Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries
Segrain v. Duffy
Joseph Segrain, an inmate at Rhode Island's Adult Correctional Institutions, filed a civil lawsuit against the Rhode Island Department of Corrections and several correctional officers, alleging violations of his Eighth Amendment rights and various state laws. Segrain claimed that on June 28, 2018, officers used excessive force by executing a leg-sweep maneuver, spraying him with pepper spray, and delaying his decontamination. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the officers on all claims, leading Segrain to appeal.The United States District Court for the District of Rhode Island initially reviewed the case. The court found that no reasonable jury could conclude that the officers' conduct constituted an Eighth Amendment violation. It granted summary judgment on the basis that the force used was minimal and necessary to maintain order. The court also dismissed the state law claims, concluding that the officers' actions did not meet the legal standards for battery, intentional infliction of emotional distress, or excessive force under Rhode Island law.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case. The court reversed the district court's judgment regarding the 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim that Officer Walter Duffy's use of pepper spray violated Segrain's Eighth Amendment rights. It found that a reasonable jury could conclude that Duffy's use of pepper spray was excessive and not in good faith. The court vacated the district court's judgment on the Rhode Island Constitution Article I, Section 8 claim regarding Duffy's use of pepper spray and remanded for further proceedings. However, the court affirmed the district court's judgment on all other claims, including the leg-sweep maneuver and the delayed decontamination, granting qualified immunity to the officers on those issues. View "Segrain v. Duffy" on Justia Law
Kim v. Uber Technologies, Inc.
The plaintiff, a pedestrian, was injured when struck by a car driven by Ralph Wilson, who had been driving for Uber earlier that evening. Wilson had turned his Uber driver app to "offline" about four minutes before the accident and more than a mile away from the accident site. Wilson testified that he had finished driving for Uber for the night and was on his way home from McDonald's when the accident occurred. The plaintiff argued that inconsistencies in Wilson's testimony and Uber's records created a triable issue of fact regarding whether Wilson was still operating as an Uber driver at the time of the accident.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County granted summary judgment in favor of Uber Technologies, Inc. and related companies, finding that Wilson was acting in his personal capacity and not as an Uber driver at the time of the accident. The court deemed the plaintiff's arguments speculative and irrelevant to establishing whether Wilson was acting within the scope of his employment with Uber at the time of the incident.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Second Appellate District, affirmed the trial court's decision. The appellate court held that the undisputed material facts demonstrated that Wilson was not acting as an Uber driver at the time of the accident. The court found no evidence to support the plaintiff's claim that Wilson intended to switch back to "available" status or that he was driving towards a surge area. The court concluded that the inconsistencies in Wilson's testimony were immaterial to the issue of his status at the time of the accident. Therefore, the judgment in favor of the Uber parties was affirmed. View "Kim v. Uber Technologies, Inc." on Justia Law
In re: Fosamax
The case involves hundreds of plaintiffs who allege that they were injured by the drug Fosamax, manufactured by Merck Sharp & Dohme Corp. (Merck), due to inadequate warnings about the risk of atypical femoral fractures. The plaintiffs claim that they would not have taken the drug if they had been properly warned. Merck contends that it proposed a label change to the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to address this risk, but the FDA rejected the proposed change due to insufficient scientific support.The United States District Court for the District of New Jersey granted summary judgment in favor of Merck, concluding that the plaintiffs' state law claims were preempted by federal law. The court found that Merck had fully informed the FDA of the justifications for the proposed warning and that the FDA had rejected the proposed label change, thus preempting the state law claims. The court relied on the FDA's Complete Response Letter and other communications to determine that the FDA's rejection was based on a lack of sufficient scientific evidence linking Fosamax to atypical femoral fractures.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the case and vacated the District Court's judgment. The Third Circuit concluded that the District Court erred in its preemption analysis by giving too little weight to the presumption against preemption. The appellate court found that the FDA's Complete Response Letter was ambiguous and that the District Court placed too much reliance on informal FDA communications and an amicus brief to interpret the letter. The Third Circuit emphasized that the presumption against preemption is strong and that Merck did not meet the demanding standard of showing that federal law prohibited it from adding any and all warnings that would satisfy state law. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "In re: Fosamax" on Justia Law
Ronnfeldt Farms v. Arp
