Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

The case involves the family of a deceased inmate who alleged that certain medical professionals and a health services foundation, after performing an autopsy at the request of correctional authorities, removed and retained the decedent’s organs without family consent. The family contended they were not informed or asked for permission regarding the autopsy or retention of organs, and only learned the organs were missing when preparing the funeral. They claimed to have relied on statements from hospital staff that such practices were standard, and only discovered in December 2023, through media reports, that retention of organs without next-of-kin consent was allegedly unlawful.The Montgomery Circuit Court reviewed and denied the defendants’ consolidated motion to dismiss, finding that statutory limitations could be tolled due to alleged fraudulent concealment. The court determined that the amended complaint sufficiently alleged facts that, if proven, could justify equitable tolling under Alabama law, and that the family’s claims were not time-barred because they filed suit within two years of learning the alleged conduct was illegal.On review, the Supreme Court of Alabama considered a petition for writ of mandamus by the University of Alabama Health Services Foundation and Dr. Stephanie Reilly. The Court held that mandamus relief was appropriate because, from the face of the complaint, the claims were barred by applicable statutes of limitations. The Court reasoned the causes of action accrued by November 6, 2021, when the family learned the organs were missing, and rejected arguments for tolling or for treating the alleged conduct as a continuous tort. The Court distinguished between statutes of limitations governing different claims, and found that all claims against the petitioners except the AUAGA claim were time-barred. It therefore granted the petition and directed dismissal of all claims against the petitioners except for the AUAGA claim. View "Ex parte University of Alabama Health Services Foundation" on Justia Law

Two sisters, aged twelve and nine, were sexually abused by their tutor during sessions at public libraries owned by two Alabama municipalities in 2017. The abuse was witnessed by library employees who allegedly failed to intervene or report the misconduct. The sisters disclosed the abuse to their mother later that year, prompting a police report. In 2023, the tutor was convicted of sexual abuse. In 2024, the sisters and their mother sued the municipalities, asserting negligence in failing to respond to the abuse.The initial complaint named nonprofit corporations associated with the libraries as defendants but was amended to substitute the municipalities themselves. Prior to filing the amended complaint, the plaintiffs served notices of claim to each municipality, but these were submitted more than six years after the alleged tortious conduct. Both the City of Irondale and the City of Birmingham moved to dismiss, arguing noncompliance with Alabama Code § 11-47-23, which requires notice of claim against a municipality within six months of claim accrual. The Jefferson Circuit Court granted their motions, dismissing the claims.On appeal, the Supreme Court of Alabama considered whether minors are exempt from the six-month notice requirement under § 11-47-23. The plaintiffs argued that minority status should toll the notice period, referencing statutory provisions that extend the time for filing suit by minors. The Supreme Court of Alabama held that § 11-47-23 contains no exception for minors and that the statutory tolling provision applies only to statutes of limitations, not notice-of-claim statutes. The court affirmed the Jefferson Circuit Court's dismissal of the claims against both municipalities, holding that minors are subject to the same notice requirements as adults under Alabama law. View "A.G.R. v. The City of Irondale" on Justia Law

Several residents of Estherville, Iowa, sued a former police officer, the police chief, the City of Estherville, and its insurance company, alleging that the officer repeatedly accessed and disseminated their confidential criminal history and intelligence data for improper purposes between 2015 and his resignation on May 3, 2019. The officer used this data for personal gain, including assisting with vehicle repossessions and harassing certain plaintiffs. Complaints about his conduct were made to the police chief, who ultimately placed the officer on administrative leave and accepted his resignation. Criminal charges were later brought against the officer in 2022 for his actions.After learning of the wrongful data access between 2021 and 2022, the plaintiffs filed suit on July 7, 2023, in the Iowa District Court for Emmet County, asserting statutory and common law claims, including invasion of privacy and conspiracy, and seeking damages under Iowa Code section 692.6. The defendants moved to dismiss, arguing the two-year statute of limitations under the Iowa Municipal Tort Claims Act (IMTCA) barred the claims, since all alleged misconduct ended by May 3, 2019. The district court denied dismissal, holding that the statutory claim under section 692.6 was subject to a five-year limitation with a discovery rule, and that the remaining claims accrued when plaintiffs discovered the wrongdoing.On appeal, the Iowa Court of Appeals reversed the district court and ordered dismissal, concluding that all claims were governed by the IMTCA’s two-year statute of limitations and that the date of injury was when the data was accessed or disseminated, not when plaintiffs learned of it. The Iowa Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court, holding that the IMTCA’s statute of limitations applied to all claims and began at the time of the wrongful acts, regardless of later discovery or emotional harm. The case was remanded for dismissal. View "Abrahamson v. Scheevel" on Justia Law

