Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

Kathy Ryan was driving northbound on Highland Springs Avenue and attempted to make a left turn into a parking lot across three lanes of oncoming traffic. The first two lanes of traffic had stopped to allow her to turn, but the third lane, where Trisha Drury was driving, had not. Ryan did not see Drury's car and turned without stopping, resulting in a collision. Drury claimed she developed severe pain and lack of mobility in her arm and neck following the accident.Drury filed a lawsuit for motor vehicle negligence against Ryan in the Superior Court of Riverside County. The case went to trial, and the jury found in favor of Ryan, determining she was not negligent. Drury then filed a motion for a new trial, arguing that the trial court erred by not giving a negligence per se instruction based on Vehicle Code section 21801, which requires drivers turning left to yield the right-of-way to oncoming traffic. The trial court denied the motion.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case. The court found that the trial court's refusal to give a negligence per se instruction was prejudicial error. The appellate court held that there was sufficient evidence to support a finding that Ryan violated Vehicle Code section 21801 by not stopping to check the third lane before completing her turn. The court concluded that the jury was likely misled by the lack of a negligence per se instruction, which could have changed the outcome of the trial. As a result, the appellate court reversed the judgment and remanded the case for a new trial. View "Drury v. Ryan" on Justia Law

William Campbell, a guest at the Windsor Court Hotel in New Orleans, was robbed and injured in the hotel’s courtyard on Christmas Day, 2008. He filed a lawsuit against the hotel and associated entities, alleging negligence and strict liability due to the hotel’s failure to provide adequate security and maintain a safe environment.The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants, finding that Campbell failed to prove the hotel had a legal duty to protect him from the specific criminal act. The Court of Appeal reversed this decision, citing genuine issues of material fact regarding the foreseeability of the incident and the hotel’s duty to protect its guests.The Supreme Court of Louisiana reviewed the case and conducted a de novo review. The court reaffirmed that an innkeeper has a duty to take reasonable precautions to protect guests from criminal acts of third parties. However, it found that the scope of this duty did not encompass the specific harm Campbell suffered. The court noted that there had been no prior criminal activity at the hotel in twenty years, and Campbell’s own actions—approaching an unknown vehicle and displaying a large sum of money—were unforeseeable and contributed to the incident.The Supreme Court of Louisiana vacated the appellate court’s judgment and reinstated the trial court’s judgment, granting summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The court held that while the hotel owed a duty to provide a reasonably safe environment, the scope of this duty did not include the risk of harm Campbell encountered due to his own actions. View "CAMPBELL VS. ORIENT-EXPRESS HOTELS LOUISIANA, INC." on Justia Law

In November 2019, Kathleen Welch was admitted to Tulane Medical Center for acute pancreatitis and diabetic ketoacidosis. After her discharge, she was admitted to BridgePoint Healthcare for rehabilitation, where she developed pressure ulcers. She was later transferred to United Medical Physical Rehabilitation Hospital, where her condition persisted. Welch filed a claim for injuries related to her pressure ulcers, naming BridgePoint and United Medical as defendants. United Medical, not being a qualified healthcare provider under the relevant statute, faced a lawsuit alleging negligence.United Medical filed an exception of no cause of action, citing La. R.S. 29:771(B)(2)(c)(i), which limits liability to gross negligence or willful misconduct during a public health emergency. The trial court granted the exception, applying the gross negligence standard but did not rule on the statute's constitutionality. Welch appealed, and the appellate court upheld the trial court's application of the statute but remanded the case for a ruling on its constitutionality. On remand, the trial court found the statute constitutional, and Welch sought supervisory review.The Supreme Court of Louisiana reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court's decision. The court held that La. R.S. 29:771(B)(2)(c)(i) is constitutional, as it is rationally related to a legitimate government interest in ensuring access to healthcare during a public health emergency. The court found that the statute does not violate the Louisiana Constitution's due process or access to courts provisions and is not a prohibited special law. The statute's application to all healthcare providers equally and its rational basis for limiting liability during emergencies were key factors in the court's decision. View "WELCH VS. UNITED MEDICAL HEALTHWEST-NEW ORLEANS L.L.C." on Justia Law

