Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

Christopher Hildebrant, a real-estate developer, facilitated a property sale in 2011 and expected consulting fees from both the seller and the buyer. During the transaction, Hildebrant alleged that Thomas Weidman, a trustee on the Sycamore Township Board, demanded a kickback. To avoid paying, Hildebrant created a fictitious email account and sent himself an email portraying Weidman as demanding payments. This email was forwarded to another party but remained private until 2020, when Hildebrant showed it to other township officials during a separate transaction. Weidman learned of the email in November 2020 during an investigation and received a copy in January 2021.The Warren County Court of Common Pleas granted Hildebrant’s motion for summary judgment, ruling that Weidman’s defamation claim was time-barred by the statute of limitations, which began when the email was first sent in 2011. The court also ruled that Weidman’s claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED) and false-light invasion of privacy were similarly time-barred as they were derivative of the defamation claim.The Twelfth District Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the discovery rule applied to defamation claims when the publication was secretive or inherently unknowable. The court ruled that Weidman’s claims were not time-barred because he could not have known about the defamatory email until it was disclosed to him in 2020.The Supreme Court of Ohio affirmed the appellate court’s decision, holding that the discovery rule applies to libel claims when the publication is secretive or inherently unknowable. The court also held that the discovery rule applies to derivative claims like IIED and false-light invasion of privacy when they are based on the same allegations as the libel claim. The case was remanded to the Warren County Court of Common Pleas for further proceedings. View "Weidman v. Hildebrandt" on Justia Law

Anthony Barron, a civilian contractor, drowned while driving through a low water crossing at Camp Bullis, a U.S. military facility near San Antonio, Texas. The crossing was not closed or guarded despite regulations requiring such measures during heavy rain. Barron’s parents sued the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act, alleging general negligence, premises liability, and negligent undertaking.The United States District Court for the Western District of Texas dismissed the claims, citing sovereign immunity and the discretionary function exception. On appeal, the Fifth Circuit reversed, finding that the regulation mandating the gate be locked or guarded was non-discretionary. On remand, the district court granted summary judgment for the government, ruling that Texas law barred the general negligence and premises liability claims and that the negligent undertaking claim was inadequately pleaded.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case de novo. It affirmed the district court’s summary judgment on the general negligence and premises liability claims, agreeing that Texas law precludes recovery under these theories. However, the appellate court disagreed with the district court’s finding that the negligent undertaking claim was inadequately pleaded. The Fifth Circuit found that the plaintiffs had sufficiently alleged the elements of negligent undertaking.Given the uncertainty in Texas law regarding whether a negligent undertaking claim can proceed when a premises liability claim is barred by the natural accumulation doctrine, the Fifth Circuit certified this question to the Supreme Court of Texas. The appellate court retained jurisdiction pending the state court’s response. View "Barron v. United States" on Justia Law

On February 1, 2020, four Pineville Police Department officers responded to a 911 call about a Black man allegedly waving a gun. They found Timothy Caraway walking alone with a cellphone in his hand. The officers, with weapons drawn, commanded Caraway to raise his hands and drop what they thought was a gun. As Caraway reached into his jacket to discard the gun, Officers Adam Roberts and Jamon Griffin fired twelve shots, hitting Caraway four times. Caraway sued the officers and the City of Pineville under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and North Carolina law, alleging excessive force and assault and battery, among other claims.The United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina granted summary judgment to the officers, finding they were entitled to qualified immunity on the Fourth Amendment excessive force claim and public official immunity on the state-law assault and battery claim. The court concluded that the officers' use of deadly force was reasonable because Caraway's gun was pointed at them in the moments before the shooting.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court held that the officers' use of deadly force was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment because Caraway's gun was pointed at the officers, posing an immediate threat. The court also upheld the grant of public official immunity on the state-law claims, finding that the officers acted without malice. The court declined to segment the shooting into different phases, noting the entire sequence lasted only a few seconds. View "Caraway v. City of Pineville" on Justia Law

Robert Nelson, a car salesman, sustained a back injury on March 29, 2018, while working for Dependable Auto Sales. He experienced significant back pain the following day, leading to a diagnosis of acute back pain with left radiculopathy. Nelson filed a worker’s compensation claim and underwent various treatments and evaluations. Medical opinions varied, with some attributing his back issues to preexisting conditions and obesity, while others recognized a work-related aggravation. Nelson also had a history of preexisting injuries, including knee surgeries and osteoarthritis.Nelson settled his worker’s compensation claim with his employer in September 2019 and subsequently filed a claim against the Idaho Industrial Special Indemnity Fund (ISIF) for total and permanent disability benefits. The Idaho Industrial Commission denied his claim, finding that Nelson failed to prove he was totally and permanently disabled or that he suffered a permanent impairment due to the work-related accident. The Commission’s decision was influenced by its determination that Nelson was not a credible witness, citing inconsistencies in his testimony and a prior conviction for insurance fraud.The Supreme Court of Idaho reviewed the case and affirmed the Commission’s decision. The Court found that substantial and competent evidence supported the Commission’s credibility determination, despite some errors in the Commission’s findings. The Court upheld the Commission’s conclusion that Nelson was not totally and permanently disabled, as the evidence indicated that there was still a labor market for him, even under the most restrictive limitations. The Court did not address the alternative finding regarding permanent impairment. View "Nelson v. State of Idaho, Industrial Special Indemnity Fund" on Justia Law

