Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

In August 2014, at approximately 2:26 a.m., Hiram Gonzalez was involved in a one-vehicle accident. Officers Leon Tucker and Saad Hashmi of the Jersey City Police Department (JCPD) were dispatched to the scene. They determined Gonzalez’s vehicle was inoperable and called for a tow truck. Officer Tucker offered to drive Gonzalez to a nearby gas or PATH station, but Gonzalez refused, saying he would wait for his brother. Officer Hashmi acknowledged that the standard police practice is to leave a stranded motorist in a safe place or offer them a ride within the city’s limits, but he claimed there was no standard practice for when a stranded motorist refuses a ride but was not in a safe place. Officer Hashmi also stated that he and Officer Tucker could have waited with Gonzalez until he had a ride, but they did not because it was a busy Saturday night in the summer and “there were a lot of calls going out.” Before leaving the scene, the officers told Gonzalez to remain in the pedestrian walkway, which had a guardrail between the roadway and the sidewalk. Gonzalez was struck at around 3:42 a.m. According to a toxicology report, he had a BAC of .209% at the time he died. The officers claimed that Gonzalez did not appear intoxicated. The issue this case presented for the New Jersey Supreme Court's review centered on whether the officers were entitled, under the particular facts and circumstances of this case, to any of the immunities from liability provided by the New Jersey Tort Claims Act (TCA), the Good Samaritan Act, or N.J.S.A. 26:2B-16, a statute that immunized officers from liability for assisting persons intoxicated in a public place to an appropriate location. The Court determined the immunities from liability provided by the Good Samaritan Act, N.J.S.A. 26:2B-16, and most TCA provisions invoked by defendants did not apply here. Defendants’ actions might be entitled to qualified immunity under certain TCA provisions on which defendants relied, however, if the involved officers’ actions were discretionary, rather than ministerial, in nature. In this instance, because of a factual dispute, that determination was for the jury to make upon remand. View "Estate of Hiram Gonzalez v. City of Jersey City" on Justia Law

This case arose out of the explosion of a hydrogen generator at the campus of HP, Inc., which severely injured plaintiff William Cox. After Cox and his wife filed suit against HP in an Oregon court, HP brought a third-party claim against relator, TÜV Rheinland of North America, Inc (TÜV). HP alleged TÜV—a Delaware company that tests and certified products manufactured by others as conforming to established industry safety standards—had negligently certified the design of the generator at issue in this case. TÜV sought to dismiss HP’s claim against TÜV for lack of personal jurisdiction. The trial court denied the motion to dismiss, and TÜV sought an alternative writ of mandamus, which the Oregon Supreme Court allowed. There was no suggestion that TÜV had the kind of “continuous operations” within Oregon that were “so substantial and of such a nature” as to give rise to general personal jurisdiction. But there also was no dispute that TÜV had some contacts with Oregon that could support the exercise of specific personal jurisdiction over TÜV in some case. That posture focused the dispute in this case on the limits of what has been called the “relatedness” requirement of specific personal jurisdiction. The U.S. Supreme Court explored the requirement in Ford Motor Co. v. Montana Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 141 S Ct 1017 (2021), ultimately concluding that Ford’s extensive activities in the forum states created a “relationship among the defendant, the forums, and the litigation” that was “close enough to support specific jurisdiction.” "The Oregon Court surmised the question in this case was whether there was a connection between TÜV’s Oregon activities and HP’s claim against TÜV that was sufficient to permit Oregon to exercise specific personal jurisdiction over TÜV. Under the specific facts of this case, the Oregon Court concluded Oregon lacked personal jurisdiction to resolve HP’s claim against TÜV. Accordingly, it issued a peremptory writ of mandamus directing the trial court to dismiss the claim against TÜV. View "Cox v. HP Inc." on Justia Law

