Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

Rebecca Blakesley, a nurse, ended her marriage with Andrew Blakesley in early 2021 after a tumultuous relationship marked by alleged abuse. Shortly after she obtained a protective order and filed for divorce, Andrew’s mother, Colleen Marcus, and his sister-in-law, Jennifer Marcus, reported Rebecca to various public and private organizations. They accused her of violating patient confidentiality, fraudulent billing, academic dishonesty, and faking a COVID test. These reports led to investigations, the loss of Rebecca’s employment, and the suspension of her application for a professional license.Rebecca filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts, alleging defamation and intentional interference with business relations. She claimed the Marcuses’ actions were motivated by retaliation for her divorce. The Marcuses responded with a special motion to dismiss under the Massachusetts anti-SLAPP statute, which is designed to protect individuals from lawsuits intended to chill their right to petition the government. The district court denied the motion, finding that Rebecca’s claims were not based solely on petitioning activity because the Marcuses’ reports to private employers and a nursing school did not qualify as protected petitioning under the statute.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed whether the anti-SLAPP statute applied. The court held that the Marcuses failed to show their conduct was solely petitioning activity, as required by the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court’s recent clarification in Bristol Asphalt, Co. v. Rochester Bituminous Prods., Inc. The First Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of the anti-SLAPP motion, holding that mixed claims involving both petitioning and non-petitioning conduct are not subject to dismissal under the statute, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Blakesley v. Marcus" on Justia Law

A young woman was seriously injured when the passenger airbag in a 1998 Infiniti QX4 deployed during a low-speed collision, causing permanent vision loss in one eye. She was wearing her seatbelt at the time. The accident occurred when another vehicle exited a parking lot and collided with the Infiniti. The injured party, initially represented by her mother as next friend, sued the vehicle’s manufacturer, alleging that the airbag system was defectively designed and that safer alternative designs were available at the time of manufacture.The case was tried in the Mobile Circuit Court. During voir dire, two jurors failed to disclose their prior involvement as defendants in civil lawsuits, despite being directly asked. After a jury awarded $8.5 million in compensatory damages to the plaintiff on her Alabama Extended Manufacturer’s Liability Doctrine (AEMLD) claim, Nissan discovered the nondisclosures and moved for judgment as a matter of law, a new trial, or remittitur. The trial court denied all motions, finding that substantial evidence supported the verdict and, although it believed probable prejudice resulted from the jurors’ nondisclosures, it felt bound by Alabama Supreme Court precedent to deny a new trial.On appeal, the Supreme Court of Alabama affirmed the denial of Nissan’s renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law, holding that the plaintiff presented substantial evidence of a safer, practical, alternative airbag design. However, the Court reversed the denial of the motion for a new trial, concluding that the trial court erred in believing it lacked discretion due to prior case law. The Supreme Court clarified that the trial court retained discretion to determine whether the jurors’ nondisclosures resulted in probable prejudice and remanded the case for the trial court to exercise that discretion. View "Nissan North America, Inc. v. Henderson-Brundidge" on Justia Law

A 68-year-old man experiencing abdominal pain was brought to a hospital emergency room in Bayamón, Puerto Rico, in January 2016. After a delayed CT scan revealed a perforated intestine, he underwent surgery and remained in intensive care until his death in February 2016. His son, a physician residing in Florida, later learned of the seriousness of his father’s condition during a visit. The son filed a lawsuit against several doctors, the hospital, and related entities, alleging that negligent medical care led to his father’s death.The United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico reviewed the case after a contentious discovery period. The court granted summary judgment in favor of five defendants: three doctors, a corporate entity managing the emergency room, and the emergency room’s medical director. The court found that the claims against the doctors and the corporate entity were time-barred under Puerto Rico’s one-year statute of limitations for tort claims, and that Puerto Rico law did not provide a basis for liability against the medical director, as he had not directly treated the patient. The court also disregarded certain evidence submitted by the plaintiff and denied his motion for reconsideration.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit found that the district court erred in converting two doctors’ motions to dismiss into motions for summary judgment without giving the plaintiff adequate notice or an opportunity to present evidence. The appellate court also held that the district court abused its discretion in disregarding the plaintiff’s declaration regarding when he learned of one doctor’s involvement. The court vacated and remanded the summary judgments for the three doctors and the medical director on the first cause of action, but affirmed summary judgment for the corporate entity and the medical director on the second cause of action. Each party was ordered to bear its own costs. View "Calderon-Amezquita v. Rivera-Cruz" on Justia Law