A fourteen-year-old boy, Tanner Smith, was vaccinated against COVID-19 at his school clinic without his or his mother Emily Happel's consent. The school clinic, operated in partnership with Old North State Medical Society (ONSMS), administered the vaccine despite lacking the required parental consent. Plaintiffs, Smith and Happel, sued the Guilford County Board of Education and ONSMS for battery and violations of their state constitutional rights.The Superior Court of Guilford County dismissed the case, agreeing with the defendants that the federal Public Readiness and Emergency Preparedness (PREP) Act preempted the plaintiffs' state law claims, granting them immunity. The Court of Appeals affirmed this decision, holding that the PREP Act's broad immunity shielded the defendants from liability for all of the plaintiffs' claims.The Supreme Court of North Carolina reviewed the case and held that the PREP Act's immunity only covers tort injuries and does not bar state constitutional claims. The court concluded that the PREP Act does not preempt claims brought under the state constitution, specifically those related to the right to control a child's upbringing and the right to bodily integrity. The court affirmed the dismissal of the battery claim but reversed the dismissal of the state constitutional claims and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Happel v. Guilford Cnty. Bd. of Education" on Justia Law

Jahn Patric Kirlin and Sara Louise Kirlin filed a medical malpractice lawsuit against Dr. Christian William Jones, Dr. Barclay A. Monaster, and Physicians Clinic Inc. d/b/a Methodist Physicians Clinic – Council Bluffs. Jahn Kirlin experienced severe neck pain and headaches, and despite seeking medical help, an MRI was delayed. Dr. Monaster, who had returned from treatment for alcohol abuse, refused to order an MRI, and Kirlin later suffered a stroke after a chiropractic adjustment. The plaintiffs allege that the defendants altered medical records and that Dr. Monaster was intoxicated during treatment.The Pottawattamie County District Court initially dismissed the case due to a defective certificate of merit. The plaintiffs refiled with a new certificate, but the court granted summary judgment for the defendants. The Iowa Supreme Court reversed this decision, allowing the plaintiffs to proceed.Upon remand, the district court did not set new deadlines, leading to confusion about the applicable expert certification deadline. The defendants moved for summary judgment again, arguing the plaintiffs missed the deadline. The district court agreed, finding no good cause to extend the deadline, and granted summary judgment to the defendants.The Iowa Supreme Court reviewed the case and found that the district court abused its discretion by not finding good cause for the plaintiffs' delayed expert certification. The court noted the confusion about deadlines, lack of prejudice to the defendants, the plaintiffs' diligence, and the defendants' actions. The court reversed the summary judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Kirlin v. Monaster" on Justia Law

JohnsonKreis Construction Company, Inc. ("JohnsonKreis") served as the general contractor on a hotel-construction project in Birmingham, with Howard Painting, Inc. ("Howard") as a subcontractor. The subcontract agreement included an indemnity provision requiring Howard to indemnify JohnsonKreis for personal injury or death arising from Howard's negligence. Domingo Rosales-Herrera, an employee of a subcontractor working for Howard, died after falling from a window while attempting to load equipment into a trash box on a telehandler owned by JohnsonKreis. The personal representative of Rosales-Herrera's estate filed a wrongful-death lawsuit against both JohnsonKreis and Howard.The Jefferson Circuit Court granted summary judgment in favor of Howard and its insurers, Auto-Owners Insurance Company and Owners Insurance Company (collectively "Owners"), determining that the indemnity provision in the subcontract agreement was legally unenforceable. The court held that Alabama law does not allow for the apportionment of damages in a wrongful-death case, thus precluding proportional indemnification.The Supreme Court of Alabama reviewed the case and reversed the trial court's decision. The Supreme Court held that the subcontract agreement's proportional indemnity provision was legally enforceable under Alabama law. The court noted that parties may enter into agreements allowing for indemnification even for claims resulting solely from the negligence of the indemnitee. The court emphasized that such agreements are valid and enforceable if expressed in clear and unequivocal language.The Supreme Court remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion, instructing the trial court to consider the parties' evidentiary submissions and arguments regarding the interpretation and application of the disputed provisions of the subcontract agreement and the additional-insured endorsement. View "JohnsonKreis Construction Company, Inc. v. Howard Painting, Inc." on Justia Law

