Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

In March 2020, Jose Gonzalez visited a Walgreens store in Austin, Texas. An unidentified customer had clogged the toilet in the men's restroom and was given a plunger by a Walgreens employee to fix it. While the customer was attempting to unclog the toilet, Gonzalez entered the restroom and slipped on water that had accumulated on the floor. Gonzalez sued Walgreens for his injuries.The case was initially filed in Texas state court but was removed to the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas based on diversity jurisdiction. Gonzalez asserted a theory of vicarious liability and a claim for premises liability against Walgreens. The district court dismissed the vicarious liability theory and denied Walgreens's motion for summary judgment on the premises liability claim. After Gonzalez presented his case at trial, Walgreens moved for judgment as a matter of law (JMOL), which the district court granted, finding that Walgreens had no actual or constructive knowledge of the wet floor. Gonzalez's motion for a new trial was also denied.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court's JMOL, holding that no reasonable jury could find that Walgreens had actual or constructive knowledge of the wet floor. The court found that Gonzalez failed to provide sufficient evidence that Walgreens knew or should have known about the hazardous condition. The court also affirmed the dismissal of Gonzalez's vicarious liability theory, stating that the allegations constituted a premises liability claim, not a basis for vicarious liability. The court concluded that Walgreens did not have a policy or practice that it knew routinely created an unreasonable risk of harm, distinguishing this case from others where such knowledge was established. View "Gonzalez v. Walgreen" on Justia Law

A student, E.I., attended El Segundo Middle School during the 2017-2018 school year and experienced bullying from classmates, particularly Skylar. Despite E.I. and her parents repeatedly reporting the bullying to school officials, including the principal and counselor, the school failed to take effective action. The bullying included verbal harassment, social media abuse, and physical aggression, which led E.I. to self-harm and develop PTSD and depression. The school’s anti-bullying policies were not adequately followed by the staff.The case was initially reviewed by the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, where a jury found the El Segundo Unified School District negligent and awarded E.I. $1 million in damages. The District moved for a new trial and for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, both of which were denied by the court.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, reviewed the case. The District argued several points on appeal, including errors in allowing reliance on certain Education Code provisions, claims of immunity under Government Code section 820.2, insufficient evidence of causation, improper consideration of a negligent training and supervision theory, admission of expert testimony, and attorney misconduct during closing arguments. The appellate court found that many of the District’s arguments were either waived or lacked merit. The court held that the District was not immune from liability under Government Code section 820.2, as the actions in question were operational rather than policy decisions. The court also found substantial evidence supporting the jury’s causation finding and determined that any potential errors were not prejudicial. Consequently, the appellate court affirmed the judgment in favor of E.I. View "E.I. v. El Segundo Unified School Dist." on Justia Law

Rita Oteka, a faculty member at The University of Texas Rio Grande Valley, attended a commencement ceremony voluntarily. While walking to her car after the event, she was struck and injured by a vehicle driven by a University police officer. The University, a self-insured employer for workers' compensation, reported the injury to its third-party claims administrator. The administrator denied benefits, stating that Oteka was using her personal insurance, no medical evidence was presented, and the injury was not work-related. Oteka did not contest this denial or file a compensation claim.Oteka later sued the police officer for negligence, and the University substituted in as the defendant. The University claimed that workers' compensation benefits were the exclusive remedy for Oteka's injury, asserting for the first time that the injury was work-related. The district court denied the University's plea to the jurisdiction, and the University appealed. The Court of Appeals for the Thirteenth District of Texas affirmed, holding that the Division of Workers' Compensation did not have exclusive jurisdiction over the course-and-scope issue in this context.The Supreme Court of Texas reviewed the case and held that the Division does not have exclusive jurisdiction to determine whether an injury was work-related when the issue is raised by an employer's exclusive-remedy defense and the employee's lawsuit does not depend on entitlement to workers' compensation benefits. The court affirmed the lower court's judgment, emphasizing that the Workers' Compensation Act does not provide a procedural mechanism for obtaining a course-and-scope finding from the Division without the employee first filing a compensation claim. View "THE UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS RIO GRANDE VALLEY v. OTEKA" on Justia Law

