Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals affirming an order of the trial court granting summary judgment in favor of Insureds and against Insurer in reliance upon its prior decision in N.C. Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Co. v. Gurley, 139 N.C. App. 178 (2000), holding that the lower courts erred.Matthew Bronson, who was intoxicated, collided with a vehicle owned by Pamela Dana, resulting in serious injuries to Pamela and William Dana, who was riding in the passenger seat. Pamela died from her injuries. At the time of the accident, Pamela was insured under a policy of automobile liability insurance issued by Insurer. William, individually and as administrator of Pamela's estate, claimed to be entitled to an additional $74,750 in underinsured motorist coverage over the amount that Insurer had already tendered to them. Insurer filed a complaint seeking a declaratory judgment regarding the amount of underinsured motorist coverage it was required to provide to the Danas. The trial court entered summary judgment in favor of the Danas, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the application of Gurley in this case was error. View "N.C. Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Co. v. Dana" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the court of special appeals reversing the judgment of the circuit court denying Respondents' motion to dismiss Petitioner's petition for judicial review of the decision of the Workers' Compensation Commission summarily denying Petitioner's second request for modification of an earlier order, holding that the circuit court erred.The Commission issued an order approving Petitioner's request for four additional weeks of physical therapy for her left shoulder that was injured due to a workplace accident. More than three years later, Petitioner filed a request for modification of the earlier order denying her request for authorization of surgery. The Commission denied the request without a hearing. Petitioner then filed a second request for modification, which the Commission denied without a hearing. The circuit court denied Petitioner's petition for judicial review. The court of special appeals reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Commission's summary denial of Petitioner's request for modification was not subject to judicial review. View "Sanders v. Board of Education of Harford County" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court granting the State's motion to dismiss Plaintiff's negligence claim based on lack of subject matter jurisdiction, holding that the State was immune from Plaintiff's claims because they arose out of an assault.Plaintiff, an inmate, claimed that the State was negligent in its handling of security when it placed an inmate who had killed Plaintiff's brother in Plaintiff's housing unit. Plaintiff, afraid for his safety, assaulted the other inmate and was later himself stabbed in retaliation. Plaintiff's negligence claims were brought against the State pursuant to Nebraska's State Tort Claims Act (STCA), Neb. Rev. Stat. 81-8,209 to 81-8,235. The district court concluded that the State was immune under the intentional tort exception to the STCA. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Plaintiff's claim arose out of an assault and was therefore barred by the intentional tort exception. View "Williams v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the district court granting Employer's motion to dismiss a petition for judicial review as untimely, holding that the district court correctly dismissed Claimant's petition for judicial review.Claimant sustained a work injury and pursued workers' compensation benefits. The workers' compensation benefits ordered Employer to pay temporary total disability benefits related to Claimant's right extremity injury but rejected Claimant's claim that she had also sustained a right shoulder occupational injury. According to Iowa Code 17A.19(3), Claimant had thirty day to file a petition for judicial review. Claimant's attorney failed to file the petition by the deadline. When the attorney realized his oversight, Claimant filed a petition for judicial review. The district court dismissed the petition as untimely. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err. View "Askvig v. Snap-On Logistics Co." on Justia Law

This appeal arose out of the tragic rape and murder of Rachel Russell, perpetrated by her grandson, Sidney DeAvila. DeAvila suffered from severe mental illness, and at the time of the murder he was on parole. Russell’s son, plaintiff Steven Russell, brought an action against the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (Department), alleging the Department’s parole agents had a special relationship with Russell, and they failed to warn her of DeAvila’s dangerous propensities. A jury agreed, and ultimately awarded plaintiff $4.5 million in noneconomic damages, which the trial court reduced to $2.7 million. The Department appealed, arguing it had no duty to warn Russell of DeAvila’s dangerous propensities and, even if it did have a duty to warn, it was immune from that liability. Plaintiff claimed on cross-appeal that the trial court erred in reducing the judgment and imposing sanctions against trial counsel. The Court of Appeal was "compelled to agree" with the Department, that because the facts presented were not sufficient to establish that there was a special relationship between the agents and Russell, no duty to warn arose. Accordingly, judgment was reversed. View "Russell v. Dept. of Corrections and Rehabilitation" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the trial court granting summary judgment for the Northern Indiana Commuter Transportation District and dismissing Clarence Lowe's tort claim, holding that the District is a political subdivision under the Indiana Tort Claims Act and that Lowe's notice was untimely.Lowe claimed he was injured while working for the District and brought this action under the Federal Employers' Liability Act (FELA). Lowe sent a note of tort claim to the Indiana attorney general, who received the notice 263 days after Lowe's injury. The District argued that, for purposes of the Act, it was a political subdivision rather than a state agency and that because Lowe failed to serve it with a notice within 180 days after his injury, the Act barred his claim. The trial court agreed and granted summary judgment against Lowe. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the District was a political subdivision under the Act and that Lowe's arguments neither factually nor legally excused his failure to provide timely notice. View "Lowe v. Northern Indiana Commuter Transportation District" on Justia Law

