Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

The plaintiff filed a defamation lawsuit against the defendant after she called him a "white supremacist" on a social media page. The defendant made this statement during a heated political discussion on a town's Facebook page, which was in response to a joint statement by local officials regarding the killing of George Floyd. The plaintiff argued that the term "white supremacist" constituted defamation per se.The trial court, the Superior Court in the judicial district of Waterbury, granted the defendant's special motion to dismiss under Connecticut's anti-SLAPP statute (§ 52-196a). The court determined that the defendant's statements were nonactionable opinions rather than actionable defamation per se. The court also awarded the defendant attorney’s fees and costs. The plaintiff appealed, arguing that the trial court incorrectly concluded that he had failed to show probable cause that he would prevail on the merits of his defamation claim and that the court abused its discretion in awarding attorney’s fees.The Supreme Court of Connecticut reviewed the case and affirmed the trial court's decision. The court held that the term "white supremacist," without more, is a nonactionable opinion rather than actionable defamation per se. The court reasoned that the term lacks a precise meaning, cannot be objectively verified, and does not necessarily imply that the declarant knew existing, undisclosed defamatory facts. The context in which the defendant made the statement—a heated political debate on social media—further supported the conclusion that the statement was an opinion. The court also found no abuse of discretion in the trial court's award of attorney’s fees and costs to the defendant. View "Murphy v. Rosen" on Justia Law

Dr. Anita Jackson, an otolaryngologist, was convicted of various offenses related to her private medical practice in North Carolina. She was the leading Medicare biller for balloon sinuplasty surgery, a procedure treating chronic sinusitis. Jackson reused single-use medical devices, specifically the Entellus XprESS Multi-Sinus Dilation Tool, on multiple patients without proper sterilization, leading to potential contamination. She also incentivized employees to recruit Medicare patients for the procedure, often bypassing proper medical assessments. Additionally, Jackson falsified documents and patient signatures in response to Medicare audits.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina convicted Jackson on all counts, including violating the Food, Drug, and Cosmetics Act (FDCA) by holding for resale adulterated medical devices, violating the federal anti-kickback statute, making materially false statements, committing aggravated identity theft, mail fraud, and conspiracy. Jackson was sentenced to twenty-five years in prison and ordered to pay over $5.7 million in restitution. She moved for a judgment of acquittal and a new trial, which the district court denied.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case. Jackson argued that the devices were not "held for sale" under the FDCA, that her actions were protected under 21 U.S.C. § 396, and that the Government relied on a defective theory of per se adulteration. She also challenged the exclusion of certain evidence and jury instructions. The Fourth Circuit found no reversible error in the district court's rulings, holding that the devices were indeed "held for sale," that § 396 did not protect her conduct, and that the Government's theory was valid. The court also upheld the exclusion of evidence and the jury instructions. Consequently, the Fourth Circuit affirmed all of Jackson's convictions. View "United States v. Jackson" on Justia Law

A motorist, a physician, was injured when a truck struck the rear of her car while she was stopped at a construction site. She sued the truck driver and his employer for lost earnings and other damages. The superior court found that her future earning capacity was affected but dismissed her claim for future lost earnings, stating she failed to prove the amount of damages to a reasonable certainty.The superior court awarded her $1,036,491 for future medical and life care expenses, $79,961 for past lost income, and $500,000 in noneconomic damages. However, it dismissed her claim for future lost earning capacity. On appeal, the Alaska Supreme Court reversed the dismissal, stating that once the fact of damages for future lost earning capacity was established to a reasonable certainty, the court could reasonably estimate the amount from the evidence in the record. The case was remanded to the superior court to determine the damages for future lost earning capacity.On remand, the superior court used the evidence in the record to fashion a damages award. It found that the motorist's pre-accident earning capacity was $1,169,554 and estimated her post-accident earning capacity to be $1,018,087.40. The court calculated her annual expected loss of income to be $150,746.60 and determined that she would suffer this loss for 6.3 years, the average remaining work life for a woman her age. The total damages for loss of earning capacity were calculated to be $949,703.58, bringing the total award to $2,566,155.58.The Alaska Supreme Court reviewed the superior court's estimation of lost earning capacity and found no clear error. The court affirmed the damages award, concluding that the superior court's method of calculating the damages was reasonable and grounded in the evidence. The superior court's order on remand was affirmed. View "Downing v. Shoreside Petroleum, Inc." on Justia Law

