Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court concluding that Conn. Gen. Stat. 7-464, as amended by section 1 of No. 17-165 of the 2017 Public Acts (P.A. 17-165), did not authority the City of Waterbury's lien in this case, holding that there was no error.Plaintiff, an employee of the City, which is a self-insured municipality, was injured in a motor vehicle accident. The City paid for Plaintiff's medical care resulting from his injuries. After Plaintiff initiated an action against the third-party tortfeasor who caused the accident, the City filed a notice of lien with Plaintiff's attorney, claiming a right to reimbursement of the medical expenses it had paid. Plaintiff subsequently settled his civil action and brought this action contesting the validity of the City's lien on the proceeds of his settlement. The trial court granted Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment, concluding that P.A. 17-165 did not apply retroactively to pending actions, such as Plaintiff's. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court correctly determined that the City's lien stemmed from an improper, retroactive application of P.A. 17-165. View "Maghfour v. Waterbury" on Justia Law

In this case arising from the sexual abuse of Plaintiffs by Allison Marchese, an English teacher at their high school, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgments of the trial court granting summary judgment in favor of Defendants on the ground of governmental immunity, holding that there was no error.Plaintiffs brought this action for damages against the town of Madison, the town's Board of Education, and the principal of the Daniel Hand High School, pursuant to the municipal liability statute, Conn. Gen. Stat. 52-557n, claiming that they were injured by Defendants' failure to prevent and/or interrupt Marchese's inappropriate relationship with Plaintiffs and to report Marchese's conduct to the proper authorities. The trial court granted Defendants' motions for summary judgment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court properly granted Defendants' motions for summary judgment. View "Doe v. Madison" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against the school district for negligence and for breach of the mandatory duty to report suspected abuse under the Child Abuse and Neglect Reporting Act (CANRA). The trial court granted the school district's motion for summary judgment.The Court of Appeal concluded, consistent with California negligence law, that school administrators have a duty to protect students from sexual abuse by school employees, even if the school does not have actual knowledge of a particular employee's history of committing, or propensity to commit, such abuse. Accordingly, the court reversed the trial court's order granting summary adjudication on plaintiff's negligence causes of action.The court also concluded that, as a matter of first impression, a plaintiff bringing a cause of action for breach of the mandatory duty to report suspected abuse under CANRA must prove it was objectively reasonable for a mandated reporter to suspect abuse based on the facts the reporter actually knew, not based on facts the reporter reasonably should have discovered. In this case, plaintiff did not create a triable issue of material fact regarding whether any of the school district's employees knew of facts from which a reasonable person in a like position could suspect abuse. Therefore, the court affirmed the trial court's order granting summary adjudication on plaintiff's CANRA cause of action. View "Doe v. Lawndale Elementary School District" on Justia Law

Clendening sued the government for her husband’s wrongful death allegedly caused by his exposure to contaminated water and environmental toxins while stationed at the Marine Corps Base Camp Lejeune in Jacksonville, North Carolina. Her complaint also asserted claims for subsequent fraudulent concealment and failure to warn relevant personnel of the severity, scope, and impact of said exposure.The district court dismissed all claims for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction The Fourth Circuit affirmed. The wrongful death claims are barred under the “Feres” doctrine and the failure-to-warn claims are barred under the Federal Torts Claims Act’s “discretionary function” exception, 28 U.S.C. 2680(a). The exposure cited as the cause of Clendening’s death stemmed from the relationship between Clendening and his military service; the military’s provision of water and accommodations to its troops is clearly activity incident to service. While the failure-to-warn claim is not barred by Feres, the government had no mandatory duty to warn Clendening of his exposure after the fact. The “challenged conduct is the product of judgment or choice,” and involved a decision “based on considerations of public policy.” View "Clendening v. United States" on Justia Law

The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of defendants in an action brought by plaintiff, an oil-platform worker, after he injured his back while building scaffolding. Plaintiff filed suit against the companies managing both the day-to-day construction and the overall construction project. The court concluded, however, that a reasonable jury could not find that either company was liable for the worker's injury because neither was his direct employer. In this case, the Hickman factors weigh in favor of holding that plaintiff was Grand Isle and BP's independent contractor. Furthermore, the court agreed with the district court that the operational-control exception did not apply as to either BP or Grand Isle. View "Coleman v. BP Exploration & Production, Inc." on Justia Law

