Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

Jayde Downey was on the phone with her daughter, Malyah Jane Vance, giving driving directions when Vance was severely injured in a car crash. Downey heard the collision and its immediate aftermath but could not see what caused it. She claims the crash was partly due to the condition of the roadway and sued the City of Riverside and the owners of adjacent private property for negligent infliction of emotional distress.The Riverside County Superior Court sustained the defendants' demurrers without leave to amend, agreeing that Downey could not claim emotional distress damages because she was not aware of the defendants' role in causing the crash at the time it occurred. The Court of Appeal affirmed, holding that Downey needed to show contemporaneous awareness of the causal connection between the defendants' negligence and her daughter's injuries.The Supreme Court of California reviewed the case and concluded that the Court of Appeal erred. The court held that for purposes of emotional distress recovery, it is sufficient for a plaintiff to be aware of an event that is injuring the victim, not necessarily the defendant’s role in causing the injury. The court emphasized that the requirement is awareness of the injury-producing event, not the specific negligent conduct of the defendant. The judgment of the Court of Appeal was reversed, and the case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Downey v. City of Riverside" on Justia Law

In July 2019, Tyler Blue, an inmate at Spring Creek Correctional Center, assaulted fellow inmate Patrick Torrence, causing abrasions, bruising, a mild concussion, and aggravation of a preexisting hip injury. Blue was criminally charged and pleaded guilty to assault in the fourth degree. In May 2022, Torrence filed a civil complaint against Blue, seeking damages for the injuries he sustained from the assault. Torrence's complaint referenced criminal statutes and sought restitution and compensation under various Alaska Statutes.The Superior Court of the State of Alaska, Third Judicial District, Seward, dismissed Torrence's complaint for failure to state a claim. The court concluded that the criminal statutes cited by Torrence did not support a private cause of action. Blue had argued that he could not be subjected to double jeopardy and that the court had already rendered judgment against him in the criminal case, including restitution. Torrence opposed the motion, asserting that the damages ordered in the criminal case were paid to the government, not to him, and that he had not been compensated for his injuries.The Supreme Court of the State of Alaska reviewed the case and concluded that Torrence's complaint, despite its reliance on criminal statutes, stated a claim for civil battery. The court held that the Superior Court erred in dismissing the complaint because Torrence had alleged facts consistent with a civil tort claim for battery. The court noted that the criminal conviction for assault did not preclude Torrence's civil suit for damages and that double jeopardy did not apply to civil claims. The Supreme Court reversed the Superior Court's dismissal and remanded the case for further proceedings, including providing procedural guidance to the self-represented litigants. View "Torrence v. Blue" on Justia Law

Ming Zheng, a drilling field engineer, suffered a work-related injury to her right ankle while attempting to disassemble a tool string. She reported the injury and received workers' compensation benefits. Approximately a year later, Zheng sought additional benefits for an injury to her left ankle and requested preauthorization for surgery on her right ankle. The Wyoming Department of Workforce Services, Workers' Compensation Division, denied these requests, finding the treatments were not related to her original work injury. The Division also discontinued her temporary total disability benefits after she received a 0% impairment rating.The Wyoming Medical Commission upheld the Division's denial of benefits and discontinuation of temporary total disability benefits after a contested case hearing. The Commission found that Zheng failed to prove the requested treatments for her left ankle were related to her compensable work injury and that the surgery on her right ankle was necessary. The district court affirmed the Medical Commission's decision.The Wyoming Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court's decision. The Court held that substantial evidence supported the Medical Commission's findings that Zheng's left ankle issues were not related to her work injury and that the requested surgery on her right ankle was not necessary. The Court also found that the Medical Commission did not act arbitrarily or capriciously in admitting an addendum to Dr. Orth's independent medical evaluation, as Zheng had the opportunity to cross-examine Dr. Orth and present rebuttal evidence. The Court concluded that the Medical Commission's decision was supported by substantial evidence and was not arbitrary or capricious. View "Zheng v. State of Wyoming, Ex Rel. Department of Workforce Services" on Justia Law