Jessica Wiseman and her children sued Dr. Nathan Rencher and others for the wrongful death of Eric Wiseman, alleging medical malpractice and gross negligence. Rencher, the only defendant subject to Idaho's prelitigation screening panel requirement, moved for summary judgment, arguing that the Wisemans failed to comply with this requirement. He supported his motion with the panel’s advisory decision, filed under seal. The district court granted Rencher’s motion, concluding that the Wisemans did not meet the prelitigation requirement based on the advisory decision. The Wisemans also sought to disqualify the district judge, which was denied.The district court, part of the Seventh Judicial District of Idaho, ruled that the advisory decision could be considered to determine compliance with the prelitigation requirement. The court found the statutes ambiguous and concluded that they allowed limited review of the advisory decision. The court also ruled that the statutes controlled over conflicting Idaho Rules of Evidence. Consequently, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of Rencher, finding no genuine issue of material fact regarding the Wisemans' compliance with the prelitigation requirement.The Supreme Court of Idaho reversed the district court’s decision, holding that the prelitigation screening statutes unequivocally precluded judicial review of the advisory decision for any purpose. The court emphasized that the statutes clearly stated there should be no judicial review and that parties should not be affected by the panel’s conclusions. The Supreme Court remanded the case for further proceedings. Additionally, the court declined to disqualify the district judge on remand, distinguishing this case from precedent and finding no appearance of bias. Neither party was awarded attorney fees on appeal, as both prevailed in part. View "Wiseman v. Rencher" on Justia Law

In this consolidated appeal, the court examined whether internal reports and documents created after alleged adverse events at nursing and assisted living facilities are discoverable or privileged under the New Jersey Patient Safety Act (PSA). In the first case, the plaintiff, Madeline Keyworth, claimed injuries from two falls at a skilled nursing facility and sought the facility’s internal incident reports. In the second case, the plaintiffs, Suzanne and Jonathan Bender, sought an incident report regarding an alleged attack on Diane Bender by another resident at an assisted living facility. Both facilities argued that the requested materials were privileged under the PSA’s self-critical-analysis privilege.The trial courts in both cases found that the self-critical-analysis privilege did not apply and ordered the defendants to disclose the materials. The Appellate Division reversed these decisions, concluding that the defendants had complied with the PSA’s procedural requirements, thus making the documents privileged and not subject to discovery.The Supreme Court of New Jersey reviewed the cases and held that the facilities did not comply with the PSA’s procedural requirements. Specifically, the court noted that the PSA requires a patient safety committee to operate independently from any other committee within the facility. The defendants’ certifications revealed that their committees did not adhere to this requirement, as they performed dual functions related to both patient safety and quality assurance. Consequently, the court determined that the disputed documents were not privileged under the PSA and were subject to discovery.The court reversed the Appellate Division’s judgment and remanded the cases to the trial courts for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. The main holding was that the facilities’ failure to comply with the PSA’s procedural requirements meant that the self-critical-analysis privilege did not apply to the disputed documents. View "Keyworth v. CareOne at Madison Avenue" on Justia Law

Pearl Ray and Andrew Ray, Sr. sued medical providers in Illinois state court for medical malpractice, which allegedly injured Pearl and caused Andrew to suffer a loss of consortium. They settled with all but one defendant. Pearl was enrolled in a federal health benefits plan, and Blue Cross and Blue Shield Association (BCBSA) was the plan’s carrier. Under the plan, BCBSA sought reimbursement from the settlement for benefits paid to Pearl. The plaintiffs filed a motion to reduce BCBSA’s reimbursement by their attorney’s fees and costs under Illinois’s common fund doctrine.The case was removed to federal court by BCBSA, arguing federal question jurisdiction and federal officer removal. The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois initially denied the remand motion but later reconsidered and remanded the entire case, concluding it lacked federal question jurisdiction. BCBSA appealed, asserting federal question jurisdiction and federal officer removal.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the district court’s decision de novo. The court held that federal question jurisdiction was not present, as federal common law did not govern the reimbursement dispute, following the precedent set by Empire Healthchoice Assurance, Inc. v. McVeigh and Blue Cross Blue Shield of Illinois v. Cruz. However, the court found that BCBSA met the requirements for federal officer removal under 28 U.S.C. § 1442, as it was acting under a federal agency (OPM) and had a colorable federal defense.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision in part, reversed in part, and remanded, instructing the district court to exercise jurisdiction over the motion for adjudication while remanding the rest of the case to state court. View "Ray v. Tabriz" on Justia Law

