Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court granting summary judgment in favor of the government and dismissing Plaintiff's claim that the negligence of the Indiana Department of Transportation (INDOT) in designing and maintaining a highway caused his injuries, holding that the government was immune from liability.Plaintiff was traveling on a highway when he struck a pool of water, lost control of his vehicle, and struck a tree. Plaintiff and his wife sued INDOT, alleging negligence. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of INDOT. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because the evidence showed that the weather-induced condition continued to worsen at the time of the accident and because Plaintiffs failed to raise a reasonable inference to the contrary, the condition was temporary, and therefore, the government was immune from liability. View "Staat v. Indiana Department of Transportation" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that when the government knows of an existing defect in a public thoroughfare and when it has ample opportunity to respond, immunity does not apply under the Indiana Tort Claims Act simply because the defect manifests during recurring inclement weather.Plaintiff was injured in an accident caused by flooding on a highway. Plaintiff sued the State and the Indiana Department of Transportation (INDOT) for negligence, alleging that INDOT's failure to post warnings of the flooded roadway and its failure to maintain proper damage resulted in her injuries. The trial court granted summary judgment for INDOT based on immunity. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that because the evidence showed the INDOT had known of the defect causing the highway to flood and had ample opportunity to remedy the defect but failed in its duty, summary judgment was appropriate. View "Ladra v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that a pet store may not be held liable under tort law where a dog adopted at the store through an adoption event conducted by an independent charitable organization later attacks and injures an individual if the pet store did not assume a duty of care or have an agency relationship with the charitable organization that conducted the adoption event.James Todd was attacked by a dog adopted by his wife two days before from an independent pet-rescue organization holding an adoption event at a PetSmart store. The Todds sued PetSmart, among other defendants, for negligence, negligent infliction of emotional distress, and respondent superior. The district court denied PetSmart's motion for summary judgment, holding that PetSmart owed a duty to the Todds as a matter of law. The Supreme Court granted a writ of mandamus sought by PetSmart, holding that PetSmart did not owe a duty of care to the Todds as a matter of law and that there was no genuine issue of fact regarding any alleged agency relationship between PetSmart and the charitable organization. View "PetSmart, Inc. v. District Court" on Justia Law

The Estate of Willy Fritz filed suit against a police officer and the City of West Union, alleging a claim of recklessness, among other things, after the officer's police cruiser crashed into Fritz's truck which led to Fritz's death. The district court granted defendants' motion for summary judgment.The Eighth Circuit affirmed, concluding that the evidence does not establish recklessness under Iowa law where it failed to show that the officer had conscious knowledge of a dangerous situation as his police cruiser crossed a four-way intersection. In this case, the police cruiser approached the intersection, traffic had stopped, the road was straight, and the "lane ahead" was clear. Therefore, the district court did not err in granting summary judgment. View "Estate of Fritz v. Henningar" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court accepted certification of two questions by the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit regarding whether a charitable write-off of medical expenses may be recovered as damages or is subject to the collateral source rule.Specifically, the Supreme Court concluded (1) for a claim that accrued prior to the effective date of Mont. Code Ann. 27-1-308 a plaintiff in a survival action may not recover the reasonable value of medical care and related services when the costs of such services or care are wholly written off under the provider's charitable care program and the patient receives a zero-balance bill; and (2) for a claim that accrued prior to the effective date of Mont. Code Ann. 27-1-308, such a charitable care write-off is not a collateral source within the meaning of section 27-1-307. View "Gibson v. United States" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court granting summary judgment for a shipper and its agent and against a commercial truck driver who sustained injuries when his cargo fell on him, holding that this Court expressly adopts the Fourth Circuit's "Savage rule."At issue was whether Defendant was negligent in packing, loading, and failing to secure the trailer's cargo. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant at issue on appeal. The Supreme Court adopted the Savage rule, which holds that carriers have the primary duty for loading and securing cargo, and if the shipper assumes a legal duty of safe loading it becomes liable for injuries resulting from any latent defect. The Court then affirmed, holding (1) given both the rule's sound policy and its consistency with Indiana law, this Court formally adopts the Savage rule; and (2) Defendant was not liable for Plaintiff's injuries under the circumstances of this case. View "Wilkes v. Celadon Group, Inc." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court concluding that Defendant, as a hospital, was not a product seller for purposes of imposing strict liability under the Connecticut Product Liability Act, Conn. Gen. Stat. 52-572m et seq., under the circumstances of this case, holding that the trial court did not err.Plaintiff brought this complaint alleging injuries arising from Defendant's violations of, among other things, the product liability act, the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act (CUTPA), Conn. Gen. Stat. 42-110a et seq., and common law. The trial court granted summary judgment for Defendant, concluding that Defendant was not a product seller for purposes of imposing strict liability under the product liability act and that Plaintiff's CUTPA and common law claims were time barred. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) because Defendant provided general information regarding various medical procedures on its website and did not significantly participate in placing the medical device at issue into the stream of commerce Defendant was not a product seller for purposes of imposing strict liability under the product liability act; and (2) the statutes of limitations governing Plaintiff's remaining claims were not tolled. View "Normandy v. American Medical Systems, Inc." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the district court granting summary judgment in favor of Sweetwater County School District No. 1 and dismissing Plaintiff's negligence claim, holding that genuine issues of material fact did not preclude summary judgment in favor of the School District.Plaintiff, through his mother as next friend, brought this action claiming that he suffered a traumatic brain injury when he fell and struck his head on a PVC pipe that had been placed across a concrete walkway outside his elementary school building to divert water away from the building. Plaintiff claimed that the negligent placement of the pipes across the walkway created a dangerous condition, causing his injury. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the School District. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court properly granted the School District summary judgment. View "Miller v. Sweetwater County School District #1" on Justia Law

In this case brought by the parents of a victim of the Route 91 Harvest Festival massacre against the manufacturers and distributors of the AR-15 rifles the gunman used the Supreme Court held that Nev. Rev. Stat. 41.131 provided the gun manufacturers and distributors immunity from the claims asserted against them under Nevada law.Plaintiffs brought this suit in Nevada's federal district court alleging wrongful death, negligence per se, and negligent entrustment. The federal district court granted Defendants' motion to dismiss the negligent entrustment and negligence per se claims but denied it as to the wrongful death claim. The federal court then reconsidered its dismissal of the negligence per se claim and certified three questions of law to the Supreme Court. In response, the Supreme Court held that section 41.131 provided the gun companies immunity from the wrongful death and negligence per se claims asserted against them under Nevada law. View "Parsons v. Colt's Manufacturing Co." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the district court denying Defendant's anti-SLAPP motion to dismiss Plaintiff's complaint alleging slander and conspiracy, holding that Defendant failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that his alleged communication leading to the civil complaint was made in good faith.At issue was how the district court at step one of the anti-SLAPP evaluation should proceed when Defendant denied making the alleged statement. The district court used Plaintiff's version of the alleged defamatory statement during its step-one analysis and then denied the motion to dismiss. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Defendant's denial that he made the alleged statement was irrelevant to step one of the anti-SLAPP analysis; (2) Defendant's alleged statement did not constitute a nonactionable opinion; and (3) the district court correctly denied Defendant's anti-SLAPP motion to dismiss. View "Spirtos v. Yemenidjian" on Justia Law