Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

Eugene Sikora, a former prisoner, claims that the State of Iowa failed to release him from prison when his sentence was over. He was convicted of three felonies in 2016 and sentenced to concurrent five-year terms, which were suspended for probation. In 2017, his probation was revoked, and he was imprisoned until March 2019. Sikora alleges that due to a miscalculation, he was imprisoned for nearly five months longer than allowed, as the defendants did not credit him for 292 days served in county jails and a custodial residential center.Sikora filed a suit over three years after his release, seeking money damages for wrongful imprisonment. He named the State of Iowa and the director of the Iowa Department of Corrections as defendants, asserting five tort claims, including violations of his constitutional rights and negligence. The defendants moved to dismiss the suit, arguing sovereign immunity and other defenses. The district court dismissed some of Sikora’s claims but allowed others to proceed. However, after the Iowa Supreme Court's decision in Burnett v. Smith, which overruled the precedent allowing constitutional tort claims, the district court dismissed Sikora’s remaining claims and denied his motion to amend his petition to add new defendants and claims.The Iowa Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s dismissal, holding that sovereign immunity barred Sikora’s claims. The court concluded that all of Sikora’s claims were essentially false imprisonment claims, which are barred by sovereign immunity under Iowa Code section 669.14(4). The court also rejected Sikora’s arguments that constitutional torts and claims against individual state employees could proceed, emphasizing that the Iowa Tort Claims Act (ITCA) provides the exclusive mechanism for such claims and explicitly prohibits claims based on false imprisonment. View "Sikora v. State of Iowa" on Justia Law

Faya Rose Toure sued the City of Selma, Chief of Police Spencer Collier, and police officer Devon McGuire following her arrest for fourth-degree theft of property and attempting to elude. Toure claimed McGuire and Collier committed assault and battery, false arrest, unlawful imprisonment, invasion of privacy, negligence, wantonness, abuse of legal process, unreasonable seizure, and defamation/libel. She also accused the City of negligent hiring, training, and supervision, and fostering a custom of police abuse. Toure sought $1,000,000 in compensatory damages and $3,000,000 in punitive damages.The defendants filed for summary judgment, citing peace-officer and State-agent immunity. They provided evidence including deposition testimonies, incident reports, and body camera footage showing McGuire witnessed Toure removing a campaign sign and subsequently attempting to elude him. Toure argued she removed the sign believing it was illegally placed and felt intimidated by McGuire, who was in an unmarked vehicle. The trial court granted summary judgment for the City but denied it for McGuire and Collier.The Supreme Court of Alabama reviewed the case. It found that McGuire and Collier were performing discretionary functions within their law enforcement duties, entitling them to immunity. The court determined that McGuire had at least arguable probable cause for Toure's arrest, and Toure failed to provide substantial evidence that McGuire or Collier acted willfully, maliciously, or beyond their authority. Consequently, the court held that McGuire and Collier were entitled to peace-officer and State-agent immunity and directed the trial court to enter summary judgment in their favor. The petition for a writ of mandamus was granted, and the writ was issued. View "Ex parte McGuire" on Justia Law

A minor child, through his mother, filed a medical malpractice lawsuit against an obstetrician, the clinic where the obstetrician was employed, and the hospital where he was born. The child suffered an obstetric brachial plexus injury during birth. The district court excluded the package insert for Pitocin used during the birth, ruling it was hearsay and lacked foundation. The child also argued that the court erred in not giving his requested jury instructions and giving other erroneous instructions, which he did not object to at trial.The District Court for Douglas County ruled in favor of the defendants. The jury found that the child had not met his burden of proof and rendered a general verdict for the defendants. The child appealed, arguing that the jury instructions were erroneous and prejudicial.The Nebraska Supreme Court reviewed the case and found that the district court committed plain error by instructing the jury that it could not determine the standard of care from the testimony of expert witnesses. This erroneous instruction was on a vital issue and misled the jury, prejudicially affecting a substantial right of the child. The court held that the error was of such a nature that to leave it uncorrected would cause a miscarriage of justice or result in damage to the integrity, reputation, and fairness of the judicial process.The Nebraska Supreme Court reversed the judgment and remanded the case for a new trial, without addressing the remaining assignments of error, as they were unnecessary to adjudicate the case and might be tried differently on remand. View "J.R.M.B. v. Alegent Creighton Health" on Justia Law

