Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

In a lawsuit between two competitors in the shipping logistics industry, Project44, Inc. and FourKites, Inc., Project44 alleged that FourKites agents sent defamatory emails to Project44's chief revenue officer and two members of its board of directors. FourKites argued that there was no publication to a third party because the emails were sent to members of the corporation who were, in effect, the corporation itself. The Cook County circuit court agreed with FourKites and dismissed Project44's complaint for failure to state a claim. On appeal, the appellate court reversed the decision, and the case was remanded for further proceedings.The Supreme Court of the State of Illinois affirmed the decision of the appellate court, holding that there is publication to a third party when an allegedly defamatory statement is communicated to a member of a corporation’s executive leadership team. It was determined that a corporation has a distinct reputation from that of its management-level employees and an interest in protecting that reputation among its employees and the public at large. Therefore, defamatory statements made to corporate employees, even those with the power to act on behalf of the corporation, can harm the corporation’s business reputation among those employees. Communication of a defamatory statement regarding the corporation to these employees establishes the publication element for a defamation action brought by the corporation against the party that publishes the statement. View "Project44, Inc. v. FourKites, Inc." on Justia Law

The Michigan Supreme Court, in a per curiam opinion, addressed the applicability of the Recreational Land Use Act (RUA) and the owner-liability provision of the Michigan Vehicle Code to a case involving a fatal off-road vehicle (ORV) accident. The accident occurred on private land owned by the defendants, also the grandparents and vehicle owners, and involved their 12-year-old granddaughter. The plaintiff, mother of the deceased, sought to hold the defendants liable.The court held that the RUA, which limits a landowner's liability for injuries occurring during recreational activity on their property to instances of gross negligence or willful and wanton misconduct, applies in this case. It found that the RUA applies to the plaintiff's proposed owner-liability claim, which is premised on the defendants' ownership of the vehicle involved in the accident. The court reasoned that the longstanding nature of owner liability when the RUA was enacted, the RUA's detailed provisions and lack of an exception for owner liability, and the optimal effect given to both statutes under this interpretation, indicate that the legislature intended the RUA to limit owner liability under the Michigan Vehicle Code.Since the plaintiff did not challenge the lower court's finding that there was no factual support for gross negligence on the part of the defendants, the court affirmed the trial court's decision granting the defendants' motion for summary disposition and denying the plaintiff's motion to amend her complaint. View "Estate Of Riley Robinson v. Robinson" on Justia Law

In West Virginia, a woman sued the City of Logan after she tripped over a loop of cable wire on a sidewalk, which she alleged the city negligently maintained. The cable wire and post were owned by the First Baptist Church of Logan, West Virginia, and the wire had been around the pole for at least ten years. The woman had walked the same route on her lunch break daily for over a year prior to the accident. She testified that she had never noticed the wire before the day of her injury.The city, in its defense, pointed out that it did not own the wire, had never received any reports about the wire causing a hazard, and did not have any notice or knowledge that the wire was on the sidewalk before the woman's fall. Street Commissioner for the City of Logan, Kevin Marcum, testified that under city ordinances, property owners are in charge of sidewalks.Following discovery, the circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of the city, finding that the woman failed to support a negligence claim under West Virginia law. The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia affirmed this decision, agreeing that the woman failed to establish that the city knew or should have known that the wire was on the sidewalk causing a potential hazard. The court held that foreseeability or reasonable anticipation of the consequences of an act is determinative of a defendant’s negligence. Because there was no evidence demonstrating that the city knew or should have known that the wire was on the sidewalk causing a potential hazard, the court concluded that the city was entitled to summary judgment. View "Orso v. The City of Logan" on Justia Law

