Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court vacated the decision of the trial court to exercise personal jurisdiction over Defendant, Logan Wagner, in a proceeding initiated by Plaintiff, Marisa Mucha, who was seeking to obtain a domestic violence protection order, holding that Defendant did not have the requisite minimum contacts with North Carolina.The only contact Defendant had with North Carolina was more than two dozen phone calls he made to Plaintiff's cell phone on the day she moved to North Carolina. Plaintiff filed a pro se complaint and motion for a DVPO in District Court, Wake County. Defendant filed a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. The trial court denied the motion to dismiss and entered a DVPO. The Supreme Court dismissed the trial court's order, holding that the Due Process Clause forbade the trial court from exercising personal jurisdiction over him to enter a DVPO. View "Mucha v. Wagner" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals reversing the judgment of the trial court dismissing this complaint against Defendants in their individual capacities, holding that the complaint adequately stated claims for the tort relief sought by the Estate of Melvin Joseph Long.Long was working to reconnect a trailer-mounted chiller on the campus of North Carolina State University (NCSU) when a metal flange fatally hit him with great force. Long's Estate brought this action against NCSU employees who had worked on the chiller during the months before Long's accident. Defendants filed a motion to dismiss, which the trial court granted. The court of appeals reversed, holding (1) Defendants had been sued in their individual capacities and were therefore not entitled to the defense of sovereign immunity; and (2) the complaint adequately stated claims for negligence and gross negligence. View "Estate of Long v. Fowler" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals affirming the order and declaratory judgment of the superior court in favor of Defendant in this personal injury action, holding that, under the circumstances, Defendant was not entitled to collect underinsured benefits.Defendant was a North Carolina resident who sought to collect underinsured motor vehicle coverage benefits from Plaintiff, her North Carolina insurer, after she was injured while traveling in Alabama in a car owned and operated by a Tennessee resident and insured by a Tennessee insurer. Plaintiff denied the claim and initiated a declaratory judgment action seeking a ruling establishing that the UIM coverage of its politics did not apply to Defendant's injuries. The trial court concluded that Defendant was not entitled to coverage under the UIM provision of her insurance contract. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that because the amount of the stacked UIM coverage limits exceeded the sum of the applicable bodily injury coverage limits, the Tennessee driver's car was an "underinsured motor vehicle" as defined under North Carolina's Financial Responsibility Act for the purposes of giving effect to Defendant's contract with Plaintiff. View "N.C. Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Co. v. Lunsford" on Justia Law

After defendant injured plaintiff while defendant was driving a vehicle owned by the US Postal Service, plaintiff filed suit against the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) and against defendant for negligence under Missouri law. The district court dismissed plaintiff's federal claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiff's state-law claim against defendant.The Eighth Circuit affirmed, concluding that plaintiff failed to establish that defendant was acting within the scope of his employment during the time of the accident under Missouri law. In this case, the Postal Service's written policies support a finding that defendant's deviation from his postal route was unauthorized and the district court did not clearly err in finding that defendant violated the Postal Service's policies when he left his route for twenty-five minutes to purchase dog food for a friend, deliver the dog food at a location where he had already delivered mail, and take a break with his friend. Therefore, defendant was not acting within the scope of his employment during the deviation, and the deviation was neither slight nor incidental. Finally, whether defendant's conduct was within the scope of his employment is unrelated to the merits question of whether his conduct was negligent. The court explained that the scope of the employment in FTCA cases is a threshold jurisdictional question for the court, rather than the jury, to decide. View "Magee v. Harris" on Justia Law

In the aftermath of her divorce from ex-Methodist minister Andrew Johnson, Kim Miller sued not only Johnson but also his employer, the Mississippi Annual Conference of the United Methodist Church (MUMC). Miller also sued fellow MUMC minister Susan Woodard. Her claims against Johnson were aimed at his risky extramarital sexual behavior, which led to Johnson contracting HIV and later infecting Miller with the virus. Miller based her claims against MUMC and Woodard on her allegation that, had the conference and the fellow minister followed United Methodist policy and procedure, they would have discovered Johnson’s behavior and remedied it or warned Miller before she contracted HIV. The question before the Mississippi Supreme Court on interlocutory appeal was whether she established a wrong for which she could legally recover. After review, the Court found "it is clear that Miller seeks to hold MUMC and Woodard legally accountable for failing to follow religious doctrine and procedure. Under the First Amendment, this Court has no authority to consider and enforce religious standards. Thus, MUMC and Woodard are entitled to summary judgment." The Court found Miller’s claims against her ex-husband, Johnson, were not barred by the First Amendment. Still, Johnson insisted he was entitled to summary judgment based on a mutual release in Miller and Johnson’s divorce settlement. The Court found Johnson did not pursue his affirmative defense based on the release for more than two and a half years. By that time, the trial court deemed this defense waived. And after review, the Court held the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying Johnson summary judgment on this basis. The trial court's orders denying MUMC’s and Woodard’s motions for summary judgment were reversed; the order denying Johnson’s motion for summary judgment was affirmed and Miller’s claims against Johnson remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. View "Woodard v. Miller" on Justia Law

