Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

An apprentice electrician, who was unmarried and had no dependents, was working for a construction project subcontractor when she died in an accident. Her direct employer paid funeral benefits required by the Alaska Workers’ Compensation Act; no other benefits were required under the Act. The employee’s estate brought a wrongful death action against the general contractor and the building owner; they moved to dismiss the action based on the Act’s exclusive liability provisions, which were expanded in 2004 to include contractors and project owners. The estate moved for summary judgment, arguing that the 2004 exclusive liability expansion violated due process because it left the estate without an effective remedy. The court rejected the estate’s argument and dismissed the wrongful death action, entering judgment against the estate. Finding no reversible error, the Alaska Supreme Court affirmed the superior court’s judgment. View "Burke v. Criterion General Inc., et al." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court dismissing Plaintiffs' lawsuit filed against the employer of Kasey Christiansen, who was killed at work, holding that the district court did not err.The district court dismissed Plaintiffs' lawsuit based on a provision of the Workers' Compensation Act that bars employees from suiting their employers over work-related injuries. Plaintiffs appealed, arguing that the district court erred in applying the Act's exclusive remedy provision to dismiss their complaint because the intentional-injury exception applied. The Supreme Court disagreed, holding that Plaintiffs failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted because it could not reasonably be inferred that Defendant believed Christiansen's fatal injuries were virtually certain to occur. View "Christiansen v. Harrison Western Construction Corp." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court vacated the decision of the district court denying Defendant's motion for summary judgment in this lawsuit over a work-related ailment, holding that remand was required.Plaintiff contracted lead poisoning while working for Defendant. A narrow exception in the Workers' Compensation Act (WCA) allows employees like Plaintiff to sue over injuries caused by an employer's intentional act, and Plaintiff sued Defendant under this exception. Defendant filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that the WCA barred Plaintiff's claim because he did not present sufficient evidence that Defendant acted intentionally. The district court denied the motion. The Supreme Court vacated the decision below, holding (1) although both parties assumed that the WCA covered Plaintiff's condition, Utah law has frequently recognized lead poisoning as an occupational disease governed exclusively by the Occupational Disease Act; and (2) therefore, remand was required to determine if Plaintiff's lead poisoning was an occupational disease. View "Kay v. Bullets" on Justia Law

The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's order dismissing with prejudice plaintiff's claims stemming from the Deepwater Horizon oil spill. Plaintiffs complied with all pretrial orders (PTOs) except for PTO 68, which required plaintiffs to provide past and present information about their medical conditions. Plaintiffs thrice attempted to comply with PTO 68 but the district court found their responses "puzzling" and "hard to make sense of" at the show cause hearing. The court concluded that there is a clear record of delay by plaintiffs in complying with PTO 68 and that no lesser sanction than dismissal with prejudice would serve the interests of justice. Accordingly, the district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing plaintiffs' claims with prejudice. View "Moore v. BP Exploration & Production, Inc." on Justia Law

Mitchell swallowed 60 Naproxen tablets. With her husband, she arrived at the Hospital emergency department on May 27, 2017, alert, oriented, and with no acute distress. The physician noted no motor deficits or sensory deficits. A nurse placed an IV catheter in Mitchell’s forearm. Nearly two hours later, Mitchell walked to the toilet with assistance from her husband, then walked back to her bed without assistance. On the way back, Mitchell fell, causing abrasions to her face and severely injuring her knee. The nursing staff had no reason to suspect Mitchell presented a high fall risk because she did not complain of dizziness; they had no observed balance problems. An x-ray and CT scan of Mitchell’s knee showed serious injuries. Mitchell was referred to physical therapy and was discharged from Hospital.Mitchell filed her complaint, alleging general negligence and premises liability on May 17, 2019. The hospital argued that the complaint alleged professional negligence, rather than general negligence or premises liability, and was barred under Code of Civil Procedure section 340.5’s one-year limitations period. Mitchell acknowledged that the condition of the floor did not contribute to her fall. The court of appeal affirmed the dismissal of the complaint. The nursing staff’s decision to not assist Mitchell in walking to the restroom was “integrally related” to her medical care. View "Mitchell v. Los Robles Regional Medical Center" on Justia Law

In June 2018, plaintiff “Clara” and defendant “Martin” had sex after a night of drinking. Plaintiff alleged she was too intoxicated to give consent, but defendant claimed the entire encounter was consensual. Plaintiff filed for a temporary restraining order pursuant to the Sexual Assault Survivor Protection Act of 2015 (SASPA), which required consideration of at least two factors, commonly referred to as the two "prongs:": “(1) the occurrence of one or more acts of nonconsensual sexual contact . . . against the alleged victim; and (2) the possibility of future risk to the safety or well-being of the alleged victim.” After a hearing, the trial court found both parties’ accounts to be “equally plausible.” Applying the preponderance of the evidence standard, the court concluded that Clara’s extreme voluntary intoxication rendered her “temporarily incapable of understanding the nature of her conduct” and that she had therefore been subjected to nonconsensual sexual contact within the meaning of SASPA’s first prong. With regard to the second prong, the court noted the lack of evidence that Martin sought to contact Clara after their encounter. Nonetheless, recognizing that SASPA was intended to provide protection to victims of nonconsensual sexual contact, as well as the possibility that Martin “may now harbor a grudge against [Clara] which would probably not have occurred but for these proceedings,” the court concluded that “it is more likely than not that a final restraining order is appropriate.” The Appellate Division reversed and remanded, holding that the proper standard to assess whether plaintiff was incapable of consent due to intoxication was the prostration of faculties standard. The New Jersey Supreme Court found both lower courts were wrong: the appropriate standard to determine whether sexual activity was consensual under SASPA was the standard articulated in New Jersey in Interest of M.T.S., 129 N.J. 422 (1992), which was applied from the perspective of the alleged victim. The trial court's judgment was reversed and the matter remanded for the trial court for assessment under the standard articulated in M.T.S. View "C.R. v. M.T." on Justia Law

