Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

Ninety-four former patients of Dr. David Broadbent, an obstetrician and gynecologist, sued him, alleging that he sexually assaulted them under the guise of providing medical treatment. The claims against Broadbent included sexual battery, sexual assault, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The plaintiffs described various incidents where Broadbent allegedly performed inappropriate and non-medical acts during their medical appointments, causing them significant emotional and psychological harm.The defendants, including Broadbent and the healthcare facilities where he worked, moved to dismiss the case in the Fourth District Court in Provo, arguing that the plaintiffs' claims were essentially medical malpractice claims. They contended that the plaintiffs had failed to comply with the prelitigation requirements of the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act. The district court agreed with the defendants, concluding that the plaintiffs' injuries arose from health care provided by Broadbent and dismissed the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.The plaintiffs appealed to the Utah Supreme Court, arguing that their claims were not subject to the Malpractice Act because their injuries did not arise from health care but from sexual assaults that had no medical purpose. The Utah Supreme Court agreed with the plaintiffs, holding that the Malpractice Act did not apply to their claims. The court reasoned that the alleged acts of sexual assault were not within the scope of legitimate medical treatment and had no medical purpose, even though they occurred during medical appointments. Therefore, the plaintiffs' claims were not based on health care rendered by Broadbent, and the Malpractice Act's prelitigation requirements did not apply. The court reversed the district court's dismissal of the complaint. View "Does v. Broadbent" on Justia Law

Three customers, D.W., L.T., and J.G., filed a lawsuit against FPA Sandy Mall Associates (SMA) and Hong Guang Lin, an unlicensed massage therapist, after Lin allegedly sexually assaulted them during their massage appointments at a shopping center owned by SMA. The plaintiffs claimed premises liability and negligence, arguing that SMA, as the landlord, had a duty to ensure the safety of its invitees and to verify Lin's licensure status.The Third District Court in Salt Lake County denied SMA's motion to dismiss the claims, concluding that SMA owed a duty to the plaintiffs as invitees to keep the premises safe and to exercise reasonable care. The court also applied the five-factor analytical framework from B.R. ex rel. Jeffs v. West, 2012 UT 11, 275 P.3d 228 (Jeffs factors), to assess whether SMA had a duty to verify Lin's licensure status and found that the factors favored recognizing such a duty.The Utah Supreme Court reviewed the case on interlocutory appeal. The court clarified that the Jeffs framework is only applicable when a party seeks to establish a previously unrecognized duty. Since the plaintiffs invoked established duties under Utah law, the district court's application of the Jeffs factors was unnecessary. The Supreme Court struck the district court's analysis based on the Jeffs factors, including its observations on foreseeability, and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its instructions. The court did not address whether SMA owed a duty to verify Lin's licensure status, as this was not the duty recognized by the district court. View "D.W. v. FPA Sandy Mall Associates" on Justia Law

Anne G. McNair experienced a perforated esophagus and infection following cervical fusion surgery performed by Dr. Joshua D. Beck at North Lincoln County Hospital District, d/b/a Star Valley Health. Dr. Beck, employed by Orthopaedics of Jackson Hole, P.C., d/b/a Teton Orthopaedics, continued to treat her post-surgery. McNair filed a complaint against Dr. Beck, Teton, and Star Valley, alleging medical malpractice, negligence, and vicarious liability. The district court dismissed her complaint, citing the statute of limitations, and denied her motion to amend the complaint, deeming it futile.The District Court of Lincoln County granted the defendants' motions to dismiss, concluding that McNair's claims were filed beyond the two-year statute of limitations for medical malpractice actions. The court determined that the continuous treatment rule did not apply, as McNair's injury stemmed from a single act of negligence during the surgery on December 30, 2020. Consequently, the court found that the statute of limitations began on December 31, 2020, the date McNair was discharged from the hospital, making her April 2023 filings untimely. The court also denied McNair's motion to amend her complaint, asserting that any amendment would be futile.The Supreme Court of Wyoming reviewed the case and found that the district court erred in its application of the continuous treatment rule. The Supreme Court held that the continuous treatment rule applies when a medical provider has provided ongoing care for the same or related complaints. The court noted that McNair's complaint alleged continuous treatment by Dr. Beck and Teton into early 2021, which could extend the statute of limitations. The court also found that the district court abused its discretion in denying McNair's motion to amend her complaint, as the proposed amendments did not show on their face that the claims were untimely. The Supreme Court reversed the district court's decision and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "McNair v. Beck" on Justia Law

