Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

Delta Airlines contracted with Lands’ End to supply new uniforms for its employees, which were manufactured overseas and distributed to approximately 64,000 workers. After the uniforms were issued, many employees reported that the garments transferred dye onto other surfaces and caused a range of health symptoms, including skin irritation and respiratory issues. Two groups of Delta employees filed lawsuits: one group sought damages for property damage and breach of express warranty as intended beneficiaries of the contract between Delta and Lands’ End, while the other group pursued personal injury claims, alleging the uniforms were defectively manufactured or designed and that Lands’ End failed to warn of these defects.The United States District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin consolidated the actions and, after discovery, granted summary judgment in favor of Lands’ End on all claims. For the personal injury claims, the court excluded the plaintiffs’ expert testimony on defect and causation, finding the opinions unreliable under Federal Rule of Evidence 702 and Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. The court also found that the plaintiffs failed to present sufficient evidence that the uniforms were defective or that any defect caused their injuries. On the breach of warranty claim, the court determined that Lands’ End had not breached the contract’s satisfaction guarantee because plaintiffs had not returned their uniforms as required by the contract’s terms.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The Seventh Circuit held that the exclusion of the plaintiffs’ expert testimony was not an abuse of discretion, as the experts failed to reliably establish defect or causation. The court also held that summary judgment on the breach of warranty claim was proper because the contract’s return requirement was reasonable and not an unlawful limitation on the express warranty. The district court’s judgment was affirmed in full. View "Gilbert v Lands' End, Inc." on Justia Law

A mechanical maintenance technician employed at a steel manufacturing facility contracted COVID-19 in August 2021, which ultimately led to his death following a double lung transplant and subsequent infection. The employee worked closely with a single partner during long shifts, and both were unvaccinated, sometimes failing to comply with company mask policies. The employee’s family and estate filed a workers’ compensation claim, alleging that his work conditions placed him at a greater risk of contracting COVID-19 than the general public. Evidence included testimony about his work environment, social activities, and the timeline of symptom onset.An Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) reviewed the claim and found that the estate failed to prove the employee’s exposure to COVID-19 at work was greater than that of the general public, or that his work increased his risk of contracting or exacerbating the disease. The ALJ dismissed the claim, concluding that the statutory requirements for an occupational disease under Kentucky law were not met. The Workers’ Compensation Board affirmed the ALJ’s findings, as did the Kentucky Court of Appeals, both determining that substantial evidence supported the denial of benefits and that the ALJ had not misapplied the law.The Supreme Court of Kentucky reviewed the case and affirmed the Court of Appeals’ decision. The Court held that, for a communicable disease like COVID-19 to be compensable under workers’ compensation, the claimant must prove the disease was work-related, that the nature of the employment increased the risk of contracting the disease compared to the general public, and that the injury exceeded the normal effects of such a disease. The Court found the estate did not meet its burden of proof on the threshold issue of work-related causation and affirmed the dismissal of the claim. View "ESTATE OF PERKINS V. NORTH AMERICAN STAINLESS" on Justia Law

An employee worked for over sixteen years as a shuttle car operator for a coal company, primarily in Kentucky, where he was regularly exposed to hazardous noise. After the Kentucky mine closed, he continued working for the same employer in Alabama for nine months before retiring. The employee began experiencing hearing difficulties before leaving Kentucky, and was later diagnosed with work-related hearing loss. He filed a workers’ compensation claim in Kentucky, listing his last day of work in Kentucky as the date of last exposure.The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) dismissed the employee’s claim for coal workers’ pneumoconiosis but granted his hearing loss claim, finding that the injury occurred on his last day working in Kentucky. The ALJ relied on medical testimony indicating that the short period of exposure in Alabama was inconsequential to the hearing loss, and applied Kentucky Revised Statute (KRS) 342.7305(4), which presumes liability for the employer with whom the employee was last injuriously exposed to hazardous noise for at least one year. The Workers’ Compensation Board affirmed, concluding that Kentucky had jurisdiction and that the injury manifested while the employee was still working in Kentucky. The Kentucky Court of Appeals also affirmed, holding that extraterritorial coverage statutes did not apply because the injury occurred in Kentucky.The Supreme Court of Kentucky affirmed the Court of Appeals’ decision. The Court held that, under the amended KRS 342.7305(4), the date of injury for liability purposes is when the employee was last injuriously exposed to hazardous noise for at least one year with the employer, here in Kentucky. The Court concluded that Kentucky had jurisdiction over the claim and that the insurer covering the employer on that date was liable. View "KENTUCKY EMPLOYERS' MUTUAL INSURANCE V. CLAS COAL CO., INC." on Justia Law