Smith’s hip resurfacing implant consists of a metal ball that covers the top of the femur and a cup that fits inside the hip socket. When a surgeon puts these ball-and-cup surfaces in the joint, the polished metal surfaces are supposed to allow smoother movement than the damaged bone or cartilage they replace. Gall, who had hip resurfacing surgery for his left hip, recovered and became physically active. Years later, convinced his implant was unsatisfactory, Gall sued Smith.Gall argued that Smith failed to properly warn Gall’s surgeon, Dr. Hernandez, about the risks of using Smith’s product. The trial court granted Smith summary judgment because Hernandez independently knew these risks and whether Smith gave Hernandez redundant warnings did not matter. Gall also argued that Smith’s product was defective. The trial court granted summary judgment because Gall did not show anything was wrong with his implant. Gall did show Smith’s quality control procedures once failed to satisfy regulatory authorities, but the court concluded this fact did not imply the parts Gall received were defective. The court of appeal affirmed. Gall’s claims share the same causation element and Gall did not establish causation. View "Gall v. Smith & Nephew, Inc." on Justia Law

Janene Owens fell outside a hotel owned and operated by Ganga Hospitality, LLC ("Ganga") and sued, alleging negligence and wantonness. The trial court entered a summary judgment in favor of Ganga, and Owens appealed. The Alabama Supreme Court found Owens did not demonstrate the trial court erred in granting Ganga's motion for a summary judgment, which argued primarily that Ganga owed Owens no duty because the raised concrete platform was open and obvious. Accordingly, the trial court's judgment was affirmed. View "Owens v. Ganga Hospitality LLC" on Justia Law

Tiffina McQueen petitioned the Alabama Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to direct a circuit court to vacate its order directing her that her compulsory counterclaims would be tried separately from the claims raised by Yukita Johnson, the plaintiff below. In 2020, Johnson sued R&L Foods, LLC, petitioner, Michael McQueen ("McQueen"), Michael London, and Joe Fortner alleging McQueen threatened her over her work performance one day. Johnson phoned Fornter, a regional manager and reported McQueen; she asked Fortner if she could leave and go home. Fortner allegedly phoned McQueen over Johnson's allegations, but did not give Johnson permission to leave for the day. Notwithstanding the call, Johnson alleged McQueen still berated her, with petitioner joining in, retreving a handgun from a bag she was carrying, and gave the gun to her brother, McQueen. Johnson alleged McQueen fired several shots at her while inside the restaurant. As she fled, McQueen allegedly gave the gun to London, another employee, and London then fired several more shots at her from inside the restaurant. Johnson averred that customers of the restaurant and of a nearby business called law-enforcement officers of the incident. Johnson alleged that, after the shooting, she telephoned Fortner and told him about the incident and that Fortner telephoned the petitioner and then drove to the restaurant. Law-enforcement officers arrested McQueen and London. Johnson alleged that law-enforcement officers caught petitioner attempting to destroy video-surveillance footage of the incident and attempting to hide the handgun that was used in the incident. Petitioner was arrested for tampering with evidence. Johnson further alleged that, unbeknownst to the law-enforcement officers, Fortner had instructed petitioner to delete the video-surveillance footage of the incident. R&L Foods terminated Johnson's employment, but did not terminate petitioner's. Johnson asserted multiple claims arising from the altercation with petitioner and her brother. The Alabama Supreme Court determined that nothing in the facts of this case demonstrated that separate trials on Johnson's claims or in the counterclaim would further the convenience of the parties, would avoid prejudice to the parties, or would be "conducive to expedition and economy." Accordingly, the trial court exceeded its discretion when it ordered separate trials in this case. The petition was granted and the writ was issued. View "Ex parte Tiffina McQueen." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the circuit court granting judgment as a matter of law in favor of Mutual Benefit Group and against Eric Parks in this action brought by Mutual Benefit as a result of an automobile accident, holding that the circuit court erred.Mutual Benefit brought this action to recover monies it paid in another action stemming from an automobile accident involving Parks. The magistrate court found in favor of Mutual Benefit. After a trial de novo, the circuit court granted judgment as a matter of law to Mutual Benefit on the grounds that Parks had failed to respond to requests for admissions that Mutual Benefit had served upon him in the magistrate court. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case for further proceedings, holding that the West Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure for Magistrate Courts provide the exclusive means of discovery in magistrate courts and do not provide for parties to serve requests for admission. View "Parks v. Mutual Benefit Group" on Justia Law