The plaintiff, an employee of a subcontractor, was electrocuted while carrying a long-handled aluminum tool at a construction site. The tool either touched or came close to a high-voltage power line owned by the defendant utility company. The plaintiff sustained severe injuries, including amputations and a traumatic brain injury. He filed a lawsuit against the general contractor and the utility company, alleging negligence and premises liability.The Wayne Circuit Court denied the defendants' motions for summary disposition. The Michigan Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the general contractor was not liable under the common work area doctrine and that the utility company did not owe a duty of care to the plaintiff. The plaintiff sought leave to appeal to the Michigan Supreme Court.The Michigan Supreme Court held that the plaintiff presented sufficient evidence to survive summary disposition. The court found genuine issues of material fact regarding three of the four elements of the common work area doctrine for the general contractor. Specifically, there were factual disputes about the height of the power lines and whether the general contractor took reasonable steps to guard against the danger. The court also found that multiple subcontractors were exposed to the risk, satisfying the requirement of a high degree of risk to a significant number of workers in a common work area.Regarding the utility company, the court found genuine issues of material fact about whether the power lines were properly maintained and whether the injury was foreseeable. The court concluded that the utility company had a duty to ensure the safety of the power lines, given the pre-injury communications and the known dangers of high-reaching conductive tools.The Michigan Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals' decision and remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings. View "El-Jamaly V Kirco Manix Construction Llc" on Justia Law

Dr. Thomas C. Franchini, the former Chief of Podiatry at the Department of Veterans' Affairs Maine Healthcare System at Togus, sued several publishers and reporters for defamation. Franchini alleged that articles written by the defendants, which described malpractice allegations related to his treatment of veterans at VA Togus, were libelous and defamatory. He also claimed negligent infliction of emotional distress and fraudulent or negligent misrepresentation against some defendants.The United States District Court for the District of Maine granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants, finding that Franchini was a voluntary public figure and had failed to plead actual malice in his Second Amended Complaint (SAC). The court determined that the issues surrounding the quality of care at VA Togus were matters of public concern and that Franchini had voluntarily injected himself into the controversy through his actions, including creating a blog and giving an interview to a reporter. The court also found that Franchini's claims of negligent infliction of emotional distress and fraudulent or negligent misrepresentation were not supported by sufficient evidence.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court agreed that a public controversy existed regarding the quality of care at VA Togus and that Franchini had voluntarily become a limited-purpose public figure by engaging in public discussions about the controversy. The court also held that Franchini failed to show that the defendants acted with actual malice, as required for a public figure to succeed in a defamation claim. The court noted that the defendants had conducted due diligence in their reporting and included Franchini's statements in their articles. Consequently, the appellate court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendants. View "Franchini v. Bangor Publishing Co., Inc." on Justia Law

Three foreign nationals, crewmembers aboard the vessel MARGUERITA, were detained in the United States after the vessel was held in port in Maine due to alleged improper disposal of bilge water and inaccurate record-keeping. The plaintiffs were ordered to remain in the U.S. as potential material witnesses. They were later allowed to leave but returned for trial and were awarded for their contributions to the conviction of the vessel's operator.The plaintiffs filed a lawsuit under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics and the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) against various U.S. government entities and officials, alleging violations of their constitutional rights and various tort claims. The U.S. District Court for the District of Maine dismissed the Bivens claim and granted summary judgment for the defendants on the FTCA claims. The court found that the plaintiffs' detention and the revocation of their landing permits were authorized and that the plaintiffs did not show that the actions taken by the government officials were unlawful or unreasonable.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court held that the requirement for ships to maintain an Oil Record Book under 33 C.F.R. § 151.25 is valid and that the plaintiffs' detention was justified under the circumstances. The court also found that the plaintiffs failed to establish their claims for false arrest, false imprisonment, abuse of process, and intentional infliction of emotional distress under the FTCA. Additionally, the court concluded that the Bivens claim presented a new context and that special factors counseled hesitation in extending a Bivens remedy, particularly given the availability of alternative remedies and the implications for government policy and international relations. View "Hornof v. United States" on Justia Law

Eugene Bowen, employed by Team Industrial Services, Inc., was injured after falling from a ladder inside a jet fuel tank at San Francisco International Airport. Bowen sued Burns & McDonnell Engineering Company Inc. and HMT, LLC, alleging premises liability due to negligence and negligent supervision. The trial court granted summary judgment for the defendants, citing the Privette doctrine, which limits a hirer's liability for injuries to independent contractors' employees unless specific exceptions apply.The San Francisco County Superior Court found that the Privette doctrine applied because the defendants had hired Team to perform work, and Bowen was injured while working for Team. The court ruled there were no triable issues of material fact regarding exceptions to the Privette doctrine. Specifically, the court noted that Burns did not control the means by which Team performed its work, and HMT had not directed or required Bowen to use its ladder and scaffolding.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Two, affirmed the trial court's decision. The appellate court held that Bowen failed to raise a triable issue of material fact regarding the applicability of the retained control exception to the Privette doctrine. The court found no evidence that HMT directed Bowen's work or required him to use its equipment. Additionally, the court noted that Bowen's execution of a Job Safety Analysis indicated Team's responsibility for its own safety measures. The judgment in favor of the defendants was affirmed, and they were awarded costs on appeal. View "Bowen v. Burns & McDonnell Engineering Co., Inc." on Justia Law

