Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

Ramsey Barton sued the City of Valdez after she was severely injured by falling from a tire swing overhanging a cliff in an undeveloped area of a city park. The swing was not built by the City, and Barton alleged the City was negligent in failing to remove it. The superior court assumed on summary judgment that the City had imputed knowledge of the swing, but because there was no evidence the City had a policy to inspect or remove hazards from undeveloped areas of the park, the City was entitled to discretionary function immunity. The court therefore dismissed Barton’s lawsuit against the City. The Alaska Supreme Court reversed, finding that there were "no conceivable policy reasons for declining to remove the unauthorized swing — a human-made hazard that was known, easily accessible, and simple to remove." The Supreme Court found that the failure to remove it was not protected by discretionary function immunity. View "Barton v. City of Valdez" on Justia Law

After Lauren Bridges’ daughter S.B. was born severely disabled, Bridges sued the many healthcare providers involved in S.B.’s birth. When Bridges’s attorneys failed to timely oppose the defendants’ motions for summary judgment, the superior court granted summary judgment and then final judgment in favor of all defendants. Bridges then moved for relief from judgment under Alaska Civil Rule 60(b). The superior court found that Bridges' attorneys’ neglect was inexcusable, precluding relief under Rule 60(b)(1), but nonetheless granted relief under Rule 60(b)(6) to avoid injustice. The Alaska Supreme Court found the superior court did not abuse its discretion in finding the neglect of Bridges’s counsel inexcusable and denying relief under Rule 60(b)(1). But the Supreme Court reversed the superior court’s decision granting relief under Rule 60(b)(6). "An attorney’s neglect, whether excusable or inexcusable, cannot be grounds for relief from judgment under Rule 60(b)(6) unless the attorney abandons the client. Because that is not what the record shows, we reverse the superior court’s ruling and remand for entry of judgment in favor of the defendants." View "Chena Obstetrics and Gynecology, et al. v. Bridges" on Justia Law

Cassell has owned the Hermosa Beach residential property since 1972; it has one bathroom, which has a two-step stairway leading up to a platform with a commode. The stairway did not have a handrail. Mazza rented the property from Cassell for 18 years. Mazza’s sister, Kaney visited Mazza many times, staying for as long as two weeks, without any mishaps. In September 2014, the light to the bathroom stopped working. Kaney used the stairs, fell, and suffered injuries.Kaney sued, claiming premises liability and negligence. The trial court granted Mazza summary judgment, concluding that as a matter of law, a plaintiff is precluded from proving causation in a slip and fall case if there were no witnesses to the fall and she remembers only being on stairs and then waking up in pain but does not remember the fall itself. The court of appeal reversed. Though Kaney cannot remember falling on Cassell’s stairs, the circumstantial evidence would permit a trier of fact to make a reasonable and probable inference that the condition of the stairs, including the absence of a handrail, was a substantial factor in the fall. View "Kaney v. Mazza" on Justia Law

After sustaining injuries in a one-vehicle accident, Terry and Jane Pruitt filed a complaint against several defendants, including AAA Interstate Transportation, LLC ("AAA"), in the Walker Circuit Court. The court dismissed their claims against AAA for lack of personal jurisdiction, and it certified that dismissal as a final judgment under Rule 54(b), Ala. R. Civ. P. The Pruitts appealed. Because the circuit court did not have either general or specific personal jurisdiction over AAA, the Alabama Supreme Court affirmed. View "Pruitt v. AAA Interstate Transportation, LLC" on Justia Law

