Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

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Shanta Webster filed a complaint in the Grenada County Circuit Court against the University of Mississippi Medical Center-Grenada (UMMC-Grenada) and Drs. Aimee Watts and Kimberly Farmer, alleging medical negligence in the performance of a hysterectomy and post-operative care. Webster served the complaint to Dr. Watts, Dr. Farmer, and Dodie McElmurry, the CEO of UMMC-Grenada. The defendants requested an extension to answer the complaint and later claimed immunity under the Mississippi Tort Claims Act (MTCA). Webster argued that service of process was proper under Rule 4(d)(8) of the Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure.The Grenada County Circuit Court dismissed the complaint, ruling that service of process was improper because it was not made to the Attorney General as required by Rule 4(d)(5) for state institutions. Webster appealed the dismissal, maintaining that UMMC-Grenada is a community hospital and that service on the CEO was sufficient.The Supreme Court of Mississippi reviewed the case de novo and upheld the trial court's decision. The court found that UMMC-Grenada is not a separate entity but a part of UMMC, a state institution. Therefore, service of process should have been made to the Attorney General under Rule 4(d)(5). Webster failed to serve the Attorney General within the 120-day period required by Rule 4(h), rendering the service invalid. Additionally, the court noted that Drs. Watts and Farmer, acting within the scope of their employment, were immune from personal liability under the MTCA.The Supreme Court of Mississippi affirmed the trial court's order of dismissal, concluding that proper service of process was not effected, and the individual defendants were immune from liability. View "Webster v. University of Mississippi Medical Center Grenada" on Justia Law

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Plaintiff Sabrina Zaragoza was admitted to Mercy Medical Center Merced with abdominal pain and later diagnosed with a bile leak. Dr. Nadir Adam performed a gallbladder removal surgery (cholecystectomy) on her. Following complications, including a bile leak and multiple subsequent surgeries, Zaragoza filed a medical malpractice lawsuit against Dr. Adam and others, alleging negligence in her treatment.The San Francisco County Superior Court granted summary judgment in favor of Dr. Adam. The court relied on the declaration of Dr. Eric Morse, a medical expert who reviewed Zaragoza's medical records and concluded that Dr. Adam performed the surgery within the standard of care and that the bile leak was a recognized risk of the procedure, not due to negligence. Dr. Morse also attributed Zaragoza's complications to a bowel perforation caused by a subsequent procedure performed by another doctor, Dr. Uppal. Zaragoza did not submit an opposing expert declaration.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Three, reversed the summary judgment. The appellate court found that Dr. Morse's declaration was conclusory and lacked a reasoned explanation for his opinions. Specifically, Dr. Morse did not adequately explain how he ruled out negligence by Dr. Adam or how he determined that the bile leak was not due to surgical error. The court emphasized that expert declarations must provide detailed factual bases and reasoned explanations to support their conclusions. The appellate court concluded that Dr. Adam failed to meet his initial burden of showing the absence of a triable issue of material fact and directed the trial court to deny the motion for summary judgment. View "Zaragoza v. Adam" on Justia Law

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Glenn and Geneanne Maniago filed a lawsuit against Desert Cardiology Consultants’ Medical Group, Inc. (DCCMG) and Dr. Praveen Panguluri, asserting five causes of action: negligence, loss of consortium, assault, battery, and unfair business practices. Glenn, a scrub technologist, was exposed to HIV patient’s blood during a procedure due to Dr. Panguluri’s actions. The complaint did not allege that Glenn contracted HIV but claimed harm from the exposure.The Superior Court of Riverside County sustained demurrers to most of the claims with leave to amend, overruled the demurrer to Glenn’s negligence claim, and struck the punitive damages allegations. The Maniagos did not request oral argument and did not appear for the hearing. Subsequently, they voluntarily dismissed their entire action with prejudice to expedite an appeal of the adverse rulings.The Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate the appeal from a voluntary dismissal entered by the clerk at the plaintiffs’ request without a final judicial determination of their claims. The court emphasized that a voluntary dismissal by a plaintiff is a ministerial act and not appealable. The court dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, noting that the appropriate vehicle for challenging interlocutory rulings is a petition for writ of mandate, not an appeal from a voluntary dismissal. View "Maniago v. Desert Cardiology Consultants' Medical Group" on Justia Law

