Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

In late 2015, decedent Cody Albert (“Cody”) and his childhood friend, Zachary Ross (“Zachary”) struggled with substance abuse issues. At that time, Zachary’s mother, April Kravchenko, was suffering from multiple myeloma for which her doctors prescribed her several opiate pain medications, which she filled at a small, independent pharmacy in Scranton called Sheeley’s Drug Store. Kravchenko and her sister Debra Leggieri worried Zachary would try to pick up (and use) Kravchenko’s pain medication from Sheeley’s while Kravchenko was in the hospital. To prevent this, Leggieri called Sheeley’s and placed a restriction on who could pick up Kravchenko’s prescriptions. Zachary called Sheeley’s one day pretending to be his mother, and asked about refilling her OxyContin prescription. Donato Iannielli, owner-pharmacist Lori Hart’s father, and the prior owner of Sheeley’s, was the pharmacist on-duty at the time, and told “Kravchenko” that her OxyContin prescription could not be filled yet, but that she had a prescription for fentanyl patches ready to be picked up. “Kravchenko” told Iannielli that she wanted to send her son to pick up the patches, but stated that he did not have a driver’s license or other form of identification. Iannielli told the caller that this would not be a problem, since he personally knew and would recognize Zachary. Cody then drove Zachary to Sheeley’s, where Zachary picked up Kravchenko’s medication even though, according to Zachary, the pharmacy receipt explicitly stated, “[d]o not give to son.” On the drive back to Zachary’s house, Cody at some point consumed fentanyl from one of the patches, smoked marijuana, and then fell asleep on the once inside the house. Later that night, Zachary tried to wake Cody up, but he was unresponsive. Cody was later pronounced dead at a hospital. Zachary eventually pleaded guilty to involuntary manslaughter and multiple drug offenses in connection with Cody’s overdose. The question in this appeal was whether claims brought against the pharmacy on behalf of the decedent who overdosed on illegally obtained prescription drugs was barred by the doctrine of in pari delicto. Because the Pennsylvania Supreme Court concluded that the trial court correctly applied the in pari delicto doctrine, judgment was affirmed. View "Albert v. Sheeley's Drug Store, et al." on Justia Law

Appellant Vincent Lorino worked as an equipment operator for the Pennsylvania Department of Transportation (“Employer”) when he slipped on the running board of the truck he used for work and fell backwards, injuring his lower back and left hip. Employer accepted liability for a low back sprain/tear and a left hip sprain/tear pursuant to two medical-only notices of compensation payable (“NCP”). In February 2017, Employer referred Appellant for an independent medical examination (“IME”). The IME examiner determined Appellant had fully recovered from his injuries, that any pain Appellant experienced was the result of pre-existing degenerative disc disease, and that Appellant required no further treatment. As a result, Employer filed a petition to terminate Appellant’s treatment. Appellant retained counsel for the hearing on Employer’s termination petition. At the hearing, Appellant testified he had been receiving treatment from Dr. Shivani Dua, who administered epidural steroid injections to alleviate the pain in his back and left hip. Appellant explained that while the steroid injections would alleviate his pain for a few months, the pain would slowly return, at which point he would need to return for additional injections. Appellant indicated he received his most recent injection approximately two to three weeks before the IME. At the conclusion of the hearing, Appellant requested, in addition to continued medical benefits, attorney’s fees pursuant to Section 440 of the Workers' Compensation Act, asserting that, because he received only medical benefits, he was unable to retain the services of an attorney based on a traditional contingent fee arrangement, and instead was required to enter into an hourly-rate fee agreement. At issue before the Pennsylvania Supreme Court was the propriety of the Commonwealth Court’s construction of Section 440 of the Act as precluding an award of attorney’s fees to a claimant when an employer established a reasonable basis for seeking a termination of benefits. The Supreme Court concluded the Commonwealth Court’s interpretation of Section 440 was contrary to the statute’s express language, and, therefore, reversed in part and remanded. View "Lorino v. WCAB (Commonwealth of PA)" on Justia Law