In this case alleging that Larry Boynton's wife, Barbara, was exposed to asbestos dust from several job sites that Larry worked at during the 1960s and 1970s, the Supreme Court reversed the order of the district court granting summary judgment to the job site operators, holding that premises operators owe a duty of care to a worker's cohabitants with respect to take-home exposure to asbestos.During his marriage to Barbara, Larry worked at numerous job sites where he was exposed to asbestos. In 2016, Barbara was diagnosed with Malignant mesothelioma and died from it that year. Larry sued the job site operators for indirectly exposing Barbara to asbestos dust. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of two of the operators, concluding that they had no duty to prevent "take-home exposure" to asbestos dust. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) premises owners are liable to their employees' co-habitants for take-home asbestos exposure; and (2) a genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether one of the premises operators retained control over its contractor. View "Kennecott Utah Copper, LLC v. Phillips 66 Co." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court granting Defendants' motion to dismiss this complaint alleging negligence and reckless conduct against a physician who performed an independent medical examination (IME) on Plaintiff, holding that even if the physician's IME report constituted an affirmative act with foreseeable harms, he was not liable for Plaintiff's injuries resulting from a delay in workers' compensation proceedings.Plaintiff was injured during the course and scope of his employment. Plaintiff made a claim for workers' compensation benefits, and the claim was coordinated by Broadspire Services, Inc. Broadspire arranged for Dr. Mark Anderson to perform an IME of Defendant's injuries. Anderson concluded that the accident caused Plaintiff to suffer a transient cervical strain and that Plaintiff's remaining symptoms were secondary to pre-existing conditions. Consequently, Broadspire denied Plaintiff various forms of workers' compensation benefits. Three years later, the Utah Labor Condition determined that the accident created additional injuries and ordered that Plaintiff's employer pay historical medical expenses. Plaintiff filed this complaint alleging negligence and reckless conduct against Anderson and vicarious liability against Broadspire. The district court dismissed the complaint. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that policy considerations favor no duty owed by an expert whose professional opinion causes a delay in legal proceedings. View "Kirk v. Anderson" on Justia Law

Michael and Mindy Zepeda appealed a district court judgment dismissing their claims for failure to prosecute and the denial of their post-judgment request to alter or amend the judgment. On November 25, 2013, Michael and Mindy Zepeda commenced a personal injury action against Adam and Mason Cool by service of summons and complaint. The personal injury action arose from a December 2011 assault by the Cools on Michael Zepeda resulting in Michael Zepeda sustaining injuries. Over six years later, on January 7, 2020, the Zepedas filed the summons and complaint. On July 17, 2020, the Zepedas filed a motion for reconsideration arguing the district court erred in dismissing the action because they appropriately pursued their claim under the circumstances. The court denied the motion as lacking merit after determining the request for relief under N.D.R.Civ.P. 59(j) was untimely and there was no other sufficient basis to warrant reconsideration. The North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the judgment, concluding the court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the Zepedas’ claims for failure to prosecute. View "Zepeda, et al. v. Cool, et al." on Justia Law

