Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

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Defendants discovered that a parcel of land near their property was seemingly omitted from the plaintiff's deed. They arranged for the heirs of a previous owner to deed that parcel to them without confirming the heirs' ownership or consulting the plaintiff, who used the parcel. After recording their deed, defendants informed the plaintiff that they owned the parcel and asked her to remove her belongings. The plaintiff sued for deed reformation and slander of title.The Superior Court, Windham Unit, Civil Division, granted the plaintiff's claim for deed reformation on summary judgment and concluded that Mr. Kolodziej slandered the plaintiff's title after a bench trial. Defendants appealed the decision.The Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court's decisions. The court held that the plaintiff had a transferrable ownership interest capable of disparagement, as the reformed deed related back to the original deed. The court found that the defendants published a false statement by recording a deed that falsely claimed ownership of the disputed parcel. The court also concluded that Mr. Kolodziej acted with malice by recklessly disregarding the plaintiff's potential claim to the property. Finally, the court determined that the plaintiff's legal expenses incurred in clearing the cloud on her title constituted special damages necessary to sustain her slander-of-title claim. The court affirmed the trial court's grant of summary judgment on the deed reformation and the ruling on the slander-of-title claim, including the award of attorney's fees to the plaintiff. View "Massucco v. Kolodziej" on Justia Law

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In this case, Claudia Kennedy, as the executor of Donald R. Gerres's estate, filed a medical malpractice lawsuit against Western Reserve Senior Care and Dr. Sataya Acharya, among others, alleging that substandard medical care led to Gerres's death in October 2013. Kennedy initially filed the lawsuit in September 2014, voluntarily dismissed it in January 2019, and refiled it within a year.The trial court denied the healthcare providers' motion for judgment on the pleadings, which argued that the four-year statute of repose for medical claims barred Kennedy's refiled action. However, after the Ohio Supreme Court's decision in Wilson v. Durrani, which held that the saving statute does not preserve claims refiled after the statute of repose expires, the healthcare providers sought summary judgment. The trial court denied this motion but later granted a directed verdict in favor of the healthcare providers after Kennedy's opening statements.Kennedy appealed to the Eleventh District Court of Appeals, arguing that R.C. 2305.15(A) tolled the statute of repose because Dr. Acharya had moved out of Ohio. The Eleventh District affirmed the trial court's decision, holding that applying the tolling statute to Dr. Acharya, who left Ohio for legitimate business purposes, violated the dormant Commerce Clause.The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the case and held that R.C. 2305.15(A) does not violate the dormant Commerce Clause as applied to a physician who moved out of Ohio to practice medicine in another state. The court found that the tolling statute serves a legitimate local purpose and does not impose a burden on interstate commerce that is clearly excessive in relation to its benefits. The judgment of the Eleventh District Court of Appeals was reversed, and the case was remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. View "Kennedy v. W. Res. Senior Care" on Justia Law

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The plaintiff, a self-represented pediatric dentist, sued the defendant newspaper for defamation, alleging that two articles published by the defendant exaggerated the scope and seriousness of disciplinary proceedings against him. The articles reported on disciplinary actions taken by the Department of Public Health and the Connecticut State Dental Commission, which resulted in a reprimand, fines, and probation of the plaintiff’s dental license. The plaintiff claimed that five statements in the articles were defamatory and that a stock photograph accompanying the articles was independently defamatory.The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant, concluding that the five statements were either substantially true or protected by the fair report privilege under the First Amendment. The court did not address the photograph as an independent defamation claim, as the plaintiff had not distinctly raised it as such in his pleadings. The plaintiff appealed, and the Appellate Court affirmed the trial court’s judgment, declining to consider the photograph claim because it was not distinctly raised before the trial court.The Connecticut Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the Appellate Court’s decision. The court held that the trial court did not err in granting summary judgment without treating the plaintiff’s references to the photograph as an independent defamation claim. The court emphasized that the plaintiff’s self-represented status did not relieve him of the obligation to sufficiently articulate his claims. The court also clarified that the fair report privilege is not defeated by demonstrating malice in fact, and that the privilege applies as long as the report is a fair and substantially accurate account of the proceedings. View "Idlibi v. Hartford Courant Co." on Justia Law

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In this case, the plaintiff, David Yaffee, was injured in a car accident in 2015 when his vehicle was rear-ended by a truck driven by Joseph Skeen, who was employed by KLS Transportation, Inc. Yaffee experienced significant pain and medical issues following the accident, leading to multiple medical treatments, including surgeries and ongoing pain management. He filed a personal injury lawsuit against Skeen and KLS, with National Liability & Fire Insurance Company appearing on behalf of KLS.The Superior Court of Sacramento County oversaw the trial, where a jury awarded Yaffee $3,299,455 in damages for past and future economic earnings and noneconomic loss. The defendants challenged several aspects of the award, including past and future medical damages, lost earnings, future noneconomic damages, and the award for costs and prejudgment interest. The trial court denied the defendants' motions for a new trial and partial judgment notwithstanding the verdict.The California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court found that the trial court had erred in its interpretation of the Hospital Lien Act (HLA) regarding the proper measure of past medical damages. The appellate court concluded that the HLA only applies to emergency and ongoing services provided while the patient remains in the hospital or an affiliated facility, not to all future services related to the injury. Consequently, the award for past medical damages was reversed, and the case was remanded for a new trial on this issue.The appellate court also found that the award for future medical damages was not supported by substantial evidence, particularly regarding the need for a dorsal root ganglion stimulator. This award was also reversed and remanded for a new trial. However, the court upheld the jury's awards for past and future lost earnings and future noneconomic damages, finding sufficient evidence to support these awards. The award for costs and prejudgment interest was vacated due to the partial reversal of the judgment. View "Yaffee v. Skeen" on Justia Law

