Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

The question presented to the Oklahoma Supreme Court in this case was whether a district court could examine the circumstances of a juror's prior litigation history for the purpose of determining whether the juror's failure to disclose this history during voir dire did not materially affect the substantial rights of a party. Francis Johnson and her sister, Omega Beyrer, visited a restaurant where Johnson fell and suffered a fractured hip. Johnson brought an action based upon premises liability against The Mule LLC (Restaurant), and a jury trial was held in February 2019. The jury returned a verdict determining Johnson was 74% negligent and Restaurant 24% negligent, and awarded no damages to Johnson. Johnson filed a motion for new trial, arguing the jury foreman, D. K., had failed during voir dire to disclose his prior involvement as a defendant in an Oklahoma County tort action in 2005. D. K. was named with his father as defendants in a 2005 action which alleged D. K. used his father's automobile which resulted in an automobile collision. The collision and 2005 action occurred when D. K. was a minor. Plaintiff argued the juror's silence denied her an opportunity to make an informed challenge to the juror and that she was entitled to a new trial. The Supreme Court concluded a trial court's adjudication of a motion for new trial may include an examination of the circumstances of the juror's litigation history when the motion is based upon a prospective juror's failure to disclose litigation history during voir dire. In this case, the Court held the juror's conduct did not rise to conduct materially affecting plaintiff's substantial rights. The district court's denial of plaintiff's motion for new trial was affirmed. View "Beyrer v. The Mule" on Justia Law

On April 4, Debra went to Kentucky’s Manchester Memorial Hospital emergency room where she presented with numbness from the waist down, pain in both legs, with the right leg being worse and cold. On April 19, Debra’s right leg was amputated below the knee at the University of Kentucky Medical Center due to serious clots that restricted blood flow. Debra sued healthcare providers for failing to consider that Debra’s symptoms were caused by vascular issues rather than musculoskeletal abnormalities. The only remaining defendant is the government which was substituted under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. 1346, 2671–80, for its employee, Dr. Madden, who examined Debra at the federally-supported health center on April 12.The district court entered judgment in favor of the United States. The Sixth Circuit reversed. The proper framing of the causation inquiry was not whether it would have made a difference as to the ultimate outcome if Dr. Madden had properly diagnosed the condition on April 12 but whether it would have made a difference to Debra’s outcome if Madden had considered the possibility of vascular causes as the source of her symptoms on April 12. The district court declined to resolve a dispute as to whether Debra suffered from ischemia from April 4 to April 13, or whether she suffered sudden ischemia on April 13, after she being seen by Madden. View "Chesnut v. United States" on Justia Law

The estates of some of the murder victims from the Pulse nightclub shooting in 2016, along with some of the injured, filed suit in federal court in Michigan against social media companies. The lawsuit was unsuccessful. A second action, this case, was filed in federal court in Florida against the same social media companies by different victims of the Pulse shooting. Here, plaintiffs alleged in part that the companies aided and abetted Omar Mateen, the shooter, in violation of the Anti-Terrorism Act (ATA) by facilitating his access to radical jihadist and ISIS-sponsored content in the months and years leading up to the shooting. Plaintiffs also alleged claims against the companies under Florida law for negligent infliction of emotional distress and wrongful death.The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of the ATA and state law claims with prejudice under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). The court agreed with the district court that plaintiffs failed to make out a plausible claim that the Pulse massacre was an act of "international terrorism" as that term is defined in the ATA. Consequently, the companies—no matter what the court may think of their alleged conduct—cannot be liable for aiding and abetting under the ATA. In regard to the state law claims, the court concluded that plaintiffs have failed to adequately brief proximate cause under Florida law, and have therefore abandoned their challenge to the district court's ruling. Accordingly, the district court properly dismissed plaintiffs' claims for aiding and abetting under the ATA and for negligent infliction of emotional distress and wrongful death under Florida law. View "Colon v. Twitter, Inc." on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of plaintiffs' Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) suit against the United States after Steve Smith and his daughter, Sydney, were killed when their car struck two mailboxes. Plaintiffs claim that the Postal Service is liable because it failed to warn the mailboxes' owners that the mailboxes did not comply with various safety regulations.The court concluded that, even assuming plaintiffs are correct—about both the regulatory infractions and the Postal Service's duty to provide warnings about those infractions—the United States cannot be held liable. The court explained that the FTCA waives sovereign immunity for the acts or omissions of a federal employee only when a private person would be liable under state tort law for those same acts or omissions. In this case, plaintiffs pointed to no state law duty where the duty plaintiffs allege, negligence per se based on the Postal Service's requirement to notify homeowners if their mailboxes did not conform to various safety standards, would spring only from federal guidance—the Postal Operations Manual. View "Smith v. United States" on Justia Law

In April 2018, Cavey filed a personal injury action for injuries sustained in a traffic accident involving a vehicle driven by a School District employee. Citing the six-month statute of limitations, Government Code 945.6,(a)(1), the trial court dismissed. The theory of untimeliness was based on the District’s July 19, 2017 notice rejecting a claim presented without Cavey’s authorization by a chiropractic firm that was treating her injuries, which, allegedly, started the statute of limitations.The court of appeal reversed. The claim submitted by the chiropractic firm was not presented “by a person acting on … her behalf” for purposes of section 910. The limitations period did not begin to run until the authorized claim submitted by Cavey’s lawyers was deemed rejected in November 2017. Using a November 2017 start date, the April 2018 complaint was timely under the six-month statute of limitations. In addition, the District’s notice of rejection was mailed to the wrong address, so the two-year statute of limitations in section 945.6(a)(2) applies. View "Cavey v. Tualla" on Justia Law

