Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

A mass shooting occurred at a Florida high school in 2018, resulting in numerous deaths and injuries. The Sheriff’s Office, which employed a school resource officer at the school, faced 60 lawsuits from victims alleging negligence in failing to secure the premises. The Sheriff’s Office held an excess liability insurance policy with Evanston Insurance Company, which required the Sheriff to pay a $500,000 self-insured retention (SIR) per “occurrence” and a $500,000 annual aggregate deductible before coverage would be triggered. The central dispute was whether the shooting constituted a single “occurrence” under the policy, or multiple occurrences—one for each victim or gunshot.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida reviewed the case after the Sheriff filed a declaratory judgment action. The district court denied Evanston’s motion to dismiss, finding that the policy’s definition of “occurrence” was ambiguous under Florida law, and that ambiguity should be construed in favor of the insured. The court determined that the Parkland shooting was a single occurrence, meaning only one SIR applied. The court also found that the Sheriff had satisfied both the SIR and the deductible through legal expenses and other covered claims, and awarded attorney’s fees and costs to the Sheriff.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s rulings. The Eleventh Circuit held that a justiciable controversy existed, as the Sheriff had demonstrated a substantial likelihood of future injury and had satisfied the policy’s prerequisites for coverage. The court further held that, under controlling Florida law, the term “occurrence” was ambiguous and must be construed in favor of the insured, resulting in the Parkland shooting being treated as a single occurrence. The court also upheld the award of attorney’s fees and costs to the Sheriff. View "Sheriff of Broward County v. Evanston Insurance Company" on Justia Law

A group of former coal miners brought products liability lawsuits against several manufacturers and distributors of respirators, alleging that the devices failed to protect them from dust exposure and caused them to develop occupational lung diseases. Each plaintiff had used specific respirators during their mining careers and claimed that the products were defective. The cases were consolidated for discovery due to common factual and legal issues. The defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing that the plaintiffs’ claims were barred by West Virginia’s two-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions.The Circuit Court of McDowell County granted summary judgment to the defendants, finding that each plaintiff knew or should have known of their injury and its possible connection to the respirators more than two years before filing suit. The court used certain “triggering” dates—such as the date of medical diagnosis, receipt of disability benefits, or application for federal black lung benefits—to determine when the statute of limitations began to run. The plaintiffs appealed, arguing that the circuit court improperly resolved factual disputes and applied an incorrect standard for latent disease cases. The Intermediate Court of Appeals of West Virginia affirmed the circuit court’s decision, concluding that there were no genuine issues of material fact regarding the timeliness of the claims.The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia reviewed the case de novo and affirmed the lower courts’ rulings. The Court held that, under the discovery rule, the statute of limitations in products liability cases begins when a plaintiff knows or should know of their injury, the identity of the product’s maker, and the product’s causal relation to the injury. The Court found no genuine dispute of material fact as to when each plaintiff was on notice of their injury and its possible cause, and rejected arguments for tolling based on fraudulent concealment. The summary judgment in favor of the defendants was affirmed. View "Hardy v. 3M Company" on Justia Law

In May 2023, a partial collapse of the Davenport Hotel apartment building resulted in three deaths and multiple injuries to individuals and property. Numerous lawsuits were filed against various parties, including the building’s owners, engineers, and the City of Davenport, as well as two city employees. These cases were consolidated in the Iowa District Court for Scott County. The City defendants sought dismissal of the claims against them, arguing that the Iowa Municipal Tort Claims Act’s qualified immunity provisions shielded them from liability and that the plaintiffs’ petition did not meet the Act’s heightened pleading requirements. They also asserted that the public-duty doctrine barred the claims, as any duty owed was to the public at large rather than to the individual plaintiffs.The Iowa District Court for Scott County denied the City defendants’ motion to dismiss. The court determined that the qualified immunity provisions of Iowa Code § 670.4A applied to common law tort claims but found that the plaintiffs’ petition satisfied the heightened pleading requirements. The court also rejected the City defendants’ argument that the public-duty doctrine barred the suit. The City defendants appealed the denial of qualified immunity under the immediate appeal provision in § 670.4A and separately sought interlocutory review of the public-duty doctrine issue, which was denied.The Iowa Supreme Court reviewed only the qualified immunity issue, concluding that the protections of Iowa Code § 670.4A do not apply to common law tort claims such as negligence and nuisance. The court held that the statute’s language, borrowed from federal law, was intended to apply only to constitutional or statutory claims, not to common law torts. As a result, the appeal was dismissed because the qualified immunity provisions did not apply to the claims asserted. View "In re Davenport Hotel Building Collapse" on Justia Law

