Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the district court determining that a proceeding before a citizen review board does not warrant tolling the statute of limitation under this Court's holding in State, Department of Human Resources v. Shively, 871 P.2d 355 (Nev. 1994), or under equitable tolling principles, holding that the district court did not err.Appellant filed a citizen complaint with the Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department (LVMPD) Citizen Review Board (CRB) after an adverse encounter with LVMPD police officers. The CRB recommended additional officer training. Appellant later filed a civil complaint against LVMPD and the two officers (LVMPD respondents), claiming battery, false imprisonment, and negligence. The district court dismissed the case, concluding that the complaint was time-barred and that equitable considerations did not favor tolling. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Shively did not provide grounds for tolling the statute of limitations, and Appellant failed to establish grounds for equitable tolling. View "Wilson v. Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Dep't" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that the wrongful death action at issue in this case was covered by the Legislature's 1999 amendment of Fla. Stat. 768.73.In 1999, the Legislature amended section 768.73 to presumptively preclude an award of punitive damages against a defendant in a civil action if “punitive damages have previously been awarded against that defendant in any state or federal court in any action alleging harm from the same act or single course of conduct for which the claimant seeks compensatory damages" and made the amendments applicable "to all causes of action arising after" October 1, 1999. The certified conflict at issue in this case was whether the amendments applied to Engle progeny wrongful death actions where the smoking-injured decedent died after October 1, 1999. The Fifth District Court of Appeal held that the 1999 amendments applied to Petitioner's Engle progeny wrongful death action against Respondent, on which "numerous prior punitive damages awards" had been imposed previously. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the 1999 amendments apply in Engle progeny wrongful death actions in which the decedent died after the effective date of the amendments. View "Sheffield v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co." on Justia Law

Jill, age 42, died two days after seeking treatment at Mercy’s emergency department. A postmortem examination by the medical examiner indicated that Jill died from myocarditis resulting from sepsis; Jill’s blood cultures showed that MRSA bacteria was present in Jill’s blood. At the request of Jill’s family, Bryant performed a second autopsy and concluded that Jill’s cause of death was acute and chronic congestive heart failure due to dilated cardiomyopathy. Bryant’s report did not indicate that Jill had myocarditis or sepsis. Her estate sued for wrongful death and medical negligence, arguing that Jill died of toxic shock syndrome and sepsis caused by a retained tampon, which could have been treated by antibiotics if timely diagnosed. A jury returned a verdict in favor of all defendants.The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed, rejecting an argument that the circuit court abused its discretion and denied the plaintiff a fair trial by refusing to issue a nonpattern jury instruction on the loss of chance doctrine and a pattern jury instruction on informed consent. When a jury is instructed on proximate cause through a pattern jury instruction, the lost chance doctrine, as a form of proximate cause, is encompassed within that instruction. The plaintiff never alleged that Jill consented to medical treatment without being adequately informed and that the treatment injured her. The plaintiff’s proposed jury instruction did not identify any treatment Jill received or any injury she received from that treatment. View "Bailey v. Mercy Hospital and Medical Center" on Justia Law

Doe sued Parillo based on physical and sexual assaults and the violation of an order of protection. The following 30 months involved multiple delays and disputes. Parillo was sanctioned several times for failing to answer the complaint, failing to cooperate in discovery, and for his (and his attorney’s) failure to appear for scheduled hearings. In 2019, following a trial that Parillo and his attorney did not attend, a jury awarded Doe $200,000 for “Loss of Normal Life,” $200,000 for “Pain and Suffering,” $200,000 for “Emotional Distress,” $200,000 for “Future Loss of Normal Life,” and $200,000 for “Future Pain and Suffering,” totaling $1 million in compensatory damages, plus $8 million in punitive damages.In ruling on a post-trial motion, the court stated “[T]he defendant lied in an affidavit to seek a trial continuance, the defense attorneys failed to follow a well-known and well-understood circuit court rule ... and the defense attorneys and defendant abandoned the trial ... defendant’s attempt should read, ‘A Conspiracy to Undermine the Integrity of the Judicial Process—or— How Not to Get a Trial Continuance in the Law Division.’ First, lie; second, don’t follow rules; and third, if the first and second don’t work, don’t show up for trial.” The appellate court reduced Doe’s punitive damages to $1 million. The Illinois Supreme Court reinstated the trial court judgments. The punitive damages award was not unconstitutionally excessive. View "Doe v. Parrillo" on Justia Law

Ittersagen brought a medical malpractice action against Advocate Medical and Dr. Thakadiyil, alleging that the defendants negligently failed to diagnose him with sepsis and treat him appropriately. A jury was sworn. More than halfway through the trial, the court received a note from a juror, who reported that he had a business relationship with “the Advocate Health Care System Endowment.” The juror, a partner in a company that handles investments, said he believed the endowment was affiliated with but separate from Advocate Medical. He explained that his connection to Advocate Medical was so attenuated that he forgot to mention it during jury selection. The juror insisted that the outcome of the trial would not affect him financially and that he could remain fair and impartial. The trial court denied Ittersagen’s request to remove the juror for actual bias or implied bias and to replace him with an alternate juror. The jury returned a verdict for the defendants.The appellate court and Illinois Supreme Court affirmed, rejecting an argument that the juror’s business relationship with the endowment created a presumption of bias that cannot be rebutted by claims of impartiality. The court noted the lack of evidence of the affiliation between the endowment and Advocate. The juror did not owe Advocate a fiduciary duty and did not have any other direct relationship with the defendants that would create a presumption of juror bias as a matter of law. View "Ittersagen v. Advocate Health and Hospitals Corp." on Justia Law