A minor, M.Y., was injured after falling into an open manhole on the lawn of Wingfield High School in Jackson, Mississippi, during a homecoming event. M.Y.'s mother, LaQuita Maxie, filed a lawsuit on his behalf against the City of Jackson and the Jackson Public School District (JPS), alleging negligence, gross negligence, premises liability, and res ipsa loquitur, and seeking compensatory and punitive damages.The Hinds County Circuit Court denied the defendants' motions to dismiss and later their motions for summary judgment. The trial court found that there were genuine issues of material fact regarding the defendants' notice of the dangerous condition and their duty to maintain the manhole. The court also determined that the defendants were not entitled to discretionary-function immunity under the Mississippi Tort Claims Act (MTCA).The Supreme Court of Mississippi reviewed the case de novo and found that the plaintiff failed to present evidence that either the City or JPS had actual or constructive notice of the open manhole. The court noted that the defendants provided evidence of no prior complaints or notifications about the manhole, while the plaintiff relied solely on the complaint and general premises liability principles without presenting probative evidence.The Supreme Court of Mississippi held that the trial court erred in denying the defendants' motions for summary judgment. The court reversed the trial court's decision and rendered summary judgment in favor of the City of Jackson and JPS, concluding that the plaintiff did not establish a genuine issue of material fact regarding the defendants' notice of the dangerous condition. View "City of Jackson v. Maxie" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, former tenants of the defendant, filed a complaint against their landlord, alleging various breaches and violations related to their tenancies. In response, the defendant filed two unlawful detainer actions against the plaintiffs for nonpayment of rent. These actions were later dismissed without prejudice. Subsequently, a jury found the defendant liable for certain claims, and the plaintiffs filed a new complaint, including a claim for malicious prosecution based on the unlawful detainer actions.The San Francisco Superior Court consolidated the cases and, after a bench trial, found in favor of the plaintiffs on their malicious prosecution claim. The court concluded that the defendant lacked probable cause to file the unlawful detainer actions and rejected the defendant's advice of counsel defense, determining that she did not rely on legal advice in good faith. The court entered judgment for the plaintiffs, and the defendant appealed.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court found that the defendant had asserted a valid advice of counsel defense. The defendant had consulted an attorney, disclosed all relevant facts, and acted on the attorney's advice in good faith. The court determined that the trial court erred in requiring the defendant to prove the attorney's competence and in shifting the burden of the attorney's legal research onto the defendant. Consequently, the appellate court vacated the judgment and remanded the case with instructions to enter a judgment of dismissal in favor of the defendant. The court declined to award costs as the respondents did not appear in the appeal. View "Ceron v. Liu" on Justia Law

Franklyn Neter-Nu, a truck driver, visited Methodist Hospital in Gary, Indiana, complaining of nausea and vomiting. He was treated with IV fluids and medications, but the IV was twice found detached from his arm by Nurse Morgan Mittler, who then placed it in his right foot without proper training or a doctor's order. Neter-Nu later experienced pain in his foot, and despite an x-ray showing no issues, he was discharged. After traveling to Iowa, he sought emergency care for blackened toes and was eventually referred for a below-the-knee amputation.Neter-Nu filed a complaint against Dr. Zainab Abbas, Nurse Mittler, and Methodist Hospital, alleging negligence. A jury found in favor of Neter-Nu, awarding him $11,000,000, which was reduced to the statutory cap of $1,250,000. The trial court also awarded $79,993.40 in prejudgment interest. The Indiana Court of Appeals reversed the jury verdict, citing errors in denying Methodist’s Rule 50(A) motion, jury instructions, and evidentiary rulings, and remanded for a new trial.The Indiana Supreme Court reviewed the case and held that the trial court erred in denying Methodist’s Rule 50(A) motion and in its jury instructions, but these errors did not necessitate reversing the jury verdict due to joint-and-several liability. The court found that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing the Providers’ proposed jury instructions on superseding cause and hindsight, nor in excluding certain medical records and emails. The Supreme Court affirmed the jury verdict but reversed and remanded for the trial court to grant Methodist’s Rule 50(A) motion and recalculate prejudgment interest based on the Providers’ statutory liability. View "Abbas v. Bilal Neter-Nu" on Justia Law

A Hobby Lobby manager called law enforcement because Kristopher Birtcher appeared to be suffering from a mental health crisis at the store. Birtcher, who was unarmed and had committed no crime, tried to flee when sheriff’s deputies arrived. The deputies subdued him by double-cuffing his hands behind his back, securing his ankles, tying his ankles to a cord around his waist, and applying bodyweight pressure to his back while he was lying face down. Birtcher gasped that he couldn’t breathe and called for help. He stopped moving after several minutes, and the deputies kept him in a prone position for another 50 seconds before turning him on his side, then later returned him to a prone position. Birtcher died from asphyxiation and sudden cardiac arrest within 25 minutes of the deputies’ arrival.Birtcher’s minor daughter, A.B., brought state claims in state court after unsuccessfully litigating federal claims. She asserted claims for wrongful death, battery, negligence, and negligent training, and a survival action for violation of the Bane Act. The Superior Court of San Diego County granted summary judgment to the defendants, finding no triable issues of material fact on the excessive force claim and ruling that the restraint was “by the book.” The court also ruled that A.B. failed to identify a legal basis for her negligent training theory against Sheriff Gore.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, reversed the trial court’s decision. The appellate court concluded that there were triable issues of material fact on the excessive force claim, noting that the deputies’ use of forceful prone restraint with bodyweight compression could be seen as excessive. The court also found that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment on the negligent training claim against Sheriff Gore, as A.B. had identified a statutory basis for the claim, and Sheriff Gore failed to demonstrate the absence of triable issues of material fact. The judgment was reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "A.B. v. County of San Diego" on Justia Law

