Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

A mother, acting on behalf of her mentally incapacitated adult daughter, brought suit against a hospital, its health partners, and a registered nurse after her daughter suffered an anoxic brain injury. The injury occurred when the nurse, while cleaning the patient, dislodged the patient’s cuffed tracheostomy tube, which had been placed to treat COVID-19 pneumonia. The tube was out for approximately seven minutes, resulting in cardiac arrest and brain injury. The patient had been admitted with COVID-19 and was receiving oxygen through the tracheostomy at the time of the incident.The defendants moved to dismiss the case in the District Court of Oklahoma County, arguing that the Public Readiness and Emergency Preparation (PREP) Act provided them immunity from suit and liability, thereby depriving the court of subject matter jurisdiction. The district court considered documentary evidence submitted by the defendants and dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction. The plaintiff appealed, and the Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals, in a split decision, reversed the district court, finding that the trial court had jurisdiction and that the defendants were not immune from suit.The Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma reviewed the case on certiorari. It held that the cuffed tracheostomy was a “covered countermeasure” under the PREP Act, the claims had a causal relationship with the administration and use of that countermeasure, and the defendants qualified as “covered persons.” The court found that the PREP Act confers both immunity from liability and suit for such claims, except for willful misconduct, which must be brought exclusively in federal court. Therefore, Oklahoma courts lack subject matter jurisdiction over the plaintiff’s claims. The Supreme Court vacated the opinion of the Court of Civil Appeals and affirmed the district court’s dismissal. View "FRANKLIN v. OU MEDICINE" on Justia Law

The case concerns the medical treatment of a fifty-eight-year-old man who suffered a shoulder injury and subsequently died from septic shock, acute septic arthritis, metabolic acidosis, and renal failure. After his initial visit to the emergency department, he was diagnosed with rotator cuff tendinitis and cellulitis, and discharged with antibiotics. His condition worsened over several weeks, leading to multiple emergency department visits and consultations with various medical providers, including nurse practitioner Michael Collins. Collins attended to the patient on August 4-5, 2020, and discharged him after administering fluids and pain medication, advising follow-up with orthopedics. The patient returned to the hospital two days later in a deteriorated state, was diagnosed with sepsis and septic arthritis, and died shortly thereafter.The plaintiff, acting as personal representative of the decedent’s estate, filed a medical malpractice action in the Massachusetts Superior Court against several providers, including Collins. The plaintiff submitted an offer of proof supported by medical records and expert opinion, alleging that Collins failed to meet the standard of care by not recognizing symptoms of septic arthritis, failing to order appropriate imaging and bloodwork, and not admitting the patient for further treatment. Collins and other defendants requested a medical malpractice tribunal under G. L. c. 231, § 60B. The tribunal found the plaintiff’s evidence insufficient to raise a legitimate question of liability against Collins, leading to dismissal of the claims after the plaintiff did not post the required bond.The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts reviewed the tribunal’s decision. It held that the tribunal erred in finding the plaintiff’s offer of proof insufficient, as the expert opinion was factually based and rooted in the medical records, and adequately raised a legitimate question of liability and causation. The Court vacated the judgment of dismissal, allowing the plaintiff’s claims against Collins to proceed without posting a bond. View "Bennett v. Collins" on Justia Law

After a fatal car accident involving a 2008 Lexus ES350, the driver, whose wife died in the crash, sued Toyota, alleging the vehicle was defective due to unintended acceleration. His case was added to a coordinated group of California state court proceedings (JCCP) involving similar claims against Toyota. The coordinated proceedings had established a Common Benefit Fund, requiring all plaintiffs whose cases resolved after a certain date to pay an 8 percent assessment from their recoveries. This fund compensated lead counsel for work that benefited all plaintiffs, such as shared discovery and expert work.The plaintiff’s case was coordinated with the JCCP in 2018. After settling with Toyota, he moved in the Superior Court of Los Angeles County to exempt his case from the 8 percent assessment, arguing he did not use or benefit from the shared work product and that his case was factually distinct. The Committee overseeing the fund opposed, submitting evidence that the plaintiff’s original attorney had relied on common benefit materials and that the issues in his case overlapped with those in the coordinated proceedings. The trial court found the plaintiff had not met his burden to show he was entitled to an exemption and denied his motion for relief from the assessment.On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Seven, held that the order denying relief was appealable as a collateral order. The court affirmed the lower court’s decision, concluding that the plaintiff failed to demonstrate as a matter of law that neither he nor his counsel benefited from the common work product. The court found the assessment applied, as the plaintiff’s case fell within the scope of the coordination order and he did not prove entitlement to an exemption. The order requiring the 8 percent assessment was affirmed. View "Pruchnik v. JCCP4621 Common Benefit Committee" on Justia Law

