Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

Aletha Porcaro was admitted to The Heights of Summerlin, a skilled nursing facility, for rehabilitation after surgery. Upon her discharge, she contracted COVID-19 and died eight days later. Her daughter, Rachelle Crupi, filed a lawsuit against The Heights and its parent companies, alleging that they failed to implement effective COVID-19 safety protocols. The claims included negligence, wrongful death, and other related causes of action.The Heights removed the case to federal court, which remanded it back to state court. In state court, The Heights moved to dismiss the case, arguing that the federal Public Readiness and Emergency Preparedness Act (PREP Act) and Nevada’s Emergency Directive 011 granted them immunity from Crupi’s claims. The district court dismissed the professional negligence claim but allowed the other claims to proceed.The Heights then petitioned the Supreme Court of Nevada for a writ of mandamus, seeking to dismiss the remaining claims based on the same immunity arguments. The Supreme Court of Nevada reviewed the petition and concluded that the PREP Act does not apply to a lack of action or failure to implement COVID-19 policies. The court also determined that Directive 011 does not grant immunity to health care facilities, as it applies to individual medical professionals, not facilities.The Supreme Court of Nevada denied the petition for a writ of mandamus, holding that neither the PREP Act nor Directive 011 provided immunity to The Heights for the claims brought by Crupi. The court affirmed the district court’s decision to allow the remaining claims to proceed. View "The Heights of Summerlin, LLC v. District Court" on Justia Law

Carolyn Greene visited her grandson at Children’s National Medical Center and slipped in a hallway, allegedly due to liquid left by a floor scrubbing machine operated by a hospital custodian. Greene claimed there were no warning signs and sustained severe injuries from the fall. She sued the hospital for negligence, asserting that the hospital's employee created the hazardous condition.The Superior Court of the District of Columbia granted summary judgment in favor of the hospital, concluding that Greene failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether the hospital was on notice of the wet floor. The court found that Greene's claims were speculative and lacked sufficient evidence to prove that the liquid was left by the scrubbing machine.The District of Columbia Court of Appeals reviewed the case and reversed the lower court's decision. The appellate court held that Greene presented enough evidence for a reasonable jury to conclude that the hospital's employee created the dangerous condition. This included Greene's testimony about the liquid and the scrubbing machine, expert testimony supporting her claims, and inconsistencies in the custodian's account. The court emphasized that the evidence should be viewed in the light most favorable to Greene, the non-moving party, and that credibility determinations are for the jury to decide.The appellate court concluded that a jury could reasonably find that the hospital was on constructive notice of the hazard created by its employee, thus making summary judgment inappropriate. The case was remanded for trial. View "Greene v. Children's National Medical Center" on Justia Law

In this case, an automobile collision occurred on November 5, 2018, involving Raymond and Florence Trigger, who were struck by a truck driven by Benjamin C. Deese. Florence died at the scene, and Raymond succumbed to his injuries in January 2019. Jerald Brown, as the administrator of both estates, sued Deese for wrongful death, alleging negligence and wantonness. The jury awarded $50,000 for Florence's death and $1 for Raymond's death. Brown moved for a new trial, arguing that the $1 award was inadequate and violated equal protection principles. The Houston Circuit Court granted the motion for a new trial, and Deese appealed.The Houston Circuit Court had initially instructed the jury on negligence, wantonness, contributory negligence, and damages, including nominal damages. The jury's initial verdict awarded $0 for Raymond's death, which the court rejected, instructing the jury that a $0 award was not permissible. The jury then awarded $1 for Raymond's death. Brown's motion for a new trial argued that the $1 award was inadequate and inconsistent with the $50,000 award for Florence's death. The trial court granted the motion without stating reasons.The Supreme Court of Alabama reviewed the case and reversed the trial court's order. The Court held that the adequacy of punitive damages in wrongful-death cases is not subject to review, as established in Louisville & Nashville R.R. v. Street. The Court also found that the jury's verdicts were not inconsistent, as the jury was instructed, without objection, that it could award different amounts for each death. The Court concluded that the trial court exceeded its discretion in granting a new trial and remanded the case with instructions to enter judgment on the jury's verdicts. View "Deese v. Brown" on Justia Law

