Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

Two sisters died in a car accident on U.S. Highway 281 in Beadle County, South Dakota, when their vehicle drifted off the paved roadway onto a gravel shoulder that was five to six inches lower than the pavement. While attempting to steer back onto the road, the driver overcorrected, resulting in a collision with an oncoming vehicle. The mother, acting as the personal representative of her daughters’ estates, filed a wrongful death and survivor action against six South Dakota Department of Transportation (DOT) employees. She alleged these employees failed to maintain the gravel shoulder in accordance with DOT policies and federal standards, and that this negligence caused the accident.The case was first heard in the Circuit Court of the Third Judicial Circuit, Beadle County. The DOT employees sought summary judgment, arguing that sovereign immunity and the public duty doctrine barred the claims. The circuit court dismissed the official capacity claims based on sovereign immunity but denied summary judgment on the individual capacity claims under the same theory. However, it granted summary judgment on the individual capacity claims on the grounds that the public duty doctrine applied, finding that the alleged duties were owed to the public at large, not to any individual.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of South Dakota reviewed both the application of the public duty doctrine and the denial of sovereign immunity for the individual capacity claims. The court held that none of the statutes, policies, or standards cited by the plaintiffs imposed a ministerial duty on the defendants. The court concluded that the actions in question were discretionary and thus shielded by sovereign immunity. The Supreme Court affirmed the grant of summary judgment for the individual capacity claims, but on the basis of sovereign immunity, making it unnecessary to address the public duty doctrine. View "Estate Of Sanborn v. Peterson" on Justia Law

Rebecca Nichols was employed as a truck driver and was injured in an accident when her tractor-trailer overturned. She believed the crash was caused by improperly secured steel coils loaded into the trailer by other parties. Nichols retained attorneys to pursue a negligence claim against those responsible for loading and securing the cargo. The attorneys filed suit, but failed to timely identify and serve the proper defendants before the statute of limitations expired. Subsequent attempts to amend the complaint to add or substitute additional parties were unsuccessful, and Nichols’s underlying tort action was ultimately dismissed with prejudice.After the dismissal, Nichols filed a legal malpractice suit against her former attorneys in the Pulaski County Circuit Court, Fifth Division. She alleged that their failure to timely investigate and properly name the responsible parties, as well as their failure to effect timely service, deprived her of the opportunity to recover damages for her injuries. The circuit court initially granted the attorneys’ motion to dismiss, finding the malpractice claim time-barred, but the Supreme Court of Arkansas reversed and remanded, holding that Nichols had sufficiently pled fraudulent concealment to toll the statute of limitations.On remand, after discovery and a series of evidentiary rulings excluding key evidence and testimony Nichols sought to introduce, the circuit court granted summary judgment for the defendants. It concluded that Nichols could not, as a matter of law, prove that the attorneys’ actions were the proximate cause of her loss, because she was unable to present admissible evidence to establish the identity of the alleged tortfeasors or to demonstrate that she would have prevailed in her underlying claim.The Supreme Court of Arkansas affirmed the circuit court’s grant of summary judgment, holding that Nichols failed to establish an essential element of her malpractice claim—proximate causation—as she did not demonstrate she could prove the merits of the underlying negligence action. The court also affirmed the circuit court’s evidentiary rulings and denial of Nichols’s recusal motion. View "NICHOLS v. SWINDOLL" on Justia Law

A woman began using talcum powder products from a cosmetics company as a child in the 1950s, continued through the late 1970s, and resumed use from 1995 to 2010. She was later diagnosed with mesothelioma, a disease associated with asbestos exposure. She and her husband sued multiple companies, alleging that asbestos in cosmetic and automotive products caused her illness. By the time of trial, only the cosmetics company and one other defendant remained; the other defendant is not a party to this appeal. After her passing, her husband continued the suit as her successor.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County presided over a lengthy trial. A jury found the cosmetics company liable on multiple grounds: strict liability for inadequate warnings, manufacturing and design defects, negligence, fraudulent misrepresentation, and fraudulent concealment. The jury further found the company had acted with malice, oppression, or fraud, justifying punitive damages. The jury awarded over $40 million in compensatory damages and $10.3 million in punitive damages, apportioning 90 percent of fault to the company. The company appealed, challenging several evidentiary rulings and the sufficiency of the evidence.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Eight, reviewed the case. The court held that the cosmetics company had waived its challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence and most of its evidentiary objections. It found no abuse of discretion by the trial court in admitting the plaintiffs' expert testimony or excluding the company’s corporate witness due to lack of disclosure and personal knowledge. The appellate court affirmed the judgment, including all damages awards and findings of liability. View "LAOSD Asbestos Cases" on Justia Law

