Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

A mother of four regularly sought care at a federally funded health center in Rhode Island from 2006 onward. Over a period of several years, she repeatedly reported persistent, weeks-long headaches with changing characteristics to her primary-care providers, also disclosing experiences of domestic abuse. Despite these reports, she was diagnosed with migraines and prescribed medication, but was never referred to a neurologist or for neuroimaging. In 2019, her symptoms worsened, and she lost consciousness, leading to hospitalization and the discovery of a slow-growing brain tumor, which had caused a buildup of cerebral fluid. Surgery to remove the tumor resulted in cerebellar strokes and permanent neurological damage, severely limiting her mobility and ability to care for her family.After the Department of Health and Human Services denied her administrative claim, she and her family filed suit under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) in the United States District Court for the District of Rhode Island. The district court found negligence by the primary-care providers, awarded her damages for medical expenses, pain and suffering, and homemaker loss, and awarded her children damages for loss of consortium. The government appealed, arguing that the children’s consortium claims were not properly presented administratively, that the homemaker damages were excessive, and that the findings on standard of care, causation, and medical expenses were erroneous.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit held that the children’s loss-of-consortium claims were barred for failure to exhaust administrative remedies and reversed those damages. The court vacated the homemaker damages award as excessive and unsupported by the evidence, remanding for further proceedings. The court affirmed the district court’s findings on negligence and causation and upheld the pain and suffering awards, but reduced the medical expense award by the cost of an unrelated spinal MRI. The judgment was thus affirmed in part, reversed in part, modified in part, and remanded. View "Urizar-Mota v. US" on Justia Law

A woman in her mid-30s suffered a severe stroke that left her paralyzed and unable to speak, requiring months of inpatient care at a rehabilitation hospital operated by a corporate defendant. While at the facility, she was assigned daily intimate care, including by a male certified nursing assistant. She later alleged that this male attendant sexually assaulted her multiple times during her stay. After her discharge, she sued the hospital, its corporate parent, and the attendant, asserting claims for assault, battery, negligence, and abuse of a dependent adult.The case went to a jury trial in Marin County Superior Court. The jury found in favor of the attendant on all claims, concluding he had not assaulted, abused, or been negligent towards the plaintiff. However, the jury found the hospital and its parent negligent, and determined their negligence was a substantial factor in causing harm to the plaintiff. The jury awarded her $1,000,000 in noneconomic damages. The hospital and its parent then moved for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, arguing there was no causal link established between their negligence and the plaintiff’s harm. The trial court agreed, granting the motion and entering judgment for the defendants.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, First Appellate District, Division Two, reviewed the case. It held that substantial evidence supported the jury’s finding that the hospital’s failure to offer the plaintiff, or her representative, the option of receiving intimate care from a female caregiver (as required by the Patient’s Bill of Rights) was a substantial factor in causing her emotional distress. The court found this basis for liability was independent of the alleged sexual assault and did not require expert testimony on causation. Accordingly, the appellate court reversed the judgment notwithstanding the verdict and directed the trial court to reinstate the judgment in accordance with the jury’s special verdict. View "Sobalvarro v. Vibra Health Care" on Justia Law

A teacher employed by a school district in a remote Alaska village rented housing from the district. After the district removed a railing from the stairs of the teacher’s residence and did not repair it despite complaints, the teacher fell while taking out the trash and was injured. The teacher notified the school principal of his injury, but she declined to assist or allow him to seek medical help. There were additional conflicts between the teacher and the principal, including disciplinary actions and allegations of policy violations. The teacher later reported the principal to her supervisors and the state’s Professional Teaching Practices Commission. Following these events, the district decided not to rehire the teacher for the following school year.The teacher filed a negligence lawsuit against the district and the principal, later amending his complaint to add claims for whistleblower retaliation, wrongful termination, defamation, intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED), and workplace safety violations. The Bering Strait School District, after being sued, reported the injury as work-related to the Alaska Workers’ Compensation Board and moved to dismiss the lawsuit, arguing that the teacher’s exclusive remedy was through workers’ compensation. The Superior Court for the Second Judicial District, Nome, dismissed the case in its entirety, concluding that the teacher failed to state a claim, and later awarded attorney’s fees to the district.The Supreme Court of the State of Alaska reviewed the case and held that, taking the teacher’s allegations as true, it was not clear that his injury was within the course and scope of his employment or that workers’ compensation was his exclusive remedy. The court reversed dismissal of the negligence, whistleblower, wrongful termination, IIED, and defamation claims, finding the complaint stated viable claims. The court affirmed dismissal of the workplace safety claim and vacated the attorney’s fees award, remanding the case for further proceedings. View "Mitchell v. Bering Strait School District" on Justia Law