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Ricky Koel sought emergency care at Citizens Medical Center in Colby, Kansas, after sustaining serious injuries to his right eye. He was evaluated by a triage nurse, a physician assistant, and Dr. Daniel Kuhlman, who suspected a possible globe rupture. Dr. Sam Funk, an optometrist, also examined Koel but did not confirm an open globe rupture. A CT scan indicated a possible globe rupture, but Dr. Kuhlman did not share these results with the specialists. Koel was discharged with instructions to see an ophthalmologist the next morning. Despite undergoing emergency surgery the following day, Koel ultimately lost vision in his injured eye.The United States District Court for the District of Kansas dismissed Koel's EMTALA claim, concluding that Citizens Medical Center did not violate the Act's requirements. The court granted summary judgment in favor of Citizens and declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Koel's state-law claims.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that Citizens Medical Center provided an appropriate medical screening examination within its capabilities and adhered to its own standard procedures, as required by EMTALA. The court also found that Citizens did not have actual knowledge of Koel's specific emergency medical condition (an occult globe rupture) and therefore was not obligated to stabilize him for that condition before discharge. The court affirmed the district court's summary judgment in favor of Citizens Medical Center. View "Koel v. Citizens Medical Center" on Justia Law

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Vernon Holland was fatally injured by a rewinder machine at his workplace. Robert Cearley, Jr., representing Holland’s estate, filed a wrongful death lawsuit against Bobst Group North America, Inc. (Bobst NA), the company responsible for delivering and installing the rewinder. The lawsuit sought damages based on several tort claims.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas granted summary judgment in favor of Bobst NA. The court ruled that Arkansas’s statute of repose, which limits the time frame for bringing claims related to construction or design defects, barred Cearley’s claims. Cearley appealed this decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case. The court examined whether Bobst NA was protected under Arkansas Code § 16-56-112(b)(1), which is a statute of repose for claims arising from personal injury or wrongful death caused by construction defects. The court concluded that Bobst NA’s involvement in the delivery, installation, integration, and commissioning of the rewinder constituted the construction of an improvement to real property. The court also determined that the rewinder was an improvement to real property because it was affixed to the plant, furthered the purpose of the realty, and was designed for long-term use.As the lawsuit was filed more than four years after the installation of the rewinder, the court held that the claims were barred by the statute of repose. Consequently, the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment in favor of Bobst NA. View "Cearley v. Bobst Group North America Inc." on Justia Law

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In this case, Joely Ng filed a complaint against Los Alamitos Medical Center and several doctors, alleging medical malpractice and wrongful death following the death of her husband, Kenneth Ng. Kenneth was admitted to the Medical Center due to a malfunction of his G-tube, which was improperly placed by Dr. McMahon. Subsequent negligence by other doctors led to Kenneth developing sepsis and dying three months later. Joely Ng sought noneconomic damages for both wrongful death and a survival claim.The Superior Court of Orange County granted the Medical Center's motion to strike portions of Ng's complaint that sought two separate caps on noneconomic damages under the Medical Injury Compensation Reform Act (MICRA). The court reasoned that the wrongful death claim was not separate from the medical negligence claim and thus could not be subject to a separate MICRA cap. The court denied leave to amend but allowed for the possibility of future amendments if Ng could allege facts supporting the claims as separate and distinct.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case. The court concluded that wrongful death and survival claims are separate and distinct, even when based on the same incident of medical malpractice. Therefore, Ng is entitled to seek two separate MICRA caps for noneconomic damages. The court granted Ng's petition, directing the trial court to vacate its previous order and issue a new order denying the Medical Center's motion to strike. View "Ng v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

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Jason Waterhouse, high on methamphetamine, barricaded himself in his sister's basement and started a fire when Lakewood Police Department officers arrived. After an hour of failed negotiations, seven officers entered the basement to extract him and locate the fire. Sergeant Marc Direzza, providing lethal cover, was among the last two officers in the basement when Waterhouse burst out of a bedroom and rushed towards them. Another officer fired a beanbag shotgun, and Direzza fired his pistol, killing Waterhouse with a shot to the back.The Estate of Jason Waterhouse filed a Fourth Amendment excessive-force claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the United States District Court for the District of Colorado. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Sergeant Direzza, concluding he was entitled to qualified immunity. The court found that Direzza's use of lethal force was reasonable under the circumstances and did not violate clearly established law. The district court also dismissed a state-law wrongful-death claim without prejudice.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court's summary judgment, holding that Sergeant Direzza was entitled to qualified immunity. The court determined that Direzza's use of lethal force was objectively reasonable given the dangerous circumstances, including the fire and smoke, and the perceived threat posed by Waterhouse. The court also affirmed the dismissal of the wrongful-death claim, as it was contingent on the outcome of the excessive-force claim. View "Estate of Jason Waterhouse v. Direzza" on Justia Law