Laura Henry filed a lawsuit against Olakunle Oluwole and their former employer, Bristol Hospital, alleging that Oluwole had sexually assaulted her. Shortly after the complaint was filed, Oluwole was seriously injured in a motorcycle accident, which he claimed prevented him from receiving timely notice of the action. Oluwole did not initially appear in court, leading the U.S. District Court for the District of Connecticut to enter a default judgment against him. Five years later, Oluwole appeared and moved to set aside the default judgment, but the district court denied his motion. The case against Bristol proceeded to a jury trial, which resulted in a verdict that Henry had failed to prove that Oluwole sexually assaulted, assaulted, or battered her. Following the jury verdict, the district court vacated the default judgment against Oluwole for the assault and battery claims but left it in place for other claims.The U.S. District Court for the District of Connecticut initially entered a default judgment against Oluwole due to his failure to appear. After Oluwole eventually appeared and moved to set aside the default judgment, the district court denied his motion, finding his default willful and that setting it aside would prejudice Henry. The jury trial against Bristol resulted in a verdict in favor of Bristol, finding no proof of sexual assault, assault, or battery by Oluwole. Consequently, the district court vacated the default judgment against Oluwole for the assault and battery claims but maintained it for other claims, including false imprisonment and emotional distress.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case and found that the district court erred in denying Oluwole’s motions to set aside the default judgment. The appellate court held that the district court should have set aside the default judgment based on the factors established in Enron Oil Corp. v. Diakuhara. Additionally, the appellate court determined that the entire default judgment should have been vacated following the jury verdict, as maintaining it was inconsistent with the jury’s findings, pursuant to the principle in Frow v. De La Vega. The Second Circuit reversed the district court’s judgment and remanded with instructions to enter judgment for Oluwole. View "Henry v. Oluwole" on Justia Law

Pedro and Aida Alonzo filed a personal injury lawsuit against Richard Menholt and Menholt Farms, alleging negligent selection of an independent contractor. The case arose from an accident where Alberto Lopez, a driver for Braaten Farms, crossed the centerline and collided with Pedro Alonzo's semi-truck, causing serious injuries. Lopez had a suspended license and a history of driving offenses. Menholt Farms had hired Braaten Farms to haul sugar beets, but neither Menholt Farms nor Braaten Farms conducted thorough background checks on Lopez.The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Menholt Farms, recognizing the tort of negligent selection of an independent contractor but finding no genuine issue of material fact regarding Menholt Farms's alleged negligence. The court concluded that Menholt Farms had no duty to inquire into Braaten Farms's hiring practices or Lopez's qualifications. The Minnesota Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's decision, holding that Minnesota does not recognize the claim and that, even if it did, no genuine issue of material fact existed.The Minnesota Supreme Court reviewed the case and recognized the tort of negligent selection of an independent contractor under Minnesota common law. The court noted that the tort is supported by the Restatement (Second) of Torts and is analogous to other recognized claims like negligent hiring. However, the court was evenly divided on whether the district court erred in granting summary judgment, leading to an affirmation of the lower court's decision by default. The court emphasized that the duty of care in selecting an independent contractor depends on the risk involved and the nature of the work, requiring a higher degree of care for more dangerous or specialized tasks. View "Alonzo vs. Menholt" on Justia Law

Charles Johnson, Jr. was arrested by Officer Garrett Rolfe for driving while intoxicated. Johnson alleged that Rolfe used excessive force during the arrest, resulting in a broken collarbone. Johnson sued Rolfe and the City of Atlanta under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Georgia state law, claiming excessive force and battery. Johnson's complaint stated that he was respectful and did not resist arrest, but Rolfe threw him to the ground, causing his injury.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia reviewed the case. The City moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing it failed to state a claim for Monell liability. Rolfe moved for judgment on the pleadings, submitting body camera and dashcam footage showing Johnson resisting arrest. The district court considered the video evidence, determining it was central to Johnson's claims and its authenticity was not disputed. The court found that Rolfe did not use excessive force and was entitled to qualified immunity on the federal claims and official immunity on the state law claims. Consequently, the court dismissed the Monell claim against the City, as there was no underlying constitutional violation.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court's decision, holding that the video evidence was properly considered under the incorporation-by-reference doctrine. The court found that Rolfe's use of force was objectively reasonable given the circumstances, including Johnson's resistance and the dangerous location of the arrest. Therefore, Rolfe was entitled to qualified immunity on the federal claims and official immunity on the state law claims. The court also affirmed the dismissal of the Monell claim against the City, as no constitutional violation occurred. View "Johnson v. City of Atlanta" on Justia Law