In 2016, Craig Steltz filed a medical malpractice action against Dr. William Meyers, Vincera Core Institute, and Vincera Institute (collectively Appellants). While rehabilitating from surgery, Steltz, a professional football player, felt a pop in his right leg. This led him to return to Dr. Meyers, after team physicians received results from a MRI. At a follow-up appointment, Dr. Meyers also performed an MRI on Steltz, discussed the MRI with Dr. Adam Zoga, a musculoskeletal radiologist, and concluded Steltz had scar tissue breakup, a normal postoperative finding, and not a new injury. However, Dr. Paul Read, a second musculoskeletal radiologist, also independently reviewed the second MRI, and issued a report concluding there was a complete tear of the adductor tendon. Based on these conflicting interpretations of the MRI, Steltz alleged Dr. Meyers was negligent in failing to diagnose and disclose the existence of the tear as reported by Dr. Read. Appellants’ counsel’s first line of questioning to Dr. Zoga on direct examination at trial, asked Dr. Zoga's estimation of how many musculoskeletal radiologists there were in the US, and commented, in his question, that "plaintiff couldn’t find one of them to come into this courtroom to support Dr. Read, did you know that?" Steltz's counsel requested a curative instruction, and moved for a mistrial. The trial court gave the jury a curative instruction and denied the mistrial. Appellants' counsel, in closing, referred back to that line of questioning, asserting Steltz “didn’t bring anybody in to dispute [Dr. Crain and Dr. Zoga] because they can’t.” Steltz’s counsel did not object to any of these statements. Instead, in rebuttal, Steltz’s counsel reiterated that Dr. Read was a board-certified radiologist with a focus in musculoskeletal radiology. The jury returned a verdict for Appellants. Steltz filed a post-trial motion asserting the trial court erred in denying his motion for a mistrial because the effect of Appellants’ counsel’s question to Dr. Zoga was so prejudicial that no jury instruction could adequately cure the prejudice. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court concluded the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying a mistrial based on a single, unanswered question proposed to an expert witness, and that decision alone could not later serve as the basis for granting a new trial. View "Steltz v. Meyers M.D., et al." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the decision of the circuit court ruling that Marion Life Saving Crew, Inc. (MLSC) and its paramedics were entitled to statutory immunity pursuant to Va. Code 8.01-255(A)(5), holding that the circuit court erred in ruling that MLSC was immune from liability.Plaintiff, the administrator of the Estate of Calvin Harmon Shoots, brought this wrongful death complaint alleging that Defendants' grossly negligent conduct was the direct and proximate cause of the premature death of Shoots. The circuit court ruled (1) the paramedics were clearly negligent but that they were absolutely immune from liability under section 8.01-225(A)(5); and (2) MLSC was immune because the paramedics were immune from liability. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) the circuit court correctly ruled that the paramedics were immune from liability; but (2) the paramedics' immunity from civil liability was not dispositive of whether section 8.01-225 applied to MLSC, and therefore, the circuit court erred in ruling that MLSC was immune because the paramedics were also immune. View "Stoots v. Marion Life Saving Crew, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, Matilde Ek (Mrs. Ek), Karla Ek-Elhadidy, Lucila del Carmen Ek, and Maria Ek-Ewell, filed suit alleging that defendants' employee, Mrs. Ek, contracted COVID-19 at work because of defendants' failure to implement adequate safety measures. Plaintiffs claimed that Arturo Ek subsequently caught the disease from Mrs. Ek while she convalesced at home and subsequently died from the disease a month later. Defendants filed a demurrer asserting that plaintiffs' claims are preempted by the exclusivity provisions of the Workers' Compensation Act (WCA).The Court of Appeal denied the petition for writ of mandate directing the trial court to vacate an order overruling defendants' demurrer to a wrongful death action. Assuming arguendo that Mrs. Ek's workplace infection constitutes an injury for purposes of the WCA, the court rejected defendants' efforts to apply the derivative injury doctrine to any injury causally linked to an employee injury. The court explained that defendants' interpretation is inconsistent with the language of Snyder v. Michael's Stores, Inc. (1997) 16 Cal.4th 991, 1000, which establishes that the fact an employee's injury is the biological cause of a nonemployee's injury does not thereby make the nonemployee's claim derivative of the employee's injury. Furthermore, Snyder's discussion of prior case law applying the derivative injury doctrine does not support applying the doctrine based solely on causation. View "See's Candies, Inc. v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

After Tyler S. Halsey suffered a heat stroke while working for Townsend Tree Service, his parents filed suit for wrongful death and negligence. The district court dismissed the claims against the supervisor with prejudice, dismissed the claims against Townsend Tree without prejudice, and granted summary judgment to the parent company, The Townsend Corporation of Indiana.The Eighth Circuit affirmed, concluding that plaintiffs failed to allege that the supervisor breached a duty separate and distinct from the nondelegable duties of Townsend Tree. In this case, plaintiffs stress two allegations: (1) that the supervisor directed Halsey to continue working despite indications of heat exhaustion, and (2) that the supervisor disabled the air conditioning in the work trucks so Halsey could not escape the heat. Under Missouri law, the court concluded that both plaintiffs' allegations are within Townsend Tree's nondelegable duties to provide a safe workplace and equipment. Because plaintiffs' claims against the supervisor have no reasonable basis in fact or law, the case was properly removed to federal court.The court further concluded that the district court properly dismissed Townsend Tree without prejudice and the district court did not err in applying the primary jurisdiction doctrine where the question of the cause of death was within the special competence of the Missouri Labor Industrial Relations Commission. Finally, the court concluded that the district court did not err in granting summary judgment to Townsend Corporation where it did not incur liability under either Restatement(Second) of Torts Sec. 324A(b) or 324A(c). View "Halsey v. The Townsend Corporation of Indiana" on Justia Law