A swine producer experienced a disease outbreak in its sow facility and sued two manure management companies, alleging the outbreak was caused by their failure to follow biosecurity protocols. The swine producer sought $1.5 million in damages under breach of contract and negligence theories. The claims against one company were dismissed, and the remaining company, Frost, moved for summary judgment on both theories.The district court for Burt County granted summary judgment in favor of Frost, finding no contractual relationship between Frost and the swine producer and concluding that Frost owed no duty to the producer. The swine producer appealed, and Frost cross-appealed on the issue of causation.The Nebraska Court of Appeals affirmed the summary judgment on the breach of contract claim but reversed on the negligence claim, finding that Frost owed a duty of reasonable care. The court noted that the standard of care and whether Frost breached it were factual questions for the jury. However, it declined to address Frost’s cross-appeal on causation, as the district court had not ruled on that issue.On further review, the Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part. The court agreed with the district court that Frost was entitled to summary judgment on the negligence claims. It found no evidence of an industry standard prohibiting manure pumpers from pumping at a sow facility after a hog finishing facility and concluded that Frost did not breach the standard of care by failing to inform the producer of his previous pumping location. The case was remanded with directions to affirm the grant of summary judgment. View "Ronnfeldt Farms v. Arp" on Justia Law
Maxwell v. Atria Management Co., LLC
Trudy Maxwell, a 93-year-old resident of Atria Park of San Mateo, died after ingesting an industrial strength cleaner mistakenly served to her by an Atria employee. Trudy’s eight surviving children, including James Maxwell III (James III), filed a lawsuit against Atria Management Company and related entities, alleging negligence, wrongful death, and elder abuse. The trial court denied Atria’s motion to compel arbitration, concluding that James III, who signed the arbitration agreement, was not authorized to do so under his durable power of attorney (DPOA) because he was not authorized to make health care decisions for Trudy. Instead, Trudy’s daughter, Marybeth, held the power of attorney for health care.The Atria defendants appealed, arguing that James III had the authority to sign the arbitration agreement and that all of Trudy’s heirs were bound to arbitrate their wrongful death claims. They also contended that California’s Code of Civil Procedure section 1281.2(c), which allows an exception to arbitration when third-party claims may be affected, was preempted by the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA).The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division One, reversed the trial court’s order denying arbitration and remanded the case for further proceedings. The appellate court instructed the trial court to reconsider the validity of the arbitration agreement in light of the California Supreme Court’s recent decision in Harrod v. Country Oaks Partners, LLC, which held that agreeing to an optional arbitration agreement is not a health care decision. The appellate court also directed the trial court to determine whether the DPOA was valid and whether James III had the authority to agree to arbitration despite Marybeth holding the health care POA. Additionally, the court noted that the wrongful death claims of Trudy’s children were not subject to arbitration as they were not parties to the arbitration agreement. View "Maxwell v. Atria Management Co., LLC" on Justia Law
De Becker v. UHS of Delaware, Inc.
In 2021, Hal de Becker contracted COVID-19 and was treated with ivermectin by his personal physician. Hal was later admitted to Desert Springs Hospital Medical Center, where his ivermectin treatment was stopped without consent, and he was administered remdesivir. Hal's condition deteriorated, and he died shortly after being discharged. Hal's family sued the attending doctors and the hospital, alleging negligence, professional negligence, and wrongful death, claiming the doctors and hospital failed to obtain informed consent and made treatment decisions based on media narratives.The Eighth Judicial District Court dismissed the claims against the doctors and the hospital. The court found that the claims against the doctors were barred by the Public Readiness and Emergency Preparedness Act (PREP Act) and that the expert affidavit provided by the plaintiffs did not meet the requirements of NRS 41A.071. The court also dismissed the claims against the hospital, finding them similarly barred by the PREP Act and that the claims were for professional negligence rather than ordinary negligence.The Supreme Court of Nevada reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court's decision. The court held that the plaintiffs' claims were for professional negligence and required an expert affidavit under NRS 41A.071. The court found the expert affidavit insufficient as to the doctors because it did not specify acts of negligence separately for each doctor. However, the affidavit was sufficient as to the hospital. Despite this, the court concluded that the PREP Act barred the claim against the hospital because it related to the administration of remdesivir, a covered countermeasure. Therefore, the dismissal of the complaint was affirmed. View "De Becker v. UHS of Delaware, Inc." on Justia Law
Hi-Tech Aggregate, LLC v. Pavestone, LLC