A group of companies that are frequently sued in asbestos litigation brought an action against several settlement trusts and a claims processing facility. These trusts were established as part of bankruptcy reorganizations by former asbestos manufacturers to handle and pay out current and future asbestos-related claims. The plaintiffs rely on information held by these trusts—specifically, data about claimants’ other asbestos exposures—to defend themselves in ongoing and anticipated lawsuits. In January 2025, the trusts announced new document retention policies that would result in the destruction of most existing claims data after one year, which the plaintiffs argued would severely impair their ability to defend against asbestos claims and seek contribution or indemnification from the trusts.Previously, the trusts notified claimants of the impending data destruction, and the plaintiffs, upon learning of this, requested that the trusts not implement the new policies. When the trusts refused, the plaintiffs filed suit in the Court of Chancery of the State of Delaware, seeking a declaratory judgment that the trusts have a duty to preserve the claims data and a permanent injunction to prevent the destruction of this information. The trusts moved to dismiss, arguing that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction, that the plaintiffs lacked standing, and that the complaint failed to state a claim.The Court of Chancery denied the motions to dismiss. It held that it had subject matter jurisdiction because the plaintiffs sought injunctive relief and because the case fit within the court’s traditional equitable powers, including the authority to grant a bill of discovery to preserve evidence for use in litigation. The court found that the plaintiffs had standing, as they faced a concrete and imminent injury from the threatened destruction of data essential to their defense and contribution claims. The court also held that the complaint stated a claim for relief, allowing the case to proceed beyond the pleading stage. View "DBMP LLC v. Delaware Claims Processing Facility, LLC" on Justia Law

David and Bonnie Faulk, residents of Alaska, purchased over one hundred windows from Spenard Builders Supply for their custom-built home and alleged that the windows, manufactured by JELD-WEN, were defective in breach of an oral warranty. They filed a class action in Alaska state court against Spenard Builders Supply, an Alaska corporation, and JELD-WEN, a Delaware corporation, asserting state-law claims. The defendants removed the case to federal court under the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA), which allows federal jurisdiction based on minimal diversity in class actions.After removal, the Faulks amended their complaint to remove all class action allegations and sought to remand the case to state court. The United States District Court for the District of Alaska denied their motion to remand, relying on Ninth Circuit precedent that held federal jurisdiction under CAFA is determined at the time of removal and is not affected by post-removal amendments. The district court allowed the amendment to eliminate class allegations but ultimately dismissed the second amended complaint with prejudice, finding most claims time-barred and one insufficiently pled.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the impact of the Supreme Court’s decision in Royal Canin U.S.A., Inc. v. Wullschleger, which held that federal jurisdiction depends on the operative complaint, including post-removal amendments. The Ninth Circuit concluded that, after the Faulks removed their class action allegations, the sole basis for federal jurisdiction under CAFA was eliminated, and complete diversity was lacking. The court vacated the district court’s order dismissing the complaint and remanded with instructions to remand the case to state court unless another basis for federal jurisdiction is established. View "FAULK V. JELD-WEN, INC." on Justia Law

William Weeks was employed as an equipment operator for Oneida County’s Road and Bridge Department in Idaho. In September 2021, during a period of high COVID-19 transmission, Mr. Weeks continued working as required for critical infrastructure employees. He attended daily morning meetings with coworkers in a break room and often visited local stores. After a coworker became ill and missed work, Mr. Weeks developed COVID-19 symptoms, tested positive, and later died from complications. His wife, JaLyn Weeks, filed a worker’s compensation claim, alleging he contracted COVID-19 at work.The employer denied the claim, and Mrs. Weeks brought her case before the Idaho Industrial Commission. At the hearing, both parties presented expert testimony regarding the likely source and timing of Mr. Weeks’ infection. The Commission found the employer’s expert more persuasive, concluding that it was not possible to determine, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Mr. Weeks contracted COVID-19 at work rather than from other possible sources, such as visits to stores or contact with individuals outside of work. The Commission denied the claim for medical and death benefits.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho reviewed whether the Commission applied the correct legal standard and whether its findings were supported by substantial and competent evidence. The Court held that the Commission properly applied the preponderance of the evidence standard and did not err by refusing to resolve doubts in favor of compensability in occupational disease cases. The Court affirmed the Commission’s decision, holding that Mrs. Weeks failed to prove that Mr. Weeks actually incurred COVID-19 from his employment. The Court did not reach the issue of whether COVID-19 is a compensable occupational disease under Idaho law. View "Weeks v. Oneida County" on Justia Law