The case involves Michael Goguen, an engineer and businessman, who was the subject of two civil suits alleging sexual and criminal misconduct. The New York Post published an article detailing these lawsuits, which Goguen claimed was defamatory. Goguen filed a defamation lawsuit against New York Post's parent company, NYP Holdings, and others. In response, NYP Holdings argued that their article was protected by New York’s fair report privilege, a law that protects media from defamation suits if they are reporting on official proceedings.However, the District Court in Montana, where Goguen resides, applied Montana law and denied NYP Holdings' motion to dismiss, finding that whether the article was privileged was a question of fact for the jury. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Montana determined that under Montana's choice of law rules, New York law should be applied to determine the fair report privilege. The Court found that all the contested statements in the article fairly and accurately reported the lawsuits against Goguen and were thus protected by New York's fair report privilege. Therefore, the Court held that NYP Holdings was entitled to dismissal of Goguen’s complaint.The Court also upheld the District Court's decision to dismiss Goguen's defamation claim against former police chief Bill Dial, ruling that Dial's statements in the article were protected opinions and not actionable. View "Goguen v. NYP Holdings" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court of the State of Montana affirmed a lower court decision that granted Dr. Gregory S. Tierney's motion to dismiss a medical malpractice lawsuit filed by Janice M. Dodds for insufficient service of process. Dodds initially filed the suit against Dr. Tierney and Benefis Health System in 2013, alleging medical malpractice related to a knee replacement surgery. She failed to serve the defendants in time. Dr. Tierney later filed for bankruptcy, which invoked an automatic stay, halting the lawsuit. After his bankruptcy discharge, Dodds attempted to serve Dr. Tierney but failed to do so within the required 30-day timeframe following the discharge.Dodds further sought to join Dr. Tierney's malpractice insurance company as the real party in interest, but the court denied the motion. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that Dodds had not proven Dr. Tierney's liability, thus the insurer had no duty to indemnify him. The court also rejected Dodds' argument that Dr. Tierney lacked standing after his Chapter 7 discharge. The court held that Dr. Tierney maintained a personal stake in demonstrating he was not liable for medical malpractice and that his insurer would only have a duty to indemnify him once Dodds proved her malpractice claims. View "Dodds v. Tierney" on Justia Law

In this case, the Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma addressed a claim brought by a mother seeking recovery for the loss of her minor child who had drowned in a neighbor's swimming pool. The mother alleged negligence against the property owner, claiming that the swimming pool was an "attractive nuisance." Initially, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of the property owner, arguing that the owner did not owe a duty to the child. The mother appealed the decision, leading the Court of Civil Appeals to reverse the district court's judgment, positing that whether the swimming pool was an attractive nuisance was a fact for the jury to decide.Upon review, the Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma held that the swimming pool was not an attractive nuisance as a matter of law. The court observed that the pool did not contain any hidden or unusual element of danger. However, the court also determined that a question of fact remained regarding whether the owner could be held liable under ordinary premises liability law. This conclusion barred summary judgment in favor of the property owner.Thus, while the Court affirmed the district court's judgment concerning the attractive nuisance claim, it reversed the decision on the issue of ordinary premises liability. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the Supreme Court's opinion. It was noted that these circumstances would allow a jury to evaluate all surrounding facts in determining liability under ordinary premises liability law. View "Brown v. Dempster" on Justia Law

This case involves Jade P. Schiewe and Zachary Pfaff, who filed a lawsuit against the Cessna Aircraft Company, alleging negligence after a plane crash in September 2010. The plaintiffs were flying a Cessna 172RG when a fire erupted in the cockpit, leading to a crash landing. They claimed that Cessna was negligent in not updating its service manual to include a new part and its installation instructions. Cessna, however, filed a motion for summary judgment, contending that the plaintiffs' claims were barred by the General Aviation Revitalization Act of 1994 (GARA), an act that limits liability for aircraft manufacturers 18 years after the delivery of the aircraft to its first purchaser.The Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma affirmed the lower court's decision to grant summary judgment in favor of Cessna. The court held that the service manual was created by Cessna in its capacity as a manufacturer, and thus, was included within the limitation period provided in GARA. The court further found that Cessna had not added or omitted anything to the service manual that was a proximate cause of the accident, and thus, the GARA statute of repose did not restart. Therefore, the plaintiffs' claims were barred by GARA as the statute of repose had expired. View "SCHIEWE v. CESSNA AIRCRAFT CO" on Justia Law

