Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

In 2009, a surgeon performed a shoulder replacement surgery on a patient, during which the patient suffered a fracture and subsequent nerve injury, resulting in permanent radial nerve palsy. The patient sued the surgeon and associated medical entities for professional negligence, claiming vicarious liability. The case went to trial twice; the first trial resulted in a verdict for the defendants, but the court granted a new trial due to juror misconduct. The second trial resulted in a verdict for the patient, awarding significant damages, which the court reduced according to statutory caps.The Eighth Judicial District Court of Clark County oversaw the trials. After the second trial, the court reduced the pain and suffering damages to $350,000 pursuant to NRS 41A.035, awarded attorney fees, and capped expert witness costs. The defendants moved for a new trial based on alleged juror misconduct, which the court denied. Both parties appealed various aspects of the court's decisions, including the application of the damages cap, the res ipsa loquitur instruction, and the award of attorney fees and costs.The Supreme Court of Nevada reviewed the case. It held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in giving a res ipsa loquitur instruction despite expert testimony, as the relevant statutory amendments did not apply retroactively. The court affirmed the reduction of pain and suffering damages to $350,000, applying the statutory cap to both the surgeon and the medical entities. The court also upheld the denial of a new trial based on juror misconduct, finding no intentional concealment or prejudice.Regarding attorney fees, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court's award but modified it to comply with NRS 7.095, capping the total recoverable amount. The court found no conflict between NRCP 68 and NRS 18.005 but remanded the case for further proceedings on expert witness fees, requiring a more detailed application of the Frazier factors. The judgment and order denying a new trial were affirmed, the attorney fees award was affirmed as modified, and the order retaxing costs was reversed in part. View "NEVINS VS. MARTYN" on Justia Law

A police officer from the City of Mesa, while driving his patrol car, was involved in a multi-vehicle accident that injured a bicyclist, Philip Rogers. Rogers claimed the officer's negligent driving caused the accident and served notices of claim to the City of Mesa and the officer, offering to settle for "$1,000,000 or the applicable [insurance] policy limits, whichever are greater." Later, Rogers amended his notices to specify a settlement amount of $1,000,000.The Superior Court of Maricopa County denied the City’s motion to dismiss Rogers' complaint, which argued that the initial notices did not comply with Arizona Revised Statutes § 12-821.01(A) because they did not state a specific settlement amount. The City then petitioned for special action review. The Court of Appeals reversed the Superior Court’s decision, directing it to dismiss the complaint, concluding that the notices of claim did not provide a specific amount for settlement as required by the statute.The Supreme Court of Arizona reviewed the case to determine if Rogers' notices of claim complied with § 12-821.01(A). The Court held that the settlement offer of "$1,000,000 or the applicable policy limits, whichever are greater" was insufficiently specific to meet the statutory requirements. The Court emphasized that the statute requires a clear and precise settlement amount, which was not provided in Rogers' notices. Consequently, Rogers was barred from maintaining his lawsuit due to non-compliance with the statutory notice requirements.The Supreme Court of Arizona reversed the Superior Court’s order and remanded the case with instructions to dismiss Rogers' claims. The Court also affirmed in part and vacated in part the opinion of the Court of Appeals. View "CITY OF MESA v. RYAN" on Justia Law

Michael Arneson, while working for GR Management, LLC, suffered an electric shock that he claimed caused atrial fibrillation (AFib) and numbness in his right hand. The employer and its insurer paid for initial medical treatment but denied further benefits, arguing the conditions were not caused by the shock. The Department of Labor found the electric shock was a major contributing cause of both conditions and that Arneson was permanently and totally disabled under the odd-lot category.The employer and insurer appealed to the Circuit Court of the Sixth Judicial Circuit, which found the electric shock was a major contributing cause of Arneson’s hand condition but not his heart condition. The circuit court also determined that Arneson was not permanently and totally disabled. Arneson appealed, and the employer and insurer filed a notice of review.The Supreme Court of South Dakota reviewed the case. It affirmed the Department of Labor’s finding that the electric shock was a major contributing cause of Arneson’s heart condition, based on the testimony of Dr. Holloway, who treated Arneson and found the electric shock likely caused the AFib. The court found Dr. Holloway’s testimony more persuasive than that of the employer’s experts, Drs. Brody and Elkins, who attributed the AFib to hyperthyroidism. The court also affirmed the Department’s finding that the electric shock was a major contributing cause of Arneson’s hand condition.Regarding Arneson’s claim of permanent total disability, the Supreme Court found the Department’s determination that Arneson was obviously unemployable was supported by the evidence, including the testimony of vocational expert Tom Audet. The court concluded that the employer and insurer failed to show suitable employment was available for Arneson within his limitations. The Supreme Court reversed the circuit court’s ruling on Arneson’s heart condition and permanent total disability, reinstating the Department’s original order. View "Arneson v. Gr Management, LLC" on Justia Law