Mitchell Glenn Revette sought medical care from Dr. Andrew Mallette at The Surgical Clinic Associates, P.A. for abdominal pain and underwent surgery for diverticulitis in June 2021. He later returned for a follow-up surgery in January 2022, after which he died due to complications related to respiratory depression. His wife, Nitkia Revette, brought a wrongful death and medical negligence lawsuit on behalf of his estate, alleging that negligent anesthesia and pain management led to his death.The defendants, Dr. Mallette and the Clinic, moved to compel arbitration based on an arbitration agreement included in an intake packet mailed to Mitchell. The agreement was signed "Mitchell Revette," but during a hearing in the Hinds County Circuit Court, Nitkia testified that she signed her husband’s name without his knowledge or presence, and she stated she had no authority to sign for him. The Clinic’s staff testified that patients were required to sign such agreements personally. The circuit court found that Mitchell did not sign the arbitration agreement and that Nitkia lacked authority to bind him, thus ruling the agreement unenforceable and denying the motion to compel arbitration.On appeal, the Supreme Court of Mississippi reviewed the circuit court’s findings, applying a deferential standard to factual determinations and de novo review to the denial of arbitration. The Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court’s decision, holding that substantial evidence supported the findings that Nitkia lacked both actual and apparent authority to sign for Mitchell and that there was no basis for binding the estate via direct-benefits estoppel. The case was remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings. View "Mallette v. Revette" on Justia Law

James Secrist, after recovering from COVID-19, began experiencing significant neurological symptoms, including leg weakness and inability to urinate. He was evaluated by various healthcare professionals at Rush Medical Foundation and Cardiovascular Institute of the South between March and June 2021. Ultimately, he was diagnosed with transverse myelitis attributed to COVID-19. James and his wife Dawn filed a medical malpractice suit against the involved healthcare providers, alleging negligence in failing to recognize and urgently address his worsening neurological condition.The case was brought in the Lauderdale County Circuit Court. The defendants moved to dismiss, asserting immunity under Mississippi Code Section 11-71-7, which provides legal immunity to healthcare professionals and facilities for acts or omissions related to healthcare services performed during the COVID-19 state of emergency. The circuit court found that the alleged negligent acts occurred during the COVID-19 state of emergency, that James’s condition was caused by COVID-19, and that the defendants’ actions were covered by the statutory immunity. The court therefore dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.On appeal, the Supreme Court of Mississippi reviewed the statutory language and the facts alleged in the complaint de novo. The Supreme Court determined that Section 11-71-7 immunity applied because James’s injuries resulted from treatment for a condition caused by COVID-19 during the COVID-19 state of emergency. The court rejected plaintiffs’ arguments that the statute should be construed more narrowly to exclude these facts, and also found extrajurisdictional cases cited by plaintiffs to be distinguishable. The Supreme Court of Mississippi affirmed the Lauderdale County Circuit Court’s dismissal, holding that the defendants are immune from liability under Section 11-71-7. View "Secrist v. Rush Medical Foundation" on Justia Law

Four women incarcerated at the Huron Valley Correctional Facility in Michigan suffered from persistent, painful rashes between 2016 and 2019. Despite repeated complaints, medical staff—contracted through Corizon Health—failed to diagnose scabies, instead providing ineffective treatments and attributing the condition to environmental factors like improper laundering. It was only after an outside dermatologist intervened that scabies was correctly identified, prompting prison-wide treatment efforts. However, these efforts were delayed and, in some cases, inadequate, resulting in prolonged suffering for the affected inmates.After their experiences, the four women filed suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan against multiple defendants, including high-level Michigan Department of Corrections officials and Wayne State University medical officers, alleging Eighth Amendment violations and state-law negligence. The district court found that the women’s complaint plausibly alleged “clearly established” Eighth Amendment violations by all defendants and denied the officials’ request for qualified immunity. The court also rejected a claim of state-law immunity, finding that the officials could be the proximate cause of the inmates’ injuries under Michigan law.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the district court’s denials. The Sixth Circuit held that existing precedent did not “clearly establish” that the non-treating prison officials’ reliance on contracted medical providers was so unreasonable as to violate the Eighth Amendment. Thus, it reversed the district court’s denial of qualified immunity on the federal damages claims. However, the appellate court affirmed the denial of state-law immunity, finding the plaintiffs adequately pleaded proximate cause under Michigan law. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with these holdings. View "Machelle Pearson v. MDOC" on Justia Law

Several women incarcerated at a Michigan prison developed painful, persistent rashes between 2016 and 2019. Their complaints were largely ignored by prison staff, and medical providers initially misdiagnosed the condition, ruling out scabies, a highly contagious skin infestation. The prison’s contracted health care provider, Corizon Health, and its infectious disease coordinator were tasked with managing infectious diseases but failed to control the outbreak. Only after an outside dermatologist diagnosed scabies did prison officials begin widespread treatment and quarantine measures, though these efforts were not immediately effective. Four inmates who suffered from these conditions filed suit, seeking damages and injunctive relief against both the medical providers and high-level prison officials who had not directly treated them.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan denied motions for judgment on the pleadings by the Michigan Department of Corrections and Wayne State Officials. The district court held that the inmates had plausibly alleged that all defendants, including non-treating prison officials, committed clearly established Eighth Amendment violations and were not entitled to qualified immunity. The court also found that the gross negligence claims could proceed under Michigan law, as the complaint adequately alleged that the officials proximately caused the harms.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit determined that, under existing precedent, non-treating prison officials’ reliance on contracted medical providers did not clearly constitute an Eighth Amendment violation. The court reversed the district court’s denial of qualified immunity on the inmates’ federal damages claims against these officials, finding no clearly established law requiring them to override medical judgments. However, the court affirmed the denial of state-law immunity, concluding that proximate cause under Michigan law could not be resolved at the pleading stage. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with these rulings. View "BLC Lexington SNF, LLC v. Townsend" on Justia Law