Earnest Charles Jones was severely injured by a bull on August 27, 2018, and was transported by helicopter to the University of South Alabama Hospital. During the transport, flight nurse Bryan Heath Wester allegedly removed a nasal-gastro tube from Jones's throat, causing further injuries. Nearly two years later, Ovetta Jones, on behalf of Earnest, filed a lawsuit against Wester and Air Evac EMS, Inc., alleging negligence and wantonness related to the care provided during the transport.The Dallas Circuit Court initially reviewed the case, where the Joneses filed their complaint on August 24, 2020. The complaint focused on the removal of the nasal-gastro tube by Wester. Nearly four years later, the Joneses amended their complaint to include new allegations that Wester had stolen and replaced ketamine with saline solution the day before the transport, and that other flight nurses failed to detect this and properly treat Earnest's pain. Air Evac moved for summary judgment, arguing that the amended complaint was time-barred and did not relate back to the initial complaint. The trial court denied the motion.The Supreme Court of Alabama reviewed the case and determined that the amended complaint did not arise from the same conduct, transaction, or occurrence as the initial complaint. The amended complaint introduced entirely new facts and allegations, including actions by different individuals on a different day. Consequently, the amended complaint could not relate back to the initial complaint and was time-barred under the applicable statutes of limitations and repose. The Supreme Court of Alabama granted Air Evac's petition for a writ of mandamus, directing the trial court to vacate its order denying the summary judgment and to enter an order granting the motion. View "Ex parte Air Evac EMS, Inc." on Justia Law

Keith L. Allen was convicted of first-degree murder and use of a firearm to commit a felony, resulting in a life sentence plus 20 to 30 years. After his convictions were affirmed on direct appeal, Allen filed a motion in the district court for Lincoln County, Nebraska, seeking the return of over 50 items of personal property allegedly seized from him after his arrest. These items included firearms, video recordings, and bullet slugs. At the hearing, Allen claimed that many of the firearms belonged to other people and that certain items were needed for his criminal case and a wrongful death suit against him. The State argued that some items should remain as evidence.The district court partially denied Allen's motion, categorizing the items into evidence, contraband, or other items. The court ordered that evidence be retained, contraband be sold, and other items be returned to Allen, subject to a prejudgment attachment order from the wrongful death suit. Allen objected to the admission of the prejudgment attachment order and the exclusion of receipts purportedly showing third-party ownership of the firearms. He also argued that the State failed to prove a legitimate reason to retain the property.The Nebraska Supreme Court found that the district court plainly erred in several respects. The court did not require Allen to make an initial showing that the items were seized from him, improperly relied on Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-820, and failed to identify which firearms and ammunition were evidence. The Supreme Court reversed the district court's order and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "State v. Allen" on Justia Law

Sandra Jones, representing the estate of her deceased son Antonio Jones, filed a lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Arkansas state law against Faulkner County, Arkansas, and jail officials Garry Stewart, Karen Grant, and Leanne Dixon. She claimed that the officials exhibited deliberate indifference to Antonio’s serious medical needs, violating his Fourteenth Amendment rights, and that Stewart committed medical malpractice. Jones also alleged that Faulkner County’s policies contributed to Antonio’s death.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The court found that the jail officials were not deliberately indifferent to Antonio’s medical needs and that Jones could not establish a medical malpractice claim against Stewart due to the absence of a doctor-patient relationship. The court also dismissed the municipal liability claim against Faulkner County, concluding that no jail policy caused Antonio’s death.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s decision. The appellate court held that the actions taken by Grant and Dixon did not constitute deliberate indifference. Grant responded to Antonio’s symptoms by placing him on a medical watch and took appropriate actions based on the information available to her at the time. Dixon, who was not a medical professional, followed her superior’s instructions and did not disregard any substantial risk of harm. The court also affirmed the dismissal of the municipal liability claim, as there was no constitutional violation by the county employees. Lastly, the court found no abuse of discretion in the district court’s exercise of supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claim against Stewart. View "Jones v. Faulkner County, Arkansas" on Justia Law

Nicole Simone, a resident in a multi-tenant building, fell and was injured on January 16, 2018, after slipping on ice on a walkway in a common area. She filed a premises liability action against Mohammed Zakiul Alam on December 2, 2019, alleging that he owned, possessed, maintained, and controlled the premises, and was responsible for the common areas. Simone claimed that the ice accumulation was due to damaged or misrouted rain gutters and spouts, and sought damages exceeding $50,000.The Luzerne County Court of Common Pleas dismissed Simone’s complaint on October 7, 2022, for failure to join an indispensable party, specifically Alam’s brother, Mohammed Zafiul Alam, who was a co-owner of the property. The trial court held that all co-owners must be joined in a premises liability action. Simone’s motion to vacate and reconsider was denied, and she appealed to the Superior Court. The Superior Court affirmed the trial court’s decision, relying on precedent that all tenants in common must be joined in such actions.The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reviewed the case and concluded that a tenant in common who did not exercise possession or control over the property is not an indispensable party in a premises liability action. The court found that liability in such cases is based on possession and control, not mere ownership. Since Alam alone managed and controlled the property, his brother was not an indispensable party. The court reversed the Superior Court’s order and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Simone v. Zakiul Alam" on Justia Law