Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs Calvin and Mary Landry filed a petition for damages, alleging they suffered injuries arising out of an automobile collision. Plaintiffs brought the action against defendant-driver Riyad Shaibi, his insurer Financial Indemnity Company (“Financial”), and Progressive Security Insurance Company (“Progressive”), as the insurer of the 2008 Toyota Sienna that Shaibi was driving at the time of the collision. Shaibi was bringing the 2008 Toyota Sienna to a tire shop to repair a flat tire as a favor to its owner, Aziz Ali. The Louisiana Supreme Court granted review of this matter to address whether the court of appeal erred in finding public policy mandated liability coverage by a defendant driver’s automobile insurance policy for an accident occurring while operating a non-owned automobile. Under the narrow facts presented, the Court found neither statutory law nor public policy considerations required automobile insurance liability coverage related to a defendant driver’s negligent operation of a non-owned vehicle. Accordingly, the Court reversed the court of appeal and reinstated the ruling of the district court granting summary judgment in favor of the defendant insurer. View "Landry v. Progressive Security Ins. Co., et al." on Justia Law

In September 2015, the Tampa Bay Buccaneers played the New Orleans Saints in the New Orleans Superdome. In preparation for the game, the Buccaneers’ Director of Football Security Operations contacted the New Orleans Police Department (“NOPD”) to request motorcycle escorts, by off-duty law enforcement for officers, for the team’s buses traveling in the New Orleans area, which were to include an escort after the game when the team buses would travel from the Superdome to the airport. NOPD agreed to provide the necessary off-duty officers, along with officers from the Jefferson Parish Sheriff’s Office (“JPSO”), for the Buccaneer team buses. At issue on the motion for summary judgment filed in this case was whether the Buccaneers football organization was vicariously liable, as an employer, for the alleged negligence of an off-duty Jefferson Parish sheriff’s deputy, who was part of the motorcycle escort for the team’s buses, when the motorcycle the deputy was riding collided with another deputy directing traffic on foot in an intersection. The Louisiana Supreme Court held that the unrebutted evidence presented by defendants moving for summary judgment showed there was no employee-employer relationship between the deputy sheriff and the Buccaneers under the facts and circumstances of this case; therefore, the Court reversed the denial of the Buccaneers’ motion for summary judgment and remanded to the district court for entry of a summary judgment in favor of defendants. View "Bolden v. Tisdale et al." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the district court dismissing this personal injury lawsuit as untimely, holding that the district court erred in ruling that Wyo. Stat. Ann. 1-3-118 did not apply to Plaintiff's voluntary dismissal.On October 20, 2013, Plaintiff brought this lawsuit against Defendant seeking damages for his injuries incurred in an accident with Defendant. On November 1, 2019, Plaintiff filed a motion to dismiss the case without prejudice, which the trial court granted. On July 22, 2020, Plaintiff filed a new complaint. Defendant filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the new action was outside the four-year statute of limitations under Wyo. Stat. Ann. 1-3-105(a)(iv)(C) and that the claims were untimely under section 1-3-118. The district court granted the motion to dismiss. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that dismissal was not warranted because section 1-3-118 does not limit its application to dismissals initiated by an opposing party or sua sponte dismissals. View "Hugus v. Reeder" on Justia Law

Prior to her death, Eyvon Ambrose (decedent) had become entirely dependent upon others for her basic care needs. Defendants Oroville Hospital d/b/a Golden Valley Home Health and Oroville Hospital, agreed to provide decedent in-home nursing services for wound care for a pressure injury to her left ischium or buttock. Defendants provided such in-home wound care on six occasions in July 2015 and four additional occasions in October 2015. According to real parties in interest (plaintiffs), decedent’s wound worsened, she sustained additional wounds, she was hospitalized, and she ultimately died from her wound and complications. Plaintiffs filed the underlying actions against defendants alleging a number of causes of action. Defendant’s writ petition and arguments related solely to plaintiff’s cause of action to recover under the Elder Abuse and Dependent Adult Civil Protection Act for defendants’ alleged neglect which, they asserted, was committed with recklessness, oppression, fraud, or malice. Therefore, plaintiffs asserted entitlement to enhanced remedies under the Elder Abuse Act. They sought no other relief in their petition. Defendants moved for summary judgment or, in the alternative, summary adjudication, asserting they did not have a substantial caretaking or custodial relationship with the decedent, a prerequisite for recovery for neglect under the Elder Abuse Act. They further asserted that a reasonable jury could not find them guilty of forms of abuse or neglect rising to the level of recklessness. The trial court denied defendants’ motion. To the Court of Appeal, Defendants sought a preemptory writ of mandate directing the trial court to vacate its denial of their motion for summary adjudication and to grant the motion. The Court concluded that, in opposition to defendants’ prima facie showing of entitlement to summary adjudication on plaintiffs’ Elder Abuse Cause of action based on the absence of a substantial caretaking or custodial relationship, plaintiffs failed to raise a triable issue of material fact. The Court therefore issued the requested writ. View "Oroville Hospital v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