A retired teacher who continued to work as a substitute until 2014 filed a workers’ compensation claim in 2015, alleging he developed mesothelioma from asbestos exposure during his employment with a county school board. Initially, he identified his last exposure as occurring during his full-time employment, which ended in 2003, and named Kentucky Employers’ Mutual Insurance (KEMI) as the insurer. Later, the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) determined that the last injurious exposure actually occurred in 2014, when the teacher stopped substitute teaching, which would make Encova Mutual Insurance Group the responsible carrier for the claim.After the ALJ’s finding, KEMI sought to have Encova certified as the responsible insurer, but the ALJ denied the motion as untimely and questioned his authority to resolve the issue. The Workers’ Compensation Board (WCB) affirmed the denial, but on the ground that neither KEMI nor Encova had standing, as neither had been formally joined as parties. The Kentucky Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the ALJ and WCB had the authority and obligation under the Workers’ Compensation Act to determine and certify the proper insurance carrier, even after a change in the last date of exposure.The Supreme Court of Kentucky affirmed the Court of Appeals. It held that the ALJ and WCB have statutory authority to determine which insurer is responsible for payment of benefits when the last date of injurious exposure changes, and that insurers have standing to participate in such proceedings. The Court further held that the Act binds the insurer on the risk at the time of last exposure, regardless of notice or formal joinder, and that equitable defenses such as laches or estoppel do not bar certification in these circumstances. The case was remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "ENCOVA MUTUAL INSURANCE GROUP V. HALL" on Justia Law

A Kentucky resident purchased a firearm from a local pawn shop and, shortly after, suffered severe injuries when the gun allegedly discharged unexpectedly while the safety was engaged. The gun had been manufactured by a Utah-based company, which sold it to a Texas distributor. The distributor then sold the firearm to a Kentucky merchant, and it eventually reached the plaintiff through a Kentucky pawn shop. The injured party filed a products liability lawsuit in Fayette Circuit Court against both the manufacturer and the pawn shop, alleging the manufacturer’s product caused his injuries.The Fayette Circuit Court initially held the manufacturer’s motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction in abeyance to allow for limited discovery. However, the manufacturer failed to timely respond to discovery requests, only providing responses after being compelled by court order and after significant delay. Despite this, the trial court granted the manufacturer’s motion to dismiss, finding that the manufacturer had not purposefully availed itself of doing business in Kentucky and that exercising personal jurisdiction would not comport with due process. The Kentucky Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal, agreeing that due process would be offended, though it found the manufacturer fell within the state’s long-arm statute due to deriving substantial revenue from Kentucky sales.The Supreme Court of Kentucky reviewed the case and held that the evidence was sufficient to show the manufacturer derived substantial revenue from sales in Kentucky and that the plaintiff’s claims arose from those sales, thus satisfying the long-arm statute. However, the Court determined that the manufacturer’s failure to comply with discovery obligations deprived the plaintiff of an adequate opportunity to conduct jurisdictional discovery. The Court reversed the dismissal in part and remanded the case to the Fayette Circuit Court, instructing it to allow the plaintiff ample opportunity to complete jurisdictional discovery before ruling on personal jurisdiction. View "BRAUN V. BEARMAN INDUSTRIES, LLC" on Justia Law