The First Circuit reversed the judgment of the district court granting Defendant's motion to dismiss this action seeking damages for injuries received in a boating accident, holding that this case was allowed to proceed in Plaintiffs' chosen forum.Plaintiffs were ferrying in a small boat when another boat, owned by Defendant, plowed into Plaintiffs' boat and sunk it. The crash also left one of the Plaintiffs with serious personal injuries. Plaintiffs filed suit against Defendant, a U.S. citizen, in Massachusetts, bringing claims for maritime negligence, loss of consortium, and property damages. Defendant moved to dismiss the complaint for forum non conveniens, arguing that Greece was the most appropriate venue for the case. The district court granted the motion and dismissed the case. The First Circuit reversed, holding that the district court abused its discretion in failing to hold Defendant to his burden of showing that the public and private interest factors displaced the presumption weighing in favor of Plaintiffs' initial forum of choice. View "Curtis v. Galakatos" on Justia Law

Blackburn, who has Crohn’s disease, was prescribed LIALDA, an anti-inflammatory drug specifically aimed at the gut. LIALDA is not FDA-approved to treat Crohn’s, but it is approved to treat ulcerative colitis, Crohn’s “sister” disease. Blackburn was subsequently diagnosed with advanced-stage kidney disease. Blackburn does not claim that Shire, LIALDA’s manufacturer failed to warn of the risk of kidney disease; he and his doctor knew that the drug might impair his kidney function. Blackburn contends that Shire should have more explicitly warned his doctor about how regularly to monitor his kidney function after prescribing LIALDA. He contends that, if LIALDA’s warning label had been better, his physician would have discovered the effect on his kidneys sooner and prevented his injury.The Eleventh Circuit identified two unsettled, dispositive questions of Alabama law, which it certified to the state’s highest court. May a pharmaceutical company’s duty to warn include a duty to provide instructions about how to mitigate warned-of risks? May a plaintiff establish that an improper warning caused his injuries by showing that his doctor would have adopted a different course of testing or mitigation, even though he would have prescribed the same drug? View "Blackburn v. Shire US Inc." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals affirming the judgment of the district court dismissing this insurance dispute for failure to state a claim, holding that resident-relative exclusions do not frustrate the purpose behind the abolition of interfamilial tort immunities.Appellants' son was seriously injured by a pet dog at his grandparents' residents. Appellants, on behalf of their son, filed a declaratory judgment action against Respondent after Respondent denied their claim for homeowner's insurance benefits on the basis a resident-relative exclusion in the relevant policy. In their complaint, Appellants claimed that resident-relative exclusions, inter alia, frustrate the purpose of the abolition of interfamilial tort immunities. The district court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the resident-relative exclusion in the homeowner's insurance policy at issue was enforceable. View "Poitra v. Short" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the district court granting summary judgment to two job site operators during the 1960s and 1970s for indirectly exposing his wife to asbestos dust, holding that job site operators owe a duty of care to a worker's cohabitants with respect to take-home exposure to asbestos.During his marriage to Barbara Boynton, Larry Boynton worked at numerous job sites where he was exposed to asbestos. Larry alleged in this complaint that Barbara was exposed to asbestos dust he carried home from work, bringing on her mesothelioma and resulting death. The district court granted summary judgment for two job site operators, concluding that they did not owe a duty of care to Barbara. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) job site operators are liable to their employees' cohabitants for take-home asbestos exposure; and (2) a genuine issue of material fact existed about whether one of the operators retained control over its contractor. View "Kennecott Utah Copper, LLC v. Phillips 66 Co." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court declined in this case to recognize an exception to the general rule that an adjacent landowner generally owes no duty of care to a motorist who leaves the regularly traveled portion of the road and strikes a stationary object in the right-of-way, holding that Defendants in this case did not owe a duty of care to a motorist with respect to their mailbox.Plaintiff sustained catastrophic injuries as a result of his collision with Defendants' reinforced mailbox after hitting a patch of ice and leaving the ordinarily traveled portion of the road. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants, concluding that they owed no duty of care to Plaintiff. The court of appeals affirmed. On appeal, Defendants asked the Supreme Court to hold that an adjacent landowner owes a duty of care to a motorist who unintentionally strays from the regularly traveled portion of the road if the landowner has consciously created a hazard in the right-of-way with knowledge of the danger it would present to such a motorist. The Supreme Court declined to do so and affirmed, holding that Defendants did not owe Plaintiff a duty of care with respect to their mailbox. View "Snay v. Burr" on Justia Law