Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

Rodney Dean Bjornson, the relator, suffered two injuries while employed by McNeilus Companies, Inc. He received treatment at Mayo Clinic, with expenses paid by United Healthcare Services. Bjornson's attorney, David C. Wulff, sought Roraff fees for recovering medical benefits. The compensation judge awarded Wulff $49,000 in Roraff fees, finding that United paid $327,257.37 in medical benefits based on itemized medical bills from Mayo Clinic attached to Bjornson's Employee’s Claim Petition.The Workers’ Compensation Court of Appeals (WCCA) reviewed the case and concluded that the itemized bills from Mayo Clinic were not in the appellate record. The WCCA reversed the compensation judge’s award of Roraff fees due to insufficient evidence regarding the bills and modified the Roraff fees to $500, as per the statutory formula for unascertainable benefits amounts.The Minnesota Supreme Court reviewed the case to determine if Wulff presented sufficient evidence of the ascertainable dollar value of medical benefits. The court found that the WCCA did not assess whether the remaining evidence, including Wulff’s testimony and exhibits, was adequate to support the compensation judge’s conclusion. The Supreme Court reversed the WCCA's decision and remanded the case for further proceedings. The WCCA was directed to clarify whether the itemized medical bills were actual bills or a summary document and to determine if the evidence in the record was adequate to support the compensation judge’s conclusion. View "Bjornson v. McNeilus Companies, Inc." on Justia Law

A man was injured in an accident outside city limits and sued a city and an emergency-responder employee for negligently providing assistance and aggravating his injuries. The city and employee offered the man $7,500 to settle the lawsuit, which he did not accept. They also moved for summary judgment, arguing that they could not be sued because AS 09.65.070(d)(4) does not allow lawsuits based on the “gratuitous extension of municipal services” beyond city limits. The superior court granted summary judgment in their favor, ruling that their actions were gratuitous because they were under no legal obligation to take them. The court also granted attorney’s fees to the city and employee based on a court rule that requires a party to pay the other side’s legal fees if the party rejected an offer of judgment to settle the case that was more favorable than the judgment the party ultimately received.The man appealed, arguing that the city’s emergency response was not gratuitous because he was billed a mileage fee for the ambulance service. He also argued that the city and employee were not entitled to attorney’s fees because their pretrial offer of judgment was invalid.The Supreme Court of the State of Alaska reviewed the case. The court held that AS 09.65.070(d)(4) bars the lawsuit because the city and employee’s actions were gratuitous, meaning they were performed without legal obligation and without charging more than the standard fee. The court also held that the offer of judgment was valid and that the superior court did not err in awarding attorney’s fees to the city and employee. The court affirmed the superior court’s grant of summary judgment and the award of attorney’s fees. View "Rochon v. City of Nome" on Justia Law

PorterCare Adventist Health Systems had inadequate surgical-sterilization procedures for about two years, leading to over $40 million in liability from thousands of patients' claims. PorterCare sought coverage from AdHealth, its excess-liability insurer, for the full $40 million policy limit, arguing that the claims arose from one medical incident. AdHealth refused coverage, asserting that a medical incident covers injuries to a single person, not multiple people, and filed a complaint seeking a declaratory judgment. PorterCare counterclaimed for declaratory judgment and breach of contract.The United States District Court for the District of Colorado granted summary judgment to AdHealth, agreeing with its interpretation that a medical incident is limited to the acts or omissions causing injury to one person. The court found that AdHealth owed coverage only for the claims of a single patient that trigger the excess policy’s liability threshold, not for multiple patients' claims grouped together.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court held that the policy’s definition of “medical incident” unambiguously applies to the injuries of a single person. Therefore, AdHealth is liable only for individual claims exceeding PorterCare’s $2 million self-insurance retention, not for the aggregated claims of multiple patients. View "Adhealth, Limited v. PorterCare Adventist Health Systems" on Justia Law