Cudd Pressure Control, Inc. and WISCO, Inc. appealed a judgment entered in favor of Murex Petroleum Corporation in a personal injury case. As between WISCO and Murex, the case presented the question of whether a defense and indemnification provision in a contract applied. As between Cudd and Murex, the case presented a question of whether the district court abused its discretion when it sanctioned Cudd for spoliation of evidence. The North Dakota Supreme Court concluded the district court erred as a matter of law when it granted summary judgment for Murex determining the defense and indemnification provision applied. The Supreme Court also concluded the trial court abused its discretion when it sanctioned Cudd. Therefore, the Court reversed those portions of the judgment. Because the sanctions included an adverse inference instruction against Cudd at trial that may have affected the jury’s fault determination, the case was remanded for a new trial on the issue of fault apportionment. View "Simmons v. Cudd Pressure Control, et al." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the trial court dismissing this suit brought under the Death on the High Seas Act and maritime law, see 46 U.S.C. 30301 et seq., for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, holding that the issue presented were capable of judicial management without interfering with the military's judgment.A private contractor maintained a fleet of older Navy helicopters. In 2014, one of the helicopters crashed during a training exercise, killing three service members and injuring two others. Plaintiffs, the families of the deceased service members and one of the survivors, sued the contractor. The trial court dismissed the suit on the ground that questions of military judgment rendered the case nonjusticiable. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case, holding that the political question doctrine did not deprive the state courts of jurisdiction over this case. View "Preston v. M1 Support Services, L.P." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the district court sua sponte entering a harassment protection order against Juan P., holding that the procedure utilized in this case deprived Juan of sufficient notice and an opportunity to be heard.Yerania O. Sought and obtained an ex parte sexual assault protection order against Juan, alleging that Juan had pestered her at work, followed her, and threatened to kidnap her and her children. After the case was submitted, the district court entered a harssment protection order on its own initiative, finding that it had jurisdiction and that a harassment protection order was more appropriate. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court's procedure violated Defendant's due process rights. View "Yerania O. v. Juan P." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court denied relief to Banner University Medical Center Tucson Campus, LLC and other Banner entities (collectively, Banner) which challenged the denial of its motion for summary judgment in this vicarious liability case, holding that the vicarious liability claim against Banner was not precluded.Doctors jointly employed by Banner provided treatment to Plaintiffs' fourteen-month-old son, who died. Plaintiffs brought medical malpractice claims against the doctors, a vicarious liability claim against Banner based on the doctors' conduct, and direct claims of breach of contract and fraud against Banner. The trial court granted summary judgment for the doctors because Plaintiffs failed to serve each of them with a notice of claim. Banner then filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that the trial court's dismissal of the doctors with prejudice served as an adjudication on the merits precluding any claim of vicarious liability against Banner. The court denied the motion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because there was no final judgment on the merits, Plaintiffs' vicarious liability claim against Banner was not precluded. View "Banner University Medical Center Tucson Campus, LLC v. Honorable Richard Gordon" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court denying Plaintiffs' declaratory judgment action against State Farm seeking payment of $2 million under Florida's uninsured motorist (UM) statute, holding that Florida law did not require State Farm to provide UM coverage.State Farm denied Plaintiffs UM coverage under their personal liability umbrella insurance policy after a motorcycle accident with an uninsured vehicle in South Dakota because the policy did not include UM coverage. Thereafter, Plaintiffs, who resided in Florida at the time of the accident, filed this declaratory action. The circuit court concluded that Florida law applied to the dispute, that State Farm did not violate Florida's UM statute, and that Plaintiffs were not entitled to UM coverage. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Florida law did not require State Farm to provide UM coverage. View "Payne v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the superior court's entry of partial final judgment in accordance with Sup. Ct. R. Civ. P. 54(b) and the dismissal for lack of personal jurisdiction of Plaintiff's action under Sup. Ct. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2) as to certain defendants, holding that the hearing justice did not err.At issue was the superior court's authority to exercise jurisdiction over claims brought against foreign corporate defendants based on a fatal injury to a Rhode Island resident following an accident that occurred outside of Rhode Island. The corporate defendants filed a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, which the hearing justice granted. Partial final judgment pursuant to Rule 54(b) was entered in favor of the corporate defendants. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that the hearing justice (1) did not err in dismissing the claims against the corporate defendants based on a lack of personal jurisdiction; and (2) did not err in denying Plaintiff's request to conduct jurisdictional discovery. View "Martins v. Bridgestone Americas Tire Operations, LLC" on Justia Law