A patient was hospitalized after contracting COVID-19 and, as his condition worsened, was transferred between several hospitals in Kentucky and Indiana. During his treatment, he was intubated, placed on a ventilator, and medically immobilized. While under this care, he developed a severe bed sore that progressed to necrotizing fasciitis. Despite ongoing treatment, he ultimately died, with his death certificate listing multiple causes including cardiopulmonary arrest and sepsis. His estate claimed that negligence in the treatment of the bed sore caused his death and filed a proposed medical malpractice complaint against more than eighty healthcare providers.The case began when the estate filed its complaint with the Indiana Department of Insurance, while a medical-review panel was being requested. Before the panel was constituted, the providers moved for summary judgment in Vanderburgh Superior Court, arguing they were immune from liability under Indiana’s Healthcare Immunity Act, Premises Immunity Act, and the federal PREP Act. The trial court granted summary judgment for the providers, finding that statutory immunity applied and that the court, not the medical-review panel, could decide the immunity issue. The estate appealed, and the Indiana Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the question of immunity required expert input from the medical-review panel, especially regarding causation.The Indiana Supreme Court granted transfer, vacating the Court of Appeals’ decision. It held that the trial court could make a preliminary determination on statutory immunity without waiting for a medical-review panel’s opinion, since the facts relating to the connection between the patient’s COVID-19 treatment and his injury were undisputed for summary judgment purposes. The court further held that the providers were immune from civil liability under both state and federal law, as the patient’s injuries arose from treatment provided in response to the COVID-19 emergency. The court affirmed summary judgment for the providers. View "Estate of Waggoner v. Anonymous Health System, Inc." on Justia Law

The case concerns injuries suffered by two individuals, one in New York and one in Pennsylvania, each struck by buses operated by New Jersey Transit Corporation (NJ Transit), a public transportation entity created by the New Jersey Legislature. NJ Transit operates as a “body corporate and politic” with significant powers such as suing and being sued, entering contracts, and raising funds. Its founding statute specifies that debts or liabilities of NJ Transit are not debts of the State of New Jersey, and all expenses must be paid from NJ Transit’s own funds. The State retains substantial control over NJ Transit through board appointments and removal powers, veto authority, and some legislative oversight, but the statute also stresses NJ Transit’s operational independence.After the incidents, the injured parties filed negligence lawsuits against NJ Transit in their home state courts. NJ Transit moved to dismiss both suits, arguing it was an arm of New Jersey and thus entitled to sovereign immunity. The Court of Appeals of New York concluded that NJ Transit is not an arm of New Jersey, allowing the New York suit to proceed. Conversely, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania found that NJ Transit is an arm of New Jersey and dismissed the Pennsylvania suit.The Supreme Court of the United States reviewed both cases to resolve the conflict. It held that NJ Transit is not an arm of the State of New Jersey and therefore does not share in New Jersey’s interstate sovereign immunity. The Court emphasized that NJ Transit’s status as a legally separate corporation, responsible for its own debts and judgments, and the absence of formal state liability for its obligations, are decisive. The Court affirmed the New York decision, reversed the Pennsylvania decision, and remanded both cases for further proceedings. View "Galette v. New Jersey Transit Corp." on Justia Law

A sheriff’s deputy in Virginia arrested an individual for skateboarding on a public road and suspected public intoxication. During the arrest, the deputy punched the individual in the face multiple times, causing significant injuries, including facial fractures and a brain hemorrhage. The individual sued the deputy for excessive force under the Fourth Amendment and for common law battery. The deputy argued that the force he used was necessary because the individual resisted arrest and that, regardless, he was entitled to qualified immunity because he did not violate clearly established law.The United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia reviewed the case on the deputy’s motion for summary judgment. The district court examined the record, including body camera footage, and found that several key facts were disputed, such as whether the individual had surrendered and ceased resisting before the deputy continued to use force. The court held that if a jury found in favor of the individual on these disputed facts, it would be clearly established that the level of force used was excessive. Therefore, the district court denied the deputy’s motion for summary judgment, including his claim of qualified immunity.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit addressed its jurisdiction to review the denial of qualified immunity at this interlocutory stage. The court explained that it could not review the district court’s factual determinations but could consider whether, taking the facts most favorably to the plaintiff, the deputy was entitled to qualified immunity as a matter of law. The Fourth Circuit held that, under the facts as viewed by the district court, prior precedent clearly established that the deputy’s actions would constitute excessive force. As a result, the appellate court affirmed the district court’s denial of qualified immunity. View "Barricks v. Wright" on Justia Law

The City of Boston, along with its Public Health Commission and Housing Authority, brought suit against two pharmacy benefit managers (PBMs), OptumRx and Express Scripts, alleging that the PBMs had worked with opioid manufacturers to misrepresent the risks of opioid drugs. The City claimed that this conduct violated Massachusetts public nuisance law and resulted in harm to the City. The PBMs removed the case to federal court and argued that the suit was untimely because it was brought after the three-year statute of limitations had expired. The City responded by asserting that its complaint sufficiently alleged a continuing nuisance and that the statute of limitations should be tolled due to the PBMs’ fraudulent concealment of their wrongdoing.The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts granted the PBMs’ motion to dismiss, finding that the City either knew or should have known of its injuries and of the PBMs’ alleged role before 2021, based on public records and prior litigation, and thus failed to file suit within the statutory period. The district court further ruled that the City had not adequately pled a continuing nuisance, as it did not allege any specific, recent unlawful acts within the limitations period, and rejected the City’s claim of fraudulent concealment, determining that the City had the means to discover the facts needed for its claim. The district court also denied a motion by the PBMs to disqualify the City's law firm, Motley Rice.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed both the dismissal of the City’s state law claim and the denial of the motion to disqualify Motley Rice. The court held that the action was time-barred and that the City had not met the requirements for tolling the statute of limitations or for pleading a continuing nuisance under Massachusetts law. View "The City of Boston v. OptumRx, Inc." on Justia Law

