Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

Krista Dozier slipped and fell on an unmarked puddle of water in the Jefferson County courthouse. She filed a tort action against Jefferson County, which moved to dismiss the case, claiming immunity under the Colorado Governmental Immunity Act (CGIA). Dozier argued that the spill was a "dangerous condition" of a public building, an exception to CGIA immunity. The district court found the County's response to the spill reasonable and dismissed Dozier's claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The Colorado Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the reasonableness of the County's response was irrelevant to jurisdiction and that the County had waived CGIA immunity under the dangerous-condition exception.The Supreme Court of Colorado reviewed the case and reversed the judgment of the court of appeals. The court held that when disputed jurisdictional facts are inextricably intertwined with the merits, a plaintiff must demonstrate a likelihood of the existence of the facts necessary to establish a waiver of CGIA immunity. Additionally, the plaintiff must show that a public entity's negligent act or omission proximately caused the condition in question for the dangerous-condition exception to apply. The district court had found the County's response to the spill reasonable, concluding that Dozier failed to establish the spill as a "dangerous condition" and thus lacked jurisdiction over her claims.The Supreme Court of Colorado reinstated the district court's order dismissing Dozier's complaint, emphasizing that the plaintiff must demonstrate a likelihood that the public entity's negligent act or omission proximately caused the dangerous condition to establish a waiver of CGIA immunity. View "Jefferson Cnty. v. Dozier" on Justia Law

Alonzo McClanahan, a former employee of DPR Construction, claimed workers' compensation benefits for an injury to his right shoulder that he alleged occurred on July 25, 2017, while moving heavy materials at work. DPR's claims administrator denied the claim, and McClanahan sought adjudication from the Workers' Compensation Appeals Board (WCAB). During the trial, McClanahan testified about the injury, but DPR presented evidence and testimony from employees that contradicted his account. Medical evaluations were conducted by several doctors, including Dr. McGahan, who supported McClanahan's claim of an industrial injury.The Workers' Compensation Judge (WCJ) ruled in favor of McClanahan, finding his testimony credible and supported by medical evidence. DPR filed a petition for reconsideration, which the WCJ recommended denying. The WCAB granted the petition for further review but ultimately affirmed the WCJ's decision in a two-to-one decision, despite acknowledging that the Hanley reports, which were not listed in the pretrial conference statement, were admitted in error. The dissenting board member believed the error warranted a return to the trial level for correction.The California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court found that the WCAB did not err in its credibility determination under section 5313, as the WCJ provided sufficient reasons for finding McClanahan credible. However, the court agreed with DPR that the admission of the Hanley reports, which were not listed in the pretrial conference statement, violated section 5502. The court held that this error was not subject to harmless error analysis and annulled the WCAB's decision, remanding the case for reconsideration without reference to the Hanley reports. View "DPR Construction v. Workers' Compensation Appeals Board" on Justia Law

Ashley Hushen and Alexandra Weary, along with their mothers, reported allegations of sexual harassment by a classmate, Benjamin Gonzales, to their high school administrators. The school conducted a Title IX investigation, resulting in Benjamin's three-day suspension and subsequent juvenile charges for unlawful sexual contact. Benjamin was acquitted of all charges, and the school reopened the investigation, ultimately concluding that Benjamin had not violated school policies. The students involved felt traumatized by the process, and by the time the proceedings concluded, they had graduated.Benjamin later sued Ashley, Alexandra, and their mothers for defamation and intentional infliction of emotional distress based on statements made during the Title IX investigations. The defendants filed a special motion to dismiss under Colorado's anti-SLAPP statute, arguing that their statements were absolutely privileged as they were made during a quasi-judicial proceeding. Both the trial court and the Colorado Court of Appeals ruled that the Title IX proceedings were not quasi-judicial due to procedural shortcomings, allowing Benjamin's lawsuit to proceed.The Supreme Court of Colorado reviewed the case and clarified that the determination of whether a proceeding is quasi-judicial is separate from whether it offers sufficient due process. The court held that a proceeding is quasi-judicial if it involves determining the interests, rights, or duties of specific individuals and applying current law or policy to past or present facts. The court concluded that the Title IX investigation met these criteria and was therefore quasi-judicial. Consequently, the statements made during the investigation were protected by absolute privilege, and the lawsuit against Ashley, Alexandra, and their mothers could not proceed. The court reversed the decision of the court of appeals and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "Hushen v. Gonzales" on Justia Law

