Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

In a suburban shopping center parking lot on July 1, 2016, Michael Cokes, Isaiah Stevenson, and Ronald Arrington waited in a car while Jimmie Malone robbed a restaurant manager. After the robbery, the men drove away with Malone, who later took over as the driver. When Illinois state troopers stopped the car, the men refused to exit, and Malone sped off, leading to a high-speed chase. During the chase, Chicago Police Officer Dean Ewing, driving an unmarked car, collided with the Pontiac, resulting in serious injuries to Cokes, Stevenson, and the officers in Ewing’s car, and the deaths of Malone and Arrington.The plaintiffs, including Arrington’s estate, sued the City of Chicago and Officer Ewing, alleging various torts related to the collision. After a nine-day trial, a jury found in favor of the defendants on all claims. The plaintiffs then moved for a new trial, challenging the district court’s decisions on affirmative defenses, jury instructions, and the admissibility of evidence. The district court denied these motions, leading to the current appeal.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s decisions. The appellate court found no legal error or abuse of discretion in the district court’s handling of the affirmative defenses, jury instructions, and evidentiary rulings. Specifically, the court upheld the district court’s decisions to allow the defendants to plead a joint enterprise theory of contributory negligence, to admit testimony about Arrington’s conduct under Federal Rule of Evidence 601 rather than the Illinois Dead Man’s Act, and to exclude the COPA report under Rule 403. The appellate court concluded that any potential errors did not substantially affect the jury’s verdict. View "Arrington v. City of Chicago" on Justia Law

Georgia-Pacific LLC, a large corporation in the pulp and paper industry, acquired Bestwall Gypsum Co. in 1965, inheriting significant asbestos-related liabilities. By 2017, Bestwall faced around 64,000 pending asbestos claims, prompting Georgia-Pacific to implement a divisional merger known as the Texas two-step. This maneuver split Georgia-Pacific into two entities: Georgia-Pacific retained most assets, while Bestwall assumed the asbestos liabilities and filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy to manage these claims through a § 524(g) trust.The United States Bankruptcy Court for the Western District of North Carolina granted Bestwall's motion for an injunction to prevent asbestos claimants from pursuing claims outside the bankruptcy process. The Official Committee of Asbestos Claimants opposed this and moved to dismiss the bankruptcy case, arguing it was filed in bad faith since Bestwall was solvent. The bankruptcy court denied the motion, stating that filing for Chapter 11 to resolve asbestos claims is a valid purpose, even for solvent debtors.The Committee later moved to dismiss the case for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, arguing that the Constitution does not grant jurisdiction over bankruptcy cases involving solvent debtors. The bankruptcy court rejected this argument, holding that Congress has the authority to define bankruptcy jurisdiction, which includes cases filed by solvent debtors.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the bankruptcy court's decision. The Fourth Circuit held that federal courts have subject-matter jurisdiction over bankruptcy cases involving solvent debtors because the Bankruptcy Code is a federal law, and petitions for relief under it arise under the laws of the United States. The court clarified that challenges to a debtor's eligibility for bankruptcy protection are not jurisdictional issues. View "Bestwall LLC v. Official Committee of Asbestos Claimants" on Justia Law

The case involves two companies, Skyline Tower Painting, Inc. (Skyline) and Television Tower, Inc. (TTI), which were sued by a group of plaintiffs for allegedly causing lead paint contamination in a Baltimore neighborhood. TTI owns a TV tower that was coated with lead-based paint, and Skyline was contracted to clean the tower using hydroblasting, a process that dislodged and dispersed the lead paint. The plaintiffs, who own property within a 4000-foot radius of the tower, claimed that the hydroblasting caused lead paint chips and dust to spread throughout their community, posing health risks and reducing property values.The plaintiffs filed a class action lawsuit in Maryland state court, asserting claims for negligence, negligent hiring, retention, and supervision, and strict liability for an abnormally dangerous activity. The defendants removed the case to federal court under the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA). The plaintiffs moved to remand the case to state court, invoking CAFA’s local-controversy exception. The United States District Court for the District of Maryland granted the motion to remand, finding that the local-controversy exception applied.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case. The court first determined that it had jurisdiction to hear the appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, despite the defendants also filing petitions for permission to appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1453. The court dismissed the § 1453 petitions as unnecessary. On the merits, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision, holding that the local-controversy exception to CAFA applied. The court found that more than two-thirds of the proposed class members were Maryland citizens, and that TTI, a Maryland citizen, was a significant defendant from whom significant relief was sought and whose conduct formed a significant basis for the claims. View "Skyline Tower Painting, Inc. v. Goldberg" on Justia Law