A housekeeper employed by a nursing and rehabilitation facility experienced a respiratory incident after wearing a sterilized N95 mask at work. She felt a burning sensation and had difficulty breathing, leading to hospitalization. She subsequently sought medical treatment for persistent respiratory issues and was diagnosed with moderate persistent asthma. She filed a petition in the Nebraska Workers’ Compensation Court, claiming her injury was work-related and seeking various benefits.The Workers’ Compensation Court held a trial where the housekeeper and her former supervisor testified. Medical evidence from her treating physicians was presented, including a report from her family care physician, who opined that her respiratory issues were associated with the mask incident. The pulmonologist, who treated her later, agreed that her symptoms began on the day of the incident but did not opine on causation. The employer denied the work-related nature of the injury and suggested a preexisting condition but did not provide contrary expert testimony.The Workers’ Compensation Court found that the housekeeper’s respiratory issues were caused by the work incident and awarded her temporary total and permanent partial disability benefits, past medical expenses, and future medical care. The court found the medical expert’s opinion credible and supported by the evidence, including the absence of preexisting respiratory issues and the timing of symptoms.The Nebraska Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court’s decision. It held that the Workers’ Compensation Court did not err in finding the medical expert’s opinion had sufficient foundation and was persuasive. The court also found no clear error in the determination of a 30-percent loss of earning capacity, as the compensation court had considered the relevant factors and evidence. View "Prinz v. Omaha Operations" on Justia Law

In this case, the plaintiff, Dakota Miller, was injured when a vehicle crashed into a business he was patronizing, located on property owned by T & J Land Co., LLC. Miller filed a lawsuit against T & J Land nearly two years after the incident, alleging negligence and seeking punitive damages. He claimed the property owner failed to protect patrons from such accidents.The Knox Circuit Court dismissed Miller's lawsuit, ruling it was untimely under the one-year statute of limitations for personal injury claims as per Kentucky Revised Statute (KRS) 413.140(1)(a). The Kentucky Court of Appeals reversed this decision, holding that the two-year statute of limitations under the Motor Vehicle Reparations Act (MVRA) applied, as Miller was a victim of a motor vehicle accident.The Supreme Court of Kentucky reviewed the case and reversed the Court of Appeals' decision. The Court held that the MVRA's two-year statute of limitations did not apply to Miller's premises liability claim against T & J Land. The Court reasoned that the MVRA is intended for claims involving the ownership, operation, maintenance, or use of motor vehicles, which was not the nature of Miller's claim. The Court emphasized that Miller's lawsuit was fundamentally about premises liability, not a motor vehicle accident, and thus fell under the one-year statute of limitations for personal injury claims.The Supreme Court of Kentucky reinstated the Knox Circuit Court's order of dismissal, concluding that Miller's claims were indeed time-barred under the applicable one-year statute of limitations. View "T & J LAND CO., LLC V. MILLER" on Justia Law

On the night of July 18, 2019, in Charlestown, Indiana, bystanders called 911 to report a fight between RJ Slaymaker and his wife, Amylyn Slaymaker. Two police officers responded, separated the couple, and learned from Amylyn that RJ was drunk, had hit her, had guns, and was threatening to kill her and himself. RJ denied the allegations. The officers called an ambulance for RJ to seek mental health help at a hospital but did not place him under a 24-hour mental health hold. RJ left the hospital shortly after arriving, returned home, and killed Amylyn before committing suicide.The administrator of Amylyn’s estate sued Officer Roederer and the estate of Officer Johnson, claiming they created a danger by misleading Amylyn into believing RJ would be held for 24 hours, thus making her believe it was safe to return home. The United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana granted summary judgment to the defendants, concluding they were entitled to qualified immunity.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court’s judgment regarding Officer Roederer, finding no evidence of his personal involvement in making assurances to Amylyn. However, the court reversed the judgment regarding Officer Johnson, finding that a jury could reasonably infer that he misled Amylyn about RJ’s detention, creating a danger she would not have otherwise faced. The court held that Officer Johnson’s actions could be seen as a violation of clearly established law under the state-created danger doctrine, as established in Monfils v. Taylor. The case against Officer Johnson’s estate was remanded for further proceedings. View "Rakes v. Roederer" on Justia Law

A.H., a student at Tamalpais High School, was sexually abused by his tennis coach, Normandie Burgos. A.H. sued the Tamalpais Union High School District (the District) for negligent supervision, arguing that the District's employees failed to properly investigate a prior complaint against Burgos and did not adequately supervise him, which enabled the abuse. A jury found the District negligent and awarded A.H. $10 million in damages.The District appealed, claiming the trial court improperly instructed the jury and allowed inadmissible evidence regarding Burgos's conduct with other students. The District argued that the jury instructions failed to clarify that the District could not be held vicariously liable for Burgos's actions and that the District could only be liable for the conduct of its supervisory employees. The District also contended that evidence of Burgos's misconduct with other students and his 2019 criminal conviction was irrelevant and prejudicial.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Two, reviewed the case. The court found no instructional error, noting that the jury was properly instructed on the District's liability for negligent supervision and that the instructions adequately covered the relevant legal principles. The court also held that the evidence of Burgos's prior misconduct and the 2005 complaint were relevant to show what the District should have known about Burgos's propensity for abuse. Additionally, the court ruled that evidence of Burgos's 2019 criminal conviction was relevant to the issue of damages, as it demonstrated the ongoing psychological impact on A.H.The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's judgment, upholding the $10 million damages award to A.H. View "A.H. v. Tamalpais Union High School Dist." on Justia Law