Ben E. Keith Company, Inc. ("BEK"), appealed a circuit court order entering summary judgment in favor of Lyndon Southern Insurance Company ("Lyndon") on Lyndon's complaint for a declaratory judgment. On December 14, 2018, Felicia Edwards and Robert Allen Marak were involved in a motor-vehicle accident in Dadeville. Felicia was driving a 2009 Toyota Camry automobile that was owned by Annette Edwards and insured by Lyndon. Marak was driving a tractor-trailer that was owned by BEK. As a result of the accident, BEK incurred damage to its tractor-trailer. BEK sued Felicia and Annette claiming negligence and wantonness against both Felicia and Annette and a claim of negligent entrustment against Annette. BEK later amended the complaint to add a negligent-maintenance claim against Annette. Lyndon filed a complaint for a declaratory judgment against Felicia, Annette, and BEK, asserting the policy it issued to Annette excluded coverage for "[a]ny operator of a vehicle who is not listed as a driver on the Policy Applications, Declarations, and/or added by Endorsement who is under the age of twenty-five and is either a Family Member or resides in the same household as the Named Insured" and for "[a]n operator of a vehicle who is an unlicensed driver or whose driving privileges have been terminated or suspended." BEK argued the trial court erroneously granted Lyndon's motion for a summary judgment because Lyndon did not produce substantial admissible evidence to establish that Felicia was a noncovered person under the policy that insured Annette's vehicle at the time of the accident. Specifically, it contended Lyndon did not produce substantial admissible evidence to establish that Felicia did not have a valid driver's license at the time of the accident or to establish Felicia's age and residence at the time of the accident. After review, the Alabama Supreme Court concurred Lyndon did not produce substantial evidence to establish that Felicia did not have a valid driver's license at the time of the accident and did not produce substantial evidence to establish that Felicia was under the age of 25 and resided in Annette's household at the time of the accident. Therefore, Lyndon did not shift the burden of proof to BEK. Accordingly, the trial court erred in granting Lyndon's motion for a summary judgment. Judgment was therefore reversed. View "Ben E. Keith Company, Inc. v. Lyndon Southern Insurance Company" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the judgment of the district court dismissing Appellant's 42 U.S.C. 1983 civil rights claims and state law tort claims, holding that the district court erred by requiring Appellant to administratively exhaust all potential remedies.Appellant brought this complaint alleging that Georgina Stuart, who was employed by the Clark County Department of Family Services (DFS), and two police officers forced him to sign a temporary guardianship over his two minor children to the children's maternal aunt. DFS subsequently made a findings of maltreatment against Appellant, which he administratively appealed. The district court dismissed Appellant's request for punitive damages as not available and dismissed Appellant's section 1983 and state law tort claims for failure to exhaust his administrative remedies. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding (1) Appellant was not required to administratively exhaust all potential remedies in his DFS case before bringing his section 1983 and tort claims; and (2) the district court erred by finding that Appellant's section 1983 claim was solely a procedural due process claim subject to the exhaustion doctrine. View "Eggleston v. Stuart" on Justia Law

In each of two automobile personal injury actions, plaintiffs moved for entry of a qualified protective order (QPO) pursuant to the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA), 110 Stat. 1936, and its implementing regulations (45 C.F.R. 160, 164) (Privacy Rule). Plaintiffs’ proposed QPOs would allow protected health information (PHI) to be released, subject to restrictions that nonlitigation use or disclosure of PHI is prohibited and PHI must be returned or destroyed at the conclusion of the litigation. State Farm, the liability insurer for the named defendants, intervened in each lawsuit and sought entry of its own protective order, which expressly allowed insurance companies to use, disclose, and maintain PHI for purposes beyond the litigation and expressly exempted insurers from the “return or destroy” requirement.In both cases the circuit court granted the plaintiffs’ motions. The appellate court and Illinois Supreme Court affirmed, rejecting State Farm’s argument that property and casualty insurers fall outside HIPAA. Rejecting arguments concerning the requirements of the Illinois Insurance Code, the court stated that no Illinois law requires State Farm to use or disclose plaintiffs’ PHI after the conclusion of the litigation. The Cook County standard protective order is preempted by the Privacy Rule and the McCarran-Ferguson Act, 15 U.S.C. 1011, does not apply to shield that order from traditional preemption. View "Haage v. Zavala" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the order of the circuit court granting summary judgment in favor of Defendants in this wrongful death suit, holding that the circuit court properly dismissed Plaintiffs' negligence claims but erred in dismissing Plaintiffs' strict liability claim.Chalan Hedman and Troy Hattum died after and explosion and fire at the Hattum Family Farms. Chalan's estate brought a wrongful death suit against Hattum Family Farms and individual members of the Hattum family, alleging claims for strict liability and negligence and seeking compensatory and punitive damages. The circuit court granted summary judgment for the Hattums on the Estate's claims. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding that the circuit court erred by granting summary judgment on the strict liability claim because genuine issues of material fact existed precluding dismissal. View "Sheard v. Hattum" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the circuit court granting summary judgment to Defendants, the City of Pierre and the Pierre Volunteer Fire Department (PVFD), in this personal injury action, holding that the trial court correctly determined that the City and the PVFD were not vicariously liable under the circumstances of this case.Gerrit Tronvold, an on-call volunteer member of the PVFD, collided with Plaintiffs' motorcycle while his was traveling to a routine PVFD meeting. The trial court determined that the City and the PVFD were not vicariously liable for Tronvold's actions under the doctrine of respondeat superior and that the defendants were shielded from liability by governmental immunity. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court correctly determined that Tronvold was not acting within the scope of his employment or agency, precluding liability under the doctrine of respondeat superior. View "Jurgens v. Tronvold" on Justia Law