The case involves Raymond Dugan, who was convicted and sentenced in the Southern District of West Virginia for accessing child pornography. Dugan raised three main issues on appeal: the denial of his motion to compel discovery related to a foreign law enforcement agency's investigation, the denial of his motion to suppress evidence obtained from a search warrant, and the restitution order requiring him to pay $22,000 to five child victims.In the lower court, Dugan was convicted by a jury of accessing child pornography. He was sentenced to 54 months in prison, followed by five years of supervised release, and ordered to pay $22,000 in restitution. Dugan filed pretrial motions to compel discovery and suppress evidence, both of which were denied by the district court. The court found that the foreign agency's tip was reliable and that the search warrant was supported by probable cause. The court also ruled that the officers acted in good faith when executing the warrant.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court's decisions, holding that the denial of the motion to compel discovery was appropriate because Dugan's request was speculative and unsupported by evidence. The court also upheld the denial of the motion to suppress, finding that the search warrant was based on probable cause, given the deliberate steps required to access the child pornography website. Finally, the court found no abuse of discretion in the restitution order, as the district court had carefully considered the relevant factors and evidence in determining the amounts.The Fourth Circuit affirmed Dugan's conviction and sentence, including the restitution order. View "US v. Dugan" on Justia Law

Ty Whitehead suffered a serious head injury during a bicycle training ride for a charity fundraiser due to a large pothole on Skyline Boulevard in Oakland. Whitehead alleged that the City of Oakland breached its statutory duty to maintain a safe roadway. Prior to the ride, Whitehead signed a release and waiver of liability, which included a provision discharging the City from any liability for negligence.The Alameda County Superior Court granted summary judgment in favor of the City, holding that the release was valid and enforceable, thus barring Whitehead’s claim. The court reasoned that the release did not affect the public interest, relying on the multifactor test from Tunkl v. Regents of University of California. The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court’s decision, also relying on the Tunkl framework.The Supreme Court of California reviewed the case and concluded that the release was against public policy under Civil Code section 1668, which prohibits contracts that exempt a party from responsibility for their own fraud, willful injury, or violation of law. The court held that an agreement to exculpate a party for future violations of a statutory duty designed to protect public safety is unenforceable. The court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeal and remanded the case for further proceedings, allowing the City to argue the doctrine of primary assumption of risk on remand. View "Whitehead v. City of Oakland" on Justia Law

Oscar Hernandez allegedly sustained injuries from a RIDGID-branded nail gun purchased from Home Depot. The nail gun, designed and manufactured by other companies, was marketed and sold by Home Depot under a trademark license agreement with Ridge Tool Company. Hernandez filed a complaint against Ridge Tool Company and Home Depot, asserting claims of strict liability, negligence, breach of express warranty, and breach of implied warranty of fitness. The case was removed to the U.S. District Court for the District of Nevada.The respondents moved for summary judgment, arguing that Ridge Tool Company should not be held strictly liable as it only licensed the RIDGID trademark and did not participate in the design, manufacture, distribution, or sale of the nail gun. The U.S. District Court granted summary judgment on all claims except the strict liability claim, noting the lack of controlling precedent in Nevada on whether a trademark licensor can be held strictly liable under such circumstances. The court certified the question to the Supreme Court of Nevada.The Supreme Court of Nevada concluded that Nevada does not impose strict products liability on an entity whose only involvement with a defective product is licensing its trademark for marketing purposes. The court adopted the rule set forth in section 14 of the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability, which states that a trademark licensor is not subject to strict liability unless it substantially participates in the design, manufacture, or distribution of the product. The court answered the certified question in the negative, holding that a trademark licensor cannot be held strictly liable for damages caused by a defective product if its role is limited to licensing its trademark. View "HERNANDEZ VS. THE HOME DEPOT, INC." on Justia Law

In 2018, Lillian Hester was convicted by a jury of abusing and murdering her six-year-old nephew, Jack. Lenda Hester, Jack’s grandmother, and Jason Conlee, Lillian’s boyfriend, pleaded guilty to charges of child abuse and endangerment. Jack’s half-sister, Elise, sought over $3 million in restitution for Jack’s future lost wages from the defendants.The Superior Court of Coconino County allowed Elise to assert victims' rights on Jack’s behalf but denied her request for restitution for Jack’s future lost wages, ruling that such wages were consequential damages and not recoverable as restitution. The Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed this decision, agreeing that the future lost wages were too speculative and attenuated to be considered direct economic losses.The Supreme Court of the State of Arizona reviewed the case and reversed the lower courts' decisions. The court held that future lost wages of a murdered child are recoverable as restitution if they meet the criteria of being economic losses directly caused by the criminal conduct, as outlined in the Wilkinson test. The court emphasized that the loss of Jack’s future wages was a direct result of his murder and not consequential damages. The court remanded the case to the Superior Court to determine the amount of restitution for Jack’s future lost wages, ensuring that the amount is reasonably estimated and not based on speculation. View "E. H. v HON. SLAYTON" on Justia Law