A correctional officer employed by a city for over a decade contracted COVID-19 after close contact with an infected coworker. He was hospitalized twice and diagnosed with COVID-19, pneumonia, and related lung issues. He filed a workers’ compensation claim for occupational lung disease, asserting that his illness was work-related. The insurer denied the claim, and the officer sought administrative review. His treating physician classified his COVID-19 infection as a disease of the lung.An appeals officer reviewed the case and affirmed the denial of benefits. The officer found that, while the claimant was entitled to a statutory presumption that his lung disease arose out of and in the course of employment due to his years of service, he failed to show that his lung disease was caused by exposure to heat, smoke, fumes, tear gas, or other noxious gases, as required by the relevant statute. The Eighth Judicial District Court reviewed the administrative decision and denied the officer’s petition for judicial review, concluding that the appeals officer’s decision was supported by substantial evidence and was not erroneous.The Supreme Court of the State of Nevada reviewed the case. The court held that, under NRS 617.455, a claimant must satisfy both the requirement that the lung disease arose out of and in the course of employment (for which a conclusive presumption may apply) and the separate requirement that the disease was caused by exposure to heat, smoke, fumes, tear gas, or other noxious gases. The conclusive presumption does not eliminate the need to prove the exposure element. Because the claimant did not show his lung disease was caused by the required type of exposure, the court affirmed the denial of his claim. View "Holguin v. City of Henderson" on Justia Law

While incarcerated at High Desert State Prison in Clark County, Brian Caperonis was killed by other inmates. His father, William Joseph Caperonis, acting individually and as the special administrator of Brian’s estate, filed a civil complaint against the Nevada Department of Corrections (NDOC) and several of its employees. The claims included civil rights violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, wrongful death, and various negligence claims related to Brian’s death.NDOC moved to dismiss the state law negligence claims, arguing that the estate had failed to exhaust administrative remedies as required by NRS 41.0322 and NRS 209.243. NDOC asserted that, as the estate stands in the shoes of the decedent, it was required to file an administrative claim before pursuing litigation. William opposed, contending that the exhaustion requirement applied only to living inmates and not to the estates of deceased prisoners. The Eighth Judicial District Court denied NDOC’s motion to dismiss, finding that the plain language of the statutes and the relevant administrative regulations did not extend the exhaustion requirement to estates of deceased inmates.The Supreme Court of Nevada reviewed NDOC’s petition for a writ of mandamus. The court held that the administrative exhaustion requirements in NRS 41.0322 and NRS 209.243 do not apply to the estate of a deceased prisoner. The court reasoned that the statutory language is limited to “a person who is or was” in NDOC custody and does not contemplate survival claims by estates. The court also found that the administrative regulations provide no mechanism for an estate to pursue such remedies. Accordingly, the Supreme Court of Nevada denied NDOC’s writ petition, affirming the district court’s decision. View "Department of Corrections v. District Court" on Justia Law

A welder was injured while working on a launch site on the Mississippi River, operated by two closely related companies. The injury occurred when a defective hook, lacking a required safety latch, struck him during a crane operation, causing him to fall and sustain multiple injuries, including a fractured eye socket and a cervical disk injury. Over the following months, he underwent surgery and was prescribed pain medications. After his prescriptions ran out, he attempted to manage his pain with over-the-counter drugs, but ultimately died from an overdose of street fentanyl mixed with Xylazine, a non-prescribed animal tranquilizer.The estate of the deceased sued the two companies for personal injury under the Jones Act, general maritime law, and the Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act (LHWCA) in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana. After a bench trial, the district court found the companies liable for vessel negligence under the LHWCA, determining that the defective hook was an appurtenance of the vessel and the proximate cause of the initial injury. The court also found the two companies to be essentially the same entity and awarded damages to the decedent’s children and mother, including for wrongful death and loss of consortium.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the district court’s findings for clear error and legal conclusions de novo. The Fifth Circuit held that while the defective hook was the proximate cause of the workplace injury, the ingestion of illegal drugs was a superseding cause of death, breaking the chain of causation from the workplace injury. The court reversed the award of damages stemming from the death and loss of consortium, concluding that the companies were not liable for the decedent’s death, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Bommarito v. Belle Chasse Marine Trans" on Justia Law

Elisabeth Koletas, who was four months pregnant, requested a pat-down instead of passing through a body scanner at Southwest Florida International Airport due to concerns about radiation. During the pat-down, Transportation Security Officer (TSO) Sarno conducted a prolonged probe of Koletas’s vaginal area, focusing on material in her underwear. Koletas explained it was toilet paper used to stem pregnancy-related bleeding. Sarno, skeptical, moved Koletas to a private room and brought in Supervising TSO Shane, who further probed Koletas’s underwear and vaginal area. Shane directed Koletas to lift her dress and ultimately removed the toilet paper, finding no prohibited items. Koletas experienced psychological and physical distress from the encounter.After exhausting administrative remedies, Koletas filed suit against the United States in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), alleging battery, false imprisonment, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and negligence. The United States moved to dismiss, arguing that the FTCA’s intentional tort exception preserved sovereign immunity for the alleged battery and false imprisonment. The district court agreed, relying solely on an unpublished Eleventh Circuit decision, and dismissed the case for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the dismissal de novo. The court held that TSOs are “officers of the United States” empowered by law to execute searches under the FTCA’s law enforcement proviso, which waives sovereign immunity for certain intentional torts committed by such officers. The court found the statutory language unambiguous and joined five other circuits in this interpretation. The Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court’s dismissal and remanded the case for further proceedings on the merits. View "Koletas v. USA" on Justia Law