Andrews had two years from the accrual of her cause of action to file suit. Thus, the Court determined the trial court erred by finding that the six-month limitations period applied, and reversed judgment on that basis. View "Andrews v. Metropolitan Transit System" on Justia Law

The First Circuit reversed the judgment of the district court finding that Electric Boat Corp. had failed to satisfy the requirements of 28 U.S.C. 1442(a)(1) for federal officer removal, holding that Electric Boat established the statutory requirements for removal.During the late-1960s, Michael Moore was allegedly exposed to asbestos during construction of a submarine, the USS Francis Scott Key, where he worked as an electronics officer. Moore and his wife (collectively, Moore), brought suit against Electric Board and others, alleging several state claims. Electric Boat removed the case to federal court under the federal officer removal statute, 28 U.S.C. 1442. Moore filed a motion to remand to state court, which the district court granted after finding that Electric Boat had failed to satisfy the requirements for federal officer removal under section 1442(a)(1). The First Circuit reversed, holding (1) the district court interpreted section 1442(a)(1) in a manner inconsistent with the 2011 congressional amendment to the statute; and (2) Electric Boat satisfied the standard for federal officer removal under section 1442(a)(1). View "Moore v. Electric Boat Corp." on Justia Law

Petitioner California Correctional Peace Officers Association Benefit Trust Fund (CCPOA) paid money pursuant to its disability policy to real party in interest David Martin Jr., a CCPOA member, after he filed a workers’ compensation claim for injuries sustained while working as a correctional officer. CCPOA subsequently filed a lien against the prospective workers’ compensation award for the sum it paid. It was represented in the workers’ compensation proceedings by petitioner Dan Escamilla, a non-attorney appearing pursuant to Labor Code section 5700. After Martin’s attorney petitioned for costs and sanctions against CCPOA and Escamilla for alleged misbehavior during proceedings on Martin’s claim, CCPOA withdrew the lien. Escamilla then failed to appear at four subsequent hearings on the petition for costs and sanctions. While respondent Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board (WCAB) ultimately affirmed the denial of costs and sanctions, it affirmed an award of $3,280 in attorney fees against CCPOA and Escamilla for the failure to appear at the four hearings. Petitioners filed a petition for writ of review, claiming: (1) the failure to notify them that a hearing held subsequent to the COVID-19 pandemic was to be held telephonically was a deprivation of due process; (2) failure to appear following the withdrawal of the lien was not sanctionable bad faith; and (3) attorney fees were not permitted for an attorney expending time litigating on his or her own behalf. The Court of Appeal found there was adequate notice of the one hearing in question, withdrawal of the lien did not deprive WCAB of jurisdiction to determine the petition for costs and sanctions, and the contention regarding attorney fees for work on behalf of the attorney was not properly before the Court, as it was determined by WCAB in a previous proceeding. Accordingly, judgment was affirmed. View "Cal. Correctional Peace Officers Assn. v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd." on Justia Law