Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

In 2010, the British Petroleum Deepwater Horizon oil spill released crude oil into the Gulf of Mexico. Matthew Williams, the plaintiff, performed oil spill clean-up work in the Gulf that summer. On September 24, 2020, Williams was diagnosed with chronic pansinusitis, an inflammatory condition of the nasal passages. Williams filed a lawsuit against BP Exploration & Production Inc. and BP America Production Co., alleging that his condition was caused by exposure to oil, dispersants, and other chemicals during the cleanup work. Williams presented two expert witnesses, Dr. Michael Freeman and Dr. James Clark, to establish causation.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi reviewed the case. BP filed motions to exclude the expert reports under Federal Rule of Evidence 702 and Daubert, and subsequently filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that Williams lacked admissible expert testimony to establish causation. The district court granted BP’s motions to exclude the expert testimonies and the motion for summary judgment, leading Williams to appeal the decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court upheld the district court’s exclusion of Dr. Freeman’s testimony, finding it unreliable as it did not properly apply the differential etiology approach. Similarly, the court found Dr. Clark’s testimony unreliable due to errors in his report, including references to another case and incorrect assumptions about benzene concentrations. Without admissible expert testimony, Williams could not establish specific causation, a necessary element in toxic tort cases. Consequently, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of BP. View "Williams v. BP Expl & Prod" on Justia Law

Anthony Mitchell was driving his Ferrari in Dana Point when he ran over large rocks that had rolled onto the road from an adjacent slope, causing damage to his car and unspecified personal injuries. Mitchell and his passenger, Scott Sieverts, sued multiple parties, including Gail B. Hutchinson, trustee of the Hutchinson Family Trust, for negligence and premises liability, alleging that the defendants failed to maintain their properties to prevent rocks from becoming hazards.The Superior Court of Orange County granted summary judgment in favor of Hutchinson, concluding that she met her initial burden of showing that the plaintiffs could not prove causation. The court found that the plaintiffs failed to create a triable issue of material fact regarding whether the rocks came from Hutchinson’s property or whether the defendants negligently maintained their slopes. The plaintiffs appealed the decision.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case. The court affirmed the lower court's decision, holding that Hutchinson met her initial burden under Code of Civil Procedure section 437c, subdivision (p)(2), by showing that the plaintiffs could not prove causation. The burden then shifted to the plaintiffs, who failed to show a triable issue of material fact. The court found that the plaintiffs' expert's opinion was speculative and lacked foundation, and there was no admissible evidence tying the rocks to Hutchinson’s property or proving negligence. Consequently, the summary judgment in favor of Hutchinson was affirmed. View "Mitchell v. Hutchinson" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs in this multi-district products liability suit allege that they purchased defective Chrysler Pacifica minivans from FCA, which were recalled due to a risk of battery explosions. After the recall, plaintiffs filed seven putative class action suits, which were consolidated in the Eastern District of Michigan. During discovery, FCA discovered that some plaintiffs had agreed to arbitration clauses when purchasing their minivans and moved to compel arbitration for those plaintiffs. The district court denied FCA’s motion, finding that FCA had waived its right to arbitrate by moving to dismiss the entire complaint.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan denied FCA’s motion to compel arbitration, concluding that FCA had waived its right to arbitrate by engaging in litigation conduct inconsistent with that right, specifically by moving to dismiss the plaintiffs’ claims. The district court made this finding sua sponte, without the plaintiffs raising the issue of waiver.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case and reversed the district court’s decision. The appellate court held that a party cannot waive its right to arbitration without knowledge of that right. The court found that FCA did not know about the arbitration clauses until it obtained the relevant purchase agreements through discovery. Additionally, the appellate court determined that the district court erred by raising the issue of waiver on its own, violating the principle of party presentation. The Sixth Circuit concluded that the district court’s decision was clearly erroneous and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Berzanskis v. FCA US, LLC" on Justia Law

The case involves nearly 75,000 plaintiffs who filed personal injury claims in the Delaware Superior Court, alleging that their ingestion of ranitidine, marketed under the brand name Zantac, caused them to develop various types of cancer. The plaintiffs claim that ranitidine contains or degrades into N-Nitrosodimethylamine (NDMA), a likely carcinogen. The defendants in the case include GlaxoSmithKline LLC, Boehringer Ingelheim Pharmaceuticals, Inc., Sanofi US Services Inc., Pfizer Inc., and Patheon Manufacturing Services, LLC.The Superior Court of Delaware denied the defendants' motions to exclude the plaintiffs' expert testimony, which supported the claim that ranitidine causes cancer. The court concluded that the general causation question could focus on NDMA rather than ranitidine itself and that Delaware law does not require a "threshold dose" for general causation. The court also applied a "liberal thrust" favoring the admissibility of expert testimony, viewing challenges to the experts' methodologies as questions for the jury.The Supreme Court of Delaware reviewed the case and reversed the Superior Court's decision. The Supreme Court held that the Superior Court erred in interpreting Delaware Rule of Evidence 702 by applying a "liberal thrust" favoring admissibility and by concluding that Delaware's standard for admissibility is distinct from the federal standard. The Supreme Court emphasized that the proponent of expert testimony must establish its admissibility by a preponderance of the evidence, and the trial court must act as a gatekeeper to ensure the reliability and sufficiency of the expert's methodology and application.The Supreme Court also found that the Superior Court erred in defining the general causation question as focusing on NDMA rather than the product at issue, ranitidine. The court concluded that the plaintiffs' experts did not reliably link the NDMA studies to the exposure caused by ranitidine, failing to establish the necessary scientific connection between the product and the alleged harm. Consequently, the Supreme Court reversed the Superior Court's decision and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "In re Zantac (Ranitidine) Litigation" on Justia Law