A same-sex married couple, one a U.S. citizen residing in California and the other a Saudi citizen, spent part of each year living together in Saudi Arabia, where homosexuality is punishable by death. In 2021, after U.S. travel restrictions eased, they booked tickets with a German airline to fly from Saudi Arabia to San Francisco. The airline, which operates extensively in California, required them to confirm their marital status for entry into the U.S. During check-in in Riyadh, a senior airline employee publicly disclosed and questioned their relationship, and copies of their marriage certificate and passports were sent electronically to airline headquarters despite their concerns about Saudi government surveillance. After the trip, the Saudi government updated one plaintiff’s official status to “married,” and he feared returning to Saudi Arabia due to potential severe penalties. The couple alleged that the airline’s actions led to significant personal, financial, and health consequences.The couple filed suit in California state court against the airline and its U.S. subsidiary, alleging breach of contract and several torts. The defendants removed the case to the United States District Court for the Northern District of California, asserting diversity and federal question jurisdiction. The district court dismissed the case for lack of personal jurisdiction. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit initially remanded for clarification of the subsidiary’s citizenship, after which the district court allowed amendment of the removal notice to reflect the correct citizenship.Upon renewed review, the Ninth Circuit held that the district court had both specific personal jurisdiction over the defendants and subject matter jurisdiction based on diversity. The court found that the airline purposefully availed itself of California’s market, the claims arose from the airline’s California-related activities, and exercising jurisdiction was reasonable. The court reversed the district court’s dismissal and remanded for further proceedings. View "DOE V. DEUTSCHE LUFTHANSA AKTIENGESELLSCHAFT" on Justia Law

Three public school teachers in Washington developed health problems after working in an older school building that contained polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs) manufactured by Monsanto. The teachers sued Pharmacia, Monsanto’s successor-in-interest, alleging injuries from PCB exposure and brought claims under the Washington Product Liability Act (WPLA) for design defect, construction defect, and failures to warn, while also seeking punitive damages under Missouri law. After a seven-week trial, the jury found for the teachers on all claims, awarding substantial compensatory and punitive damages.The Snohomish County Superior Court, where the case was tried, ruled that Missouri law governed the issues of repose and punitive damages, while Washington law governed the substantive elements of liability. The court also admitted expert testimony estimating historic PCB exposure levels. Pharmacia challenged the verdict, but the trial court denied its post-trial motions. On appeal, the Washington Court of Appeals reversed in part, holding that Washington’s statute of repose applied, limiting the plaintiffs’ claims, and that the verdict form was insufficient for punitive damages because it did not specify which theory of liability supported the award. The Court of Appeals also found error in the admission of certain expert testimony.The Supreme Court of the State of Washington reviewed the case and partially reversed the Court of Appeals. The Supreme Court held that, under Washington’s established choice of law principles, Missouri law governs both the issues of repose and punitive damages because Missouri has the most significant relationship to those issues. The Court also held that the jury instructions and special verdict form were sufficient to sustain the punitive damages award under Missouri law, and that the challenged expert testimony was admissible under the Frye standard and ER 702. The Supreme Court reinstated the jury’s verdict and remanded for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Erickson v. Pharmacia LLC" on Justia Law

After a car accident in which the defendant, while driving a marked police vehicle, rear-ended the plaintiff’s car, the plaintiff sought medical treatment at a hospital and received an initial bill for $7,175.77 for emergency care and $92 for an eye exam. However, due to a preexisting contract between the plaintiff’s health insurer and the hospital, the insurer paid a reduced, negotiated amount—$4,395.75 for the emergency care—which fully satisfied the bill. The plaintiff then sued the defendant for negligence, seeking special damages for past medical expenses based on the gross charges listed on the hospital bill.In the Third District Court, Salt Lake County, both parties filed motions in limine regarding the admissibility of the gross charges versus the negotiated charges. The district court ruled that, under the collateral source rule, evidence of the negotiated charges paid by the plaintiff’s insurance was inadmissible, and only the gross charges could be considered. At a bench trial, the court awarded the plaintiff special damages based on the gross charges, less a deduction for amounts already reimbursed by the defendant to the plaintiff’s car insurance provider.On direct appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Utah addressed whether the collateral source rule requires exclusion of evidence of the negotiated charges for an insured plaintiff’s medical care. The court held that the collateral source rule does not require exclusion of the negotiated charges, because the gross charge does not reflect the plaintiff’s actual loss; neither the plaintiff nor the insurer was ever obligated to pay the gross amount. The court concluded that only the negotiated charge represents the compensable loss for special damages. Accordingly, the Supreme Court of Utah vacated the special damages award and remanded for a new trial on that issue. View "Gardner v. Norman" on Justia Law

A plaintiff brought suit against a defendant for defamation, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and related claims after the defendant published false and damaging material about her online. The defendant initially participated in the litigation with counsel, but later became self-represented and provided a P.O. box as his address. After failing to appear or defend the action, his answer was stricken, and the plaintiff mailed a statement of damages to the address he provided. The court entered a default judgment against the defendant for over $1 million, which was later renewed nearly a decade after its entry.Prior to the current appeal, the Superior Court of Los Angeles County denied the defendant’s anti-SLAPP motion and struck his cross-complaint after direction from the California Court of Appeal, which also awarded attorney fees to the plaintiff. After the defendant’s answer was stricken for nonappearance, the plaintiff served a statement of damages and obtained a default judgment. Years later, the plaintiff renewed the judgment, and the defendant moved to vacate the renewal, arguing the default judgment was void due to improper notice of damages and defective service.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Two, reviewed the denial of the defendant’s motion to vacate the renewal of judgment. The court held that the plaintiff’s claims for defamation and related torts qualified as personal injury actions, making a statement of damages appropriate. The court further held that use of a custom statement of damages form, rather than the Judicial Council form, did not render the judgment void, and that service by mail to the defendant’s provided address was proper under the applicable statutes. The court affirmed the order denying the motion to vacate the renewal of judgment. View "Backlund v. Stone" on Justia Law