Christopher Hildebrant, a real-estate developer, facilitated a property sale in 2011 and expected consulting fees from both the seller and the buyer. During the transaction, Hildebrant alleged that Thomas Weidman, a trustee on the Sycamore Township Board, demanded a kickback. To avoid paying, Hildebrant created a fictitious email account and sent himself an email portraying Weidman as demanding payments. This email was forwarded to another party but remained private until 2020, when Hildebrant showed it to other township officials during a separate transaction. Weidman learned of the email in November 2020 during an investigation and received a copy in January 2021.The Warren County Court of Common Pleas granted Hildebrant’s motion for summary judgment, ruling that Weidman’s defamation claim was time-barred by the statute of limitations, which began when the email was first sent in 2011. The court also ruled that Weidman’s claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED) and false-light invasion of privacy were similarly time-barred as they were derivative of the defamation claim.The Twelfth District Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the discovery rule applied to defamation claims when the publication was secretive or inherently unknowable. The court ruled that Weidman’s claims were not time-barred because he could not have known about the defamatory email until it was disclosed to him in 2020.The Supreme Court of Ohio affirmed the appellate court’s decision, holding that the discovery rule applies to libel claims when the publication is secretive or inherently unknowable. The court also held that the discovery rule applies to derivative claims like IIED and false-light invasion of privacy when they are based on the same allegations as the libel claim. The case was remanded to the Warren County Court of Common Pleas for further proceedings. View "Weidman v. Hildebrandt" on Justia Law

Anthony Barron, a civilian contractor, drowned while driving through a low water crossing at Camp Bullis, a U.S. military facility near San Antonio, Texas. The crossing was not closed or guarded despite regulations requiring such measures during heavy rain. Barron’s parents sued the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act, alleging general negligence, premises liability, and negligent undertaking.The United States District Court for the Western District of Texas dismissed the claims, citing sovereign immunity and the discretionary function exception. On appeal, the Fifth Circuit reversed, finding that the regulation mandating the gate be locked or guarded was non-discretionary. On remand, the district court granted summary judgment for the government, ruling that Texas law barred the general negligence and premises liability claims and that the negligent undertaking claim was inadequately pleaded.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case de novo. It affirmed the district court’s summary judgment on the general negligence and premises liability claims, agreeing that Texas law precludes recovery under these theories. However, the appellate court disagreed with the district court’s finding that the negligent undertaking claim was inadequately pleaded. The Fifth Circuit found that the plaintiffs had sufficiently alleged the elements of negligent undertaking.Given the uncertainty in Texas law regarding whether a negligent undertaking claim can proceed when a premises liability claim is barred by the natural accumulation doctrine, the Fifth Circuit certified this question to the Supreme Court of Texas. The appellate court retained jurisdiction pending the state court’s response. View "Barron v. United States" on Justia Law

On February 1, 2020, four Pineville Police Department officers responded to a 911 call about a Black man allegedly waving a gun. They found Timothy Caraway walking alone with a cellphone in his hand. The officers, with weapons drawn, commanded Caraway to raise his hands and drop what they thought was a gun. As Caraway reached into his jacket to discard the gun, Officers Adam Roberts and Jamon Griffin fired twelve shots, hitting Caraway four times. Caraway sued the officers and the City of Pineville under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and North Carolina law, alleging excessive force and assault and battery, among other claims.The United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina granted summary judgment to the officers, finding they were entitled to qualified immunity on the Fourth Amendment excessive force claim and public official immunity on the state-law assault and battery claim. The court concluded that the officers' use of deadly force was reasonable because Caraway's gun was pointed at them in the moments before the shooting.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court held that the officers' use of deadly force was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment because Caraway's gun was pointed at the officers, posing an immediate threat. The court also upheld the grant of public official immunity on the state-law claims, finding that the officers acted without malice. The court declined to segment the shooting into different phases, noting the entire sequence lasted only a few seconds. View "Caraway v. City of Pineville" on Justia Law

Robert Nelson, a car salesman, sustained a back injury on March 29, 2018, while working for Dependable Auto Sales. He experienced significant back pain the following day, leading to a diagnosis of acute back pain with left radiculopathy. Nelson filed a worker’s compensation claim and underwent various treatments and evaluations. Medical opinions varied, with some attributing his back issues to preexisting conditions and obesity, while others recognized a work-related aggravation. Nelson also had a history of preexisting injuries, including knee surgeries and osteoarthritis.Nelson settled his worker’s compensation claim with his employer in September 2019 and subsequently filed a claim against the Idaho Industrial Special Indemnity Fund (ISIF) for total and permanent disability benefits. The Idaho Industrial Commission denied his claim, finding that Nelson failed to prove he was totally and permanently disabled or that he suffered a permanent impairment due to the work-related accident. The Commission’s decision was influenced by its determination that Nelson was not a credible witness, citing inconsistencies in his testimony and a prior conviction for insurance fraud.The Supreme Court of Idaho reviewed the case and affirmed the Commission’s decision. The Court found that substantial and competent evidence supported the Commission’s credibility determination, despite some errors in the Commission’s findings. The Court upheld the Commission’s conclusion that Nelson was not totally and permanently disabled, as the evidence indicated that there was still a labor market for him, even under the most restrictive limitations. The Court did not address the alternative finding regarding permanent impairment. View "Nelson v. State of Idaho, Industrial Special Indemnity Fund" on Justia Law