The plaintiff underwent a vein-ablation procedure on her right leg in August 2016, performed by a physician other than the defendant. She subsequently developed an infection and was treated by the defendant, who performed several irrigation and debridement procedures over the following months. In March 2017, a 4" x 4" piece of gauze was removed from the plaintiff’s wound, raising questions about whether it had been negligently left in the wound during one of the defendant’s procedures or during subsequent wound care. The plaintiff filed a medical-malpractice complaint in July 2018, alleging that the defendant left a sponge in her body during a September 2016 surgery, which the defendant denied ever performing.The Shelby Circuit Court initially denied the defendant’s motion for summary judgment, allowing the plaintiff to proceed with her claims. After depositions and further discovery, the plaintiff sought to amend her complaint to correct the date of the alleged negligent procedure from September 21, 2016, to October 26, 2016, but continued to reference a vein ablation rather than the actual irrigation and debridement procedure. The defendant moved to strike the amended complaint, arguing undue delay and lack of specificity as required by the Alabama Medical Liability Act (AMLA). The circuit court denied the motion to strike and allowed the amendment.The Supreme Court of Alabama reviewed the case on a petition for writ of mandamus. It held that the plaintiff’s delay in amending her complaint was truly inordinate and unexplained, especially given the information available to her and the defendant’s repeated assertion of his rights under AMLA § 6-5-551. The court found that the circuit court exceeded its discretion by allowing the amendment and directed it to vacate its order granting leave to amend and to strike the plaintiff’s first amended complaint. The petition for writ of mandamus was granted. View "Ex parte Taylor" on Justia Law

A train operated by Norfolk Southern carrying hazardous materials derailed near East Palestine, Ohio, in February 2023. The cleanup released toxic chemicals into the surrounding area, prompting affected residents and businesses to file suit against the railroad and other parties in federal court. These cases were consolidated into a master class action, and after extensive discovery and mediation, Norfolk Southern agreed to a $600 million settlement for the class. The district court for the Northern District of Ohio approved the settlement in September 2024. Five class members objected and appealed, but the district court required them to post an $850,000 appeal bond by January 30, 2025, to cover administrative and taxable costs. The objectors did not pay the bond or offer a lesser amount.After the bond order, the objectors filed a motion in the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit to eliminate or reduce the bond, but did not seek a stay. The Sixth Circuit motions panel explained that, absent a separate notice of appeal, it could only address the bond on a motion to stay, which the objectors expressly disclaimed. The objectors then moved in the district court to extend the time to appeal the bond order, but did so one day after the deadline set by Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(5)(A). The district court denied the motion as untimely, finding it lacked jurisdiction to grant an extension.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that the deadlines for appealing and requesting extensions are jurisdictional and cannot be equitably extended. The court dismissed the objectors’ appeal of the motion to extend for lack of jurisdiction and granted the plaintiffs’ motion to dismiss the objectors’ appeals of the settlement for failure to pay the required bond. View "In re E. Palestine Train Derailment" on Justia Law

A former professional football player, who played in the National Football League for 15 seasons, filed a workers’ compensation claim in California alleging cumulative injuries sustained throughout his career. He began his career with a California-based team, signing his initial contract in California, but spent the majority of his career with out-of-state teams, including the Atlanta Falcons, for whom he played his final seasons. During his employment with the Falcons, he played only a small number of games in California and spent the majority of his duty days outside the state.A workers’ compensation judge determined that both the player and the Falcons were exempt from California workers’ compensation law under specific statutory provisions, as the Falcons provided workers’ compensation coverage under another state’s laws and the player did not meet the statutory thresholds for California coverage. The Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board (WCAB), upon reconsideration, disagreed, finding that it had jurisdiction over the claim because the player had signed a contract in California during his career, and it rescinded the judge’s decision.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case. The court held that the Falcons are exempt from California workers’ compensation law under Labor Code sections 3600.5(c) and (d), because the player did not spend enough of his career working for California-based teams or in California, and he played more than seven seasons for non-California teams. The court annulled the WCAB’s decision and remanded the matter for further proceedings consistent with its opinion, holding that the statutory exemptions for professional athletes applied and precluded the player’s claim against the Falcons under California law. The court awarded costs in connection with the writ proceeding to the Falcons. View "Atlanta Falcons v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd." on Justia Law

The plaintiff received medical care at Sanford medical facilities in Fargo, North Dakota, in April 2022. He alleged that Sanford and its staff, including nurse Shannon Mulinex, refused to provide him pain medication, verbally abused and humiliated him, failed to investigate his complaints, engaged in a pattern of hostile conduct, and discharged him against his wishes. Based on these events, he brought six claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED), as well as claims for general negligence, defamation, discrimination, and violation of the Emergency Medical Treatment and Labor Act.The District Court of Cass County, East Central Judicial District, reviewed the case after Sanford moved for summary judgment. Sanford argued that the plaintiff failed to serve an expert affidavit within three months as required by North Dakota law for professional negligence claims, and that the IIED claims did not allege conduct sufficiently extreme and outrageous. The district court denied the plaintiff’s oral motion for a continuance, finding he had received adequate notice of the hearing. The court granted summary judgment, dismissing all claims, concluding that several IIED claims required an expert affidavit and the remaining IIED claims did not meet the legal threshold for extreme and outrageous conduct. A supplemental order granted summary judgment to Mulinex for the same reasons.On appeal, the Supreme Court of North Dakota affirmed the district court’s amended judgment. The Supreme Court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying a continuance, that the plaintiff had not preserved the issue of additional discovery for appeal, and that the requirement for an expert affidavit applied to IIED claims involving medical decisions. The court further held that the conduct alleged in the remaining IIED claims did not rise to the level of extreme and outrageous conduct as a matter of law. The amended judgment of dismissal was affirmed. View "McMahon v. Sanford" on Justia Law