The plaintiff, Rhonda Lucas, filed a personal injury lawsuit against Peter Warhol and Progressive Direct Insurance Company following a car accident. Lucas struggled to serve Warhol, who had no fixed address and may have been homeless. Despite various efforts, including hiring a private investigator and attempting service through the Iowa Department of Transportation (DOT), Warhol remained unserved eleven months after the lawsuit was filed. The district court eventually allowed Lucas to serve Warhol by serving an attorney hired by Warhol’s liability insurance carrier.The Iowa District Court for Polk County denied Warhol’s motion to dismiss for lack of timely service, finding good cause to extend the time for service due to the difficulty in locating Warhol. The court also permitted alternative service on the attorney. Warhol appealed, and the Iowa Supreme Court granted interlocutory review. While the appeal was pending, Lucas personally served Warhol.The Iowa Supreme Court addressed three issues: whether the district court should have dismissed the case for untimely service, whether the district court erred in permitting service on the attorney, and the effect of the personal service during the interlocutory review. The court held that the district court was correct in finding good cause to extend the time for service due to Lucas’s diligent efforts and Warhol’s homelessness. However, the court found that serving the attorney did not satisfy due process requirements, as there was no evidence of contact between Warhol and the attorney. The court concluded that the personal service on Warhol during the interlocutory review should be treated as timely.The Iowa Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s refusal to dismiss the case, reversed the order permitting service on the attorney, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Lucas v. Warhol" on Justia Law

A mother and daughter drowned while floating on innertubes on the Turkey River after going over a low-head dam. Their estates sued the State of Iowa, Fayette County, the Fayette County Conservation Board, and the City of Clermont, alleging negligence and premises liability for failing to maintain warnings about the dam. The defendants moved to dismiss the claims.The Iowa District Court for Fayette County dismissed all claims. The court concluded that the claims were barred by the public-duty doctrine and that the petition failed to meet the heightened pleading requirements in Iowa Code § 670.4A. The court also dismissed the claims against the State, referring generally to the reasons set forth in the State’s motion, which included qualified immunity, sovereign immunity, discretionary function immunity, and the public-duty doctrine.The Iowa Supreme Court reviewed the case and reversed the district court’s dismissal. The court held that the heightened pleading requirements did not apply to the estates’ common law tort claims of negligence and premises liability. The court also determined that the public-duty doctrine did not bar the claims, as the allegations involved affirmative acts of negligence by the defendants. Additionally, the court found that the State’s sovereign immunity and discretionary function immunity did not apply at this stage, as the petition alleged inattention rather than considered choices by the State. The court also rejected the recreational immunity defense, concluding that the estates sufficiently pleaded an exception to the statute.The Iowa Supreme Court reversed the district court’s dismissal of the claims and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Estate of Kahn v. City of Clermont, Iowa" on Justia Law

Promenade D’Iberville, LLC, the owner and developer of a large retail shopping center in D’Iberville, Mississippi, discovered soil issues during construction in 2009. The problems were linked to the use of OPF42, a soil stabilizer containing bed ash from Jacksonville Electric Authority (JEA), a Florida public utility. Promenade filed a lawsuit in 2010 in the Harrison County Circuit Court against several parties, including JEA, alleging damages from the defective product.The Harrison County Circuit Court granted JEA’s motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, citing sovereign immunity based on California Franchise Tax Board v. Hyatt (Hyatt III). The court also held that the Full Faith and Credit Clause and comity principles required dismissal due to Florida’s presuit notice and venue requirements. Promenade appealed the decision.The Supreme Court of Mississippi reviewed the case and found that Hyatt III does not apply to JEA, as it is not an arm of the State of Florida but an instrumentality of the City of Jacksonville. The court also determined that neither the Full Faith and Credit Clause nor comity principles mandated dismissal. The court held that Promenade should be allowed to proceed with its claims against JEA in Mississippi, seeking damages similar to those allowed under Mississippi’s constitution for property damage.The Supreme Court of Mississippi reversed the trial court’s judgment of dismissal and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "The Promenade D'Iberville, LLC v. Jacksonville Electric Authority" on Justia Law

Casey Cotton rear-ended Caleb Crabtree, causing significant injuries. Cotton, insured by Allstate, faced potential liability exceeding his policy limit. Allstate allegedly refused to settle with Crabtree and failed to inform Cotton of the settlement negotiations or his potential liability, giving Cotton a potential bad-faith claim against Allstate. The Crabtrees sued Cotton, who declared bankruptcy. The bankruptcy court allowed the personal-injury action to proceed, resulting in a $4 million judgment for the Crabtrees, making them judgment creditors in the bankruptcy proceeding. Cotton’s bad-faith claim was classified as an asset of the bankruptcy estate. The bankruptcy court allowed the Crabtrees to purchase Cotton’s bad-faith claim for $10,000, which they financed through Court Properties, Inc.The Crabtrees sued Allstate, asserting Cotton’s bad-faith claim. The United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi dismissed the action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, holding that the assignments of Cotton’s claim to Court Properties and then to the Crabtrees were champertous and void under Mississippi law. Consequently, the court found that the Crabtrees lacked Article III standing as they had not suffered any injury from Allstate.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court certified a question to the Supreme Court of Mississippi regarding the validity of the assignments under Mississippi’s champerty statute. The Supreme Court of Mississippi held that the statute prohibits a disinterested third party engaged by a bankruptcy creditor from purchasing a cause of action from a debtor’s estate. Based on this ruling, the Fifth Circuit held that the assignment of Cotton’s claim to Court Properties was void, and thus, the Crabtrees did not possess Cotton’s bad-faith claim. Therefore, the Crabtrees lacked standing to sue Allstate, and the district court’s dismissal was affirmed. View "Crabtree v. Allstate Property" on Justia Law