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Todd Weiland filed a personal injury lawsuit against Patrick Bumann for injuries sustained in a motor vehicle accident while Bumann was on duty as a South Dakota Highway Patrol trooper. The circuit court denied Weiland’s motion for partial summary judgment on negligence, contributory negligence, causation, and failure to mitigate damages, leading to a jury trial. The court also denied Bumann’s request to apply a recklessness standard instead of ordinary negligence. At trial, the court excluded the Minnehaha County Sheriff’s Department accident report, certain SDHP investigation materials, and representations by Bumann’s insurance adjuster. The jury found Bumann negligent but also found Weiland contributorily negligent, awarding Weiland $18,661.50 in damages.Weiland appealed, challenging the circuit court’s rulings. The South Dakota Supreme Court reviewed the case. The court found Weiland’s challenge to the denial of summary judgment and judgment as a matter of law on negligence moot since the jury found Bumann negligent. The court upheld the denial of summary judgment and judgment as a matter of law on contributory negligence and failure to mitigate damages, finding sufficient evidence to support the jury’s verdict.The court also upheld the circuit court’s evidentiary rulings, finding no prejudice from the exclusion of the accident report and SDHP investigation materials, as the jury heard similar testimony. The exclusion of the insurance adjuster’s testimony was also upheld due to lack of an offer of proof. The court found no abuse of discretion in denying the jury instruction on liability insurance and precluding a per diem argument for non-economic damages, as the evidence did not support such an argument.The South Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court’s judgment, making it unnecessary to address issues raised by Bumann’s notice of review. View "Weiland V. Bumann" on Justia Law

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In 2019, the New York legislature passed the Child Victims Act (CVA), allowing previously time-barred tort claims based on sex offenses against children to be brought within a specific period. The CVA stipulated that such claims could be filed between August 14, 2019, and August 14, 2021. The plaintiff, alleging sexual misconduct by a teacher in 2009 and 2010, filed a negligence action against the defendant school district on April 26, 2019, before the CVA's filing window opened. The teacher had pleaded guilty to rape in the third degree in 2013.The defendant removed the case to federal court and asserted a statute of limitations defense. After extensive litigation, the defendant moved for summary judgment on September 3, 2021, arguing that the plaintiff's action was premature. The District Court granted the motion, noting that the plaintiff conceded the premature filing but argued for equitable estoppel, which the court rejected.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case, focusing on whether the CVA's six-month waiting period constituted a statute of limitations. The Second Circuit concluded that the CVA revived claims immediately upon its effective date and imposed a two-year filing window. However, it was unclear if the start date was a statute of limitations, leading the court to certify the question to the New York Court of Appeals.The New York Court of Appeals determined that the six-month waiting period is neither a statute of limitations nor a condition precedent. The court explained that statutes of limitations bar claims asserted too late, not too early, and the CVA's waiting period was intended to allow the court system to prepare for the influx of cases. The court's response to the certified question clarified that the waiting period does not create a statute of limitations or condition precedent, impacting the Second Circuit's handling of the appeal. View "Jones v Cattaraugus-Little Val. Cent. Sch. Dist." on Justia Law

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In September 2016, a high school student, almost 16 years old, was involved in a fistfight during an art class. The teacher, who weighed 375 pounds and had a back condition, intervened to stop the fight. While pulling one of the boys away, the teacher lost his balance and fell onto the plaintiff, breaking the plaintiff’s leg. The plaintiff sued the teacher and the school district for negligence, arguing that the teacher should not have intervened due to his physical condition and that the school district failed to train its teachers on safely handling physical altercations.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County held a 15-day trial, during which the jury viewed a video of the incident multiple times. The jury concluded that neither the teacher nor the school district was negligent and found that the plaintiff and the other boy were each 50 percent responsible for the harm. The plaintiff’s motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV) and a new trial was denied.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court found substantial evidence supporting the jury’s verdict that neither the teacher nor the school district was negligent. The court also upheld the trial court’s exclusion of the plaintiff’s expert witness on the grounds that the expert was not qualified to opine on classroom management and discipline. Additionally, the court found no error in the trial court’s refusal to give the plaintiff’s requested special jury instructions, as the standard instructions on negligence were deemed sufficient. The judgment and the order denying the plaintiff’s motion for JNOV and a new trial were affirmed. View "I.C. v. Compton Unified School Dist." on Justia Law