On the evening of May 21, 2014, Denise Garrison went to Target in Anderson, South Carolina with her eight-year-old daughter. Before entering the store, however, Denise retrieved her coupon book from her car, placed it on the hood, and proceeded to examine it. Looking up from the book, her daughter appeared with what looked like a hypodermic needle in her hand. Denise instinctively swatted the syringe out of her daughter's hand. However, in the swatting process, the syringe punctured the palm of her hand. Denise informed Target's store manager, who apologized for what happened. Denise believed the manager assured her that her medical bills would be paid, testifying that the manager said "bring us the bill." Despite Denise's belief that Target would cover her medical costs, Target refused to do so. The case proceeded to a jury trial, in which Target was found negligent, and awarded Denise $100,000 in compensatory damages and $4.51 million in punitive damages. The jury also awarded Clint $3,500 for lost wages and $5,000 for loss of consortium. The South Carolina Supreme Court granted review to determine whether the court of appeals erred in: (1) affirming the trial court's denial of Target's motion for JNOV as to liability based on a theory of constructive notice; (2) holding the statutory cap on punitive damages was an affirmative defense; (3) instructing the trial court to consider on remand the potential harm caused by Target's conduct in evaluating the constitutionality of the amount of punitive damages; and (4) refusing to award interest on punitive damages under Rule 68, SCRCP. The Supreme Court determined the evidence was sufficient for the jury to find Target had constructive notice of the syringe in its parking lot and failed to discover and remove it in the exercise of due care. In addition, Court held the statutory cap on punitive damages pursuant was not required to be pled by the defendant as an affirmative defense in order to apply. The court of appeals properly instructed the trial court to consider on remand the potential harm caused by Target's conduct in evaluating the constitutionality of the amount of the Garrisons' punitive damages award. Lastly, the Supreme Court held Denise was entitled to eight percent interest on the entirety of her damages award, including punitive damages, pursuant to Rule 68, SCRCP. View "Garrison v. Target Corporation" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court affirming the decision of the Medical Commission upholding the denial of Appellant's request for benefits, holding that there was substantial evidence to support the Commission's denial of coverage.In 2007, Appellant suffered a compensable injury to her left knee. More than a decade later, Appellant submitted requests to the Department of Workforce Services, Workers' Compensation Division to cover treatment for her right knee, ankles and back and further applied for permanent total disability (PTD) benefits. The Division denied both requests, and the Commission affirmed the ruling. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that that there was substantial evidence to support the Commission's findings that (1) Appellant's right knee, ankle, and back injuries were not second compensable injuries; and (2) Appellant did not qualify for PTD benefits under the odd lot doctrine. View "Ross v. State, ex rel., Department of Workforce Services, Workers' Compensation Division" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against the City for the wrongful death of her son after he drowned when, while stand-up paddle boarding, he fell into the waters of the Santa Barbara Harbor. The trial court granted the City's motion for summary judgment based on governmental immunities.The Court of Appeal affirmed, concluding that the City is immune from liability under the hazardous recreational activity doctrine. The court explained that exceptions for failure to warn, gross negligence and specific payment of fees does not bar the application of the immunity in the present case. In this case, there is no evidence showing that there was a known dangerous condition of property in the area where the decedent drowned; the record fails to show that the City engaged in the want of scant care or an extreme departure from the ordinary standard of conduct; and the City did not receive a specific fee for permission to participate in paddle boarding or any other hazardous recreational activity. View "Mubanda v. City of Santa Barbara" on Justia Law

The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment in an action concerning the allision between three vessels passing each other in the Hahnville Bar, a bend between mile markers 124.5 and 126 in the Mississippi River where a number of moorings are located. The court concluded that the district court did not err in allowing the parties' respective liabilities, in limiting the parties' liability, or in dismissing the personal injury claim. In this case, the district court did not clearly err in allocating liability as to the Elizabeth, the Loretta, or the Aris T. The court agreed with the district court's ruling that the Limitation of Liability Act does not allow the Elizabeth Interests or the Loretta Interest to limit liability in this case. Furthermore, the Aris T's negligence was attributable solely to the compulsory pilot, Pilot Leone, and therefore, the Aris T is only liable in rem. Finally, in regard to the personal injury claim, the court concluded that the proximate cause element was not satisfied where claimant's unforeseeable panic caused the accident. View "SCF Waxler Marine, LLC v. Genesis Marine, LLC" on Justia Law

An explosion at the Omega Protein Plant in Moss Point, Mississippi killed one man and seriously injured several others. Multiple lawsuits were filed against Omega in federal district court. Colony Insurance Company filed a declaratory judgment action in state circuit court seeking a declaration that it did not cover bodily injuries arising out of the Moss Point facility explosion. Evanston Insurance Company intervened also seeking a declaration of no coverage for the same injuries: Evanston provided a $5 million excess liability policy, which provided coverage after Colony’s $1 million policy was exhausted. Because Colony settled one of the underlying personal injury cases for $1 million (the limits under its policy), Omega sought excess coverage from Evanston for the injuries that occurred at its plant. A special master was appointed, and the trial court granted Evanston’s motion for summary judgment, finding that the pollution exclusion in the insurance contract barred coverage. Omega appealed that grant of summary judgment. The Mississippi Supreme Court found that a pollution exclusion in the insurance contract was ambiguous, and should have been construed in favor of the insured, allowing coverage. Further, the Court found the question of whether coverage was triggered was governed by the language of the contract, and that Evanston failed to prove there could be no coverage under the excess liability policy. Therefore, the Supreme Court reversed the trial court’s grant of summary judgment as to all issues and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Omega Protein, Inc. v. Evanston Insurance Company" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeal concluded that a plaintiff is not barred as a matter of law from proving causation in a slip and fall case if there were no witnesses to the fall and he or she remembers being on stairs and then waking up in pain but does not remember the fall itself. The court concluded that the trial court erred when it granted summary judgment in favor of defendant on plaintiff's negligence complaint. In this case, although plaintiff cannot remember falling on plaintiff's stairs, the circumstantial evidence would permit a trier of fact to make a reasonable and probable inference that the condition of the stairs, including the absence of a handrail, was a substantial factor in the fall. Accordingly, the court reversed the trial court's grant of summary judgment to defendant. View "Kaney v. Custance" on Justia Law