A patient in his mid-thirties, with a history of neurological complaints but no similar recent issues, was hospitalized twice in early April 2018 for severe testicular pain at a regional medical center. During the second admission, he received high doses of opioid medications, with documented warnings about their risks and instructions for monitoring his respiratory function. On the last day of his hospitalization, he exhibited abnormal drowsiness and a low respiratory rate. Shortly after discharge, his wife observed sudden, profound cognitive and behavioral changes, including confusion, speech difficulties, and memory problems. Over the following months, he underwent multiple neurological and psychiatric evaluations, many of which failed to show physiological brain abnormalities. Several providers ultimately diagnosed him with functional neurological (conversion) disorder, while a brain injury rehabilitation center noted a history of hypoxia based on family accounts.The patient and his wife filed a medical malpractice suit against the hospital and a treating physician in the Circuit Court of the Third Judicial Circuit, Beadle County, South Dakota. They alleged negligent overprescription of opioids and inadequate monitoring, resulting in a hypoxic brain injury. The defendants moved to exclude the plaintiffs’ causation expert, arguing that his methods were unreliable under Daubert and state law. The circuit court excluded the expert’s testimony and granted summary judgment for the defendants, reasoning that without expert causation testimony, the plaintiffs could not establish a genuine issue of material fact.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of South Dakota reviewed whether the exclusion of the expert’s testimony and the grant of summary judgment were proper. The court held that the circuit court erred by failing to assess the reliability of the expert’s overall differential diagnosis methodology and by excluding all his opinions based solely on certain quantitative tests. The Supreme Court reversed the exclusion of most of the expert’s testimony (except regarding two specific tests) and reversed summary judgment, allowing the case to proceed. View "Walton V. Huron Regional Medical Center" on Justia Law

Unity McGill was murdered on the dance floor of The Red Carpet Nightclub in St. Cloud, Minnesota, by three assailants who had previously been removed from the premises following an earlier assault but were permitted to reenter without adequate communication among staff or use of a metal detecting wand. The nightclub, operated by R.C. of St. Cloud, Inc., had policies to remove anyone involved in a fight, yet these protocols were not properly followed. McGill’s brother, Alvin Glay, acting as trustee for the next of kin, brought a wrongful death civil suit against R.C. under an innkeeper negligence theory, arguing that R.C. failed to use reasonable care to protect patrons.The Stearns County District Court denied summary judgment for R.C., finding that whether the attack was foreseeable was a close factual question suitable for a jury. At trial, the jury found R.C. negligent for failing to prevent McGill’s death but determined R.C.’s negligence was not the direct cause, and thus did not hold R.C. liable. Glay’s motion for a new trial was denied as to R.C.’s liability, but granted for damages against the assailants. The Minnesota Court of Appeals reversed the district court’s denial of a new trial on R.C.’s liability, finding the jury instructions on superseding intervening cause were confusing and prejudicial.The Minnesota Supreme Court reviewed whether the district court’s jury instruction on superseding intervening cause was erroneous and prejudicial. The Court held that Glay did not invite error in the instructions and that it was improper to instruct the jury on superseding intervening cause when the same conduct (the attack) was both the basis for innkeeper negligence and the alleged superseding cause. The jury instructions were found likely to confuse and mislead, and the error was prejudicial. The Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals and ordered a new trial on R.C.’s liability. View "Glay vs. R.C. of St. Cloud, Inc." on Justia Law

An 11-year-old student, Therese, died by suicide at her father's home during her school’s winter break. Her parents brought claims against the school district, alleging negligent hiring, supervision, and training of staff, failure to protect Therese from bullying, and inadequate response to her expressions of suicidal ideation. They argued the district failed to fulfill its duty to supervise students and to inform them of Therese’s condition. The parents also pursued a survival claim for Therese’s pre-death suffering, alleging harm occurred on campus due to the district’s negligence.The Superior Court of Solano County denied the school district’s motion for summary judgment, finding triable issues of fact as to whether the district exercised reasonable care and whether Therese suffered injury on campus due to the district’s negligence. The court relied on the California Supreme Court’s decision in Hoyem v. Manhattan Beach City School District, determining that statutory immunity under Education Code section 44808 did not apply because there were factual questions about on-campus harm and failure to exercise reasonable care.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, First Appellate District, Division Four, reviewed the case on a petition for writ of mandate. The appellate court held that under section 44808, the district is immune from liability for harms resulting from Therese’s off-campus suicide, as she was not under the district’s supervision at the time. However, the court determined that this immunity does not extend to the survival claim, which concerns alleged on-campus harm while Therese was under the district’s supervision. The appellate court ordered the trial court to grant summary adjudication in favor of the district on the wrongful death and related claims but allowed the survival claim to proceed. View "Vallejo City Unified School Dist. v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

The case involves a plaintiff who was injured in an automobile accident caused by the defendant. More than a year after the accident, the plaintiff fell down a set of stairs at a party, fracturing her leg. She alleged that the injuries from the car accident, including a traumatic brain injury, caused ongoing symptoms such as migraines and episodes of syncope (fainting), which she claimed led to her later fall. The defendant disputed both the extent of injuries from the accident and the claim that those injuries caused the subsequent fall, suggesting instead that the plaintiff’s intoxication at the party was a significant factor.After a jury trial in the Rockingham Superior Court, the jury found the defendant liable for the car accident and awarded damages to the plaintiff for those injuries. However, the jury determined that the accident injuries did not cause or substantially contribute to the plaintiff’s later fall down the stairs. The plaintiff moved to set aside the verdict, arguing that there were errors in evidentiary rulings and in the conduct of defense counsel, but the trial court denied the motion.On appeal, the Supreme Court of New Hampshire affirmed the trial court’s admission of the defendant’s expert testimony regarding the plaintiff’s blood alcohol content and its role as a contributing factor in the fall. However, the court reversed the trial court’s decision to limit the plaintiff’s cross-examination of the defense’s medical expert and its refusal to strike or provide a curative instruction for defense counsel’s references to missing witnesses during closing arguments. The Supreme Court held that these errors were prejudicial to the plaintiff. The court remanded the case for a new trial on damages for the automobile accident and on both liability and damages related to the subsequent fall. View "Rivas v. Ciecko" on Justia Law