A widow, Lori Olson, individually and as the personal representative of her deceased husband Scott Olson's estate, filed a lawsuit against Huron Regional Medical Center (HRMC), Dr. William Miner, and Thomas Miner, a physician’s assistant, alleging negligence, wrongful death, loss of consortium, intentional infliction of emotional distress, civil conspiracy, and fraudulent concealment. Scott Olson died at HRMC in January 2020 under the care of Dr. Miner and Thomas Miner. Lori Olson initiated the lawsuit in September 2021.The Circuit Court of the Third Judicial Circuit in Beadle County, South Dakota, denied Dr. Miner’s motion to dismiss for insufficient service of process but later granted the defendants' motions to dismiss for failure to prosecute. Lori Olson appealed the dismissal, and Dr. Miner filed a notice of review challenging the denial of his motion to dismiss for insufficient service.The Supreme Court of South Dakota reviewed the case and found that there was verifiable record activity within the year prior to the defendants’ motion to dismiss, including efforts to compile medical records and communication between the parties. The court concluded that the Circuit Court erred in dismissing the case under SDCL 15-11-11 for lack of prosecution, as there was sufficient activity to move the case forward. Additionally, the court found that the delays in the case did not rise to the level of egregiousness required for dismissal under Rule 41(b) and that the Circuit Court did not consider less severe sanctions before dismissing the case.The Supreme Court of South Dakota reversed the Circuit Court’s decision to dismiss the case for failure to prosecute and affirmed the denial of Dr. Miner’s motion to dismiss for insufficient service of process, concluding that Dr. Miner was properly served. View "Olson v. Huron Regional Medical Center, Inc." on Justia Law

Sidney and Julian Helvik, who have lived on their family ranch since 1947, sold a portion of their ranch to Wesley and Karen Tuscano in 2018. In 2020, the Helviks agreed to sell the remainder of the ranch to the Tuscanos under an agreement that included a promissory note and provisions for the Tuscanos to assist the elderly Helviks with end-of-life issues. The Helviks signed a quitclaim deed, but the Tuscanos later had them sign a gift deed, which transferred the ranch without consideration. The Tuscanos never made any payments under the agreement and used the gift deed to obtain a mortgage on the ranch.The Helviks filed a complaint in the District Court of the Sixth Judicial District, Sweet Grass County, seeking to void the agreement and the gift deed, alleging undue influence and fraud. The Tuscanos counterclaimed and filed a third-party complaint against Jacqueline Conner, alleging tortious interference and abuse of process. The District Court granted summary judgment in favor of Conner on the tortious interference claim and excluded evidence of an Adult Protective Services investigation and an oral agreement to transfer land.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case. It affirmed the District Court's decision to rescind the agreement based on its equitable powers, noting the unique fiduciary duty in grantor-support agreements. The court found no abuse of discretion in excluding evidence of the APS investigation and the oral agreement. The court also held that the Tuscanos waived their argument regarding jury instructions on undue influence by not objecting at trial. The summary judgment in favor of Conner was upheld due to the lack of evidence of damages. The court declined to award attorney fees to Conner under M. R. App. P. 19(5). The District Court's orders and judgments were affirmed. View "Helvik v. Tuscano" on Justia Law

Robert Cox, acting as the personal representative and special administrator of the estate of Greta Cox, sued Total Quality Logistics, Inc. and Total Quality Logistics, LLC (collectively, TQL) for negligence under Ohio law. Cox alleged that TQL, in its role as a freight broker, negligently hired an unsafe motor carrier, Golden Transit, Inc., which resulted in a motor vehicle crash that killed his wife, Greta Cox. The crash occurred when the driver of the motor carrier, Amarjit Singh Khaira, failed to slow down in a construction zone and collided with Greta Cox's vehicle.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio dismissed the case, ruling that Cox’s claims were preempted by the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act (FAAAA), specifically 49 U.S.C. § 14501(c). The district court found that the FAAAA preempted the state law claims because they related to the services of a broker with respect to the transportation of property and did not fall within the Act’s safety exception.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the district court erred in its interpretation of the FAAAA’s safety exception. The Sixth Circuit concluded that the safety exception, which preserves the safety regulatory authority of a state with respect to motor vehicles, includes common law claims like Cox’s negligent hiring claim. The court reasoned that such claims are genuinely responsive to safety concerns and directly involve motor vehicles and motor vehicle safety. Therefore, the court reversed the district court’s judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Cox v. Total Quality Logistics, Inc." on Justia Law