Gene Cleveland Battieste, a veteran, underwent surgery at a Veterans Affairs Medical Center in Jackson, Mississippi in 2006. Although he had consented to surgery on certain cervical vertebrae, an additional procedure was performed on his C2 vertebra without his knowledge or consent. Following the surgery, Mr. Battieste experienced post-operative complications, including infection and increased pain. He applied for VA disability benefits in 2008, which were ultimately approved in 2020. The 2020 decision by the VA Board of Veterans’ Appeals was the first time Mr. Battieste or his family learned of the unauthorized surgery and the VA’s failure to provide proper informed consent or adequate post-operative care. Mr. Battieste died in 2022.In November 2022, the administrator of Mr. Battieste’s estate filed an administrative claim under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), which the VA denied. In May 2024, a lawsuit for medical negligence was filed in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi. The district court dismissed the case, finding that Mississippi’s medical malpractice statute barred any action brought more than seven years after the alleged negligence.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court determined that Mississippi Code Annotated § 15-1-36(2)’s seven-year period is a statute of repose, not merely a statute of limitations. The court found that Mississippi’s intermediate appellate courts consistently interpret the seven-year provision as an absolute bar to claims, and the statute’s structure and language support this reading. Because the suit was filed more than seven years after the surgery, the court held the claim was time-barred and affirmed the district court’s dismissal. View "Battieste v. United States" on Justia Law

A woman underwent knee replacement surgery at a hospital and soon developed respiratory distress. Shortly after the operation, she allegedly suffered a femur fracture in a fall while hospitalized, which her doctor failed to detect on an X-ray. The following day, she fell again, reportedly because a nurse fell on her while assisting her, resulting in a more severe fracture. This severe injury caused fat emboli to enter her bloodstream and led to a pulmonary embolism. She was transferred to another hospital, where her deteriorating condition was documented. She died nearly two weeks later. Her estate filed a wrongful-death lawsuit alleging that the defendants’ negligence in failing to diagnose and prevent the fracture ultimately caused her death.The Iowa District Court for Polk County granted summary judgment for the defendants, dismissing the lawsuit as untimely under Iowa Code § 614.1(9)(a), which imposes a two-year statute of limitations on medical malpractice actions. The district court determined that the estate knew or should have known of the injury and its cause by February 5, 2021, the date the decedent was transferred and her injury was documented. Because the estate filed its petition on February 17, 2023, more than two years later, the court found the claims time-barred.Reviewing the case, the Supreme Court of Iowa affirmed the district court’s decision. The Supreme Court held that, under Iowa law, wrongful-death claims based on medical malpractice are derivative of the decedent’s personal injury claims. When the injury and its negligent cause are known during the decedent’s lifetime, the limitations period begins at that time, not the date of death. Because the estate had knowledge of the injury and its cause by February 5, 2021, the wrongful-death action was untimely and barred by the statute of limitations. View "Cataldo v. RCHP-Ottumwa, LLC" on Justia Law

A property owner in Idaho allowed her adult grandson, who suffered from severe mental illness and a history of violent behavior, to reside on her rural property. She periodically employed a caretaker to perform maintenance, but did not supervise his work or control his schedule. In September 2021, the grandson killed and mutilated the caretaker, perceiving him as a trespasser. The grandson pleaded guilty to second-degree murder and was sentenced to life in prison. The caretaker’s family sued the property owner and her limited liability company, seeking to hold them liable for wrongful death, intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED), and negligent infliction of emotional distress (NIED).The District Court of the First Judicial District, Bonner County, granted summary judgment in favor of the property owner and the LLC. The court found no duty to protect the caretaker under either a special relationship or an assumed duty theory, and rejected the emotional distress claims, holding the alleged conduct was not extreme or outrageous and that no duty was owed to the heirs. The claims against other defendants were dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction, and the plaintiffs did not appeal the dismissal of the premises liability claim or claims against one family member.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho affirmed the district court’s decision. The Supreme Court held that the property owner’s employment relationship with the caretaker did not create a special relationship imposing a duty to protect him from the grandson, nor did her limited attempts to mediate disputes constitute a voluntarily assumed duty. The Court also concluded that the IIED and NIED claims failed as a matter of law because the owner’s conduct was neither extreme nor outrageous, and she owed no legal duty to the heirs. The Supreme Court awarded partial attorney fees to the owner, finding the IIED and NIED appeals were frivolously pursued. View "Spears v. Antelope Mountain Resort, LLC" on Justia Law