Civil Code section 3333.2, known as the Medical Injury Compensation Reform Act of 1975 (MICRA), limits noneconomic damages to $250,000 based on professional negligence. The Court of Appeal held that this limitation does not apply to plaintiffs' causes of action under the Elder Abuse and Dependent Adult Civil Protection Act. In this case, plaintiffs, former patients at an acute psychiatric hospital, suffered sexual abuse by a hospital employee. The jury subsequently found in plaintiffs' favor and awarded substantial noneconomic damages against both defendants, as well as punitive damages against the management company.The court affirmed, concluding that plaintiffs' cause of action based on professional negligence may be barred by the statute of limitations, but their cause of action for elder abuse is not. The court also concluded that clear and convincing evidence supports the finding that defendants were reckless in their failure to protect plaintiffs from elder abuse. The court rejected defendants' challenges to the jury instructions. Finally, the court concluded that the damages are not excessive; the jury correctly attributed 70 percent of the fault to defendants; and the punitive damages were supported by clear and convincing evidence of malice or oppression.In regard to plaintiffs' appeal, the court concluded that it need not make a determination of liability under the respondeat superior doctrine where the court could uphold liability under the Elder Abuse Act. The court explained that plaintiffs have suffered the same harm whether the theory of recovery is breach of the Elder Abuse Act or respondeat superior. Finally, plaintiffs' ratification count has the same limitation as their respondeat superior count. View "Samantha B. v. Aurora Vista Del Mar, LLC" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that the term "civil action" in Mass. Gen. Laws 27-7-2.2 refers to a judicial proceeding that is commenced by the filing in court of a complaint and all other required documents together with fees.This case involved an accident in which Horace Johnson and Carlton Johnson were seriously injured when Horace was driving. Before any party filed suit, Carlton's counsel sent a letter to Arbella Mutual Insurance Company, which had issued an automobile insurance policy to Horace, demanding a settlement in the amount of the $100,000 policy limit. After Arbella indicated its acceptance of the settlement offer Carlton and his mother (together, Plaintiffs) filed suit. The case was removed to federal district court, which granted summary judgment to Defendants, rejecting Carlton's argument that section 27-7-2.2 applied to the case and rendered Arbella's acceptance of the settlement offer ineffective. On appeal, the First Circuit Court of Appeals certified the instant question to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court answered that "civil action" in section 27-7-2.2 refers to a judicial proceeding which is commenced by the filing of a complaint and all other required documents together with the fees prescribed by law. View "Johnson v. Johnson" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal based on lack of subject matter jurisdiction of a Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) case brought by landowners, seeking damages when their property was intentionally burned by a Type 2 Incident Management Team, convened by the U.S. Forest Service, during a controlled burnout performed as part of the fire suppression effort to combat the 2015 North Star Fire in Washington.The panel concluded that the government has met its burden of establishing that plaintiffs' claims fall within the scope of the discretionary function exception. Accepting as true the factual allegations contained in the complaint, the panel concluded as a matter of law that a land management employee's communication with Plaintiff Willard was based upon the exercise or performance of choosing how to organize and conduct fire suppression operations, which undisputedly requires the exercise of judgment grounded in social, economic, or political policy. Furthermore, these claims regarding the employee's communication with Willard are independently barred by the FTCA's misrepresentation exception. The court also held that the district court did not make improper factual findings in resolving the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) motion and did not abuse its discretion by denying additional jurisdictional discovery. View "Cruz Esquivel v. United States" on Justia Law

Suing under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 42 U.S.C. 233(a) Clanton alleged that nurse practitioner Jordan, an employee of the U.S. Public Health Service, failed to educate him about his severe hypertension or to monitor its advancement; his hypertension developed into Stage V kidney disease so that Clanton required dialysis and, at the age of 35, a kidney transplant. The district court rejected the government’s comparative negligence argument as to Clanton and awarded Clanton nearly $30 million in damages. The Seventh Circuit upheld the damages calculation but remanded for the court to assess Clanton’s comparative negligence under Illinois’s reasonable-person standard, noting that Clanton had external clues that he was seriously unwell, such as two employment-related physicals which showed dangerously high blood pressure.On remand, the court again concluded that comparative negligence was inapplicable. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The district court made findings as to what an objectively reasonable person would understand as to hypertension and found that a reasonable person would not understand the potential for damage absent any symptoms, and therefore would not understand the need to take medication or see a medical provider when asymptomatic. Based on those findings, the court held that Clanton’s actions were not inconsistent with the due care that would be expected of a reasonable person. The government did not challenge whether the fact-findings and conclusion were supportable; the court properly identified and applied the standard. View "Clanton v. United States" on Justia Law