Josh Rinaldi, an inmate at the Maine Correctional Center, slipped on an untreated patch of ice on a paved road within the correctional center, referred to as the "Runway," and broke his ankle. Rinaldi filed a twelve-count complaint asserting various tort claims, arguing that the State was not immune under the Maine Tort Claims Act (MTCA) due to an exception for injuries sustained in or on an appurtenance to a public building.The Superior Court (Androscoggin County) granted Rinaldi's motion for partial summary judgment, ruling that the Maine Correctional Center is a public building under the MTCA and that the Runway is an appurtenance to the correctional center's buildings. The State appealed, arguing that it was immune from liability under the MTCA and that the Runway did not fall under any exceptions to the MTCA.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the case and concluded that the Runway is not an appurtenance to the correctional center's buildings. The court applied a three-element test to determine whether the Runway was an appurtenance: physical annexation to the realty, adaptation to the realty, and intent to be irremovable from the realty. The court found that the Runway was not physically annexed to the buildings, was not specially adapted to the buildings, and was not intended to be irremovable from the realty. Therefore, the Runway did not meet the criteria for an appurtenance under the MTCA.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court vacated the Superior Court's judgment granting Rinaldi's motion for partial summary judgment and remanded the case for entry of summary judgment in favor of the State, concluding that the State was immune from liability under the MTCA. View "Rinaldi v. Maine Correctional Center" on Justia Law

Jose Cruz-Muniz and Sandra Cruz were injured in a car accident in 2018 and received treatment from C-Spine Orthopedics, PLLC. They assigned their rights to seek personal protection insurance (PIP) benefits from Progressive Michigan Insurance Company to C-Spine. C-Spine then assigned its accounts receivable, including the claims for unpaid benefits, to several factoring companies. Progressive argued that C-Spine lacked standing to seek payment because it had assigned its rights to the factoring companies. C-Spine countered with signed counter-assignments from the factoring companies, purportedly restoring its right to bring suits. The trial court initially denied Progressive's motion but later granted it, concluding that C-Spine lacked standing when the complaints were filed.In a separate case, Parie Wallace was injured in a bus accident and received treatment from several providers, including C-Spine. Wallace assigned her rights to seek PIP benefits to these providers. She later filed a lawsuit against Suburban Mobility Authority for Regional Transportation (SMART) seeking payment of PIP benefits. SMART argued that Wallace could not bring the action because she had assigned her rights to the providers. The trial court allowed Wallace to obtain revocations of the assignments, which she did, and then denied SMART's motion for summary disposition. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that Wallace was not the real party in interest when she filed her complaint and that her claims were barred by the one-year-back rule.The Michigan Supreme Court held that both C-Spine and Wallace had standing to file their lawsuits but were not the real parties in interest at the time they filed suit because they had assigned their claims. The Court ruled that defects in real party in interest status could be cured after filing a lawsuit. In C-Spine's case, the Court of Appeals' judgment was affirmed on alternate grounds, and the case was remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. In Wallace's case, the Court of Appeals' judgment was affirmed in part, reversed in part, and vacated in part, and the case was remanded for the trial court to consider whether equitable rescission was warranted and whether the real party in interest defect could be cured. View "C-Spine Orthopedics PLLC v. Progressive Michigan Insurance Company" on Justia Law

On July 6, 2013, a train carrying crude oil derailed in Lac-Mégantic, Quebec, causing explosions that killed forty-seven people and destroyed the town center. Joe R. Whatley, Jr., as trustee for the wrongful death claimants, sued Canadian Pacific Railroad Company and related entities, alleging liability for the value of the train’s crude oil cargo.The United States District Court for the District of North Dakota found Canadian Pacific liable under the Carmack Amendment for the value of the crude oil cargo and awarded Whatley $3,950,464 plus prejudgment interest. However, the court declined to address whether the judgment reduction provision from the Montreal Maine & Atlantic Railway (MMA) bankruptcy plan applied, stating that it was a matter for the Bankruptcy Court. Canadian Pacific's motion for reconsideration was denied, leading to this appeal.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that the district court abused its discretion by setting aside part of the joint stipulation between the parties, which required the court to decide whether the judgment reduction provision applied. The Eighth Circuit determined that the judgment reduction provision from the MMA bankruptcy plan should apply, reducing Canadian Pacific’s liability to zero, as MMA was solely responsible for the derailment.The Eighth Circuit reversed the district court’s decision and remanded the case for a complete reduction of the judgment against Canadian Pacific, ensuring that Canadian Pacific would not be held liable for more than its proportionate share of the damages, which in this case was zero due to MMA's sole liability. View "Whatley v. Canadian Pacific Railway Co." on Justia Law