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A woman was involved in a head-on car collision in Petaluma, California. Fire department paramedics responded to the scene and repeatedly offered her medical assistance, which she declined, stating she was not injured. Despite being warned of potential serious injuries that might not yet be symptomatic, she refused transport to a hospital. Hours later, she suffered a debilitating stroke due to a hypertensive crisis triggered by the collision. She subsequently filed a lawsuit against the City of Petaluma and the paramedics, alleging gross negligence for failing to properly assess her medical condition and transport her to a hospital.The Sonoma County Superior Court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants, ruling that the paramedics did not assume a duty of care to provide the medical assistance claimed by the plaintiff. The court found that the paramedics did not initiate medical care but merely offered it, which the plaintiff refused. Therefore, the paramedics did not owe a duty to perform a full medical assessment.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division One, reviewed the case. The court affirmed the lower court's decision, holding that the paramedics did not assume a duty to provide medical assistance under the negligent undertaking doctrine. The court emphasized that the paramedics' duty was limited by the plaintiff's repeated refusals of medical assistance and transport to a hospital. The court concluded that the paramedics' actions did not increase the risk of harm to the plaintiff and that they left her in the same condition as when they arrived. Thus, the paramedics did not owe a duty to provide the medical care the plaintiff claimed was necessary. View "Murphy v. City of Petaluma" on Justia Law

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Plaintiffs Antonio Juarez, Jose Hinojosa, Jose Espinosa, and Maria Morfin filed a lawsuit against the San Bernardino City Unified School District following an incident involving Officer Alejandro Brown, a District employee. In February 2018, Juarez found a cell phone and later, Officer Brown, tracking his phone, confronted the plaintiffs, identifying himself as a District police officer. Brown, armed and displaying his badge, demanded compliance, struck Juarez with his firearm, and threatened the others. Brown later pled guilty to assault and battery and threatening the plaintiffs under color of law.The Superior Court of Riverside County sustained the District’s demurrer to the plaintiffs’ second amended complaint without leave to amend, leading to the dismissal of the case. The court found the complaint insufficient to establish that Officer Brown was acting within the scope of his employment with the District and dismissed the claims of negligence, battery, assault, negligent hiring, supervision, and retention, false arrest and imprisonment, intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress, and violation of the Bane Act.The Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, State of California, reversed and remanded the case. The appellate court held that the scope of employment is a factual issue that cannot be resolved as a matter of law on demurrer. The court found that Officer Brown’s off-duty misconduct, while investigating a suspected theft and wielding his authority as a peace officer, could be regarded as an outgrowth of his employment. The court directed the trial court to vacate its order sustaining the demurrer, enter a new order overruling the demurrer, and conduct further proceedings. The appellate court also rejected the District’s arguments regarding the Bane Act and found the plaintiffs’ allegations sufficient to state a cause of action for negligent hiring, supervision, and retention. View "Juarez v. San Bernardino City Unified Sch. Dist." on Justia Law

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On February 9, 2017, a bus owned and operated by New Jersey Transit Corporation (NJT) allegedly struck and injured Jeffrey Colt in Manhattan. Colt and his wife, Betsy Tsai, filed a lawsuit on September 18, 2017, claiming negligence, negligent hiring, and loss of consortium. NJT and its employee, Ana Hernandez, who was driving the bus, denied many of the allegations and asserted various defenses, including a lack of jurisdiction and immunity from suit. In 2020, NJT moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing it was protected by sovereign immunity as an arm of the State of New Jersey.The Supreme Court of New York County denied NJT's motion, ruling that NJT had waived its right to assert sovereign immunity by waiting three years to raise the defense. The Appellate Division affirmed the decision but on different grounds, concluding that NJT was an arm of the State of New Jersey and entitled to sovereign immunity. However, it held that dismissing the case would be unjust since the plaintiffs could not sue in New Jersey due to venue rules.The New York Court of Appeals reviewed the case and affirmed the Appellate Division's order but on different grounds. The Court of Appeals held that NJT is not entitled to invoke sovereign immunity in New York courts. The court considered factors such as how New Jersey defines NJT and its functions, the state's power to direct NJT's conduct, and the effect of a judgment against NJT on the state's dignity. The court concluded that allowing the suit to proceed would not offend New Jersey's sovereign dignity because NJT operates with significant independence and New Jersey would not be liable for a judgment against NJT. Therefore, NJT and the other defendants could not claim sovereign immunity. View "Colt v. New Jersey Tr. Corp." on Justia Law