In July 2019, Brent Bartlett, an off-duty police officer with the Juneau Police Department (JPD), rear-ended Arlene Tripp’s vehicle while driving his personal car under the influence of alcohol, resulting in her injury. Bartlett, who had a history of alcohol abuse and PTSD, was found to have a blood alcohol content of 0.239. Bartlett’s partner, also a JPD officer, was aware of his issues but did not report them. The Tripps sued the City and Borough of Juneau (CBJ), JPD, and the police chief, alleging negligent training and supervision of Bartlett.The Superior Court of Alaska, First Judicial District, dismissed the case, ruling that JPD did not owe a duty of care to the public to protect them from harm caused by officers’ off-duty alcohol consumption. The court found no statutory duty under AS 18.65.130 or CBJ’s Drug-Free Workplace policy and JPD Conduct Rule 114. It also determined that existing precedent did not impose such a duty and that public policy considerations did not support recognizing a duty of care in these circumstances.The Supreme Court of Alaska affirmed the Superior Court’s decision. The court held that neither statutes nor precedent imposed a duty of care on JPD to train officers against excessive off-duty alcohol consumption. It also concluded that public policy did not favor imposing such a duty, as it was not foreseeable that training officers on alcohol consumption would reduce the likelihood of them driving under the influence while off duty. The court emphasized that the connection between JPD’s conduct and the Tripps’ injuries was too remote and that the moral blame lay with Bartlett’s criminal conduct. Therefore, the dismissal of the lawsuit was upheld. View "Tripp v. City and Borough of Juneau" on Justia Law

In 2020, Sarah E. Martin was injured in a car accident involving an 18-wheel tractor-trailer driven by Charles Streeter, an employee of Al-Amin Brothers Transportation, LLC. Martin sued the LLC, several individuals, and 18 fictitiously named defendants. In January 2023, Martin settled with the original defendants, agreeing to release them and related parties from any claims arising from the accident. Subsequently, Martin amended her complaint to add PEI Ohio, Inc. and Premium Transportation Group, Inc. (the corporations) as defendants, alleging various negligence and breach of contract claims.The Jefferson Circuit Court enforced the settlement agreement in favor of the corporations, dismissed Martin's third amended complaint, and awarded attorney fees to the corporations. Martin filed a fourth amended complaint, which remains pending. The circuit court certified its orders as final under Rule 54(b), Ala. R. Civ. P., and Martin appealed both the enforcement of the settlement and the attorney fee award.The Supreme Court of Alabama reviewed the case and determined that the circuit court exceeded its discretion in certifying the orders as final under Rule 54(b). The court found that the adjudicated and unadjudicated claims were closely related, the need for review might be mooted by future developments in the circuit court, and there was a possibility of having to consider the same issue again, particularly regarding attorney fees. Consequently, the Supreme Court of Alabama dismissed Martin's appeals, emphasizing the preference to avoid piecemeal litigation and the need for a final judgment on all pending claims before appellate review. View "Martin v. PEI Ohio, Inc." on Justia Law

Barry Chrisman was seriously injured when a tree fell on his work vehicle while driving through a riparian management zone (RMZ) in a recently logged forest area. The RMZ, a buffer of trees left standing to benefit wildlife and water quality, was part of the Lugnut timber area managed by the Washington Department of Natural Resources (DNR). Chrisman and his employer sued the State of Washington, Sierra Pacific Industries, and Precision Forestry Inc. for negligence, arguing that the defendants were not immune under the Forest Practices Act of 1974, which provides immunity for forestland owners when a tree required to be left standing in an RMZ falls and causes injury.The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants, holding that they were immune under the statute as forestland owners required to leave the RMZ trees standing. The plaintiffs appealed, and the Court of Appeals reversed the decision. The appellate court held that Sierra and Precision were not forestland owners because they did not have the right to harvest RMZ trees and that only entities with the authority to determine RMZ parameters are entitled to immunity. The court also found a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether the RMZ was properly drawn.The Supreme Court of the State of Washington reviewed the case and held that the defendants are immune under the Forest Practices Act. The court determined that the statute provides broad immunity to forestland owners, including those in actual control of the land with the right to sell or dispose of timber. The court concluded that Sierra and Precision fit the definition of forestland owners and that the immunity applies regardless of whether the RMZ was properly drawn. The court reversed the Court of Appeals' decision and affirmed the trial court's summary judgment in favor of the defendants. View "Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1 of Snohomish County v. State" on Justia Law

On November 10, 2014, a traffic accident occurred at the intersection of Wellington Road and Market Place Avenue involving vehicles driven by Sharon Elizabeth Furr and Janaia Spurlock. Tamara Al-Saray, a passenger in Spurlock's vehicle, suffered significant injuries, including a traumatic brain injury. Spurlock attempted a left turn with a solid green light, requiring her to yield to oncoming traffic. Furr, traveling westbound at the speed limit, collided with Spurlock's vehicle. Al-Saray filed claims against both drivers for negligence but later nonsuited her claims against Spurlock. The trial court excluded evidence of Spurlock's guilty plea for failure to yield.The Prince William County Circuit Court denied Furr's motions to strike the evidence and for reconsideration, finding sufficient circumstantial evidence to support the claim that Furr failed to maintain a proper lookout. The jury returned a verdict in favor of Al-Saray, awarding her $7,000,000 in damages. Furr appealed to the Court of Appeals of Virginia, which reversed the trial court's decision, ruling that the evidence was insufficient to establish Furr's negligence as a proximate cause of the accident. The Court of Appeals majority found that the evidence was purely circumstantial and did not exclude other possible causes of the accident.The Supreme Court of Virginia reviewed the case and reversed the Court of Appeals' decision. The Supreme Court held that the evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to Al-Saray, was sufficient to support the jury's verdict. The Court emphasized that proximate cause can be established by circumstantial evidence and that the jury's inference of Furr's negligence was reasonable. The case was remanded to the Court of Appeals to address Furr's remaining assignments of cross-error. View "Al-Saray v. Furr" on Justia Law