An employee of a roofing subcontractor was severely injured after falling through an uncovered hole while working on a library roof replacement project. The general contractor had contracted with the property owner to perform the roof work and then subcontracted the roofing portion to the injured worker’s employer. The injured worker received workers’ compensation benefits from his direct employer and subsequently filed a negligence lawsuit against the general contractor, seeking damages for his injuries.In the Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas, the general contractor asserted statutory employer immunity under Pennsylvania’s Workers’ Compensation Act, arguing it was immune from tort liability as a statutory employer. The trial court struck the general contractor’s answer and new matter as untimely and granted the injured worker’s motion to preclude the statutory employer defense at trial. The case proceeded to a jury, which found the general contractor negligent and awarded $5 million to the plaintiff. The trial court denied the general contractor’s post-trial motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict.On appeal, the Pennsylvania Superior Court vacated the trial court’s judgment and remanded for entry of judgment in favor of the general contractor. The Superior Court held that the general contractor was the injured worker’s statutory employer and thus immune from tort liability, finding all elements of the statutory employer test satisfied and that the defense was not waivable.The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reviewed whether to overrule prior precedent (Fonner and LeFlar) regarding statutory employer immunity and waiver, and whether the Superior Court properly applied the statutory employer test. The Supreme Court reaffirmed its prior holdings that a general contractor’s statutory employer immunity does not depend on actual payment of workers’ compensation benefits and that the defense is jurisdictional and not waivable. However, it found the Superior Court erred by exceeding its scope of review and remanded the case to the trial court to determine, after appropriate proceedings, whether the general contractor satisfied the disputed elements of the statutory employer test. View "Yoder v. McCarthy Const." on Justia Law

A patient was involuntarily admitted to a hospital for mental health treatment due to dementia-related aggression. During his stay, he developed and experienced worsening pressure ulcers. After being transferred to another facility, he died ten days later. The estate of the patient filed a wrongful death and survival action against the hospital, alleging negligence and corporate negligence in the care and treatment of the patient’s pressure ulcers, claiming these injuries contributed to his decline and death.The Lehigh County Court of Common Pleas granted the hospital’s motion for judgment on the pleadings, finding that the hospital’s care for the pressure ulcers was incidental to the patient’s mental health treatment. The court concluded that, under Section 114 of the Pennsylvania Mental Health Procedures Act (MHPA), the hospital was immune from liability for ordinary negligence because the care provided was coincident to mental health treatment, and the complaint did not allege willful misconduct or gross negligence. The Superior Court of Pennsylvania affirmed this decision, holding that the immunity provision of the MHPA applied to the hospital’s conduct.The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reviewed whether the MHPA’s immunity provision applied to the hospital’s treatment of the patient’s physical ailments during his mental health admission. The Court held that the MHPA’s immunity provision covers not only treatment directly related to mental illness but also medical care coincident to mental health treatment, including foreseeable physical complications like pressure ulcers. Because the estate’s complaint alleged only ordinary negligence and not gross negligence or willful misconduct, the Court affirmed the Superior Court’s order granting judgment on the pleadings in favor of the hospital. View "Wunderly v. Saint Luke's Hosp." on Justia Law

A patient alleged that she suffered a neck fracture after falling from her hospital bed while medicated and unattended at a hospital. She filed a complaint against the hospital within the one-year statute of limitations for medical claims, also naming ten John Doe defendants described as unknown medical providers involved in her care. The hospital was served and answered the complaint, but the plaintiff did not obtain summonses or attempt service on the John Doe defendants. Several months later, with the hospital’s consent, she amended her complaint to replace the John Doe defendants with specific individuals and entities, including two doctors and a medical group.The newly named defendants moved to dismiss, arguing that the claims against them were time-barred because they were not named before the statute of limitations expired and the plaintiff had not complied with Ohio Civil Rule 15(D), which governs the naming and service of unknown defendants. The Richland County Court of Common Pleas granted the motion, holding that the statutory 180-day extension for joining additional defendants in medical-claim actions did not apply to defendants who were “obvious” at the outset and that the plaintiff was required to comply with Civil Rule 15(D). The Fifth District Court of Appeals reversed, finding that the statutory extension applied to any additional defendants not named in the original complaint, regardless of whether their existence was contemplated at filing.The Supreme Court of Ohio affirmed the appellate court’s decision. It held that a plaintiff is not required to comply with Civil Rule 15(D) to name additional defendants in an amended complaint under R.C. 2323.451(D)(1), and that the 180-day extension under R.C. 2323.451(D)(2) is not limited to newly discovered defendants. Because the plaintiff properly amended her complaint to join the additional defendants, the extension applied and her action was timely commenced. View "Lewis v. MedCentral Health Sys." on Justia Law