Jessica Wiseman and her children sued Dr. Nathan Rencher and others for the wrongful death of Eric Wiseman, alleging medical malpractice and gross negligence. Rencher, the only defendant subject to Idaho's prelitigation screening panel requirement, moved for summary judgment, arguing that the Wisemans failed to comply with this requirement. He supported his motion with the panel’s advisory decision, filed under seal. The district court granted Rencher’s motion, concluding that the Wisemans did not meet the prelitigation requirement based on the advisory decision. The Wisemans also sought to disqualify the district judge, which was denied.The district court, part of the Seventh Judicial District of Idaho, ruled that the advisory decision could be considered to determine compliance with the prelitigation requirement. The court found the statutes ambiguous and concluded that they allowed limited review of the advisory decision. The court also ruled that the statutes controlled over conflicting Idaho Rules of Evidence. Consequently, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of Rencher, finding no genuine issue of material fact regarding the Wisemans' compliance with the prelitigation requirement.The Supreme Court of Idaho reversed the district court’s decision, holding that the prelitigation screening statutes unequivocally precluded judicial review of the advisory decision for any purpose. The court emphasized that the statutes clearly stated there should be no judicial review and that parties should not be affected by the panel’s conclusions. The Supreme Court remanded the case for further proceedings. Additionally, the court declined to disqualify the district judge on remand, distinguishing this case from precedent and finding no appearance of bias. Neither party was awarded attorney fees on appeal, as both prevailed in part. View "Wiseman v. Rencher" on Justia Law

In this consolidated appeal, the court examined whether internal reports and documents created after alleged adverse events at nursing and assisted living facilities are discoverable or privileged under the New Jersey Patient Safety Act (PSA). In the first case, the plaintiff, Madeline Keyworth, claimed injuries from two falls at a skilled nursing facility and sought the facility’s internal incident reports. In the second case, the plaintiffs, Suzanne and Jonathan Bender, sought an incident report regarding an alleged attack on Diane Bender by another resident at an assisted living facility. Both facilities argued that the requested materials were privileged under the PSA’s self-critical-analysis privilege.The trial courts in both cases found that the self-critical-analysis privilege did not apply and ordered the defendants to disclose the materials. The Appellate Division reversed these decisions, concluding that the defendants had complied with the PSA’s procedural requirements, thus making the documents privileged and not subject to discovery.The Supreme Court of New Jersey reviewed the cases and held that the facilities did not comply with the PSA’s procedural requirements. Specifically, the court noted that the PSA requires a patient safety committee to operate independently from any other committee within the facility. The defendants’ certifications revealed that their committees did not adhere to this requirement, as they performed dual functions related to both patient safety and quality assurance. Consequently, the court determined that the disputed documents were not privileged under the PSA and were subject to discovery.The court reversed the Appellate Division’s judgment and remanded the cases to the trial courts for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. The main holding was that the facilities’ failure to comply with the PSA’s procedural requirements meant that the self-critical-analysis privilege did not apply to the disputed documents. View "Keyworth v. CareOne at Madison Avenue" on Justia Law

Pearl Ray and Andrew Ray, Sr. sued medical providers in Illinois state court for medical malpractice, which allegedly injured Pearl and caused Andrew to suffer a loss of consortium. They settled with all but one defendant. Pearl was enrolled in a federal health benefits plan, and Blue Cross and Blue Shield Association (BCBSA) was the plan’s carrier. Under the plan, BCBSA sought reimbursement from the settlement for benefits paid to Pearl. The plaintiffs filed a motion to reduce BCBSA’s reimbursement by their attorney’s fees and costs under Illinois’s common fund doctrine.The case was removed to federal court by BCBSA, arguing federal question jurisdiction and federal officer removal. The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois initially denied the remand motion but later reconsidered and remanded the entire case, concluding it lacked federal question jurisdiction. BCBSA appealed, asserting federal question jurisdiction and federal officer removal.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the district court’s decision de novo. The court held that federal question jurisdiction was not present, as federal common law did not govern the reimbursement dispute, following the precedent set by Empire Healthchoice Assurance, Inc. v. McVeigh and Blue Cross Blue Shield of Illinois v. Cruz. However, the court found that BCBSA met the requirements for federal officer removal under 28 U.S.C. § 1442, as it was acting under a federal agency (OPM) and had a colorable federal defense.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision in part, reversed in part, and remanded, instructing the district court to exercise jurisdiction over the motion for adjudication while remanding the rest of the case to state court. View "Ray v. Tabriz" on Justia Law