This appeal concerned whether the standards governing the selection of an appropriate venue for litigating libel or defamation claims grounded on newspaper publications should also be applied to causes of action premised on internet-based publication. In November 2017, Appellee Joy Fox appeared on the general-election ballot as the Democratic candidate for mayor of the Borough of Chester Heights in Delaware County, Pennsylvania. She was defeated, however, by the Republican candidate, Appellant Stacey Smith. Appellee subsequently brought a civil action in Philadelphia County against Smith, along with other individuals and Republican-affiliated organizations (collectively, “Appellants”), advancing multiple causes of action including defamation, false light, and civil conspiracy. The complaint alleged, in relevant part, that during the campaign Appellants published information on internet and social media websites falsely accusing Appellee of having been charged, in North Carolina, with criminal conduct. Appellee further averred that the false allegations were also published in campaign flyers and posted on billboards in the Chester Heights locality. Appellee contended that venue was proper in Philadelphia County because Appellants’ website was accessible to – and accessed by – Philadelphia residents. These included one of Appellee’s friends who was identified in the complaint and who had assertedly understood the posted information to be damaging to Appellee’s reputation. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed the superior court, holding that when a person is defamed via a medium with worldwide accessibility, a cause of action may arise in multiple venues. "Per a straightforward application of the civil procedural rules, then, a plaintiff may select a single venue in a defamation action in any location in which publication and concomitant injury has occurred, albeit that publication and harm may have ensued in multiple counties." View "Fox v. Smith, et al." on Justia Law

Jonathan Peters (Claimant) was employed by Cintas Corporation (Employer) as a uniform sales representative. In this position Claimant worked half-days in Employer’s Allentown, Pennsylvania branch office on Mondays, Tuesdays, and Wednesdays, and traveled the remainder of those days, as well as Thursdays and Fridays, to meet with, and present products to, potential customers in the region around Reading, Pennsylvania. Following his last sales appointment on February 27, 2015, Claimant attended an Employer-sponsored event at a pub in Allentown called the Tilted Kilt. After leaving the event Claimant was injured in a motor vehicle accident. Alleging that the motor vehicle accident occurred during the course of his employment with Employer, Claimant filed a claim petition seeking partial disability benefits from February 28, 2015 to April 2, 2015, and total disability benefits from April 3, 2015 onwards. Employer responded, specifically denying that Claimant was in the course of his employment at the time of the motor vehicle accident. In a November 2016 decision, the WCJ denied and dismissed Claimant’s claim petition. The WCJ explained that for his injuries to be compensable under the Act, Claimant had the burden of demonstrating that he was in the course of his employment with Employer at the time of the motor vehicle accident, which required him to show that he was actually engaged in the furtherance of Employer’s business or affairs at the time of the accident. The WCJ wrote that he did not doubt that work was discussed at the event but that work-related discussions do “not transform every meeting into a business meeting.”Claimant then appealed to the Commonwealth Court, which affirmed. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed, finding Claimant remained in the course of his employment through the event at the Tilted Kilt. Judgment was reversed and the matter remanded for further proceedings. View "Peters v. WCAB" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs-appellants, Paula and Christopher LeRoy lost their 15-year-old son, Kennedy LeRoy, to suicide two days after finishing his sophomore year at Ayala High School in Chino. The LeRoys sued the Chino Valley Unified School District, Ayala’s principal, Diana Yarboi, and its assistant principal, Carlo Purther (collectively, Respondents). The LeRoys alleged Respondents were liable for Kennedy’s suicide because of their inadequate response to his complaints of bullying by his classmates. The trial court granted summary judgment for Respondents, and the LeRoys timely appealed. After review, the Court of Appeal concluded Respondents were statutorily immune from liability and therefore affirmed the judgment. View "Leroy v. Yarboi" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment of the superior court in this insurance dispute, holding that the superior court properly entered summary judgment in favor of 21st Century Centennial Insurance Company and 21st Century Insurance and Financial Services, Inc. (collectively, 21st Century).Collette Boure and Alexander Meyers took the car of Nancy Snow, Meyers's great aunt, and fled Maine to begin a drive across the country. While the teenage couple was in Oklahoma, they crashed in a chase with police, resulting in Boure's death. Boure's Estate sought uninsured motorist coverage from Concord General Mutual Insurance Company (Concord) on a personal auto policy issued to him and from 21st Century on a personal auto policy issued to Meyers's great aunt. After both insurers denied coverage Concord brought a declaratory judgment action against the Estate. The Estate counterclaimed against Concord and brought a separate action against 21 Century. The court granted summary judgments in favor of Concord and 21st Century. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding (1) the Estate's appeal of the summary judgment in favor of Concord was untimely; and (2) the court properly entered summary judgment in favor of 21st Century. View "Concord General Mutual Insurance Co. v. Estate of Collette J. Boure" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Tenth District Court of Appeals compelling the Ohio Public Employees Retirement System (OPERS) to reverse its denial of Appellant's application for disability benefits, holding that there was no error.After sustaining a fall while working for the state as a highway technician Appellant applied to OPERS for disability benefits. OPERS denied Powell's application. Appellant then filed a complaint for a writ of mandamus asking the Tenth District to issue a writ compelling OPERS to reverse its denial of his application. The Tenth District found that OPERS's decision was supported by some evidence in the record and denied the writ. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that some evidence supported OPERS's decision, and Appellant did not establish that any evidence should have been excluded from OPERS's consideration. View "State ex rel. Powell v. Ohio Public Employees Retirement System" on Justia Law