Hi-Tech Aggregate, LLC supplied Pavestone, LLC with aggregate used to manufacture pavers. After customers complained about efflorescence on the pavers, Pavestone determined that sodium carbonate in Hi-Tech’s aggregate caused the issue. Pavestone sued Hi-Tech for negligence, products liability, breach of contract, and breach of warranty. The district court ruled in favor of Pavestone on the breach of warranty and products liability claims.The Eighth Judicial District Court of Clark County conducted a bench trial and found that Hi-Tech breached the warranty of fitness for a particular purpose and was liable under products liability. Hi-Tech appealed the decision, arguing that it did not know of Pavestone’s specific need for sodium-free aggregate and that the economic loss doctrine barred Pavestone’s tort claims.The Supreme Court of Nevada reviewed the case. It held that Hi-Tech’s sale of aggregate carried an implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose because Hi-Tech had reason to know Pavestone’s intended use. The court adopted the reasoning of UCC § 2-315, which does not require proof of a seller’s actual knowledge if the seller had reason to know the product’s intended purpose. The court also held that Pavestone was excused from testing the aggregate for sodium carbonate because the defect was latent and not detectable through a simple examination.However, the court reversed the district court’s ruling on the products liability claim, holding that the economic loss doctrine precluded Pavestone’s noncontractual claims. The doctrine applies when the damage is to the product itself and not to other property. Pavestone did not provide sufficient evidence of damage to property other than the pavers. Thus, the Supreme Court of Nevada affirmed the district court’s judgment on the warranty claim but reversed its judgment on the products liability claims. View "Hi-Tech Aggregate, LLC v. Pavestone, LLC" on Justia Law
Passafiume v. Jurak
The case involves Paul Passafiume, as the independent administrator of the estate of Lois Passafiume, who filed a professional negligence complaint against Daniel Jurak, D.O., and others, alleging wrongful death and survival actions due to negligent care leading to Lois's death in 2014. The case proceeded to a jury trial, where the plaintiff sought damages for loss of material services beyond his remarriage in 2015.In the Grundy County circuit court, the defendants filed a motion in limine to limit the testimony of the plaintiff’s expert witness, economist Stan Smith, regarding the loss of material services to the period before the plaintiff’s remarriage. The court denied this motion, allowing evidence of loss of material services beyond the remarriage. The jury awarded the plaintiff $2,121,914.34 in damages, later reduced due to contributory negligence. The defendants' posttrial motion for a new trial or remittitur was denied, leading to an appeal.The Appellate Court, Third District, affirmed the trial court's decision, holding that a plaintiff’s remarriage does not limit damages for loss of material services in a wrongful death action. The defendants then appealed to the Supreme Court of Illinois.The Supreme Court of Illinois affirmed the appellate court's judgment, holding that in a wrongful death claim under the Wrongful Death Act, a plaintiff’s remarriage does not affect the recoverable damages for the loss of a decedent’s material services. The court overruled previous appellate decisions that had incorporated material services into loss of consortium claims, which terminate upon remarriage. The court maintained that material services remain a separate element of pecuniary damages under the Act, unaffected by remarriage. View "Passafiume v. Jurak" on Justia Law
SPENCER v. NELSON
Mark Glen Spencer died from sepsis two days after a surgical procedure performed by Dr. Lana Nelson at Norman Regional Medical Authority. Spencer's brother, Jimmy Wayne Spencer, acting as the Special Administrator of the estate, filed a wrongful death action against the hospital and Dr. Nelson, alleging negligent and grossly negligent treatment. The hospital delayed providing complete medical records, which were essential for evaluating the claim.The District Court dismissed the case, finding that the plaintiff had actual knowledge of the potential claim before the statutory deadline and that Dr. Nelson, as a hospital employee, was immune from individual liability under the Oklahoma Governmental Tort Claims Act (GTCA). The Court of Civil Appeals affirmed the dismissal, holding that the discovery rule did not apply to wrongful death claims under the GTCA and that Dr. Nelson could not be individually sued for actions within the scope of her employment.The Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma reviewed the case and vacated the Court of Civil Appeals' opinion. The Supreme Court held that the discovery rule applies to wrongful death actions arising from medical negligence under the GTCA. It also ruled that governmental employees have no immunity under the GTCA for gross negligence or acts outside the scope of employment. The court found that the trial court erred in making factual determinations on a motion to dismiss and that it should have taken the plaintiff's allegations as true. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with these findings. View "SPENCER v. NELSON" on Justia Law
Deane v. Central Maine Power Company
From 2018 to 2020, Central Maine Power Company (CMP) sent misleading communications to customers behind on their electric bills, threatening winter disconnection without providing accurate information about customers' rights and the required process under Maine Public Utilities Commission rules. In 2020, the Commission investigated and CMP consented to a finding of rule violations and paid a $500,000 penalty.Brett Deane, Henry Lavender, and Joleen Mitchell, CMP customers who received these misleading communications, filed a multicount complaint against CMP in January 2020. The Business and Consumer Docket dismissed claims of fraudulent misrepresentation, negligent misrepresentation, and statutory violations, and granted summary judgment for CMP on the claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED).The Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the case. The court affirmed the lower court's dismissal of the misrepresentation claims, concluding that the plaintiffs failed to allege pecuniary harm, which is necessary for such claims. The court also affirmed the dismissal of the statutory cause of action, determining that 35-A M.R.S. § 1501 does not create a private right of action. Finally, the court upheld the summary judgment on the IIED claim, finding that the plaintiffs did not demonstrate severe emotional distress as required by law, and that CMP's conduct, while extreme and outrageous, did not warrant an inference of severe emotional distress. View "Deane v. Central Maine Power Company" on Justia Law