Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

Seattle police officers sued, alleging that they were defamed by Sawant, a Seattle City Council member, through comments Sawant made about a deadly police shooting in which the plaintiffs were involved. The district court dismissed the claims, finding that the complaint failed adequately to allege that Sawant’s remarks were “of and concerning” them.The Ninth Circuit reversed. Sawant’s words suggested that her remarks were directed not only at the police generally, but also at the individual officers involved in the shooting. She told the crowd that the shooting constituted “a blatant murder at the hands of the police,” and she called for the Seattle Police Department to be held accountable “for their . . . individual actions.” The complaint plausibly alleged that some of those who read or heard Sawant’s remarks— the plaintiffs’ families, friends, and colleagues, and members of the general public—knew that the plaintiffs were the officers involved in the shooting and that these readers and listeners understood that Sawant’s remarks were directed at the plaintiffs. The district court erred in concluding that no reasonable person could conclude that Sawant’s remarks concerned the individual officers but rather spoke to broader issues of police accountability; at most, the district court identified one reasonable interpretation of Sawant’s words, not the only reasonable interpretation. Where a communication is capable of two meanings, one defamatory and one not, it is for a jury, not a judge, to determine which meaning controls. View "Miller v. Sawant" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court returning a $5.9 million verdict in favor of Plaintiff on his negligence action, holding that there was no error in the proceedings below.An employee of Defendant collided the forklift he was driving with Plaintiff's vehicle, resulting in injuries to Plaintiff. Plaintiff brought this action, alleging negligence. The case proceeded to trial. The jury returned a verdict for Plaintiff, and the district court awarded Plaintiff $2.3 million in attorney fees. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court (1) imposed sanctions within its discretion; (2) did not err in instructing the jury; and (3) did not err by concluding that Plaintiff was entitled to recover the entirety of his contingency fee from the verdict under Nev. R. Civ. P. 68. View "Capriati Construction Corp. v. Yahyavi" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court overruled Savage v. St. Aeden’s Church, 189 A. 599 (Conn. 1937), insofar as it concluded that an employee is entitled to compensation as a matter of law when, during the course of the employee's employment, he or she is injured due to an idiopathic fall onto a level floor.The Appellate Court reversed the decision of the Compensation Review Board (Board) affirming the decision of the Workers' Compensation Commissioner for the Second District (Commissioner) denying Plaintiff's application for benefits filed after she suffered a syncopal episode at her workplace, which caused her to fall backward and strike her head on the ground, concluding that, under Savage, Plaintiff's injury was compensable as a matter of law. The Supreme Court reversed after overruling the portion of Savage at issue, holding that the risk or condition must be "peculiar to the employment" for the injury to be compensable. View "Clements v. Aramark Corp." on Justia Law

An opioid manufacturer appealed a $465 million verdict following a bench trial in a public nuisance lawsuit. The district court held the opioid manufacturer liable under Oklahoma's public nuisance statute for its prescription opioid marketing campaign. The State of Oklahoma counter-appealed. The Oklahoma Supreme Court retained the appeal and held that the opioid manufacturer's actions did not create a public nuisance. The district court erred in extending the public nuisance statute to the manufacturing, marketing, and selling of prescription opioids. View "Oklahoma ex rel. Attorney General of Oklahoma v. Johnson & Johnson" on Justia Law

An apprentice electrician, who was unmarried and had no dependents, was working for a construction project subcontractor when she died in an accident. Her direct employer paid funeral benefits required by the Alaska Workers’ Compensation Act; no other benefits were required under the Act. The employee’s estate brought a wrongful death action against the general contractor and the building owner; they moved to dismiss the action based on the Act’s exclusive liability provisions, which were expanded in 2004 to include contractors and project owners. The estate moved for summary judgment, arguing that the 2004 exclusive liability expansion violated due process because it left the estate without an effective remedy. The court rejected the estate’s argument and dismissed the wrongful death action, entering judgment against the estate. Finding no reversible error, the Alaska Supreme Court affirmed the superior court’s judgment. View "Burke v. Criterion General Inc., et al." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court dismissing Plaintiffs' lawsuit filed against the employer of Kasey Christiansen, who was killed at work, holding that the district court did not err.The district court dismissed Plaintiffs' lawsuit based on a provision of the Workers' Compensation Act that bars employees from suiting their employers over work-related injuries. Plaintiffs appealed, arguing that the district court erred in applying the Act's exclusive remedy provision to dismiss their complaint because the intentional-injury exception applied. The Supreme Court disagreed, holding that Plaintiffs failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted because it could not reasonably be inferred that Defendant believed Christiansen's fatal injuries were virtually certain to occur. View "Christiansen v. Harrison Western Construction Corp." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court vacated the decision of the district court denying Defendant's motion for summary judgment in this lawsuit over a work-related ailment, holding that remand was required.Plaintiff contracted lead poisoning while working for Defendant. A narrow exception in the Workers' Compensation Act (WCA) allows employees like Plaintiff to sue over injuries caused by an employer's intentional act, and Plaintiff sued Defendant under this exception. Defendant filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that the WCA barred Plaintiff's claim because he did not present sufficient evidence that Defendant acted intentionally. The district court denied the motion. The Supreme Court vacated the decision below, holding (1) although both parties assumed that the WCA covered Plaintiff's condition, Utah law has frequently recognized lead poisoning as an occupational disease governed exclusively by the Occupational Disease Act; and (2) therefore, remand was required to determine if Plaintiff's lead poisoning was an occupational disease. View "Kay v. Bullets" on Justia Law