E.R., the appellant, filed a complaint against the Beaufort County School District, alleging that the district failed to respond appropriately to her reports of sexual abuse and harassment while she was a student. E.R. claimed she was sexually assaulted by three male students and subsequently bullied and harassed by other students. Despite reporting these incidents to school officials, she alleged that no appropriate action was taken.The case was initially filed in South Carolina state court, asserting claims under Title IX and state law for negligence and gross negligence. The school district removed the case to federal court and moved to dismiss it, arguing that the claims were untimely under the South Carolina Tort Claims Act (SCTCA), which has a two-year statute of limitations. The district court agreed, applying the SCTCA's statute of limitations to both the Title IX and state law claims, and dismissed the case as it was filed more than two years after E.R. turned 18.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the appropriate statute of limitations for Title IX claims is the state's general personal injury statute of limitations, not the SCTCA's two-year period. The court reasoned that Title IX claims should borrow the statute of limitations from the most analogous state law cause of action, which in this case is the general personal injury statute. Since South Carolina's general personal injury statute of limitations is three years, E.R.'s claims were timely.The Fourth Circuit vacated the district court's dismissal of E.R.'s complaint and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "E.R. v. Beaufort County School District" on Justia Law

Christopher Cole, an employee of The Kansas City Southern Railway Company (KCSR), sustained severe injuries while working, leading to the amputation of both legs. Cole filed a negligence claim under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act (FELA), asserting general negligence and negligence per se due to KCSR's violation of an Illinois close clearance regulation. The jury found KCSR liable and awarded Cole $12 million in damages, which the circuit court entered as judgment. The court later amended the judgment to include post-judgment interest.The Circuit Court of St. Louis County presided over the initial trial. The jury found Cole 21 percent at fault and KCSR 79 percent at fault. KCSR filed motions for a new trial and for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV), both of which were overruled. Cole subsequently filed a motion to amend the judgment to include post-judgment interest, which the circuit court granted.The Supreme Court of Missouri reviewed the case. The court affirmed the circuit court’s judgment in many respects but vacated the $12 million damages award and the post-judgment interest. The court held that the circuit court erred in submitting jury instructions that deprived KCSR of its contributory negligence defense under FELA. The court also found that the circuit court lacked jurisdiction to amend its judgment to include post-judgment interest after the original judgment became final. The Supreme Court of Missouri remanded the case to the circuit court to reduce the damages award to $9.48 million, reflecting Cole’s contributory negligence, and to enter judgment without post-judgment interest. View "Cole v. The Kansas City Southern Railway Co." on Justia Law

Dr. Jeffery Weisman filed a lawsuit after resigning from Washington University’s residency program, alleging that he was forced to resign due to hostile treatment and that Washington University and Barnes Jewish Hospital prevented him from transferring to another residency program. Weisman brought claims for breach of contract, tortious interference, fraudulent inducement, and defamation under Missouri law. Washington University and Barnes Jewish Hospital counterclaimed for a violation of the Missouri Computer Tampering Act (MCTA).The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri dismissed Weisman’s tortious interference and fraudulent inducement claims, and some of his breach of contract claims. The court granted summary judgment in favor of Barnes Jewish Hospital on the remaining breach of contract claims and the defamation claim. The court also dismissed the MCTA counterclaims and the defendants’ request for attorneys’ fees. Weisman appealed the adverse judgments on his claims, and the defendants cross-appealed the dismissal of the MCTA counterclaims and denial of attorneys’ fees.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decisions. The appellate court held that the statute of frauds barred Weisman’s breach of contract claim related to the Lab-Residency Contract, as it was an oral agreement for a term of five years. The court also affirmed the dismissal of the tortious interference claims, concluding that Evers and Benzinger, as agents of Washington University, were not third parties to the contracts. Additionally, the court upheld the dismissal of the fraudulent inducement claims, as the alleged Separation Agreement did not exist. Finally, the court affirmed the dismissal of the MCTA counterclaims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, as Weisman’s tender of full payment rendered the claims moot. View "Weisman v. Barnes Jewish Hospital" on Justia Law

Kierra Dates filed a lawsuit against the City of Atlanta after her minor son was injured by a falling tree branch on City property. Dates sent an initial ante litem notice to the City within the required time frame, claiming a nonspecific amount of loss. Over a year later, she sent a supplemental notice claiming a loss of $1,000,000. The trial court dismissed her complaint for failing to comply with the municipal ante litem notice statute, and Dates appealed.The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision, holding that Dates's first notice was not specific enough and that her second notice was untimely. The court also ruled that the tolling provision for actions brought by minors did not apply to municipal ante litem notices.The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the case to determine whether the minor tolling provision applies to the municipal ante litem notice statute. The Court concluded that the tolling provision does not apply. The Court reasoned that the municipal ante litem notice statute is a condition precedent to bringing a lawsuit, not a statute of limitations, and therefore is not subject to tolling under the minor tolling provision. The Court affirmed the Court of Appeals' decision, holding that Dates's supplemental notice was untimely and not tolled by the minor tolling provision. View "DATES v. CITY OF ATLANTA" on Justia Law