A federal immigration agent, Keith Slatowski, was injured when his Sig Sauer P320 pistol fired a bullet into his hip and out his thigh during a training session. Slatowski claimed he did not touch the trigger, only the grip, and argued that the gun's design, which lacks an external safety, made it prone to accidental discharge. He sued Sig Sauer, alleging that the gun was defectively designed and that a different safety design, such as a tabbed trigger, would have prevented the accident.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania excluded the causation testimony of Slatowski's two experts, Dr. James Tertin and Dr. William Vigilante, because their conclusions were based on speculation rather than reliable testing. The court allowed their testimony on the gun's design defects but granted summary judgment for Sig Sauer, reasoning that without expert testimony on causation, the jury could not determine what caused the gun to fire.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the District Court's exclusion of the expert testimony on causation, agreeing that the experts' conclusions were speculative. However, the Third Circuit reversed the grant of summary judgment, holding that the jury could still determine causation based on the admissible evidence and lay testimony. The court found that the jury, with the help of expert explanations of the gun's design, could understand the remaining causation question without further expert testimony. The case was remanded for trial. View "Slatowski v. Sig Sauer, Inc." on Justia Law

Two minor boys, referred to as John Doe 1 and John Doe 2, were coerced by a trafficker into producing pornographic content, which was later posted on Twitter. Despite reporting the content to Twitter, the platform did not immediately remove it, leading to significant views and retweets. The boys and their mother made multiple attempts to have the content removed, but Twitter only acted after being prompted by the Department of Homeland Security.The United States District Court for the Northern District of California dismissed the plaintiffs' complaint, primarily based on the immunity provided under § 230 of the Communications Decency Act of 1996. The court found that Twitter was immune from liability for most of the claims, including those under the Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act (TVPRA) and California product-defect claims, as these claims treated Twitter as a publisher of third-party content.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that Twitter is immune from liability under § 230 for the TVPRA claim and the California product-defect claim related to the failure to remove posts and the creation of search features that amplify child-pornography posts. However, the court found that the plaintiffs' claims for negligence per se and their product-liability theory based on defective reporting-infrastructure design are not barred by § 230 immunity, as these claims do not arise from Twitter's role as a publisher. Consequently, the court affirmed the dismissal of the TVPRA and certain product-defect claims, reversed the dismissal of the negligence per se and defective reporting-infrastructure design claims, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "DOE 1 V. TWITTER, INC." on Justia Law

On January 20, 2018, Francisco Gutierrez was driving his truck on a California highway when an ambulance driven by Uriel Tostado, an EMT employed by ProTransport-1, LLC, rear-ended his vehicle. At the time, Tostado was transporting a patient between medical centers. Gutierrez filed a lawsuit on January 7, 2020, claiming the collision caused him neck and back injuries. He framed his complaint as a general negligence action. Defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing the claim was time-barred under the Medical Injury Compensation Reform Act (MICRA)’s one-year statute of limitations for medical professional negligence. Gutierrez opposed, asserting his claim was timely under the two-year statute of limitations for general negligence.The trial court granted summary judgment for the defendants, finding that MICRA’s statute of limitations applied because Tostado was rendering professional medical services at the time of the accident. Gutierrez appealed, and the Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court’s decision, reasoning that MICRA applied as long as the plaintiff was injured due to negligence in the rendering of professional services.The Supreme Court of California reviewed the case and held that MICRA’s statute of limitations does not apply to Gutierrez’s claim. The court concluded that the applicable statute of limitations depends on the nature of the right being sued upon. Since Gutierrez’s claim was based on a breach of a duty owed to the public generally, rather than a professional obligation owed to a patient, the two-year statute of limitations for general negligence claims applied. The court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeal and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "Gutierrez v. Tostado" on Justia Law

The Anne Carlsen Center (ACC) petitioned the North Dakota Supreme Court for a supervisory writ after the district court granted plaintiff A.K.-W.'s motion to compel discovery of documents that ACC claimed were not subject to disclosure. The case arose from an alleged sexual assault of A.K.-W., an autistic child, by an ACC employee. The plaintiff's grandmother and adoptive parent, Lisa Wibstad, noticed signs of trauma and sought medical care, leading to a Sexual Assault Nurse Examination (SANE) that documented injuries consistent with sexual contact. The employee was placed on administrative leave and later terminated, but criminal charges were dismissed for lack of probable cause. Wibstad then filed a civil suit against ACC.The district court ordered an in-camera review of the disputed documents and subsequently granted the motion to compel, concluding that the asserted privileges did not apply. The court ordered the documents to be re-designated from "sealed" to "confidential." ACC then sought a supervisory writ from the North Dakota Supreme Court, arguing that the district court's order was contrary to law and created an injustice without an adequate alternative remedy.The North Dakota Supreme Court found that the district court erred by not explaining why the asserted privileges did not apply and by not addressing necessary or agreed-upon redactions. The court noted that the district court's order lacked sufficient detail for meaningful review and directed the district court to vacate its order and enter a new order that addresses redactions and explains the decision on a document-by-document, privilege-by-privilege basis. The Supreme Court emphasized the need for specificity in claims of privilege and the importance of providing readable documents for review. View "Anne Carlsen Center v. LeFevre" on Justia Law