Elanore Vaughan purchased a ticket and signed an online liability waiver to go tubing at Eagle Island State Park, operated by Gateway Parks, LLC. The next day, Vaughan was injured when her tube went over an embankment and crashed into a flatbed trailer housing snowmaking equipment. Vaughan sued Gateway, alleging negligence and premises liability, claiming Gateway failed to maintain the tubing hill safely and created a hazard by placing the trailer at the end of the tubing run.The District Court of the Fourth Judicial District of Idaho denied Gateway's motion to dismiss Vaughan's complaint. Gateway argued that Vaughan's claims were barred by the liability waiver she signed and the Responsibilities and Liabilities of Skiers and Ski Area Operators Act. The district court found that while the Act applied, there was a genuine issue of material fact regarding the placement of the snowmaking equipment. The court also concluded that the liability waiver did not preclude Vaughan's claims. Gateway then sought and was granted permission to appeal the denial of its motion for summary judgment.The Supreme Court of the State of Idaho reviewed the case and reversed the district court's decision. The court held that the electronic liability waiver Vaughan signed precluded her claims against Gateway. The waiver explicitly acknowledged the risks of tubing, including collisions with manmade obstacles such as snowmaking equipment. The court determined that the waiver's language was broad enough to encompass Vaughan's accident and injuries. Consequently, the court directed the district court to grant summary judgment in favor of Gateway and dismiss Vaughan's complaint. The court also denied Gateway's request for attorney fees on appeal, as the gravamen of Vaughan's lawsuit was a tort, not a commercial transaction. View "Vaughan v. Gateway Park, LLC" on Justia Law

Peter A. Smith visited Mercy Hospital twice in June 2017 with symptoms indicative of Lyme disease. Dr. John R. Henson misdiagnosed him on both occasions, leading to a lack of appropriate treatment. Smith subsequently developed Lyme carditis and died on July 2, 2017. His parents, Angela M. Smith and Richard T. Smith Jr., as co-personal representatives of his estate, filed a medical negligence lawsuit against Henson, Mercy Hospital, and Eastern Maine Healthcare Systems.The Superior Court (Cumberland County) ruled that Maine’s Wrongful Death Act allowed recovery for pecuniary injuries even if the decedent would not have provided financial support to the beneficiaries. A jury found the defendants liable and awarded damages, including $2 million for pecuniary injury to Smith’s parents, despite no evidence that Smith would have financially supported them.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the case. The court held that the applicable wrongful death statute authorized recovery for pecuniary injury only when the death deprived one or more of the people identified in the statute of prospective financial gain. The court concluded that damages for such a loss were not available when the loss was asserted only by the estate. Consequently, the court vacated the portion of the judgment awarding damages for pecuniary injury. All other aspects of the judgment were unaffected, and the case was remanded for entry of a modified judgment consistent with the opinion. View "Smith v. Henson" on Justia Law

A police cruiser driven by Officer Dallas Bennett collided with a vehicle driven by Jeanne Dinga, with Rachelle Thorne and her children as passengers. Thorne and Dinga filed separate negligence suits against the District of Columbia, which were later consolidated. The District moved for summary judgment, arguing that Officer Bennett was on an "emergency run" under D.C. Code § 2-411(4), and thus could only be liable for gross negligence. The trial court granted the motions, finding that no reasonable juror could conclude that Officer Bennett was grossly negligent.The Superior Court of the District of Columbia granted summary judgment in favor of the District, concluding that Officer Bennett was on an emergency run and that no reasonable juror could find gross negligence. The court found that Officer Bennett believed he was responding to an emergency and acted pursuant to that belief at the time of the collision.The District of Columbia Court of Appeals reviewed the case and reversed in part. The court held that a reasonable jury could find that Officer Bennett was not on an emergency run and that he acted with ordinary negligence. The court noted that Officer Bennett's testimony, the MPD General Orders, and the circumstances of the collision could lead a jury to conclude that he did not genuinely believe he was responding to an emergency. However, the court agreed with the trial court that no reasonable jury could find gross negligence based on the evidence presented. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the opinion. View "Thorne v. District of Columbia" on Justia Law