In a March 6, 2015, vehicular collision at a Minooka truck terminal, Armstead, a semi-truck driver with Pennsylvania-based Manfredi Mushroom, was allegedly struck and injured by the semi-truck operated by Roberts, employed by NFI. Armstead filed a Pennsylvania workers’ compensation claim against Manfredi Mushroom, which led to the execution of a “Compromise and Release Agreement by Stipulation” settling the claim. Armstead then filed a negligence suit against NFI in Illinois. The circuit court determined that the Agreement included a judicial admission that prohibited Armstead from claiming injuries other than a right knee strain. The appellate court affirmed.The Illinois Supreme Court vacated and remanded for dismissal. The circuit court’s order limiting Armstead’s injury allegations resolved an issue that was ancillary to the negligence claims. Permitting an appeal from that order would promote precisely the type of piecemeal appeals Rule 304(a) was designed to discourage. After the circuit court’s improper Rule 304(a) finding that there was no just reason to delay enforcement or appeal of its order, Armstead dismissed his action in the circuit court, where jurisdiction remained due to the improper Rule 304(a) finding. He failed to refile the action within one year or within the statute of limitations period, so his action remains dismissed. View "Armstead v. National Freight, Inc." on Justia Law

The plaintiffs alleged that the doctors negligently failed to recognize that Thomas was pregnant before performing elective surgery on her and administering anesthesia, pain medication, and antibiotics, resulting in irreversible injury to the fetus. Thomas was subsequently informed by another physician that the fetus would not survive to term and the pregnancy should be terminated. Thomas had a lawful, consensual abortion. Because the abortion would not have occurred but for the doctors’ negligent conduct and the injuries suffered by the fetus, plaintiffs alleged that defendants’ negligence “ultimately caused the death of” the fetus.Responding to a question certified by the trial court, the appellate court and Illinois Supreme Court held that the Wrongful Death Act, 740 ILCS 180/2.2, does not bar a cause of action against a defendant for fetal death if the defendant knew or had a medical reason to know of the pregnancy and the alleged malpractice resulted in a non-viable fetus that died as a result of a lawful abortion with requisite consent. Section 2.2 addresses only the liability of the doctor who performs the abortion, not the liability of other physicians, and does not state that abortion is a superseding cause, as a matter of law, where a physician tortiously injures a fetus in a separate medical procedure. View "Thomas v. Khoury" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals affirming the order of the Board vacating an order of the administrative law judge (ALJ) and remanding the claim back to him to enter an award terminating Michael O'Bryan's benefits at age seventy, holding that the court of appeals did not err.O'Bryan received a work-related injury at age sixty-five, leading to his disability. The ALJ found O'Bryan to be permanently totally disabled and awarded him benefits that would continue as long as he remained disabled. On appeal, the Board held that newly-amended version of Ky. Rev. Stat. 342.730(4) applied to O'Bryan's benefits and that they should terminate when he reached the age of seventy. The court of appeals affirmed, holding that the statute was constitutional. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that O'Bryan's challenges to the amendment to section 342.730(4) were unavailing. View "O'Bryan v. Zip Express" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals finding that Plaintiff was an invitee when she was injured while visiting the monument marking her son's grave at a cemetery maintained by the City of Versailles, holding that the cemetery was not obligated to inspect and repair the monument, regardless of Plaintiff's status.Plaintiff was injured when the headstone marking the grave of her son dislodged from the base and toppled onto Plaintiff's foot. Plaintiff brought this suit against the City for negligence in maintaining her son's monument. The trial court granted summary judgment for the City, finding that Plaintiff had failed to establish that the City owed her a duty to maintain or repair the headstone. The court of appeals reversed, finding that Plaintiff was a business invitee and that the City owed her an affirmative duty to inspect and repair the monument. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the City did not owe Plaintiff a duty with regard to the monument. View "City of Versailles v. Johnson" on Justia Law