Robbie Plyler, a longtime farm worker, was injured when his leg became trapped in a running grain auger inside a grain bin on Cox Brothers Farms, resulting in the amputation of his right leg below the knee. The jury found that both Plyler and Cox Brothers Farms were negligent, but the farm had the last clear chance to avoid the injury. The jury awarded Plyler $2,000,000 in compensatory damages and $500,000 for loss of consortium to his wife, Deborah. Cox Brothers Farms appealed the decision.The United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina denied Cox's pre-trial motions for summary judgment and its renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law on Plyler’s negligence and gross negligence claims. The court also denied Cox's motion to bifurcate the trial into separate liability and damages phases and its motion to exclude testimony from Plyler’s farm safety expert.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the jury’s verdict. The court found that the district court did not err in denying Cox's motions for summary judgment and judgment as a matter of law, as there was sufficient evidence to support the jury's finding that Cox had the last clear chance to avoid Plyler’s injury. The appellate court also upheld the district court’s decision to deny Cox's motion to bifurcate the trial and to admit the expert testimony, noting that the district court provided appropriate limiting instructions to the jury regarding the use of OSHA regulations as evidence. The court concluded that the district court acted within its discretion and that there were no exceptional circumstances warranting a new trial. View "Plyler v. Cox" on Justia Law

Everett Robinson was transferred to Canton Harbor Healthcare Center, a skilled nursing facility, for follow-up care after a stroke. During his stay, he developed pressure ulcers, which allegedly worsened after his transfer to other facilities, leading to his death. Felicia Robinson, his widow, and his surviving children filed a complaint against Canton Harbor, alleging negligence in allowing the pressure ulcers to develop and worsen, causing his wrongful death. They submitted a certificate of a qualified expert, signed by registered nurse Anjanette Jones-Singh, attesting that Canton Harbor breached the standard of care, causing the pressure ulcers.The Circuit Court for Baltimore City dismissed the complaint, ruling that as a registered nurse, Jones-Singh was not qualified to attest to the proximate cause of Robinson's pressure ulcers. The Robinsons appealed, and the Appellate Court of Maryland vacated the dismissal, holding that a registered nurse is not disqualified per se from attesting that a breach of nursing standards proximately caused pressure ulcers. The case was remanded for further proceedings.The Supreme Court of Maryland affirmed the Appellate Court's judgment. The court held that a registered nurse may attest in a certificate that a breach of nursing care standards at a skilled nursing facility proximately caused a pressure ulcer, provided the nurse relies on a pre-existing diagnosis and does not make a medical diagnosis. The court also held that a registered nurse meets the peer-to-peer requirement to attest to breaches of nursing care standards but not to the standards applicable to physicians. The case was allowed to proceed based on the certificate provided by Nurse Jones-Singh. View "Canton Harbor Healthcare v. Robinson" on Justia Law

The plaintiff, Colleen Ryan, was injured in a parking lot owned by Sea Colony Recreational Association, Inc. while attending an event organized by Operation SEAs the Day, Inc. Before the event, Ryan signed a liability waiver that covered the event organizer and its agents. Upon arrival, she was directed to park in Sea Colony's lot, where she tripped in a hole and injured her ankle. The relationship between the event organizer and the parking lot owner was not clear from the pleadings.The Superior Court of Delaware granted judgment on the pleadings in favor of Sea Colony, concluding that Sea Colony was an agent of the event organizer based on the fact that the parking lot was used for the event. The court found the waiver unambiguous and applicable to Sea Colony, and that Ryan's injuries fell within its scope. Ryan's motion for reargument, which included new information that she was a registered guest at Sea Colony, was denied.The Supreme Court of Delaware reviewed the case and reversed the Superior Court's decision. The Supreme Court held that the Superior Court erred in finding an agency relationship between Sea Colony and the event organizer based solely on the use of the parking lot. The Supreme Court noted that the pleadings did not contain sufficient facts to establish an agency relationship and that other reasonable inferences could be drawn, such as a license agreement or public use of the lot. The case was remanded for further proceedings to determine whether the waiver covered Sea Colony and whether Ryan's injuries fell within its scope. View "Ryan v. Sea Colony Recreational Association, Inc." on Justia Law