Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

In this case involving mesothelioma, the Fifth Circuit concluded that the multidistrict litigation (MDL) court engaged in improper weighing of the evidence on summary judgment relative to the survival action. Accordingly, the court reversed in part and remanded to the Louisiana district court. The court also considered it appropriate case management for the Louisiana district court to reconsider plaintiffs' motion for additional discovery. Finally, the court affirmed the district court's dismissal of the wrongful death claim, concluding that the district court properly determined that plaintiffs' wrongful death claims are time-barred. View "Williams v. Boeing Company" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs purchased a 2006 aircraft from an unidentified individual in 2016. In 2017, the plane was forced to make an emergency crash landing. The aircraft suffered significant structural damage and the complete loss of its engine, but no one was killed in the crash. Various actors were involved in the manufacture and maintenance of the aircraft, including Continental, which manufactured and shipped the engine to Columbia in Oregon, where it was installed. Cessna acquired assets from Columbia but did not assume Continental’s liabilities apart from express, written aircraft warranties still in effect at the time of acquisition. In 2014, Cessna became a subsidiary of Textron.Plaintiffs filed suit in Arizona, where the crash occurred. The case was removed to federal court. Four of the 15 original defendants—including Continental and Textron—were dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction, finding that Plaintiffs had failed to show “that any of the moving Defendants are meaningfully connected to Arizona in such a way that renders them subject to this Court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction.” The Ninth Circuit affirmed, noting that the Plaintiffs have conceded that Arizona does not have general jurisdiction over either Defendant. Plaintiffs also failed to establish a prima facie case of specific jurisdiction over either Defendant, failing to establish that Defendants had sufficient minimum contacts with Arizona that are related to Plaintiffs’ claims. Plaintiffs’ reasons for seeking jurisdictional discovery with regard to Defendants’ contacts with Arizona were properly deemed insufficient. View "LNS Enterprises, LLC v. Continental Motors, Inc." on Justia Law

Isaak, an 84-year-old retired farmer, was diagnosed with Parkinson’s disease in 2020 and suffers physical and mental impairments. He is wheelchair-bound and receiving palliative care. Several parties have sued the manufacturers of Paraquat alleging that the pesticide caused their Parkinson’s disease and successfully petitioned the Judicial Council to form a Judicial Council Coordination Proceeding (JCCP) in 2019. By March 2021, discovery was underway in the JCCP.Isaak filed a products liability lawsuit in May 2021. The case was coordinated with the JCCP. Isaak sought trial preference under Code of Civil Procedure section 36; a party to a civil action is entitled to trial preference where the person is over 70 years of age and the court finds that the party has a substantial interest in the action as a whole and that the party’s health is such that preference is necessary to prevent prejudicing the party’s interest in the litigation. Defendants argued that the law governing coordinated proceedings conflicted with, and took precedence over, section 36. The trial court denied Isaak’s motion but approved a special procedure for seeking preference that it found would balance the interests of parties for whom a preference might be warranted with the need to streamline coordinated proceedings. The court of appeal upheld the ruling. Section 36 does not supersede California Rules of Court, 3.504, which governs coordinated proceedings. View "Isaak v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

The First Circuit posed a question of Massachusetts state law to the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court (SJC) in this negligence and failure to warn case, holding that this case met the both the SJC's and this Court's certification standards.Appellants sued Sorin Group USA, Inc. in Massachusetts state court alleging negligence and failure to warn claims predicated on Sorin's not reporting adverse events to the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) concerning Mitroflow malfunctions in young patients. Sorin removed the lawsuit to federal court under diversity jurisdiction. The trial court judge granted summary judgment to Sorin, concluding that Appellants' claims were preempted. At issue on appeal was whether Massachusetts law imposes a duty on medical device manufacturers to report adverse events to the FDA that no more than parallel the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act and FDA regulations. The First Circuit certified to the SJC the question of whether a manufacturer's failure to report adverse events to a regular such as the FDA gives rise to liability under Massachusetts law. View "Plourde v. Sorin Group USA, Inc." on Justia Law

Ikia Pope and Brandi Powell were in a motor vehicle collision. Pope left the scene of the collision. Powell alleged Pope drove a vehicle owned by third parties who gave permission for Pope to drive the vehicle. Progressive Direct Insurance Company insured the vehicle driven by Pope. Powell made bodily injury and property damage claims with Progressive Direct Insurance Company (insurer). Powell asserted she was entitled to treble property damages. Progressive sought a declaratory judgment for the purpose of adjudicating whether its insurance policy excluded treble damages pursuant to 47 O.S.2011, section 10-103. Progressive filed a motion for summary judgment, and the court concluded the treble damages provided by 47 O.S. 2011, section 10-103 were punitive in nature, and excluded by a clause excluding punitive damages. Powell appealed the subsequent consent judgment which was based, in part, upon the trial court's adjudication of the treble damages issue. The Oklahoma Supreme Court retained the appeal sua sponte, concurring with the district court that the statutory treble damages in 47 O.S.2011, section 10-103 were punitive in nature, and punitive damages were expressly excluded by the policy. View "Progressive Direct Ins. Co. v. Pope" on Justia Law