Frank Driscoll was running along East Shore Road in Isle La Motte when he was struck by a trailer being pulled by a truck driven by Benjamin Wright, an employee of Wright Cut and Clean, LLC. Driscoll was running on the left side of the road, facing traffic, while Wright was driving in the same direction on the right side. As Wright's truck approached, Driscoll moved to the left edge of the road but was struck by the trailer when he moved back towards the center. Driscoll was unconscious when police arrived and had no memory of the accident.Driscoll sued Wright for negligence and Wright Cut and Clean for vicarious liability and direct negligence in hiring, training, and supervising Wright. The Superior Court, Grand Isle Unit, Civil Division, bifurcated the claims and held a jury trial on the negligence claim. Driscoll's expert, Dr. Jerry Ogden, testified about the dimensions of the trailer and the truck's speed but could not establish Driscoll's position before the impact or a clear causative link between Wright's actions and Driscoll's injuries. The court granted judgment as a matter of law in favor of the defendants, concluding that Driscoll failed to establish causation.The Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court's decision. The court held that Driscoll did not provide sufficient evidence of causation, as his expert could not definitively link Wright's actions to the injury. The court emphasized that without clear evidence showing that Wright's alleged negligence caused the injury, the claim could not proceed. Consequently, the judgment in favor of Wright and Wright Cut and Clean was affirmed, and the direct negligence claim against Wright Cut and Clean was also dismissed due to the lack of an underlying tort by Wright. View "Driscoll v. Wright Cut and Clean, LLC" on Justia Law

Ana Lilia Cardenas, a special education teacher, injured her knee at work, resulting in both a physical impairment to her knee and a secondary mental impairment. The Workers’ Compensation Judge awarded her permanent partial disability (PPD) benefits for her knee injury, limited to 150 weeks as per the Workers’ Compensation Act. The Act also limits the duration of PPD benefits for secondary mental impairments to the maximum period allowable for the initial physical impairment, which in this case was also 150 weeks.Cardenas appealed, arguing that this limitation violated the equal protection clause of the New Mexico Constitution. The New Mexico Court of Appeals agreed, holding that the Act’s provisions for secondary mental impairments were unconstitutional because they treated workers with mental impairments differently from those with subsequent physical impairments. The Court of Appeals noted that subsequent physical impairments are treated as separate injuries with their own benefit durations, unlike secondary mental impairments.The New Mexico Supreme Court reviewed the case to determine the constitutionality of the Act’s provisions. The Court held that the Act’s differential treatment of secondary mental impairments compared to subsequent physical impairments violated the equal protection clause. The Court applied intermediate scrutiny, given that mental disabilities are a sensitive class, and found that the employer failed to demonstrate that the disparate treatment was substantially related to an important governmental interest. Consequently, the Court affirmed the Court of Appeals' decision, ruling that the relevant sections of the Workers’ Compensation Act were unconstitutional. View "Aztec Municipal Schools v. Cardenas" on Justia Law

On December 29, 2015, Timothy Morales, a pedestrian, was struck by a vehicle driven by Ruby Junewal while walking along a roadway within the Weatherford distribution facility in Williston, North Dakota. Morales alleged that Weatherford U.S., L.P. was negligent in maintaining the premises, specifically citing inadequate lighting, lack of road signs, and absence of sidewalks. Morales filed a lawsuit in 2019 against Weatherford, Junewal, and Junewal’s employer, Wilhoit Properties, Inc., asserting claims of negligence and premises liability.The District Court of Williams County granted summary judgment in favor of Weatherford, concluding that Weatherford did not owe Morales a duty of care. The court dismissed all claims against Weatherford and the other defendants. Morales appealed the decision, arguing that the district court erred in its judgment.The North Dakota Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The Supreme Court held that the danger posed by vehicles on the roadway was open and obvious, and therefore, Weatherford owed no duty of care to Morales. The court noted that Morales was aware of the dangers of walking on the roadway and that the conditions were such that a reasonable person would have recognized the risks. The court also rejected Morales's argument that Weatherford should have anticipated the harm despite the obvious danger, concluding that the distraction exception did not apply as Morales's distraction was self-created. The judgment dismissing all claims with prejudice was affirmed. View "Morales v. Weatherford U.S." on Justia Law