The appellant brought a defamation action against two individuals, with whom he had prior romantic relationships. After those relationships ended, one defendant told others that the appellant had raped and abused her, while the other engaged in a broad social media campaign accusing the appellant of stalking, rape, threats, and violent behavior. These statements led to significant consequences for the appellant, including being confronted at his home by an armed group, being forced to leave his residence for months, being excluded from a local coffee shop, losing organizational affiliations and a speaking engagement, and being removed from shared office space.The case was first heard in the Circuit Court of St. Louis County. At the close of the appellant’s evidence, both defendants moved for directed verdicts, arguing that the appellant had failed to present evidence of reputational harm independent of his own testimony. The circuit court sustained the motions and entered judgment for the defendants, apparently on that sole ground. Four counts against one defendant related to agency were also dismissed; the appellant later abandoned those claims on appeal.The Supreme Court of Missouri reviewed the case. It held that a plaintiff in a defamation action is not required to provide independent evidence of reputational harm, and that credible testimony by the plaintiff may suffice if it establishes actual injury to reputation. The court found that the appellant’s testimony regarding the consequences of the defendants’ statements was sufficient for a reasonable jury to find reputational damage. The judgment in favor of the defendants was affirmed with respect to the abandoned agency-based counts, but was vacated as to all other counts. The case was remanded for a new trial on those remaining claims. View "Apperson v. Kaminsky" on Justia Law

The plaintiff, who is a type 1 diabetic, received treatment from the defendants for foot pain following an injury. Over several visits in January 2017, the treating physician diagnosed cellulitis and prescribed antibiotics and pain medication, but did not diagnose a fracture. Subsequent evaluation by a podiatrist revealed a dislocated fracture and other breaks in the foot, which ultimately led to multiple surgeries and the amputation of the plaintiff’s left leg below the knee. The plaintiff alleged that the physician misdiagnosed his condition, causing him to continue using the injured foot and suffer further harm.A jury trial was held in the Circuit Court of Adams County, and after six days of testimony, the jury deliberated and returned a verdict for the defendants. During deliberations, the jury sent several notes to the court, including one from a juror who expressed personal belief in the physician’s negligence but agreed to sign the verdict for the defendants to end deliberations. The plaintiff’s counsel moved for a mistrial based on this note, but the trial court denied the motion, gave the jury a supplemental Prim instruction to guide further deliberations, and subsequently polled the jury after the verdict was reached. All jurors affirmed the verdict. The trial court also denied motions for a new trial and for additional polling of jurors.The Appellate Court, Fourth District, affirmed the trial court’s rulings, finding no abuse of discretion. Upon further appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Illinois held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion for a mistrial or refusing to conduct additional polling. The Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court’s judgment, upholding the verdict for the defendants. View "Schilling v. Quincy Physicians & Surgeons Clinic, S.C." on Justia Law

Jack Rose was a resident at Oakland Manor, a skilled nursing facility in Iowa. During the COVID-19 pandemic, Rose was hospitalized and later returned to the facility, where he was placed in precautionary isolation following public health guidance. After attending off-site medical appointments, he was again isolated but was subsequently hospitalized for a suspected stroke and tested positive for COVID-19. Rose died in the hospital, with COVID-19 listed as the immediate cause of death. A federal inspection later found Oakland Manor had failed to fully comply with recommended infection-control protocols, including inconsistent use of personal protective equipment and incomplete isolation measures.The plaintiffs, Rose’s sons, brought wrongful death and other related claims against Oakland Manor, alleging reckless and willful misconduct in failing to follow federal and state COVID-19 prevention guidelines. The Iowa District Court for Pottawattamie County granted summary judgment in favor of Oakland Manor, holding that the plaintiffs' evidence—primarily a federal inspection report and an expert witness disclosure—did not establish reckless or willful misconduct as required to overcome statutory immunity provided to health care providers for COVID-19-related injuries. The plaintiffs appealed, and the Iowa Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal, finding insufficient evidence of recklessness and, in addition, lack of qualified evidence regarding causation.The Iowa Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s judgment, concluding that the plaintiffs had not presented sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact regarding recklessness or willful misconduct under Iowa Code section 686D.6(2). The Court vacated the portion of the Court of Appeals decision related to causation, holding that the deficiencies at Oakland Manor amounted at most to negligence, not recklessness, and thus statutory immunity applied. View "Rose v. Oakland Healthcare Management, LLC" on Justia Law