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The plaintiff, the decedent's son and Administrator of her estate, filed a negligence, medical malpractice, and wrongful death lawsuit in the Supreme Court, New York County, against Dewitt Rehabilitation and Nursing Center and other defendants. The decedent was a resident at Dewitt in February and March 2019. Dewitt moved to transfer the venue to Nassau County based on a forum selection clause in two electronically signed admission agreements. Dewitt supported its motion with the agreements and an affidavit from its director of admissions, Francesca Trimarchi. The plaintiff contested the authenticity of the agreements, claiming the signatures were forged and provided an exemplar of the decedent's handwritten signature for comparison.The Supreme Court granted Dewitt's motion, finding that Dewitt met its initial burden to show the forum selection clause was applicable and enforceable, and that the plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact regarding the alleged forgery. The case was ordered to be transferred to Supreme Court, Nassau County. The Appellate Division reversed, holding that Dewitt failed to adequately authenticate the admission agreements as Trimarchi did not witness the signing, and thus the forum selection clause was unenforceable. The dissent argued that the burden should be on the plaintiff to prove the clause should not be enforced.The Court of Appeals of New York reversed the Appellate Division's decision, reinstating the Supreme Court's order. The court held that Dewitt met its burden of establishing the authenticity of the agreements through circumstantial evidence, including Trimarchi's affidavit and the agreements themselves. The plaintiff failed to provide sufficient evidence to raise a genuine issue of fact regarding the authenticity of the signatures. The court also clarified that CPLR 4539(b) was inapplicable as the documents were originally created in electronic form. The certified question was answered in the negative. View "Knight v New York & Presbyt. Hosp." on Justia Law

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In July 2020, the plaintiff used Uber's app to request a ride. Upon being dropped off in the middle of a roadway, she was struck by another vehicle and sustained injuries. She filed a personal injury lawsuit against Uber in November 2020, serving the complaint via the New York Secretary of State. Uber did not respond within the required 30 days, allegedly due to mail processing delays caused by the COVID-19 pandemic.In January 2021, Uber updated its terms of use, including an arbitration agreement, and notified users via email. The plaintiff received and opened this email. When she next logged into the Uber app, she was presented with a pop-up screen requiring her to agree to the updated terms to continue using the service. She checked a box and clicked "Confirm," thereby agreeing to the terms, which included a clause delegating the authority to resolve disputes about the agreement's applicability and enforceability to an arbitrator.The plaintiff moved for a default judgment in March 2021, and Uber responded by asserting that she had agreed to arbitrate her claims. Uber then sent a Notice of Intent to Arbitrate. The plaintiff moved to stay Uber's arbitration demand, arguing that the arbitration agreement was unconscionable and violated ethical rules. Uber cross-moved to compel arbitration.The Supreme Court granted Uber's motion to compel arbitration, finding that the plaintiff was on inquiry notice of the arbitration agreement and had assented to it. The Appellate Division affirmed, stating that the plaintiff's challenges to the agreement's validity must be decided by an arbitrator due to the delegation provision.The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division's decision, holding that the clickwrap process used by Uber resulted in a valid agreement to arbitrate. The court also held that the delegation provision was valid and that the plaintiff's challenges to the arbitration agreement's enforceability should be resolved by an arbitrator. The court found no abuse of discretion in the lower court's decision not to sanction Uber for the alleged ethical violation. View "Wu v. Uber Tech., Inc." on Justia Law

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Grace Gonzalez slipped and fell on oranges in the common walkway of the Ontario Mills Shopping Center, owned by Ontario Mills Limited Partnership (OMLP) and maintained by Interstate Cleaning Corporation (ICC). Gonzalez filed a lawsuit against OMLP and ICC, alleging premises liability. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants, ruling that there was no triable issue of material fact because the defendants conducted active and frequent inspections of the floors, including the area where Gonzalez fell, and had no actual or constructive knowledge of the spilled oranges.The Superior Court of San Bernardino County reviewed the case and found that the defendants had no actual knowledge of the oranges before the fall. The court also found that the evidence of ICC’s training and inspection practices demonstrated that the area where Gonzalez fell had been inspected eight to nine minutes before the incident. The court ruled that this evidence showed the defendants lacked constructive knowledge of the dangerous condition in time to remedy it, and therefore, granted summary judgment for the defendants.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Fourth Appellate District, Division Two, reviewed the case and affirmed the trial court’s decision. The appellate court held that the undisputed evidence showed the defendants actively inspected the floor, and the eight- to nine-minute interval between the last inspection and Gonzalez’s fall was insufficient to demonstrate constructive knowledge. The court concluded that the defendants could not be held liable for Gonzalez’s injuries as they had exercised reasonable care in inspecting the premises. View "Gonzalez v. Interstate Cleaning Corp." on Justia Law