Lorne Jay appealed a district court judgment ordering Jay pay Lawrence Lavallie $946,421.76. Lavallie commenced this personal injury action after he was involved in a motor vehicle accident with Jay and Michael Charette. In Lavallie v. Jay, 945 N.W.2d 288, the North Dakota Surpeme Court retained its jurisdiction while remanding the case back to the district court for further determination on subject matter jurisdiction. Relying on the findings of the district court, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded with directions to vacate the judgment and to dismiss the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. View "Lavallie v. Jay, et al." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the circuit court's dismissal of Plaintiffs' malicious prosecution claim and affirmed the circuit court's dismissal of Plaintiffs' abuse of process claim, holding that the claim for abuse of process failed as a matter of law.Mathews County initiated criminal proceedings against Plaintiffs alleging that Plaintiffs added an expansion of their residence and that the expansion encroached on neighboring property. The warrants were later dismissed or nolle prossed. Plaintiffs then filed a complaint against the County Administrator and two County employees alleging malicious prosecution and abuse of process.The circuit court granted the County employees' demurrer and dismissed the case with prejudice. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) the "thing decided" doctrine does not apply to a claim of malicious prosecution or abuse of process; (2) Plaintiffs' allegations of malicious prosecution were sufficient to withstand demurrer; and (3) Plaintiffs' claim of abuse of process failed as a matter of law because Plaintiffs did not allege that any particular process was abused. View "Eubank v. Thomas" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court granting a plea in bar and dismissing a complaint alleging that an employer operating a residential program for at-risk youth had negligently failed to protect an employee who had been murdered by one of the residents, holding that the court correctly held that the Virginia Workers' Compensation Act provided the exclusive remedy for the employee's death.Plaintiff, the estate of the murdered employee, filed a negligence claim against Defendant, the employer, claiming that the employer had negligently created an unsafe work environment for the employee. Defendant responded by filing a plea in bar, arguing that the exclusivity provision of the Virginia Workers' Compensation Act, Va. Code 65.2-307(A) precluded the negligence and wrongful death claims. The court granted the plea in bar and dismissed the action with prejudice. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court correctly held that the employee's murder had arisen out of the conditions of her employment and that the exclusivity provision of the Virginia Workers' Compensation Act applied. View "Lopez v. Intercept Youth Services, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff B. A. Tyler filed suit against David Findling; the Findling Law Firm, PLC; and Mekel Miller, alleging that David Findling published defamatory statements to attorney Anna Wright by telling her that plaintiff and plaintiff’s client (Samir Warda, for whose estate Findling had been appointed as a receiver) might have engaged in inappropriate or illegal activities. Findling made the allegedly defamatory statements to Wright, Warda’s attorney in a personal protection insurance (PIP) lawsuit, who recorded the conversation, in a room reserved for the plaintiffs’ side at the outset of a court-ordered mediation in the PIP matter. Wright subsequently shared this recording with plaintiff. Findling and his law firm (collectively, “defendants”) moved for summary judgment, and plaintiff responded with an affidavit by Wright. Defendants moved to strike Wright’s affidavit and to preclude her testimony at trial. The trial court granted the motion to strike under MCL 2.412(C), which governed the confidentiality of mediation communications, and granted defendants’ motion for summary judgment. Plaintiff’s motion to file an amended complaint was also denied. In an unpublished per curiam opinion, the Court of Appeals vacated the trial court’s order granting defendants’ motion to strike Wright’s affidavit and find her testimony inadmissible, reversed the order granting defendants summary judgment, affirmed the order denying plaintiff’s motion to amend his complaint, and remanded for further proceedings. The Michigan Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals in part, finding Findling's statements were indeed "mediation communications" under MCR 2.412(B)(2) and were therefore confidential under MCR 2.412(C). The Supreme Court also determined the appeals court erred in reversing the grant of summary judgment without which, plaintiff had no evidence to support the relevant defamation allegations. In all other respects, the appellate court's judgment was affirmed. View "Tyler v. Finding" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of a Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) case brought by plaintiffs, alleging negligence by an emergency room physician. The physician treated Tyrone Sisto at the San Carlos Apache Healthcare Corporation hospital and failed to diagnose Rocky Mountain Spotted Fever. Plaintiffs claimed that the physician was an "employee of the United States" under the FTCA and the Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act (ISDEAA), 25 U.S.C. 5301 et seq., and that he negligently failed to diagnose the disease that led to Sisto's death.The panel agreed with the district court that the FTCA and section 5321(d) do not waive the United States' sovereign immunity with respect to claims based on the negligence of employees of independent contractors providing health care pursuant to a self-determination contract under the ISDEAA. Therefore, the panel concluded that the physician was an employee of T-EM rather than the hospital, and that the FTCA and section 5321(d) do not authorize a suit against the United States based on his alleged negligence. In this case, the physician had only a contract with T-EM and he was not an individual who provided health care services pursuant to a personal services contract with a tribal organization and was therefore not an employee of the Public Health Service under section 5321(d); because hospital privileges were not issued to the physician on the condition that he provide services covered by the FTCA, neither 25 U.S.C. 1680c(e)(1) nor 25 C.F.R. 900.199 confers FTCA coverage; and the hospital did not control the physician's actions in administering care to a degree or in a manner that rendered him an employee of the government when he treated Sisto. View "Sisto v. United States" on Justia Law