The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's order dismissing with prejudice plaintiff's claims stemming from the Deepwater Horizon oil spill. Plaintiffs complied with all pretrial orders (PTOs) except for PTO 68, which required plaintiffs to provide past and present information about their medical conditions. Plaintiffs thrice attempted to comply with PTO 68 but the district court found their responses "puzzling" and "hard to make sense of" at the show cause hearing. The court concluded that there is a clear record of delay by plaintiffs in complying with PTO 68 and that no lesser sanction than dismissal with prejudice would serve the interests of justice. Accordingly, the district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing plaintiffs' claims with prejudice. View "Moore v. BP Exploration & Production, Inc." on Justia Law

Mitchell swallowed 60 Naproxen tablets. With her husband, she arrived at the Hospital emergency department on May 27, 2017, alert, oriented, and with no acute distress. The physician noted no motor deficits or sensory deficits. A nurse placed an IV catheter in Mitchell’s forearm. Nearly two hours later, Mitchell walked to the toilet with assistance from her husband, then walked back to her bed without assistance. On the way back, Mitchell fell, causing abrasions to her face and severely injuring her knee. The nursing staff had no reason to suspect Mitchell presented a high fall risk because she did not complain of dizziness; they had no observed balance problems. An x-ray and CT scan of Mitchell’s knee showed serious injuries. Mitchell was referred to physical therapy and was discharged from Hospital.Mitchell filed her complaint, alleging general negligence and premises liability on May 17, 2019. The hospital argued that the complaint alleged professional negligence, rather than general negligence or premises liability, and was barred under Code of Civil Procedure section 340.5’s one-year limitations period. Mitchell acknowledged that the condition of the floor did not contribute to her fall. The court of appeal affirmed the dismissal of the complaint. The nursing staff’s decision to not assist Mitchell in walking to the restroom was “integrally related” to her medical care. View "Mitchell v. Los Robles Regional Medical Center" on Justia Law

In June 2018, plaintiff “Clara” and defendant “Martin” had sex after a night of drinking. Plaintiff alleged she was too intoxicated to give consent, but defendant claimed the entire encounter was consensual. Plaintiff filed for a temporary restraining order pursuant to the Sexual Assault Survivor Protection Act of 2015 (SASPA), which required consideration of at least two factors, commonly referred to as the two "prongs:": “(1) the occurrence of one or more acts of nonconsensual sexual contact . . . against the alleged victim; and (2) the possibility of future risk to the safety or well-being of the alleged victim.” After a hearing, the trial court found both parties’ accounts to be “equally plausible.” Applying the preponderance of the evidence standard, the court concluded that Clara’s extreme voluntary intoxication rendered her “temporarily incapable of understanding the nature of her conduct” and that she had therefore been subjected to nonconsensual sexual contact within the meaning of SASPA’s first prong. With regard to the second prong, the court noted the lack of evidence that Martin sought to contact Clara after their encounter. Nonetheless, recognizing that SASPA was intended to provide protection to victims of nonconsensual sexual contact, as well as the possibility that Martin “may now harbor a grudge against [Clara] which would probably not have occurred but for these proceedings,” the court concluded that “it is more likely than not that a final restraining order is appropriate.” The Appellate Division reversed and remanded, holding that the proper standard to assess whether plaintiff was incapable of consent due to intoxication was the prostration of faculties standard. The New Jersey Supreme Court found both lower courts were wrong: the appropriate standard to determine whether sexual activity was consensual under SASPA was the standard articulated in New Jersey in Interest of M.T.S., 129 N.J. 422 (1992), which was applied from the perspective of the alleged victim. The trial court's judgment was reversed and the matter remanded for the trial court for assessment under the standard articulated in M.T.S. View "C.R. v. M.T." on Justia Law