In October 2017, the FBI mistakenly raided the home of Hilliard Toi Cliatt, Curtrina Martin, and her 7-year-old son in suburban Atlanta, instead of the intended gang hideout. The error occurred due to Special Agent Guerra's reliance on a personal GPS device and the team's failure to notice the correct street sign and house number. The raid resulted in personal injuries and property damage. The plaintiffs sued the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) for the officers' negligent and intentional actions.The district court granted summary judgment to the government, and the Eleventh Circuit affirmed. The Eleventh Circuit applied a unique approach to FTCA claims, holding that the law enforcement proviso in §2680(h) overrides all exceptions, including the discretionary-function exception, allowing intentional-tort claims to proceed without further analysis. The court also allowed the government to assert a Supremacy Clause defense, which it found valid, leading to summary judgment for the United States.The Supreme Court of the United States reviewed the case and held that the law enforcement proviso in §2680(h) overrides only the intentional-tort exception, not the discretionary-function exception or other exceptions in §2680. The Court also held that the Supremacy Clause does not afford the United States a defense in FTCA suits. The case was vacated and remanded to the Eleventh Circuit to reconsider whether the discretionary-function exception bars the plaintiffs' claims and to assess liability under Georgia state law without reference to a Supremacy Clause defense. View "Martin v. United States" on Justia Law

Krista Dozier slipped and fell on an unmarked puddle of water in the Jefferson County courthouse. She filed a tort action against Jefferson County, which moved to dismiss the case, claiming immunity under the Colorado Governmental Immunity Act (CGIA). Dozier argued that the spill was a "dangerous condition" of a public building, an exception to CGIA immunity. The district court found the County's response to the spill reasonable and dismissed Dozier's claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The Colorado Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the reasonableness of the County's response was irrelevant to jurisdiction and that the County had waived CGIA immunity under the dangerous-condition exception.The Supreme Court of Colorado reviewed the case and reversed the judgment of the court of appeals. The court held that when disputed jurisdictional facts are inextricably intertwined with the merits, a plaintiff must demonstrate a likelihood of the existence of the facts necessary to establish a waiver of CGIA immunity. Additionally, the plaintiff must show that a public entity's negligent act or omission proximately caused the condition in question for the dangerous-condition exception to apply. The district court had found the County's response to the spill reasonable, concluding that Dozier failed to establish the spill as a "dangerous condition" and thus lacked jurisdiction over her claims.The Supreme Court of Colorado reinstated the district court's order dismissing Dozier's complaint, emphasizing that the plaintiff must demonstrate a likelihood that the public entity's negligent act or omission proximately caused the dangerous condition to establish a waiver of CGIA immunity. View "Jefferson Cnty. v. Dozier" on Justia Law

Alonzo McClanahan, a former employee of DPR Construction, claimed workers' compensation benefits for an injury to his right shoulder that he alleged occurred on July 25, 2017, while moving heavy materials at work. DPR's claims administrator denied the claim, and McClanahan sought adjudication from the Workers' Compensation Appeals Board (WCAB). During the trial, McClanahan testified about the injury, but DPR presented evidence and testimony from employees that contradicted his account. Medical evaluations were conducted by several doctors, including Dr. McGahan, who supported McClanahan's claim of an industrial injury.The Workers' Compensation Judge (WCJ) ruled in favor of McClanahan, finding his testimony credible and supported by medical evidence. DPR filed a petition for reconsideration, which the WCJ recommended denying. The WCAB granted the petition for further review but ultimately affirmed the WCJ's decision in a two-to-one decision, despite acknowledging that the Hanley reports, which were not listed in the pretrial conference statement, were admitted in error. The dissenting board member believed the error warranted a return to the trial level for correction.The California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court found that the WCAB did not err in its credibility determination under section 5313, as the WCJ provided sufficient reasons for finding McClanahan credible. However, the court agreed with DPR that the admission of the Hanley reports, which were not listed in the pretrial conference statement, violated section 5502. The court held that this error was not subject to harmless error analysis and annulled the WCAB's decision, remanding the case for reconsideration without reference to the Hanley reports. View "DPR Construction v. Workers' Compensation Appeals Board" on Justia Law