On a snowy day in December 2018, the Superintendent of Highways for the Town of Carmel, Michael J. Simone, drove into an intersection without the right of way and collided with Ana Orellana's vehicle. Simone had been inspecting road conditions during a snowstorm and had directed his team to salt the roads. After completing his inspection, he was returning to his office when the accident occurred. Simone testified that he was not in a rush, did not consider the situation an emergency, and had no intention of conducting further inspections en route.The Supreme Court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment, holding that Simone's conduct was protected under Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1103 (b), which exempts municipal employees from liability for ordinary negligence when "actually engaged in work on a highway." The court denied the plaintiff's cross-motion for summary judgment as academic. The Appellate Division affirmed this decision.The New York Court of Appeals reviewed the case and reversed the lower courts' decisions. The Court held that Simone was not "actually engaged in work on a highway" at the time of the accident, as he had completed his inspection and was merely returning to his office. Therefore, the protections of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1103 (b) did not apply. The Court granted the plaintiff's cross-motion for summary judgment on the issue of liability and denied the defendants' motion for summary judgment. View "Orellana v Town of Carmel" on Justia Law

In August 2014, a train operated by BNSF Railway Company collided with a pickup truck driven by Paul Watson at a railroad crossing in Pawnee County, Oklahoma. Watson, who was not wearing a seatbelt, died instantly, while his wife Terri and their minor child, both belted, survived with injuries. Terri Watson, on behalf of herself, her child, and as a representative of her deceased husband's estate, filed a wrongful death and personal injury lawsuit against BNSF, alleging negligent maintenance of the crossing and failure to install adequate safety features.The case went to trial, and after three weeks of testimony and evidence, the jury found in favor of BNSF on all claims. The plaintiffs' motion for a new trial was denied by the trial court. On appeal, the Court of Civil Appeals, Division IV, found prejudicial errors in the jury instructions, specifically noting that the instructions were biased in favor of BNSF and required an excessive degree of care from Watson. The appellate court reversed the trial court's decision and remanded the case for a new trial.The Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma reviewed the case on certiorari. The court found that the jury instructions, when considered as a whole, were not so prejudicial as to mislead the jury. The court noted that the instructions accurately reflected Oklahoma law and did not impose a higher standard of care on Watson than required. Consequently, the Supreme Court vacated the opinion of the Court of Civil Appeals, affirmed the trial court's judgment, and reinstated the jury's verdict in favor of BNSF. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "WATSON v. BNSF RAILWAY COMPANY" on Justia Law

Caroline Adams suffered a spinal cord injury while sledding on property owned by Moose Hill Orchards, LLC, which operates under the name Mack’s Apples. Adams and her husband, Christopher Estrella, filed a lawsuit against Moose Hill for negligence and loss of consortium. The incident occurred in January 2022 when the plaintiffs visited Moose Hill, which allows the public to use a hill on its property for sledding at no charge. Moose Hill also operates a seasonal stand selling hot beverages and other goods to sledders. Adams was injured during sledding and is now paralyzed from the waist down.The Superior Court granted Moose Hill's motion to dismiss the case, citing recreational use immunity under RSA 508:14, I. The plaintiffs argued that the immunity should not apply because they were on the property for a purpose related to Moose Hill's business, which customarily charges for its goods. The trial court denied the plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration, leading to this appeal.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire reviewed the case and upheld the trial court's decision. The court concluded that Moose Hill qualifies for immunity under RSA 508:14, I, because it allows the public to use its land for recreational purposes without charge. The court distinguished this case from Soraghan v. Mt. Cranmore Ski Resort, where the ski resort charged for access to its recreational facilities. The court found that Moose Hill's sale of hot beverages was incidental to the free recreational use of the sledding hill and did not negate the "without charge" requirement of the statute. Therefore, the court affirmed the dismissal of the plaintiffs' claims. View "Adams v. Moose Hill Orchards, LLC" on Justia Law

Torrey Kath brought a personal injury lawsuit against Michael Prochnow and Prochnow Farms, alleging that Prochnow moved a semi-truck while Kath was underneath, causing significant injury. Kath and Prochnow entered into a Miller-Shugart agreement, where Prochnow accepted damages, and Kath agreed to collect solely from Prochnow’s insurers. The case was dismissed with prejudice after a stipulation of dismissal was filed.Kath then filed a declaratory judgment action against Farmers Union Mutual Insurance Company (FUMIC), which insured Prochnow under a farm liability policy. Kath sought declarations that the policy covered his injuries and that the Miller-Shugart agreement was reasonable and binding on FUMIC. The District Court of Stutsman County granted Kath summary judgment on the coverage issue, interpreting the policy’s motor vehicle exclusion as not applying to the coverage added by a farm employer liability endorsement.FUMIC moved for summary judgment, arguing it had no duty to indemnify Prochnow because the personal injury action had been dismissed with prejudice. While this motion was pending, Kath and Prochnow successfully moved to vacate the dismissal and entered a $2 million judgment against Prochnow, to be paid solely by FUMIC. The district court then denied FUMIC’s motion for summary judgment, holding that the judgment in the personal injury action rendered FUMIC’s motion moot and granted summary judgment in favor of Kath on the second count of his complaint.The North Dakota Supreme Court reviewed the case and reversed the district court’s judgment. The Supreme Court held that the policy’s motor vehicle exclusion applied to Kath’s injuries, and thus, the policy did not provide coverage. The court concluded that the endorsement did not supersede the motor vehicle exclusion and that the policy, when read as a whole, excluded coverage for injuries related to the use of motor vehicles. View "Kath v. Farmers Union Mutual Ins. Co." on Justia Law