In October 2020, Elliot Fama, employed by Sanford Contracting, was working on a project in Scarborough, Maine. After work, he and his co-worker, Robert Clarke, consumed alcohol at a hotel and a tavern. Later, in the hotel parking lot, Clarke struck Mr. Fama, causing him to fall and sustain fatal injuries. Laureen Fama, Mr. Fama’s widow, settled a workers’ compensation claim in Massachusetts for $400,000.Laureen Fama then filed a lawsuit in Cumberland County Superior Court against Bob’s LLC, which operated the tavern, and Clarke. She alleged liquor liability, wrongful death, loss of consortium, and battery. The defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing that the workers’ compensation settlement precluded the lawsuit. The Superior Court denied these motions, leading to the current appeal.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the case. It held that under Maine’s Workers’ Compensation Act (MWCA), Ms. Fama’s settlement barred her from suing Clarke, as the Act’s immunity provisions extend to co-employees. Consequently, Clarke was exempt from the lawsuit. The court further held that because Clarke could not be retained as a defendant, the claims against Bob’s LLC failed under the “named and retained” provisions of Maine’s Liquor Liability Act (MLLA).The court vacated the Superior Court’s order denying summary judgment and remanded the case for entry of judgment in favor of Bob’s LLC and Clarke. View "Fama v. Bob's LLC" on Justia Law

Joseph Segrain, an inmate at Rhode Island's Adult Correctional Institutions, filed a civil lawsuit against the Rhode Island Department of Corrections and several correctional officers, alleging violations of his Eighth Amendment rights and various state laws. Segrain claimed that on June 28, 2018, officers used excessive force by executing a leg-sweep maneuver, spraying him with pepper spray, and delaying his decontamination. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the officers on all claims, leading Segrain to appeal.The United States District Court for the District of Rhode Island initially reviewed the case. The court found that no reasonable jury could conclude that the officers' conduct constituted an Eighth Amendment violation. It granted summary judgment on the basis that the force used was minimal and necessary to maintain order. The court also dismissed the state law claims, concluding that the officers' actions did not meet the legal standards for battery, intentional infliction of emotional distress, or excessive force under Rhode Island law.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case. The court reversed the district court's judgment regarding the 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim that Officer Walter Duffy's use of pepper spray violated Segrain's Eighth Amendment rights. It found that a reasonable jury could conclude that Duffy's use of pepper spray was excessive and not in good faith. The court vacated the district court's judgment on the Rhode Island Constitution Article I, Section 8 claim regarding Duffy's use of pepper spray and remanded for further proceedings. However, the court affirmed the district court's judgment on all other claims, including the leg-sweep maneuver and the delayed decontamination, granting qualified immunity to the officers on those issues. View "Segrain v. Duffy" on Justia Law

The plaintiff, a pedestrian, was injured when struck by a car driven by Ralph Wilson, who had been driving for Uber earlier that evening. Wilson had turned his Uber driver app to "offline" about four minutes before the accident and more than a mile away from the accident site. Wilson testified that he had finished driving for Uber for the night and was on his way home from McDonald's when the accident occurred. The plaintiff argued that inconsistencies in Wilson's testimony and Uber's records created a triable issue of fact regarding whether Wilson was still operating as an Uber driver at the time of the accident.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County granted summary judgment in favor of Uber Technologies, Inc. and related companies, finding that Wilson was acting in his personal capacity and not as an Uber driver at the time of the accident. The court deemed the plaintiff's arguments speculative and irrelevant to establishing whether Wilson was acting within the scope of his employment with Uber at the time of the incident.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Second Appellate District, affirmed the trial court's decision. The appellate court held that the undisputed material facts demonstrated that Wilson was not acting as an Uber driver at the time of the accident. The court found no evidence to support the plaintiff's claim that Wilson intended to switch back to "available" status or that he was driving towards a surge area. The court concluded that the inconsistencies in Wilson's testimony were immaterial to the issue of his status at the time of the accident. Therefore, the judgment in favor of the Uber parties was affirmed. View "Kim v. Uber Technologies, Inc." on Justia Law