A patient with a history of aortic valve replacement visited an urgent care facility with symptoms including fever, headache, and chills. The urgent care doctor suspected bacterial endocarditis, a potentially fatal infection, and referred the patient to the emergency department at a hospital, providing a note and calling ahead. At the emergency department, the attending physician reviewed the note but dismissed the suspicion of endocarditis, diagnosing the patient with a viral syndrome and discharging him. The patient later saw his primary care provider, who also suspected endocarditis, but he died two days later. An autopsy confirmed death from complications of sepsis due to acute bacterial endocarditis. The patient’s family filed a wrongful death lawsuit, alleging that the hospital and emergency physician’s failure to diagnose and treat endocarditis caused his death.The Superior Court in Maricopa County granted summary judgment for the defendants, finding that the plaintiff’s expert testimony did not meet the clear and convincing evidence standard required by Arizona Revised Statutes § 12-572 for emergency department malpractice claims. The court reasoned that the experts did not state causation to a high degree of medical probability. The Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the expert opinions were insufficient to meet the heightened standard and that summary judgment was appropriate.The Supreme Court of the State of Arizona reversed and remanded. It held that the clear and convincing evidence standard in § 12-572 is a standard of proof, not a prima facie element of the claim. The Court clarified that a plaintiff’s expert testimony that negligence “likely” caused the injury is sufficient to establish causation for purposes of surviving summary judgment. The factfinder must consider all relevant, admissible evidence—not just expert testimony—when determining whether causation has been proven by clear and convincing evidence. The Court vacated the court of appeals’ decision and remanded for further proceedings. View "HENKE v. HOSPITAL" on Justia Law

After her pregnancy extended past her due date, a woman was admitted to a hospital and came under the care of a physician who, along with hospital staff, induced labor. When a vacuum extraction delivery attempt failed, the physician performed an emergency cesarean section, delivering a baby who was born alive but in critical condition. The infant died eight days later after being treated in neonatal intensive care and ultimately removed from life support.The woman brought suit against the physician, the hospital, and a nurse-midwife, asserting several claims, including medical malpractice and lack of informed consent, both on behalf of her deceased son’s estate and on her own behalf. As relevant here, she sought damages for her own emotional distress based on an alleged lack of informed consent for the vacuum extraction procedure. The Supreme Court, Bronx County, granted summary judgment dismissing her direct medical malpractice claim but denied summary judgment on her lack of informed consent claim, finding factual disputes. The Appellate Division, First Department, affirmed, holding that precedent barring recovery for purely emotional damages in prenatal torts did not apply to lack of informed consent claims, and alternatively invited the Court of Appeals to revisit its precedent.The New York Court of Appeals reviewed whether its prior decision in Sheppard-Mobley v King, which bars recovery for purely emotional damages by a birthing parent when medical malpractice causes in utero injury to a fetus born alive, also applies to lack of informed consent claims. The Court held that it does, reasoning that lack of informed consent is a form of medical malpractice and that no legal or logical basis exists to treat such claims differently for purposes of emotional damages. The Court declined to overrule its precedent, reversed the Appellate Division’s order, dismissed the lack of informed consent claim for emotional damages, and answered the certified question in the negative. View "SanMiguel v. Grimaldi" on Justia Law