Derik L. Seymour was using a cable crossover exercise machine at the Bulldog Athletic Recreation Center at the University of Montana-Western when the cable snapped, allegedly causing him severe injury. Seymour filed a complaint against the State of Montana and the University of Montana-Western, alleging negligence and negligence-premises liability for improper maintenance of the exercise equipment.The First Judicial District Court found that Seymour failed to present admissible evidence that the State breached its standard of care and granted the State’s motion for summary judgment. Seymour's counsel withdrew, and he proceeded pro se. The court extended discovery deadlines multiple times due to Seymour's failure to respond to the State’s discovery requests. The State filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that Seymour had not secured a liability expert to testify at trial. The District Court granted summary judgment, concluding that Seymour had not introduced any admissible evidence that the State breached its duty of care.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case. The court held that Seymour failed to present sufficient evidence to establish the State’s standard of care. The court noted that Seymour did not dispute the necessity of an expert in the District Court and only argued on appeal that an expert was not necessary. The court found that the inspection and maintenance of specialized gym equipment involved technical considerations beyond the common knowledge of lay jurors, requiring expert testimony. The court concluded that Seymour did not present any evidence regarding the State’s standard of care, an essential element of his negligence claims, and affirmed the District Court’s grant of summary judgment for the State. View "Seymour v. State" on Justia Law

Livorio Loera was charged with felony vehicular homicide while under the influence after a two-vehicle accident on Interstate 90 resulted in the death of Jerome Socheath. Loera drove the wrong way on the highway and collided with an SUV, causing it to roll and eject Socheath, who died three days later. Loera was found intoxicated and with a blood alcohol content of .124 several hours after the crash. Evidence found in Loera's car included open and unopened alcohol containers and self-help books on addiction.The Fourth Judicial District Court, Missoula County, excluded evidence regarding Socheath's seat belt use, deeming it irrelevant to Loera's conduct. The court also admitted evidence of unopened alcohol and self-help books found in Loera's trunk, considering it relevant to Loera's negligence. Loera appealed these decisions, arguing that the seat belt evidence was necessary for his causation defense and that the trunk evidence was irrelevant and prejudicial.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case. It held that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the seat belt evidence, as it was irrelevant to determining Loera's conduct and causation. The court also found that the transaction rule did not apply to the seat belt evidence. However, the Supreme Court determined that the District Court erred in admitting the trunk evidence, as it was irrelevant to Loera's negligence and intoxication. Despite this error, the court concluded it was harmless due to the overwhelming admissible evidence proving Loera's guilt. Consequently, the Supreme Court affirmed Loera's conviction. View "State v. Loera" on Justia Law

Trent Berhow, while incarcerated at Western Missouri Correctional Center, fell from a ladder and subsequently filed a lawsuit against the state of Missouri, alleging that his supervisor's instructions created a dangerous condition leading to his injury. Berhow filed his suit more than a year after the incident, which brought into question the statute of limitations.Initially, Berhow sued the Missouri Department of Corrections. The department moved to dismiss the petition, citing the statute of limitations. Berhow then amended his petition to dismiss the department and add the state as the defendant. The Circuit Court of DeKalb County overruled the state's first motion for judgment on the pleadings but later sustained the state's renewed motion, which argued both sovereign immunity and the statute of limitations. Berhow's motion for sanctions was also effectively overruled by the circuit court.The Supreme Court of Missouri reviewed the case de novo. The court held that Berhow's claim was barred by the statute of limitations under section 516.145, which requires actions against the Department of Corrections or any entity thereof to be brought within one year. The court reasoned that allowing Berhow to sue the state instead of the department would defeat the purpose of the statute, as the department acts on the state's behalf. The court affirmed the circuit court's judgment, concluding that the statute of limitations barred Berhow's claim. View "Berhow v. State" on Justia Law