In this case, the Supreme Court clarified the proper timing of Alvarado calculations, which determines the reimbursement due the insurer from a third-party settlement, and the reimbursement process for an insurer when the amount of workers' compensation (WC) benefits the insurer has already dispensed to the employee is less than the amount it owes the employee for its share of attorney's costs and fees for the third-party action.Petitioner received WC benefits from Respondent. Petitioner brought suit against the owner of the building in which she was injured and reached a settlement. Respondent then sought reimbursement of the WC benefits it had paid to Petitioner under Haw. Rev. Stat. 386-8 and Alvarado v. Kiewit Pacific Co., 993 P.2d 549 (Haw. 2000). At issue was whether certain WC benefits that Respondent owed Petitioner were properly classified as "paid compensation" and whether the process of Respondent's reimbursement of WC benefits exceeded the amount it had previously contributed to Petitioner as "paid compensation." The Supreme Court held (1) Alvarado calculations shall be performed based on the date on which the employee receives the third-party recovery; and (2) an insurer's "share" of the attorney's fees and costs the employee incurs while pursuing third-party recovery is based on the insurer's total WC liability. View "Moranz v. Harbor Mall, LLC" on Justia Law

Appellees, Rite Aid Corporation, Rite Aid Hdqtrs. Corp., and Rite Aid of Maryland, Inc. (collectively, “Rite Aid”), held a general liability insurance policy underwritten by defendany Chubb, Limited ("Chubb"). Rite Aid and others were defendants in multi-district litigation before the United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio (the “MDL Opioid Lawsuits”). Plaintiffs in that suit filed over a thousand suits in the MDL Opioid Lawsuits against companies in the pharmaceutical supply chain for their roles in the national opioid crisis. Certain suits were bellwether suits - including the complaints of Summit and Cuyahoga Counties in Ohio (“the Counties”) which were at issue here. The question this case presented for the Delaware Supreme Court was whether insurance policies covering lawsuits “for” or “because of” personal injury required insurers to defend their insureds when the plaintiffs in the underlying suits expressly disavowed claims for personal injury and sought only their own economic damages. The Superior Court decided that Rite Aid’s insurance carriers were required to defend it against lawsuits filed by two Ohio counties to recover opioid-epidemic-related economic damages. As the court held, the lawsuits sought damages “for” or “because of” personal injury because there was arguably a causal connection between the counties’ economic damages and the injuries to their citizens from the opioid epidemic. The Supreme Court reversed, finding the plaintiffs, governmental entities, sought to recover only their own economic damages, specifically disclaiming recovery for personal injury or any specific treatment damages. Thus, the carriers did not have a duty to defend Rite Aid under the governing insurance policy. View "ACE American Insurance Company v. Rite Aid Corporation" on Justia Law

In 2018, plaintiff-appellant Monica Mayes was struck in the face by a foul ball while attending an intercollegiate baseball game between two private universities, Marymount University (Marymount) and defendant-respondent La Sierra University (La Sierra). Mayes suffered skull fractures and brain damage, among other injuries. When struck by the foul ball, Mayes was seated in a grassy area along the third-base line, behind the dugout, which extended eight feet above the ground, and there was no protective netting above the dugout. Mayes sued La Sierra for her injuries, alleging a single cause of action for negligence for its failure to: (1) install protective netting over the dugouts; (2) provide a sufficient number of screened seats for spectators; (3) warn spectators that the only available screened seats were in the area behind home plate; and (4) exercise crowd control in order to remove distractions in the area along the third-base line that diverted spectators’ attention from the playing field. La Sierra moved for summary judgment, claiming that the primary assumption of risk doctrine barred Mayes’s negligence claim. The trial court agreed and granted the motion, observing that the case was “a textbook primary assumption of the risk case.” To this, the Court of Appeal reversed, finding La Sierra did not meet its burden of showing that the primary assumption of risk doctrine barred Mayes’s negligence claim. In addition, Mayes showed there were triable issues of material fact concerning whether La Sierra was negligent for the reasons she alleged in her complaint. View "Mayes v. La Sierra Univ." on Justia Law

This case stemmed from plaintiffs' action alleging that nuclear waste materials from various St. Louis sites leaked into Coldwater Creek and its 100-year floodplain in St. Louis County, damaging their health and property. Following Cotter's removal to federal court on the basis of the Price-Anderson Act (PAA), the district court concluded that the PAA did not apply and remanded to state court. After plaintiffs amended their complaint in state court, Cotter filed a third party action for contribution against seven defendants, including Mallinckrodt, which then removed the entire lawsuit under the PAA and other bases. The district court granted the motion and Cotter appealed.After determining that the court has jurisdiction over the appeal, the Eighth Circuit concluded that the district court abused its discretion by determining that the PAA does not apply to plaintiffs' claims against Cotter because Cotter lacked an applicable license or indemnity agreement. Contrary to the district court's ruling, the court concluded that the PAA provides federal question jurisdiction over all "nuclear incidents," regardless of whether the defendant had an applicable license or indemnity agreement. The court explained that the PAA's text and history support its conclusion. In this case, the PAA Act provides original federal question jurisdiction for all nuclear incidents regardless of whether the defendant had an applicable indemnity agreement. View "In Re: Cotter Corporation" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the summary judgment entered by the circuit court in favor of Defendant, Rapid City, and dismissing Plaintiff's complaint for negligence, holding that there was no error in the proceedings below.Plaintiff was riding her bicycle near the curb on a street in Rapid City when when her front tire fell through a storm drain grate she was riding over (grate four), causing her to crash and suffer a spinal cord injury. Plaintiff filed a complaint alleging that the City was negligent for failing to repair a modified and subsequently damaged grate four. The circuit court granted the City's motion for summary judgment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Plaintiff failed to present any evidence to show that grate four was in a damaged condition on the day of her accident; and (2) S.D. Codified Laws 31-32-10 does not provide a remedy against a governmental entity for known dangerous design defects on a highway or street. View "Godbe v. City Of Rapid City" on Justia Law