A minor, L.W., suffered severe injuries when an Audi Q7, allegedly defective, surged forward and crushed him against a garage wall. L.W., his mother, and two siblings filed a products liability suit against Audi AG and Volkswagen Group of America Inc. (VWGoA), claiming the vehicle lacked necessary safety features. Audi AG, a German company, manufactures vehicles sold in the U.S. through VWGoA, which markets and sells them to authorized dealerships, including in California.The Superior Court of Placer County granted Audi's motion to quash service of summons, finding no personal jurisdiction. The court concluded that plaintiffs failed to establish Audi's purposeful availment of California's market or a substantial connection between Audi's activities and the plaintiffs' injuries. The court also found that exercising jurisdiction would not be reasonable or consistent with fair play and substantial justice.The California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court found that Audi, through VWGoA, deliberately served the U.S. market, including California, and thus could reasonably anticipate being subject to suit in California. The court held that the plaintiffs met their burden of demonstrating Audi's purposeful availment and the relatedness of the controversy to Audi's contacts with California. The court also found that exercising jurisdiction over Audi would be fair and reasonable, given California's significant interest in providing a forum for its residents and enforcing safety regulations.The appellate court reversed the trial court's order granting the motion to quash and remanded the case with directions to enter a new order denying the motion. The plaintiffs were awarded their costs on appeal. View "L.W. v. Audi AG" on Justia Law

The case involves a car accident where Thomas Irwin rear-ended Linda Brehme's vehicle. Brehme's Personal Injury Protection (PIP) carrier paid benefits but not up to the policy limits. Brehme filed a personal injury complaint against Irwin, seeking damages for pain and suffering, disability, impairment, loss of enjoyment of life, and past lost wages. At trial, Brehme attempted to admit evidence of her projected future medical expenses, but the trial judge denied the motion because she had not exhausted her PIP limits. The jury awarded Brehme $225,000 for pain and suffering and $50,000 for past lost wages, totaling $275,000. Irwin's carrier paid the final judgment, and Brehme's counsel signed a warrant to satisfy the judgment.The Appellate Division dismissed Brehme's appeal as moot, noting that she had accepted and received the full judgment amount and signed a warrant to satisfy the judgment before indicating her desire to appeal. The court found that Brehme's acceptance of the judgment precluded her from appealing the trial judge's ruling barring evidence of future medical expenses.The Supreme Court of New Jersey reviewed the case and held that a plaintiff who accepts a final judgment may still appeal if they can show that they made their intention to appeal known before accepting payment and executing the warrant to satisfy the judgment, and that prevailing on the appellate issue will not impact the final judgment other than to potentially increase it. The court found that Brehme did not express her intention to appeal before accepting payment and executing the warrant, and that the issue of future medical expenses was not separable from the underlying final judgment. Therefore, the appeal was properly dismissed as moot. The court affirmed the Appellate Division's decision and referred the matter to the Civil Practice Committee to assess whether to clarify Rule 4:48-1. View "Brehme v. Irwin" on Justia Law

The plaintiffs, Kayla Suprynowicz and Reilly Flaherty, discovered through genetic testing that they are half-siblings and that their biological father is the defendant, Narendra B. Tohan, a reproductive endocrinologist. They allege that the defendant used his own sperm to impregnate their mothers during in vitro fertilization (IVF) procedures without their parents' consent, causing them mental anguish, physical injury, and compromised familial relations. Kayla Suprynowicz also claimed that the defendant's sperm carried a genetic trait causing her to contract a cerebral condition and mast cell activation disorder, reducing her earning capacity.The trial court, Superior Court in the judicial district of Hartford, granted the defendant's motion to strike the plaintiffs' amended complaint, determining that their negligence claims sounded in wrongful life, which is not a legally cognizable cause of action in Connecticut. The court reasoned that the plaintiffs' claims presented the paradox of alleging harm that could only have been avoided if they had never been born, a hallmark of wrongful life claims.The Supreme Court of Connecticut reviewed the case and concluded that the trial court incorrectly determined that the plaintiffs' negligence claims sounded in wrongful life rather than ordinary negligence. The court held that the plaintiffs' claims bore none of the hallmarks of wrongful life claims and could be properly adjudicated as ordinary negligence claims. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendant's deception was directly responsible for their injuries and losses, and they sought compensation for these injuries rather than being restored to a state of nonbeing. The court reversed the trial court's judgment with respect to the plaintiffs' negligence claims and remanded the case with direction to deny the defendant's motion to strike as to those claims and for further proceedings. View "Suprynowicz v. Tohan" on Justia Law