Richard Mabee died from a methamphetamine overdose while confined in the Wheatland County Jail. He had traveled from Washington to Montana, violating his probation, and was arrested after a traffic stop. During booking, officers did not observe signs of drug use or find contraband, but video footage later showed Mabee disposing of a small object in his cell. Early the next morning, Mabee exhibited signs of methamphetamine intoxication, which were observed by Deputy Sweet, who monitored him via video but did not physically check on him until he was found unresponsive. Despite attempts at CPR, Mabee was pronounced dead from an overdose. The source of the methamphetamine was unclear, but the County theorized Mabee had concealed it prior to his confinement.The Estate of Richard Mabee sued Wheatland County for negligence, alleging the jailers failed to provide adequate medical care. The County asserted that Mabee’s own negligence contributed to his death and should diminish or bar recovery. The Fourteenth Judicial District Court, Wheatland County, allowed the County to present a comparative negligence defense and approved a special verdict form for the jury to apportion fault. The jury found both parties negligent, attributing 95% of the fault to Mabee and 5% to the County. As a result, the District Court entered judgment for the County, denying damages to the Estate.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed whether the District Court erred in permitting the comparative negligence defense. The Court held that, absent “special circumstances” where a jailer knows or should know a detainee is at risk of harm, comparative negligence applies and the factfinder may apportion fault. The Court affirmed the District Court’s judgment, concluding the Estate did not preserve any error regarding jury instructions on “special circumstances” and failed to show reversible error. View "Est. of Mabee v. Wheatland County" on Justia Law

A security services company and its sole shareholder, who is also its president and CEO, provided security services to two Iowa cities under separate contracts. After the shareholder published a letter criticizing media coverage of law enforcement responses to protests, a local newspaper published articles highlighting his critical comments about protestors and the Black Lives Matter movement. Subsequently, a city council member expressed concerns about the shareholder’s views, and the city council voted unanimously to terminate the company’s contract. The council member also pressured officials in the other city to end their contract with the company. Facing negative publicity, the company voluntarily terminated its second contract to avoid harm to a pending business transaction.The plaintiffs filed suit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Iowa against the city, the council member, and other council members, alleging First Amendment retaliation, tortious interference with business contracts, and defamation. The district court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss all claims under Rule 12(b)(6). It found that the shareholder lacked standing to assert a First Amendment retaliation claim for injuries to the corporation, and that the corporation failed to state a retaliation claim because only the shareholder engaged in protected speech. The court dismissed the tortious interference claim for lack of sufficient factual allegations and because the contract was terminated voluntarily. The defamation claim was dismissed for failure to identify any actionable statements by the defendants.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the shareholder’s First Amendment retaliation and defamation claims, but directed that these dismissals be without prejudice. The court reversed the dismissal of the corporation’s First Amendment retaliation and tortious interference claims, finding that the complaint alleged sufficient facts to survive a motion to dismiss, and remanded those claims for further proceedings. View "Conley v. City of West Des Moines" on Justia Law

Steven Douglas Coleman, a well-known jazz saxophonist, brought a defamation claim under New York law against his former pupil, Maria Kim Grand. The dispute arose from a seven-page letter Grand circulated privately to friends and colleagues in the music industry, describing her complex sexual and professional relationship with Coleman from 2011 to 2016. In the letter, Grand recounted various incidents and interactions, characterizing Coleman’s conduct as sexual harassment and describing situations where she felt pressured to be intimate with him in exchange for mentorship and professional opportunities. Grand used a pseudonym for Coleman and stated her intent was to contribute to the broader conversation about sexism in the music industry.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York reviewed cross-motions for summary judgment. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Grand, finding that Coleman failed to present facts from which a reasonable jury could conclude that Grand acted with actual malice. The court also determined that the statements in Grand’s letter were non-actionable opinions rather than demonstrably false factual assertions, and that the letter disclosed the underlying facts supporting Grand’s opinions.On appeal, Coleman argued that the district court misapplied New York law, erred in finding no genuine issue of material fact regarding actual malice, and incorrectly classified the challenged statements as non-actionable opinion. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case de novo and affirmed the district court’s judgment. The Second Circuit held that the statements Coleman challenged were Grand’s subjective opinions supported by disclosed facts, and thus not actionable as defamation under New York law. The court concluded that none of the statements at issue were defamatory and affirmed the dismissal of Coleman’s claim. View "Coleman v. Grand" on Justia Law