Two former seasonal employees of a ski resort were injured in a snowmobile accident after being laid off from their jobs. The accident occurred when, two days after their termination, they returned to the resort to drop off uniforms and accepted a ride from a current employee on a company snowmobile to attend a gathering organized by other former employees. The snowmobile crashed, causing serious injuries. Prior to their employment, both injured parties had signed a release agreement that waived the resort’s liability for injuries sustained from activities on resort property, including those caused by the resort’s negligence. The agreement specified that a free ski pass was consideration for the waiver.Both individuals brought lawsuits against the resort alleging vicarious liability for the employee’s negligence and direct liability for its own negligence. The Third District Court, Summit County, granted summary judgment in favor of the resort on the vicarious liability claims, finding no evidence the employee was acting within the scope of employment during the snowmobile ride. However, the district court denied summary judgment on the direct liability claims, relying on Pugmire v. Oregon Short Line Railroad Co., a 1907 Utah Supreme Court decision holding that employer-employee agreements waiving liability for employer negligence are void as contrary to public policy.On interlocutory appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Utah affirmed the dismissal of the vicarious liability claims, concluding that there was no factual basis for a jury to find the employee acted within the course and scope of his employment. The court reversed the district court’s ruling on direct liability, holding that Pugmire applies only to releases for work-related injuries and does not bar enforcement of the waiver in this case, where the injuries occurred outside the employment context. The case was remanded for consideration of any other arguments regarding the release agreement. View "Deer Valley v. Olson" on Justia Law

An adult individual filed a civil lawsuit against a city and unnamed prison employees, alleging he was sexually assaulted while incarcerated. The complaint claimed that several prison employees assaulted him, motivated by his sexual orientation, resulting in severe physical injuries. The only cause of action implicating the city was for sexual abuse, with allegations that the city was negligent in its supervision, staffing, and protection of inmates.The Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County initially overruled the city’s preliminary objections, allowing the case to proceed and requiring the city to answer the complaint. However, upon the city’s request for reconsideration and after additional briefing, the court amended its order to permit an interlocutory appeal. The city then petitioned the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania, challenging the applicability of a statutory exception to governmental immunity for sexual abuse. The Commonwealth Court reversed the trial court’s decision, holding that the statutory sexual abuse exception to governmental immunity applied only when the victim was a minor at the time of the abuse, and remanded for further proceedings.On further appeal, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reviewed whether the statutory waiver of governmental immunity for sexual abuse claims under Section 8542(b)(9) of the Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act applies solely to victims who were minors at the time of the abuse. The Supreme Court held that the statutory language unambiguously limits the exception to cases where the plaintiff was under eighteen at the time of the offense. Accordingly, the court affirmed the Commonwealth Court’s order, maintaining that the city retains immunity from tort liability for alleged sexual abuse unless the victim was a minor when the abuse occurred. View "City of Phila. v. J.S." on Justia Law

A Maryland county brought a lawsuit against several pharmacy benefit managers, mail-order pharmacies, and retail pharmacies, alleging that they worked with opioid manufacturers to deceptively market opioids and facilitated opioid abuse by placing these drugs on preferred formularies with few restrictions. The county claimed that this conduct created a public nuisance by causing widespread opioid misuse, which resulted in increased public health and safety costs for the county. The county sought a finding of public nuisance, an injunction, abatement costs, damages to compensate for public services, and attorney’s fees.Prior to review by the Supreme Court of Maryland, the United States District Court for the District of Maryland certified two questions to the state high court. The questions asked whether, under Maryland’s common law, the licensed dispensing of, or administration of benefit plans for, a controlled substance can constitute an actionable public nuisance, and what elements and forms of relief are available for such a claim if so. The county argued that Maryland common law supported these claims, relying on language from prior cases and the Restatement (Second) of Torts, while defendants maintained that Maryland had never recognized such a broad public nuisance doctrine, especially for lawful and licensed conduct.The Supreme Court of Maryland held that the licensed dispensing of, or administration of benefit plans for, a controlled substance does not constitute an actionable public nuisance under Maryland common law. The court explained that Maryland’s public nuisance doctrine historically allowed government entities only to seek criminal prosecutions or injunctive relief—not damages—and has not been expanded to cover lawful, regulated conduct such as the licensed dispensing of opioids. The court further found that the county’s complaint failed to meet a key requirement of public nuisance: interference with a common public right. Even if it did, the court stated that judicial restraint was appropriate given the extensive federal and state regulation of this area, making common law public nuisance an unsuitable remedy. View "Express Scripts v. Anne Arundel Cnty." on Justia Law