A man named Yoon Suk Chang was injured at the American Memorial Park on Saipan when his foot got caught in a large hole in a grassy area. He suffered severe ankle injuries, which required surgery and led to significant medical expenses and financial losses. Chang filed a negligence claim under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) against the United States, alleging that the National Park Service (NPS) allowed a dangerous hole to go unrepaired.The District Court for the Northern Mariana Islands dismissed Chang's complaint, citing the discretionary function exception of the FTCA. The court reasoned that the decisions on how to inspect and maintain the grassy areas involved policy considerations, such as safety, public access, and aesthetics. Therefore, the court concluded that the discretionary function exception applied, and the United States was immune from the lawsuit.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and reversed the district court's judgment. The Ninth Circuit held that the discretionary function exception did not apply because the routine maintenance of a grassy lawn did not involve government employees balancing public policy considerations. The court emphasized that the NPS's failure to repair a hole in a regularly maintained grass area was a matter of routine maintenance, which is not protected by the discretionary function exception. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "Chang v. United States" on Justia Law

Caitlin Workman, a maintenance trainee at a coal mine, was injured on November 8, 2021, when a chain under tension snapped and struck her right upper extremity. She was diagnosed with a right shoulder contusion and back laceration. Following the injury, she experienced increased pain, weakness in her right arm, grip strength deficit, and a noticeable tremor. Despite conflicting medical evidence, the claim administrator determined that she had reached maximum medical improvement (MMI) and suspended her temporary total disability (TTD) benefits. The Workers’ Compensation Board of Review affirmed this decision.The Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA) also affirmed the Board’s decision, concluding that the Board was not clearly wrong in finding that Ms. Workman had reached MMI and that her continuing symptoms were unrelated to the compensable injury. The ICA relied on the opinion of Dr. Mukkamala, who conducted an independent medical evaluation and found no need for further diagnostic studies or treatment.The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia reviewed the case and found that the Board failed to properly weigh the medical evidence as required by West Virginia Code § 23-4-1g(a). The Court noted that the Board did not adequately explain why it favored Dr. Mukkamala’s opinion over the medical evidence provided by Ms. Workman’s treating physicians, who indicated that her symptoms were related to the compensable injury and that she had not reached MMI. The Court also found that the Board’s conclusion that Ms. Workman’s symptoms were unrelated to the compensable injury was clearly wrong.The Supreme Court of Appeals reversed the ICA’s decision and remanded the case to the Board of Review with directions to award Ms. Workman TTD benefits from November 9, 2021, through April 9, 2022, and to authorize additional testing and treatment as supported by proper medical evidence. View "Workman v. ACNR Resources, Inc." on Justia Law

In April 2022, six-year-old Emory Sayre was killed by her school bus in Parker County, Texas. The bus was manufactured by Blue Bird Body Company and sold by Rush Truck Centers of Texas to Brock Independent School District. Emory's parents, Sean and Tori Sayre, filed a lawsuit in Dallas County against Rush Truck and Blue Bird, asserting various claims including strict liability and negligence. They argued that venue was proper in Dallas County due to several activities related to the bus sale occurring there.The trial court denied the defendants' motion to transfer venue to Parker or Comal County. Rush Truck and Blue Bird filed an interlocutory appeal, which the Court of Appeals for the Fifth District of Texas affirmed, holding that a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claims occurred in Dallas County.The Supreme Court of Texas reviewed the case and focused on whether the Court of Appeals had jurisdiction to entertain the interlocutory appeal. The Court held that Section 15.003(b) of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code permits interlocutory appeals only in cases where a plaintiff’s independent claim to venue is at issue. Since the Sayres asserted identical claims based on identical facts with identical venue grounds, the trial court did not need to determine whether each plaintiff independently established proper venue. Therefore, the Court of Appeals erred in taking jurisdiction of the interlocutory appeal.The Supreme Court of Texas vacated the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remanded the case to the district court for further proceedings. View "Rush Truck Centers of Texas, L.P. v. Sayre" on Justia Law