Edward T. Saadi, a licensed attorney proceeding pro se, obtained a $90,000 judgment against Pierre Maroun and Maroun’s International, LLC (MILLC) following a jury verdict in a federal defamation suit. Despite the judgment, Saadi was unable to collect payment for nine years. In 2018, Saadi discovered information suggesting Maroun had transferred $250,000 from his personal account to MILLC, allegedly to evade the judgment. Saadi claimed these funds were used to purchase a condominium titled to MILLC but used as Maroun’s residence, and to pay Maroun’s personal expenses. Saadi initiated proceedings supplementary under Florida law, seeking to void the transfer and recover assets.The United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida allowed Saadi to file an impleader complaint against Maroun and MILLC, asserting claims for fraudulent transfer and actual and constructive fraud under Florida statutes. Saadi also sought sanctions when MILLC failed to produce a representative for deposition, but the district court denied the motion, finding the individual was not a managing agent of MILLC. Ultimately, the district court granted summary judgment for Maroun and MILLC, ruling that Saadi’s claims were time-barred under Florida’s statutes of repose and limitations, and that tolling provisions did not apply. The court also found that the remedies Saadi sought were unavailable under the relevant statutes.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the district court’s rulings. Finding that several dispositive questions of Florida law lacked controlling precedent and were subject to conflicting interpretations by Florida’s intermediate appellate courts, the Eleventh Circuit certified five questions to the Florida Supreme Court. The court deferred its decision pending the Florida Supreme Court’s response to the certified questions. View "Saadi v. Maroun" on Justia Law

Carlos Pellecer died after falling from a Werner brand aluminum extension ladder while working as a handyman in New Orleans. His family sued Werner Co., a Delaware corporation, and New Werner Holding Co., Inc., alleging that the ladder was unreasonably dangerous under the Louisiana Products Liability Act (LPLA) and that the defendants failed to warn about a 2018 recall. The ladder in question was manufactured in 1991 by Werner Co., a Pennsylvania corporation (later renamed Old Ladder), which filed for bankruptcy in 2006. The defendants had purchased certain assets, including the Werner name and trademark, from Old Ladder in 2007, but did not manufacture or sell the specific ladder model involved in the accident.The Civil District Court for the Parish of Orleans denied the defendants’ motion for summary judgment and, after a jury trial, entered judgment on a verdict finding the defendants to be manufacturers of the ladder under the LPLA. The jury awarded over $5 million in damages, apportioning fault equally between the defendants and Old Ladder. The defendants’ post-trial motions were denied. The Louisiana Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, affirmed the trial court’s judgment, holding that the jury could reasonably find the defendants to be manufacturers under the LPLA’s apparent manufacturer doctrine.The Supreme Court of Louisiana granted certiorari and held that the defendants were not manufacturers of the ladder under the LPLA. The court found no evidence that the defendants labeled the ladder as their own, held themselves out as its manufacturer, or exercised control over its design, construction, or quality. The court concluded that merely acquiring the Werner name and trademark did not make the defendants manufacturers of the subject ladder. The Supreme Court reversed the appellate court, vacated the trial court’s judgment, and rendered judgment in favor of the defendants. View "PELLECER VS. WERNER CO." on Justia Law

A railway employee, while working as a carman responsible for inspecting and repairing railcars, suffered injuries after the ballast beneath the tracks gave way, causing him to fall. He alleged that his employer failed to properly maintain the ballast under Tracks 46 and 47, despite prior complaints and a previous injury in the same area. The employer denied negligence and argued that federal regulations governing ballast, specifically 49 C.F.R. § 213.103 under the Federal Railroads Safety Act (FRSA), precluded the employee’s claim under the Federal Employer’s Liability Act (FELA).The District Court for the Parish of Caddo granted summary judgment for the employer, finding that the FRSA precluded the FELA claim. The Louisiana Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, affirmed, agreeing that federal regulation subsumed the field and thus barred the employee’s suit. The employee then sought review from the Supreme Court of Louisiana.The Supreme Court of Louisiana reviewed the case de novo and held that the FRSA does not preclude a FELA action. Relying on the reasoning in Pom Wonderful LLC v. Coca-Cola Co., the court found that the two federal statutes are complementary, not in irreconcilable conflict, and that Congress had not intended for the FRSA to preclude FELA claims. The court also determined that the employee presented sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact regarding negligence, making summary judgment inappropriate. Accordingly, the Supreme Court of Louisiana reversed the lower courts’ decisions and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "VAN BUREN VS. KANSAS CITY SOUTHERN RAILWAY COMPANY" on Justia Law