In this case, the decedents, Robert and Elise Sandiford, and Deon Detes Abrams, Sr., died after their vehicles collided on State Route 99 (SR 99) and struck a tree on land owned by Union Pacific Railroad Company (Union Pacific). The relatives of the decedents sued Union Pacific, alleging negligence for failing to remove the tree or take measures to protect the public from the dangerous condition it posed. Union Pacific moved for summary judgment, arguing it owed no duty to remove the tree. The trial court denied the motion, finding no judicial exception to the ordinary duty of care under Civil Code section 1714.The trial court's denial of summary judgment was based on the application of factors from Rowland v. Christian, which did not support creating an exception to the ordinary duty of care. Union Pacific then filed a petition for a writ of mandate with the California Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, seeking to overturn the trial court's decision.The California Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, reviewed the case and held that Union Pacific did not have a duty to remove the tree or take other measures to protect the driving public from the alleged dangerous condition posed by the tree. The court considered the foreseeability of harm, the certainty of injury, and the closeness of the connection between Union Pacific’s conduct and the injury. It also weighed public policy factors, including moral blame, the policy of preventing future harm, the burden on the defendant, and the availability of insurance. The court concluded that public policy clearly supported creating a judicial exception to the ordinary duty of care, thus granting Union Pacific's petition for a writ of mandate and directing the trial court to grant Union Pacific's motion for summary judgment. View "Union Pacific Railroad Co. v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

The case involves the Schrivers, who sought damages after their cat, Gypsy, died following a veterinary procedure and was subjected to an unauthorized necropsy by Dr. Raptosh and Lakeshore Animal Hospital. The Schrivers claimed non-economic damages for emotional distress and loss of companionship, arguing that the emotional bond between pet and owner should be compensable. They also sought economic damages based on the pet's value to them.The District Court of the Third Judicial District of Idaho granted summary judgment in favor of Dr. Raptosh and Lakeshore on several claims, including negligent infliction of emotional distress, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and lack of informed consent. The court denied the Schrivers' claim for emotional distress damages related to trespass to chattels/conversion but allowed the "value to owner" measure of economic damages for the loss of Gypsy.The Supreme Court of Idaho affirmed the district court's decision in part and reversed in part. The court upheld the denial of emotional distress damages for trespass to chattels/conversion, agreeing that such damages are limited to independent torts of negligent or intentional infliction of emotional distress. The court also affirmed the summary judgment on the negligent infliction of emotional distress claim, holding that veterinarians do not have a duty to prevent emotional harm to pet owners. However, the court reversed the summary judgment on the intentional infliction of emotional distress claim related to the unauthorized necropsy, finding that a jury should decide if the conduct was extreme and outrageous. The court affirmed the use of the "value to owner" measure of damages, excluding sentimental value.The case was remanded for further proceedings on the intentional infliction of emotional distress claim. The Schrivers were awarded costs on appeal, but attorney fees were not granted to Dr. Raptosh and Lakeshore, as the primary issue of liability remains unresolved. View "Schriver v. Raptosh" on Justia Law

In 1989, thirty-four members of the Kappa Gamma fraternity at Gallaudet University were photographed performing the Bellamy salute, which resembles the Nazi salute. Thirty years later, the president of Gallaudet described Kappa Gamma as the "face of systemic racism" at the university, and The Washington Post republished this statement, describing the photograph as depicting "anti-Semitic" behavior and a "Nazi salute." Four alumni of Gallaudet’s Kappa Gamma chapter, including the estate of a deceased member, sued Gallaudet and the Post for defamation and related torts.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia dismissed the complaint, concluding that none of the disputed statements concerned the plaintiffs and that many of the statements were not actionable. The plaintiffs appealed the decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case and disagreed in part with the district court. The appellate court concluded that the statements about the photograph did concern the individuals who appeared in it. However, the court agreed with the district court that these statements were protected opinions and thus not actionable. The court held that the statements describing the students in the photograph as the "face of systemic racism" and "anti-Semitic" were not provably false and were therefore protected opinions. Consequently, the appellate court affirmed the district court's dismissal of the complaint. View "Florio v. Gallaudet University" on Justia Law