At issue before the Mississippi Supreme Court in this interlocutory appeal was whether the trial court erred by finding cause to grant a 120-day extension of time to serve process on Progressive Gulf Insurance Company. Plaintiffs, Jaswinder Kaur, Harvinder Singh, Karanveer Kamboj, and Gurdev Kamboj, were occupants of a vehicle that was involved in a collision with a vehicle operated by Mary Orebo and owned by Cassandra Mann. Plaintiffs’ vehicle had uninsured-motorist coverage provided by Progressive Gulf Insurance Company. Each Plaintiff filed a separate suit against all three Defendants on the eve of the expiration of the three-year statute of limitations. Progressive contended that difficulty locating other Defendants, the owner and driver of the vehicle, was not adequate cause. After review, the Supreme Court concluded the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in that decision. However, all parties agreed that the circuit court erred by refusing to dismiss the suits of three of the Plaintiffs who failed to seek extensions of time to serve process on Progressive before the end of the original 120-day period. View "Progressive Gulf Insurance Company v. Kaur, et al." on Justia Law

Kent Turner suffered from multiple sclerosis (MS), which caused loss of his motor skills. When his wife, Kathy Turner, could not, due to her own health issues, provide necessary in-home assistance, Kent moved into a nursing home and then into an apartment, where he died in a fire. Kent’s estate, through Kathy Turner, sued the Washington State Department of Social and Health Services (DSHS) and Lewis-Mason-Thurston Area Agency on Aging (LMTAAA) (the area agency on aging) with case management responsibilities for Kent’s care, for negligence and for abuse or neglect. DSHS and LMTAAA moved for summary judgment, which the trial court granted. The trial court ruled that no special relationship was formed and only an ordinary duty of care was owed. The trial court further held that no breach occurred and causation was lacking. After review, the Washington Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s summary judgment dismissal of the claims against DSHS and LMTAAA. View "Turner v. Dep't of Soc. & Health Servs." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court remanded this case to the district court for further proceedings, holding that, as a matter of law, a boat manufacturer or supplier owes a duty to adequately warn passengers of dangers associated with the failure to wear a stop switch lanyard.Craig Feasel was severely injured when he and the driver of a boat, Monty Martinez, were ejected into the water. Martinez was not wearing the stop switch lanyard at the time of the ejection. Feasel argued that Defendants - the boat manufacturer and the engine manufacturer - were liable for his injuries because they failed adequately to warn the driver of the danger associated with failure to wear the lanyard and failed in their duty to warn boat passengers of the danger. The district court granted summary judgment for Defendants. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court remanded the case, holding (1) the standard for determining the adequacy of a warning is that the warning must be of an intensity and at a level of specificity justified by the magnitude of the risk; and (2) this Court adopts a standard of reasonableness to determine whether warnings regarding the dangers of not wearing a lanyard must be issued directly to the passenger or an intermediary may be relied upon to convey the warnings. View "Feasel v. Tracker Marine LLC" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court dismissing Plaintiff's claims against the University of Utah for breach of contract, breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and negligence, holding that Plaintiff did not identify a basis for a legal cause of action against the University.After the University dismissed Plaintiff from its neuroscience Ph.D. program, and the decision was affirmed at every level of administrative review, Plaintiff brought his action against the University. The district court dismissed all claims on summary judgment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) as to Plaintiff's breach of contract claims, the University was entitled to judgment as a matter of law; (2) Plaintiff's claims for breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing failed; and (3) the district court correctly dismissed Plaintiff's negligence claim. View "Rossi v. University of Utah" on Justia Law

Maryam Hedayati appealed the grant of summary judgment in favor of Interinsurance Exchange of the Automobile Club (Auto Club or the Club) on Hedayati’s breach of good faith and fair dealing claim. Hedayati suffered catastrophic injuries in October 2012 when Auto Club’s insured ran a red light and struck her in a pedestrian crosswalk. The insured driver immediately notified Auto Club of the accident and authorized the Club to disclose his policy limits ($25,000); he also informed Auto Club he had no other insurance or assets. Auto Club’s policy with its insured required him to relinquish to the Club his right to negotiate settlement of potential tort claims falling within the policy. When he inquired about a release, Auto Club inaccurately told its insured driver Hedayati was not willing to sign one. Despite repeated requests during settlement negotiations from Hedayati’s attorney, Auto Club initially declined to disclose the insured’s policy limits; eventually it acquiesced, but Auto Club still declined to provide written proof of those limits, which the Club knew was common practice to facilitate a settlement. Auto Club then withheld from Hedayati’s counsel the insured’s written declaration which indicated he had no other insurance, which the Club had confirmed, and the insured’s statements that he had no assets. Auto Club also, despite multiple requests from Hedayati’s lawyer, failed to provide a copy of its insured’s policy which Hedayati’s lawyer needed to verify its terms. Hedayati’s counsel had demanded a hard copy of the policy as a settlement condition. Auto Club ultimately failed to settle the matter within its $25,000 policy limits. Hedayati subsequently obtained a $26 million judgment against the insured driver, along with assignment of the insured’s claim against the Club for breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing implicit in its policy with him. The trial court concluded the evidence presented by Hedayati was insufficient as a matter of law. After its de novo review, the Court of Appeal disagreed with the trial court’s evaluation of the evidence. It therefore reversed the summary judgment ruling and remanded for further proceedings. View "Hedayati v. Interinsurance Exchange of the Auto. Club" on Justia Law