In a medical malpractice case before the Supreme Court of the State of Nevada, the plaintiff, Kimberly D. Taylor, sued Dr. Keith Brill and Women’s Health Associates of Southern Nevada-Martin PLLC for professional negligence. Taylor alleged that Dr. Brill breached the standard of care by perforating her uterus and bowel during a surgical procedure and failed to inform her of these complications. The jury ruled in favor of Dr. Brill and denied all of Taylor’s claims.The Supreme Court of Nevada held that in a professional negligence action, evidence of informed consent and assumption of the risk are irrelevant and inadmissible when the plaintiff does not challenge consent. The court stated that even if a plaintiff gave informed consent, it would not vitiate the medical provider’s duty to provide treatment according to the ordinary standard of care. Furthermore, evidence of a procedure’s risks must still fall within Nevada's professional negligence statute, and a case-by-case analysis is required to determine whether the evidence should be excluded due to its potential to confuse the jury.The court also held that expert or physician testimony is not required to demonstrate the reasonableness of the billing amount of special damages. The court found that the district court had abused its discretion by prohibiting non-expert evidence demonstrating the reasonableness of the charges for medical treatment received by Taylor.Finally, the court ruled that evidence of insurance write-downs is not admissible under NRS 42.021(1), as it only contemplates evidence of actual benefits paid to the plaintiff by collateral sources.Based on these errors, the Supreme Court of Nevada reversed the judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings, including a new trial. View "Taylor v. Brill" on Justia Law

Dorothy Hampton was released from the Medical Center of Southeast Texas after an abdominal hernia surgery. Later that night, she fell at home, becoming confused and disoriented, and was readmitted to the hospital. She filed a health care liability claim against Dr. Leonard Thome, alleging that she was released prematurely from the hospital which led to her fall and subsequent mental and physical injuries. Hampton's lawyer sent a pre-suit notice to Dr. Thome along with a medical authorization form as required under Texas law before filing a suit. The form listed only two providers and omitted future health care providers.Hampton filed her suit outside the usual two-year statute of limitations but within the 75-day tolling period provided by the law. Dr. Thome argued that the lawsuit was filed outside the limitations period as the medical authorization form served by Hampton was deficient, and hence the 75-day tolling period was not applicable. The trial court rejected this argument, but the court of appeals reversed the decision.The Supreme Court of Texas held that an imperfect medical authorization form is still a medical authorization form, which is sufficient to toll the statute of limitations for 75 days. The court emphasized that the limitations period should be established with clarity at the outset. Any defects or omissions in the medical authorization form that came to light during the litigation could have been adequately addressed by the statutory remedy of abatement, additional discovery, or even sanctions. The judgment of the court of appeals was reversed, and the case was remanded for further proceedings. View "HAMPTON v. THOME" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court of Nevada ruled on a motion for disqualification of a supreme court justice in a medical malpractice action appeal. The appellant argued that Nevada Code of Judicial Conduct 2.11(A)(6)(d) required disqualification of Justice Douglas Herndon, who had been assigned the case when he was a district judge, but had not heard or decided any matters in the case before it was reassigned. The appellant argued that the rule required disqualification whenever a judge previously presided over a matter, regardless of the level of involvement.Justice Herndon and the respondents countered that he had seen no documents and performed no work on the case at the district court level, and therefore his impartiality could not be questioned. They argued that the Code of Judicial Conduct does not require disqualification in such circumstances, and that a judge has a general duty to hear and decide cases where disqualification is not required.After considering the language and context of the Code of Judicial Conduct, along with similar cases from other jurisdictions, the Supreme Court of Nevada held that to "preside" over a matter within the meaning of the disqualification rule, a judge must have exercised some control or authority over the matter in the lower court. Given that Justice Herndon had simply been administratively assigned the case and took no action during his assignment, he did not "preside" over the case in a way that mandated disqualification. The court therefore denied the motion for disqualification. View "Taylor v. Brill" on Justia Law